Network Working Group S. Appelcline
Internet-Draft W. McNally
Intended status: Informational C. Allen
Expires: 22 May 2027 Blockchain Commons
18 November 2026
Deterministic Hashed Data Elision: Problem Statement and Areas of Work
draft-appelcline-hashed-elision-01
Abstract
This document discusses the need for deterministic hashed data
elision as a baseline for secure data storage. It focuses on four
different categories of requirements: corporate needs, privacy
compliance requirements, variable access compliance requirements, and
past IETF RFCs. Additional sections discuss the functional
requirements that match these needs and how existing technologies
meet them.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-appelcline-hashed-elision/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/WIPs-IETF-draft-hashed-elision.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2027.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Companies Generally Need to Protect Secrets . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Data Protection Laws Also Require Deletion . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Other Laws Require Variable Data Access Levels . . . . . 5
2.4. Human Rights Call for Privacy as Well . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. Data Minimization is Broadly the Answer . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Potential Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Use Cases Within the IETF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Data Must Be Structured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. Structure Must be Radically Recursive . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.2. Structure Must Be Deterministic . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.3. Structure Must Be Tamper-Evident . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Data Must Be Elidable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Different Views Must Be Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Elided Data Must Be Provable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5. Data Must Be Deletable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.6. Decisions Must Be Made Dynamically . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.7. Data Must Remain Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. The Deterministic Hashed Data Elision Model . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Deterministic Data Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Data Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Data Elision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. Data Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.5. Data Proving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Current Approaches & Their Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. Overview of Methods & Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. Summary of Methods & Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Areas of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Core Areas of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Optional Areas of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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7.2.1. Extend Support to Encryption & Compression . . . . . 16
7.2.2. Address Additional Human Rights Threats . . . . . . . 16
7.2.3. Expand Cryptographic Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
Data is the lifeblood of the digital world, but it's also
increasingly recognized as a danger. This Problem Statement lists
four situations where better control of data is needed:
1. For companies protecting secrets.
2. For anyone bound by strict compliance needs such as GDPR.
3. For anyone bound by compliance requirements that call for
different actors to have different levels of access to data.
4. For anyone interested in protecting privacy and human rights.
In recent years, data minimization has been recognized as a solution
for many of these problems: decrease the data being shown to what is
needed for a task. But it's just a first step that doesn't meet all
of these requirements. To offer complete solutions to these problems
requires creating data structures where data is dynamically removable
without it impacting digital verification or validation. This can be
done with "deterministic hashed data elision", which is offered as a
best practice for these problems. Functional requirements are laid
out for deterministic hashed data elision and current technologies
are examined for how well they support it.
Even this remains a baseline: a minimum level for secure data
storage. More powerful techniques such as anti-correlation
signatures and zero-knowledge proofs can expand on this baseline,
particularly if a deterministic hashed data elision system is
sufficiently open that it can be used with a variety of cryptographic
techniques.
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2. Problem Statement
A variety of requirements are converging on the need for
deterministic hashed data elision.
2.1. Companies Generally Need to Protect Secrets
Most generally, companies (and other entities) need to protect
digital secrets.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985) [utsa] of the United States
requires "reasonable" efforts to protect trade secrets, which is
reflected by similar language in the WTO's TRIPs Agrement (1994)
[trips]. Specific laws such as the US ADA (1990) [ada] also require
the protection of specific data (in this case, related to an
employee's disabilities). Fidicuiary duties of confidentiality offer
yet another vector where certain peoples or companies might have
higher secrecy requirements.
Encryption have usually been considered sufficient for these needs,
but it is insufficient for newer regulations, calling for a new
general solution.
2.2. Data Protection Laws Also Require Deletion
It has now been almost a decade since the implementation date of the
GDPR (2016), whose Article 17 [gdpr-17] requires that data holders
"erase personal data without undue delay" when it is no longer
needed, when consent is withdrawn, or under certain other conditions.
However, the repercussions of that continue to be felt, such as the
EDPB's 2025 "Coordinated Enforcement Action" [gdpr-masking], which
noted that "basic pseudonymisation or partial masking" was
insufficient to meet erasure needs, or their 2025 "Guidelines"
[gdpr-blockchain], which said the right to erasure "must be complied
with by design" of blockchain systems.
The GDPR was just the newest of a long series of government
regulations that call for data protection in a variety of situations.
Title II of the United States' HIPAA (1996) [hipaa], requiring that
"protected health information" be kept confidential by "covered
entities", is the most famous.
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Meanwhile, deletion and protection laws continue to expand.
California's CCPA (2018) [ccpa] took the model of the GDPR to to the
United States, including a right to deletion. As with the GDPR,
there has been continued clarification of this right, such as SB 923
(2026) [sb923], which allows a business to retain "the minimum data
necessary to ensure the consumer’s personal information remains
deleted from its record".
For businesses to ensure compliance with these and other laws
requiring data protection and deletion demands a robust program of
not just encryption, but data elision (removal), and is therefore the
first requirement leading to a deterministic hashed data elision
system.
2.3. Other Laws Require Variable Data Access Levels
Some laws reveal even more complex compliance needs, where different
parties must be given different levels of access to data.
The 2024 EU Cyber Resilience Act [cybersecurity] requires a very
common two-level model, where specific information (software bills of
material) must be offered to authorities but not the public.
The 2023 EU Battery Regulation [battery] goes further, offering an
example of how wide-ranging legislature (this one focused on battery
recycling) can now include compliance requirements for variable data
access. It describes a battery passport where different information
should be offered to the public, recyclers, and other actors. The
passport must further be stored with a "decentralised data system"
and must carry "data in a secure way which respects privacy rules".
The 2026 FATF recommendation #17 [fatf-rec] offers a more intriguing
variation. It allows banks to rely on other banks for Know-Your-
Customer (KYC) information but requires "Financial institutions
should take adequate steps to satisfy themselves that copies of
identification data and other relevant documentation relating to the
CDD requirements will be made available from the third party upon
request without delay." In other words, it recognizes variable data
storage among parties and requires that variability be provable (and
ultimately accessible).
These compliance needs suggest that a more nuanced solution is needed
than even simple protection or removal of data, which means that they
are the second requirement leading to a deterministic hashed data
elision system.
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2.4. Human Rights Call for Privacy as Well
The IETF has previously recognized the need for data privacy in two
informational RFCs, [RFC6973] and [RFC9620]. Between them, the two
offer a large menu of architectural designs to protect data
communication protocols and ensure digital human rights.
Though these RFCs are valuable resources, they unfortunately have not
been widely considered in modern standards. Newer regulations such
as the GDPR are making them more of a necessity.
2.5. Data Minimization is Broadly the Answer
Most broadly, the solution to requirements for data protection and
erasure is the removal of unnecessary content that is not required
for a specific task ("data minimization"), with the data holder
deciding exactly what goes to each party ("selective disclosure").
However, simplistic data minimization is not the full answer. It can
impact the integrity and authenticity of the original data set, which
are both flagged as things needed to ensure Human Rights in RFC 9620.
It also doesn't offer good solutions for the variable access needs of
more recent regulations such as the EU Battery Regulation, nor does
it address issues like SB 923, which seeks a way to identify a
customer without holding personally identifiable information.
The deterministic hashed data elision described here is meant to
offer a solution to all of these issues.
3. Potential Use Cases
To date, selective disclosure has largely been used in credential
systems, yet modern-day compliance needs demonstate a much larger set
of use cases.
Some possibilities are included here:
1. Employee Records. Within the US, there has long been a need to
protect certain elements of employee records under the ADA, but
records for European employees are now subject to the GDPR as
well, requiring deletion when there is not a legal obligation to
retain them.
2. User Account Systems. Any online account system is subject to
the GDPR and/or CCPA if persons from those jurisdictions have
created accounts. Therefore, user accounts must be able to elide
or delete data.
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3. Medical Records. Not only does HIPAA restrict medical data
sharing in the US, but more generally health data is sensitive
and must be well protected. Fitness trackers offer a strong use
case: they have large packets of medical (and locational)
information that is sensitive enough to require protection.
4. Shipping Records. Shipping records are often very sensitive
because they reveal not just cargoes, but also who is buying,
selling, or shipping what. They also offer a strong use case for
variable access as different members of the supply chain will
need different information.
5. Logs. Audit logs of various types tend to mix personally
identifiable data with sensitive and non-sensitive data. Each of
these three types of data must be protected in different ways.
3.1. Use Cases Within the IETF
The IETF is already working on projects related to these topics:
* CBOR: CBOR can ensure the determinism of its content through CDE
and dCBOR. Determinism of this sort is a central building block
for deterministic hashed data elision.
* COSE: COSE has already defined signatures across hash envelopes
[RFC9995]. Deterministic hashed data elision provides the
opportunity to put them into pragmatic use.
* SCITT: The supply chain is generally a strong use case for
deterministic hashed data elision, particularly given the non-
redactability of some current solutions.
* SPICE: Though SPICE is currently focused on issuer-determined
selective disclosure, deterministic hashed data elision offers new
options.
* TRANS/PLANTS: Issues with redaction and entry suppression for the
TRANS group date back 10 years and have been carried forward to
PLANTS. Deterministic hashed data elision could offer solutions
within a Merkle Tree.
4. Functional Requirements
The following lays out the functional elements that make up the
deterministic hashed data elision system being offered as a solution
to these largely compliance-related requirements and these use cases.
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4.1. Data Must Be Structured
The must fundamental requirement is that the data storage must be
structured so that it's not just a loose bag of information.
Three more specific requirements for the structure follow.
4.1.1. Structure Must be Radically Recursive
Requirement: The structure must allow data to underlie data to an
effectively infinite depth.
Purpose: This allows for the creation of complex and meaningful data
representations and should permit modeling of a number of different
types of graphs, lists, arrays, or other data organizations, creating
strong interoperability.
4.1.2. Structure Must Be Deterministic
Requirement: The structure must be deterministic, so that it is
always stored in the same way no matter what platform it is created
or reviewed on.
Purpose: This is required to ensure data hashes are always the same,
with data hashes being the main tool we suggest for permitting
elision of data.
4.1.3. Structure Must Be Tamper-Evident
Requirement: It must be obvious when data is removed from the
structure.
Purpose: Tamper-evidence and provenance are needed by many modern
data systems.
4.2. Data Must Be Elidable
Requirement: It must be possible to remove data from the structure.
Purpose: This supprots the data minimization and selective disclosure
required by many modern regulations.
4.3. Different Views Must Be Possible
Requirement: It must be possible to make different views (versions)
of a document that are potentially elided in different ways.
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Purpose: This is just an expansion of the elidability requirement.
It basically says that data should be elidable in a variety of ways.
4.4. Elided Data Must Be Provable
Requirement: It must be possible to later prove that elided data was
part of a structure.
Purpose: You don't want to be able to just remove data, but also to
show that elided data to specific parties: this supports that need.
4.5. Data Must Be Deletable
Requirement: It must be possible to remove data from the structure in
a way that it is no longer possible to prove or even blindly
correlate that the data was once part of the structure.
Purpose: This supports rights of erasure and deletion and other
situations where elision alone isn't enough.
4.6. Decisions Must Be Made Dynamically
Requirement: The decisions to elide and make different views must be
controlled entirely by the holder of the data, allowing them to do so
in a dynamic fashion.
Purpose: This avoids centralization, which could be a time delay, a
censorship point, or an information leak. Conflicts over removing
phone-home behavior from mDL [nophonehome] have already shown the
importance of this requirement.
4.7. Data Must Remain Signed
Requirement: Any signatures made across the data must remain valid
even through elisions and removals.
Purpose: This ensures that the system doesn't break any signed docs,
including not just credentials but also contracts and assertions. If
signatures were broken, then the system would return to phone-home
behavior, as holders would have to request new signatures from an
issuer after elision.
5. The Deterministic Hashed Data Elision Model
The Deterministic Hashed Data Elision Model offers a specific model
for meeting the requirements above.
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It is assumed to generally meet the structural designs of radical
recursiveness and tamper evidence, as they could be implemented in a
number of different ways, and doing so is considered trivial; they
nonetheless remain vitally important to the overall design.
The ability to elide, maintain signatures, maintain provability, and
ensure true deletion is the heart of the model and what is supported
by the specific design principles below.
5.1. Deterministic Data Hashing
Data hashing generates a fingerprint for each datum through a hash
function such as SHA-256, BLAKE3, or any other preferred hashing
algorithm. The Deterministic Hashed Data Elision model calls for
these hashes to be arranged into a hash tree, so that a single "root
hash" can represent (and validate) the content of the entire tree of
data.
To support this, a specification must:
1. Create a unidirection fingerprint hash of any data, so that the
fingerprint can prove the existence of the data, but the data
cannot be derived from the fingerprint.
2. Allow elided data to be verified with a fingerprint.
3. Support a hash tree where each leaf's data is hashed and then
each node hash is made up of the sum of the leaf hashes or node
hashes below it, up to the root hash, which is made up of the sum
of the top-level node hashes and leaves.
The determinism adds one more requirement. A specification must:
1. Ensure that the same data hashes to the same fingerprint no
matter when or where it is hashed.
5.2. Data Signing
For data signatures to remain valid, data signing must be done across
objects that do not change with elision or deletion. To ensure this,
a specification must:
1. Require signing be done against either node hashes or root
hashes.
A root hash signature will always remain valid, even if all leaves
and nodes are removed. A node hash signature will remain valid up to
the point where that node hash is itself deleted.
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5.3. Data Elision
Data elision means that any individual datum (down to the level of
granularity of the data structure) can be removed.
To support this, a specification must:
1. Allow for the elision of any datum or collection of data from a
larger package of data, leaving behind only a fingerprint of the
datum or collection of data.
2. Allow the holder of that data to do that elision, rather than
restricting it to only issuers.
This means that an issuer cannot be required to do the elision for
the holder, but also cannot preselect what can be elided by a holder.
5.4. Data Deletion
Data deletion requires something more: the ability to permanently
delete data in a nonrecoverable way.
To support this, a specification must:
1. Support salting, where a unguessably large random value can be
incorporated into a datum or collection of data, so that it
becomes part of the hash for that datum or collection of data.
2. Allow for the permanent, irrecoverable removal of that salt as
part of the elision process.
The incorporation of a salt ensures there is no possibility of
accidental or rainbow-table correlation of elided data, so it has
wider use than just ensuring true deletion.
Once all parties have expunged a salt, there will be no way to
recover the data through correlation or even to prove its existence
because the salt would have to be guessed as well, and by design it
is unguessable.
5.5. Data Proving
After data is removed, it can still be proved by revealing the
content and comparing this to the remaining hash.
To support this, a specification must:
1. Allow for the revelation of specific fingerprints.
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2. Support the easy creation of an inclusion proof that demonstrates
how specific data can be hashed to create that specific
fingerprint.
3. Enable any holder to create that inclusion proof, not just an
issuer.
If a datum has been salted, then the salt must be included as part of
an inclusion proof. If that salt is no longer available, then this
requirement cannot be met, by design.
6. Current Approaches & Their Limitations
A number of methods have appeared in the last several years that
support some form of data minimization. Each has their own
limitations. The following descriptions and listings lay out the
advantages and disadvantages of approaches to date.
6.1. Overview of Methods & Limitations
One of the most general limitations of data-minimization designs to
date is that each has been designed to fill a specific niche. C2PA
is theoretically about any type of content, but most of its
deployment to date focuses on images. SD-JWT and mdoc both focus on
identity credentials.
Following is more in-depth information on each method:
C2PA (photo and other content credentials) [c2pa]: A technical
specification from the Coalition for Content Provenance and
Authenticity (C2PA) for Content Credentials. It focuses on the
provenance of content, including audios and videos but especially
photographs. It stores data in manifests that consist of claims that
contain assertions in JSON-LD, CBOR, and other formats that are then
signed with COSE. It allows verification of the validity and
provenance of content as well as the attachment of other metadata.
Redaction is possible, but limited, as the specification forbids the
redaction of "action-oriented assertions" (e.g., that an image was
cropped) and requires that records of redactions remain. Deployment
decisions might also change how individual companies manage
redaction. As described in C2PA's own harms report [c2pa-harms],
redaction depends "on a given C2PA-enabled system's functionality for
redaction of soft or hard binding provenance datastores, and/or what
usage of irrevocable ledgers."
Gordian Envelope (data) [gordian-envelope]: A data-minimization
format that was created to support any type of data, not just the
credentials common in other data-minimization systems. It was
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especially created for data at rest, though its GSTP system also
allows for secure data transmission. However, it's ultimately not
specialized for work requiring fast response or for microservices.
Elision, encryption, and compression are all built directly into the
specification. The user can redact (or encrypt or compress) any
datum at any time, with signatures staying intact. True deletion is
allowed through the use of salt. Multiple semantic contexts can be
supported simply by eliding ones that are not required by a
particular party.
SD-JWT (credentials) [RFC9901]: A system allowing data minimization
for specific elements of a JSON structure, focused on JSON Web Token
(JWT) claims. The data minimization of SD-JWT depends entirely on
the issuer, who in advance creates salted hashes for any data to be
selectively disclosed (or hidden) in the future. There is no
opportunity for new decisions to be made about hiding data without
returning to the issuer for a new version of the credential.
Selective Disclosure CBOR Web Tokens (SD-CWT) follows the same model.
mdoc (credentials): mdoc is a "mobile document", as defined by ISO/
IEC 18013-5. At this point, it's best known as the format for an mDL
(mobile driver's license). mdoc is specifically built for high
assurance identity, such as passports or state identification cards.
mdoc uses salted hashes for selective disclosure, much like SD-JWT,
with the difference being that everything is protected by default
with mdoc, with all hashes precomputed and signatures made in
advance. This allows for much more holder control than SD-JWT, but
ultimately means that selective disclosure is limited by how the
issuer defines its data. The balance of power for disclosure also
lies mainly with the verifier asking for data rather than the holder
offering it (e.g., a verifier might ask for a date-of-birth field
rather than a less intrusive age-over field). mDL is currently used
by US states and EUDI.
6.2. Summary of Methods & Limitations
The following summarizes some of the content-focused and privacy-
focused choices made by these four selective-disclosure formats.
1. General Usage
* C2PA: content (images)
* Gordian Envelope: any data
* SD-JWT: credentials (JWT)
* mdoc: credentials (identity)
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2. General Data Structure
* C2PA: Flat
* Gordian Envelope: Hash Tree
* SD-JWT: Flat in Practice
* mdoc: Flat
3. Radical Recursion / Infinite Depth
* C2PA: NO
* Gordian Envelope: YES
* SD-JWT: NO in Practice
* mdoc: NO
4. Selection Controller (for What's Redacted)
* C2PA: Holder (Restricted)
* Gordian Envelope: Holder (Structure Limited)
* SD-JWT: Issuer
* mdoc: Holder (Structure Limited)
5. Disclosure Controller (for What's Shared)
* C2PA: Holder
* Gordian Envelope: Holder
* SD-JWT: Holder
* mdoc: Verifier
6. Dynamic Control of Disclosure
* C2PA: YES (Limited)
* Gordian Envelope: YES
* SD-JWT: NO
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* mdoc: YES
7. Salted Hashes
* C2PA: YES (Possible)
* Gordian Envelope: YES
* SD-JWT YES (Limited)
* mdoc: YES
8. Full Deletion
* C2PA: YES (Limited, with Records)
* Gordian Envelope: YES
* SD-JWT: NO
* mdoc: NO
7. Areas of Work
7.1. Core Areas of Work
The Core Areas of work for deterministic hashed data elision have
been laid out in the Functional Requirements and Data Model sections
of this document.
Most generally, they center on the following areas:
* Prioritize Data Minimization.
* Base Data Models on Radically Recursive Structures.
* Support Data Elision and Deletion Through Provable Hashing and
Salting.
* Put the Holder in Dynamic Control of Elision and Deletion
Decisions.
* Put the Holder in Control of Data Sharing Decisions.
* Expand Beyond the Limited Use Cases of C2PA, SD-JWT, and mdoc.
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7.2. Optional Areas of Work
Using hashed data elision as a foundation would improve the privacy
of almost any IETF protocol.
The Gordian Envelope Internet-Draft is one example of a specification
that supports hashed data elision. It could be used to enable all of
the Core Areas of Work. It also goes further, incorporating
additional functionality that can provide better support for RFC
6973, RFC 9620, and corporate and compliance needs, as described
below.
7.2.1. Extend Support to Encryption & Compression
A hashed data elision system can be expanded to support both
encryption and compression functions, as encrypted and compressed
data can also be represented by their hashes without revealing any
information about the original data.
Incorporating encryption into a data specification offers the highest
level of privacy and of data minimization possible, as data can only
be viewed by select individuals with the decryption key.
7.2.2. Address Additional Human Rights Threats
As currently detailed, the Gordian Envelope Internet-Draft supports
several other Guidelines for Human Rights Considerations that are
listed in §4 of RFC 9620:
* Reliability (§4.3), Integrity (§4.10). Gordian Envelope is
founded on CBOR, which means that data is self-describing. This
improves its reliability and integrity and also creates
interoperability and avoids centralization.
* Localization (§4.6), Accessibility (§4.18). Gordian Envelope
supports integrated metadata, which can be used to ensure
accessibility and internationalization of data through inclusions
of references with a variety of localizations.
* Open Standards (§4.7). As an Internet Draft, Gordian Envelope
represents an open standard. It can support interoperable
exchange of data, which is vital for human rights.
* Heterogeneity Support (§4.8), Adaptability (§4.9). Gordian
Envelope builds its data format on triples: assertions of
subjects, predicates, and objects. This format can easily be
adapted to a wide variety of data formatting styles.
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* Privacy (§4.14). Besides the obvious privacy benefits of data
minimization, Gordian Envelope also can improve privacy through
its integrated metadata, which can be used to document the
sensitivity of contents, retention limits, etc.
* Pseudonymity (§4.15), Censorship Resistance (§4.16). Gordian
Envelope is built to support XIDs, or extensible identifiers,
which can provide censorship-resistant pseudonymity.
* Decentralization (§4.19). Gordian Envelope is built as an
autonomous cryptographic object, self-contained, self-verifying,
and incorporating local signatures and cryptography.
7.2.3. Expand Cryptographic Techniques
This Problem Statement has generally been crypto-agnostic. It has
not specified precise hashing or encryption methods. A model that
can embrace a variety of cryptographic options will be more powerful,
as it will be able to adapt to flaws in cryptography systems and
ultimately to post-quantum cryptography.
This Problem Statement has also not addressed more advanced
cryptographic methods. As such, it should be considered a baseline:
the minimum necessary to meet human-rights needs and the requirements
of the modern-day compliance landscape.
More powerful techniques could improve on this. These include, but
are not limited to:
* Anti-Correlation Signatures. The possibility of untintended
correlation is an important issue to consider with hashed elision,
so anything that can work against it is a boon.
* Zero-Knowledge Proofs. ZKPs offer another way to minimize data,
by not sharing the foundational information that a fact is built
upon.
8. Privacy Considerations
As outlined, the general concept of hashed data elision provides a
wide variety of privacy advancements.
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The biggest remaining privacy concern is accidental correlation.
Salting is included as a requirement so that elided data can't be
uncovered with rainbow tables (or just knowledge of what might be
contained). This protects against the correlation of individual data
fields. However, a different form of correlation can arise if
different parties have different versions of the same data, which has
been elided in different ways: they can together piece together a new
view that has more content that was originally intended.
This is currently seen as an acceptable side-effect of an elision
system that offers many other benefits and can be offset by careful
creation of structures, such as gathering small groups of data into
distinct, elided branches.
However, the question also remains open as to whether there might be
more expansive and more automated solutions.
9. Security Considerations
Hashed data elision is intended to strengthen communication security,
primarily by enhancing confidentiality (through elision) while also
maintaining data integrity (through hashing). Supporting this with a
signature system that signs hashes rather than original data also
allows for peer entity authentication, creating a strong foundation
for overall communication security.
However, that security depends on the strength of hashing algorithms
and encryption/signature algorithms. Strong, unbroken hashes and
encryption schemes are required. Potential threats to hashes and
encryption such as quantum computing would result in threats to any
hashed data elision system.
10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions. Gordian Envelope has already been
assigned CBOR tag #200 by IANA.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[ada] "Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, As Amended",
n.d., .
[battery] "REGULATION (EU) 2023/1542 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL of 12 July 2023 concerning batteries and
waste batteries ...", n.d., .
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[c2pa] "C2PA Technical Specification", n.d.,
.
[c2pa-harms]
"PHASE III - Existing and potential mitigations (Version
1.0 - December 2021)", n.d.,
.
[ccpa] "California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA)", n.d.,
.
[cybersecurity]
"REGULATION (EU) 2024/2847 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL of 23 October 2024 on horizontal
cybersecurity requirements for products with digital
elements ...", n.d., .
[fatf-rec] "The FATF Recommendations", n.d., .
[gdpr-17] "Art. 17 GDPR: Right to erasure (‘right to be
forgotten’)", n.d., .
[gdpr-blockchain]
"Guidelines 02/2025 on processing of personal data through
blockchain technologies", n.d.,
.
[gdpr-masking]
"Coordinated Enforcement Action, implementation of the
right to erasure by controllers", n.d.,
.
[gordian-envelope]
McNally, W. and C. Allen, "The Gordian Envelope Structured
Data Format", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
mcnally-envelope-12, 10 August 2026,
.
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[hipaa] "Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA)", n.d.,
.
[nophonehome]
"No Phone Home Statement", n.d.,
.
[RFC9901] Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025,
.
[RFC9995] Steele, O., Lasker, S., and H. Birkholz, "CBOR Object
Signing and Encryption (COSE) Hash Envelope", RFC 9995,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9995, July 2026,
.
[sb923] "Consumer privacy requests: deletion request records and
request submission methods.", n.d.,
.
[trips] "AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AS AMENDED BY THE 2005 PROTOCOL AMENDING
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT", n.d.,
.
[utsa] "Uniform Trade Secrets Act, model law, as amended in 1985
(© The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws 1985), United States of America", n.d.,
.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
.
[RFC9620] Grover, G. and N. ten Oever, "Guidelines for Human Rights
Protocol and Architecture Considerations", RFC 9620,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9620, September 2024,
.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful for the support of the CBOR working group in
discussions of Gordian Envelope and general guidance within the IETF.
Authors' Addresses
Shannon Appelcline
Blockchain Commons
Email: shannon.appelcline@gmail.com
Wolf McNally
Blockchain Commons
Email: wolf@wolfmcnally.com
Christopher Allen
Blockchain Commons
Email: christophera@lifewithalacrity.com
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