Transport Layer Security B. Beck Internet-Draft OpenSSL Intended status: Standards Track D. O'Brien Expires: 23 May 2027 Apple Inc. C. A. Wood Cloudflare 19 November 2026 TLS 1.3 Code Points for Composite ML-DSA Signature Algorithms draft-beck-tls-hybrid-codepoints-00 Abstract This document allocates TLS SignatureScheme code points for the Composite ML-DSA signature algorithms that [RFC10073] short-lists for implementation, and specifies the parameters an implementation needs to use them interoperably in TLS 1.3. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://bob- beck.github.io/draft-beck-hybrid-codepoints/draft-beck-tls-hybrid- codepoints.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-beck-tls-hybrid- codepoints/. Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer Security Working Group mailing list (mailto:tls@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/bob-beck/draft-beck-hybrid-codepoints. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Beck, et al. Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Composite ML-DSA Code Points for TLS November 2026 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. SignatureScheme Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.2. Signing and Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.3. Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1. Introduction [RFC10073] defines Composite ML-DSA signature algorithms, each pairing ML-DSA [FIPS204] with a traditional signature algorithm, and allocates an object identifier for each so that they can be used in X.509 certificates. Section 10.4 of that document short-lists six of them for implementation. Beck, et al. Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Composite ML-DSA Code Points for TLS November 2026 TLS 1.3 [RFC9846] negotiates signature algorithms using values from the TLS SignatureScheme registry, which has none for Composite ML- DSA. This document allocates one code point for each of those six algorithms, and specifies the parameters that the code point alone does not determine. 2. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. "Composite ML-DSA" refers to the signature scheme of [RFC10073]. 3. Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3 3.1. SignatureScheme Values This document adds the following values to the TLS SignatureScheme namespace defined in Section 4.3.3 of [RFC9846], for use in the "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions. enum { mldsa44_ed25519_sha512 (TBD1), mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (TBD2), mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512 (TBD3), mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512 (TBD4), mldsa65_ed25519_sha512 (TBD5), mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 (TBD6) } SignatureScheme; Each value corresponds to exactly one algorithm of [RFC10073]. Table 1 identifies each by the object identifier that appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of a certificate carrying a key for that algorithm. The names transliterate the Composite ML-DSA algorithm names, using the curve names of the TLS NamedGroup registry where these differ. Names carry no TLS-level processing semantics. Beck, et al. Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Composite ML-DSA Code Points for TLS November 2026 +================================+======================+ | Description | Algorithm Identifier | +================================+======================+ | mldsa44_ed25519_sha512 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.39 | +--------------------------------+----------------------+ | mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.40 | +--------------------------------+----------------------+ | mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.41 | +--------------------------------+----------------------+ | mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.45 | +--------------------------------+----------------------+ | mldsa65_ed25519_sha512 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.48 | +--------------------------------+----------------------+ | mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.49 | +--------------------------------+----------------------+ Table 1: Mapping to Composite ML-DSA Algorithms 3.2. Signing and Verification TLS treats Composite ML-DSA as a single opaque signature algorithm, as it does Ed25519. The composite construction, its component algorithms, and its pre-hash are fixed by the negotiated scheme and specified in [RFC10073]. When a scheme defined in this document is negotiated, the CertificateVerify signature is computed over the signing input of Section 4.5.2 of [RFC9846] using Composite-ML-DSA.Sign, and verified using Composite-ML-DSA.Verify (Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC10073]). The context (ctx) parameter MUST be the empty string. The ctx parameter of [RFC10073] is not the context string of Section 4.5.2 of [RFC9846]. 3.3. Restrictions The schemes defined in this document MUST NOT be used with TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or any earlier version. An endpoint that receives one of these schemes in the ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify message of a connection that negotiated TLS 1.2 or earlier MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. Offering them in a "signature_algorithms" extension is not an error; a TLS 1.2 peer ignores values it does not recognize. These schemes apply equally to DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147]. Beck, et al. Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Composite ML-DSA Code Points for TLS November 2026 4. Security Considerations The security considerations of [RFC10073] apply. TLS authentication requires existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack; Section 9.2 of [RFC10073] discusses the unforgeability properties of Composite ML-DSA. 5. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to add the following entries to the TLS SignatureScheme registry, according to the procedures of Section 16 of [RFC9847]. The Reference for every entry is this document. +=======+================================+=============+ | Value | Description | Recommended | +=======+================================+=============+ | TBD1 | mldsa44_ed25519_sha512 | N | +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+ | TBD2 | mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 | N | +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+ | TBD3 | mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512 | N | +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+ | TBD4 | mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512 | N | +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+ | TBD5 | mldsa65_ed25519_sha512 | N | +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+ | TBD6 | mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 | N | +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+ Table 2: TLS SignatureScheme Registry Additions 6. References 6.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026, . Beck, et al. Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Composite ML-DSA Code Points for TLS November 2026 [RFC9847] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, December 2025, . [RFC10073] Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., Klaußner, J., and S. Fluhrer, "Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 10073, DOI 10.17487/RFC10073, November 2026, . 6.2. Informative References [FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 204, August 2024, . [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, . [RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022, . Acknowledgments TODO acknowledge. Authors' Addresses Bob Beck OpenSSL Email: beck@obtuse.com Devon O'Brien Apple Inc. Email: asymmetric@apple.com Christopher A. Wood Cloudflare Email: caw@heapingbits.net Beck, et al. Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 6]