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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-beck-tls-hybrid-codepoints-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.35.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Composite ML-DSA Code Points for TLS">TLS 1.3 Code Points for Composite ML-DSA Signature Algorithms</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-beck-tls-hybrid-codepoints-00"/>
    <author fullname="Bob Beck">
      <organization>OpenSSL</organization>
      <address>
        <email>beck@obtuse.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="D." surname="O'Brien" fullname="Devon O'Brien">
      <organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>asymmetric@apple.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
      <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      <address>
        <email>caw@heapingbits.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Transport Layer Security</workgroup>
    <keyword>composite</keyword>
    <keyword>ML-DSA</keyword>
    <keyword>post-quantum</keyword>
    <keyword>code point allocations</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 63?>

<t>This document allocates TLS SignatureScheme code points for the Composite
ML-DSA signature algorithms that <xref target="RFC10073"/>
short-lists for implementation, and specifies the parameters an
implementation needs to use them interoperably in TLS 1.3.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://bob-beck.github.io/draft-beck-hybrid-codepoints/draft-beck-tls-hybrid-codepoints.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-beck-tls-hybrid-codepoints/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Transport Layer Security Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:tls@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/bob-beck/draft-beck-hybrid-codepoints"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 71?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t><xref target="RFC10073"/> defines Composite ML-DSA signature
algorithms, each pairing ML-DSA <xref target="FIPS204"/> with a traditional signature
algorithm, and allocates an object identifier for each so that they can be used
in X.509 certificates. Section 10.4 of that document short-lists six of them
for implementation.</t>
      <t>TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9846"/> negotiates signature algorithms using values from the TLS
SignatureScheme registry, which has none for Composite ML-DSA. This document
allocates one code point for each of those six algorithms, and specifies the
parameters that the code point alone does not determine.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<t>"Composite ML-DSA" refers to the signature scheme of
<xref target="RFC10073"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="composite-ml-dsa-in-tls-13">
      <name>Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3</name>
      <section anchor="signaturescheme-values">
        <name>SignatureScheme Values</name>
        <t>This document adds the following values to the TLS SignatureScheme namespace
defined in Section 4.3.3 of <xref target="RFC9846"/>, for use in the
"signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
enum {
    mldsa44_ed25519_sha512          (TBD1),
    mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256  (TBD2),
    mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512      (TBD3),
    mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512  (TBD4),
    mldsa65_ed25519_sha512          (TBD5),
    mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512  (TBD6)
} SignatureScheme;
]]></artwork>
        <t>Each value corresponds to exactly one algorithm of
<xref target="RFC10073"/>. <xref target="mapping"/> identifies each by the object
identifier that appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of a certificate carrying a
key for that algorithm. The names transliterate the Composite ML-DSA algorithm
names, using the curve names of the TLS NamedGroup registry where these differ.
Names carry no TLS-level processing semantics.</t>
        <table anchor="mapping">
          <name>Mapping to Composite ML-DSA Algorithms</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">Algorithm Identifier</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">mldsa44_ed25519_sha512</td>
              <td align="left">1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.39</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256</td>
              <td align="left">1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.40</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512</td>
              <td align="left">1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.41</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512</td>
              <td align="left">1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.45</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">mldsa65_ed25519_sha512</td>
              <td align="left">1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.48</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512</td>
              <td align="left">1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.49</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section anchor="signing-and-verification">
        <name>Signing and Verification</name>
        <t>TLS treats Composite ML-DSA as a single opaque signature algorithm, as it does
Ed25519. The composite construction, its component algorithms, and its pre-hash
are fixed by the negotiated scheme and specified in
<xref target="RFC10073"/>.</t>
        <t>When a scheme defined in this document is negotiated, the CertificateVerify
signature is computed over the signing input of Section 4.5.2 of <xref target="RFC9846"/>
using Composite-ML-DSA.Sign, and verified using Composite-ML-DSA.Verify
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of <xref target="RFC10073"/>).</t>
        <t>The context (ctx) parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the empty string. The ctx parameter of
<xref target="RFC10073"/> is not the context string of Section 4.5.2
of <xref target="RFC9846"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="restrictions">
        <name>Restrictions</name>
        <t>The schemes defined in this document <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used with TLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC5246"/>
or any earlier version. An endpoint that receives one of these schemes in the
ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify message of a connection that negotiated
TLS 1.2 or earlier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
Offering them in a "signature_algorithms" extension is not an error; a TLS 1.2
peer ignores values it does not recognize.</t>
        <t>These schemes apply equally to DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The security considerations of <xref target="RFC10073"/> apply. TLS
authentication requires existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack;
Section 9.2 of <xref target="RFC10073"/> discusses the
unforgeability properties of Composite ML-DSA.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA is requested to add the following entries to the TLS SignatureScheme
registry, according to the procedures of Section 16 of <xref target="RFC9847"/>. The
Reference for every entry is this document.</t>
      <table anchor="iana-sigschemes">
        <name>TLS SignatureScheme Registry Additions</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Value</th>
            <th align="left">Description</th>
            <th align="left">Recommended</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBD1</td>
            <td align="left">mldsa44_ed25519_sha512</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBD2</td>
            <td align="left">mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBD3</td>
            <td align="left">mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBD4</td>
            <td align="left">mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBD5</td>
            <td align="left">mldsa65_ed25519_sha512</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBD6</td>
            <td align="left">mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9846">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 8446, which specified TLS 1.3. This document obsoletes RFC 5246 (specifying TLS 1.2) and RFCs 5077, 6961, 7627, and 8422, all of which pertain to TLS 1.2 or earlier, and updates RFCs 5705 and 6066. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9846"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC10073">
          <front>
            <title>Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure</title>
            <author fullname="M. Ounsworth" initials="M." surname="Ounsworth"/>
            <author fullname="J. Gray" initials="J." surname="Gray"/>
            <author fullname="M. Pala" initials="M." surname="Pala"/>
            <author fullname="J. Klaußner" initials="J." surname="Klaußner"/>
            <author fullname="S. Fluhrer" initials="S." surname="Fluhrer"/>
            <date month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a PQ/T hybrid scheme with concrete instantiations that combine the US NIST Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) with traditional algorithms RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448. These combinations are tailored to meet regulatory guidelines in certain regions. Composite ML-DSA is applicable in applications that use X.509 or PKIX data structures that accept ML-DSA, but where the operator wants extra protection against breaks or catastrophic bugs in ML-DSA and where the level of security provided by Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA) is acceptable.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="10073"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC10073"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9847">
          <front>
            <title>IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS</title>
            <author fullname="J. Salowey" initials="J." surname="Salowey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="December" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document updates the changes to the TLS and DTLS IANA registries made in RFC 8447. It adds a new value, "D" for discouraged, to the "Recommended" column of the selected TLS registries and adds a "Comment" column to all active registries that do not already have a "Comment" column. Finally, it updates the registration request instructions.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFC 8447.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9847"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9847"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC5246">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title>
            <author fullname="T. Dierks" initials="T." surname="Dierks"/>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5246"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5246"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9147">
          <front>
            <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/>
            <date month="April" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6347.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIPS204" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204">
          <front>
            <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="204"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 204?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>TODO acknowledge.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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