| Internet-Draft | Crypto Execution Finality | November 2026 |
| Das | Expires 22 May 2027 | [Page] |
A cryptographically valid signature can authorize a transaction that the organization never intended. The hard problem in digital-asset custody is therefore not only protecting keys. It is stopping compromised workflows, delegated code, misleading transaction displays, stolen credentials, and legitimate automation (including AI agents) from turning broad technical capability into unrestricted transfers.¶
This document proposes defender-controlled, consequence-specific authorization at three boundaries: signing, wallet execution, and withdrawal release. The defender reconstructs the operation that would actually take effect from the transaction bytes and account state, holds it in a non-effective state, evaluates it against independent policy and a protected exposure ledger, and releases only a bounded, act-bound, single-use authority at a mandatory enforcement point. The document specifies placement by chain type, requirements, a state machine with crash and reorganization handling, EIP-7702 delegation controls, a catalogue of edge cases and twenty-four threat scenarios, and an acceptance-test method with a reference simulator. It states the limits plainly: an off-chain gate cannot stop a leaked key that submits directly to a permissionless network, and it fails if the enforcement layer is bypassed or compromised. No deployment, measured latency, or real-world prevention is claimed.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
This is an individual, independent-submission Internet-Draft. It is a technical proposal and has not been adopted by any IETF working group.¶
Basis of disclosure: this document is based on the Mothership application PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and publicly disclosed (published as WO 2026/150382 A2) on 16 July 2026. The full filing can be read by searching "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE, by searching PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615), or at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/ . The filing text, not this draft, is authoritative for the patent disclosure.¶
Incident descriptions are drawn from public third-party reports and are treated as reported accounts, not as independently reconstructed chain forensics. Any mention of products, standards, or organizations is for technical context only. It is not an endorsement, validation, or statement of infringement, and no third-party adoption is implied.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.¶
Digital-asset custody has strong cryptographic building blocks: hardware security modules, multi-party computation, multisignature wallets, smart-contract wallets, transaction simulation, allowlists, rate limits, and chain monitoring. Large losses still occur when a signature that verifies correctly authorizes a consequence nobody approved. A multisignature threshold can be met while signers read an altered display. An HSM can correctly sign a request produced by compromised middleware. A delegated account can run code whose powers are far broader than its owner understood. A hot wallet can be emptied within minutes, faster than any human response.¶
Two public incidents motivate the problem, and this document keeps them separate (Section 3). The February 2025 theft from a major exchange involved tampering with a multisignature signing interface. The October 2026 reported theft from a major exchange's hot wallets involved leaked signing capability and, on at least one chain, an EIP-7702 delegation [EIP-7702]. Neither incident is reconstructed here, and this document does not claim the proposed architecture would have prevented either.¶
The architecture here asks one additional question at the last enforceable boundary: given the exact bytes, account state, destination, value, code, and remaining exposure budget, may this specific operation take effect now? It complements multisig, MPC, HSMs, contract audits, risk engines, and monitoring. It replaces none of them.¶
The document covers: signing services and HSM or MPC policy layers; programmable wallets and smart accounts on EVM-compatible chains; centralized-exchange withdrawal release; bridge and treasury-upgrade paths; and AI agents or automation that prepare or request such operations. It addresses non-programmable chains only at the signing and release boundary, where on-chain policy is unavailable.¶
Sections 3 to 5 give the evidence, the problem, and the threat model. Sections 6 to 11 give the architecture, requirements, data objects, state machine, and exposure accounting. Sections 12 to 18 cover EIP-7702, signing hazards, custody models, independence, agents, bridges, and edge cases. Section 19 is the threat-scenario catalogue. Section 20 and Appendix A give the evaluation method and the reference simulator results. Appendix B collects objections.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The names below describe architectural roles in this proposal. They are not established protocol or standard terms.¶
Public reports describe a large theft from a major exchange's hot wallets on 29 October 2026, on the order of USD 6.3 billion across several chains, including an Ethereum address labelled "Binance 14" on a block explorer. Reports describe an EIP-7702 delegation installing attacker-chosen code on that address, with the transfers submitted by a different address. Reports also say the delegation explains only part of the total: withdrawals on chains without account delegation, and ordinary signed transfers from another Ethereum wallet, were also reported, and several analyses point to how signing capability was obtained as the root cause rather than to the delegation feature [INCIDENT-REPORTS]. Some analyses describe about fifty delegation authorizations of which one matched the live account nonce. At least one source labels its nonce-range explanation as its own inference, so this document treats it as a test case, not as established fact.¶
All figures and mechanisms in this section are third-party accounts requiring independent on-chain and primary-source confirmation.¶
The February 2025 loss, reported at about USD 1.5 billion, is a separate case. A Japanese Financial Services Agency research paper discusses tampering with a multisignature wallet's web interface and misleading signer presentation [FSA-BYBIT]. EIP-7702 is not established as the mechanism of that theft, and the two incidents MUST NOT be conflated.¶
Following a Microsoft 365 service disruption on 12 November 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported a campaign on 13 November 2026 impersonating service-health notices, claiming held mail would be deleted within 24 hours unless a link was followed, and assessed it as consistent with credential phishing [MSFT-PHISH]. Public evidence does not establish credential capture, account takeover, or any downstream cryptocurrency loss. This document uses the campaign only as a plausible entry-stage pattern (Section 19.15).¶
| Evidence | Supported reading | Caution |
|---|---|---|
| Exchange theft, Oct 2026 | Valid signing capability plus delegation to attacker code on at least one chain | Third-party reports; delegation does not explain all losses; root cause of key or signature compromise not established here |
| Exchange theft, Feb 2025 | Compromised signing presentation in a multisig workflow | Separate event; not an EIP-7702 case |
| Outage-themed phishing, Nov 2026 | High-volume credential-phishing lure | No established account compromise or custody impact |
| This proposal | Candidate Act plus independent consequence gate | Proposed; not shown to prevent any incident |
These events support a defensible question: how can a custody system tell technically valid signing or execution apart from authorization of the actual destination, value, code path, and effect? They do not prove the proposal was present, absent, novel, effective, or sufficient.¶
A signature proves that a signing capability was used under specified rules. It does not prove the organization intended the real downstream effect. Define the invariant:¶
No Protected Consequence occurs unless the reconstructed effective operation satisfies a fresh, independently evaluated policy and the final effectuation boundary enforces that decision.¶
The invariant is conditional on complete mediation. If a private key or an existing on-chain allowance permits a direct, unmediated transfer, an external validator cannot stop it afterwards.¶
Modern custody already uses transaction policy engines, MPC approvals, allowlists, rate limits, time delays, code simulation, and monitoring, and these block many attacks. The claim here is narrower than "conventional controls fail". It is that three structural gaps can remain even when each control is correctly implemented.¶
The table below states, for common controls, what each establishes and what can remain open.¶
| Control | What it establishes | Residual gap |
|---|---|---|
| MFA, IAM, conditional access | Identity or permitted service access | Not exact asset, destination, or code intent |
| Multisig | Threshold of signatures | Signers can approve misrepresented bytes |
| HSM / MPC | Key protection, distributed signing | Compromised request construction; policy often limited to simple fields |
| Allowlists, per-transaction caps | Known destination, bounded single transfer | Approvals, delegations, and aggregation can bypass |
| Transaction simulation | Predicted call behavior | Hidden state, mutable code, ordering, and composition |
| Monitoring, alerts | Detection and investigation | Late relative to irreversible settlement |
| Smart-contract audit | Review of code at a point in time | Upgrades, delegation to other code, deployment-time substitution |
| Finality gate (proposed) | Exact protected effect authorized | Fails if bypassed, corrupted, or the key submits directly to the chain |
AI agents enlarge the surface by composing tools, iterating after failure, and operating at volume. The same finality problem exists without AI.¶
Funds and tokens under custody; allowances and permits that confer future spending; delegations and account code; signing keys and key shares; policy and governance state; upgrade authority; bridge release authority; withdrawal queues; and the evidence and ledgers that record exposure.¶
The attacker MAY:¶
The protection in this document holds only if all of the following hold for the covered effects: the Finality Sink is Mandatory; the Protected Validator and policy authority are not controlled by the attacker; signing keys are non-exportable or the on-chain rule is itself mandatory; and the attacker does not simultaneously control the validator, the sink, the policy authority, and the audit and reconciliation channels. Section 25 lists what happens when these fail.¶
Consensus attacks; compromise of a chain's client software; legal seizure; and attacks that need no signature (for example, direct exploitation of a vulnerable contract that holds funds) are out of scope except where they bear on the sink's placement.¶
The attacker never has to take part. The defender builds the Candidate Act from what actually arrives at a defender-controlled boundary.¶
Request / workflow / AI tool / operator command
|
v
Reconstruct actual operation: target, value, chain, calldata,
code hash, beneficiary, allowance and delegation effects
|
v
Hold as Candidate Act (NON-EFFECTIVE)
|
v
Protected Validator: independent policy, fresh state,
epoch, revocation, exposure ledger reservation
|
+----+--------------------+
| |
deny / hold / issue Bounded Authority
reconcile (act-bound, single use)
| |
v v
NO EFFECT Finality Sink verifies authority + exact bytes
(fail closed) at signer / wallet rule / withdrawal release
|
v
Bounded effect + Receipt
No single location fits every chain or wallet design. Several gates may be needed. The decisive property is that every protected effect path is mediated.¶
A hostile builder, agent, or stolen credential simply sends ordinary requests. The defender reconstructs the Candidate Act. The attacker cannot avoid the gate by refusing to use it, provided the effect cannot be reached through an unmediated path.¶
Place the sink in the lowest practical trusted component that exclusively controls the effect, and make every equivalent path converge on it. A check higher in the stack is supplementary if an alternate API, batch job, privileged account, or direct signer can reach the same effect.¶
| Consequence | Effective gate | Critical bypass to close |
|---|---|---|
| Hot-wallet transfer | Protected signer plus wallet contract rule | Raw key or unrestricted RPC signer |
| EIP-7702 delegation | Protected signer refusing unapproved authorizations; delegated-code policy | Direct signature offline; malicious or mutable delegate code |
| Token approval or permit | Allowance cap and spender review at signer or wallet | Previously issued permit; setApprovalForAll |
| Exchange withdrawal | Custody release, sign, and broadcast control | Privileged batch job or emergency key |
| Bridge mint or release | Bridge verifier or release contract; dual-side proof | Alternative bridge executor |
| Treasury or contract upgrade | Governance timelock and upgrade executor with independent veto | Unmediated admin upgrade |
| Key or share release | HSM or MPC policy before share release | Alternate signer; exportable key |
| Policy update | Quorum-signed policy with anti-rollback epoch | Builder-side policy edit; replay of old bundle |
On-chain policy exists only where the chain's account model supports it. Elsewhere the gate must be at the signer or withdrawal-release layer, and the protection ends at that boundary.¶
| Account model | On-chain rule possible? | Where the gate must sit | Main limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| EVM externally owned account (EOA) | Not by default; possible after delegation to a policy module | Protected signer; delegation approval | A leaked key can sign and submit directly |
| EVM smart account or ERC-4337 wallet | Yes (modules, session keys, validators) | Contract rule plus signer | Upgrade authority and module bugs |
| EOA delegated under EIP-7702 | Yes, inside the delegated code | Signer approving delegate hash; delegate policy | Delegate code quality; re-delegation by key holder |
| UTXO chains (for example Bitcoin) | Limited by script | HSM or MPC policy and release layer | Script-level covenants limited |
| Other account-based non-EVM chains | Chain-specific | Signer and release layer | Varies by chain features |
| Centralized exchange internal ledger | Not applicable | Withdrawal release and custody signer | Insider and privileged job paths |
This section lists what each object needs. It defines no wire format. A future revision or a chain-specific profile could specify canonical serialization (for example JSON canonicalization [RFC8785]), signature suites, and encodings. The field names are illustrative.¶
Much of this can be built from existing primitives: threshold signatures [RFC9591], remote attestation [RFC9334], and typed-data signing [EIP-712]. The document does not claim novelty for those primitives individually. Its subject is the integrated invariants in Section 7.¶
The state machine separates intent, validation, signing, broadcast, and confirmed effect. A wallet or exchange MUST NOT infer actual effects from a memo or endpoint name.¶
| State | Meaning | Allowed next states and rule |
|---|---|---|
| PROPOSED | Request received; no staging yet | STAGED_NON_EFFECTIVE, DENIED |
| STAGED_NON_EFFECTIVE | Candidate Act reconstructed; no effect | VALIDATED, DENIED; expires |
| VALIDATED | Policy passed; budget not yet reserved | SIGNING_RESERVED, DENIED |
| SIGNING_RESERVED | Exposure reserved atomically; authority issued | SIGNED_NOT_BROADCAST, or release on explicit abort |
| SIGNED_NOT_BROADCAST | Signature produced; transaction not yet public | BROADCAST_PENDING; signature is itself a consequential release |
| BROADCAST_PENDING | Submitted; outcome unknown | CONFIRMED, REVERTED, REPLACED, DROPPED, RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED |
| CONFIRMED | Included at required depth for this chain | Terminal; authority consumed; reservation committed |
| REVERTED | Included but failed; fee and nonce effects remain | Terminal; reservation released after reconciliation |
| RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED | Outcome uncertain (timeout, reorg, crash) | CONFIRMED, REVERTED, or bounded manual resolution; no new authority meanwhile |
| DENIED | Policy failed or authority absent, stale, or mismatched | Terminal; no effect |
A successful broadcast is not proof of confirmed settlement, and a receipt is not proof of finality under reorganization. Confirmation depth MUST follow the chain's consensus assumptions. A transaction that reverts can still cost fees and consume a nonce. Each transition has a defined authority, expiry, and idempotency rule. Consumption of authority and reservation MUST be durably recorded before the signature is released, and INDETERMINATE outcomes MUST be resolved by querying authoritative state, never by issuing fresh authority.¶
A per-transaction limit does not stop an agent from splitting a large theft into many small transfers. The system keeps a protected cumulative ledger and reserves exposure atomically before any signature. Reservation states are RESERVED, COMMITTED, and RELEASED. A reservation MUST be held through uncertain broadcast outcomes. Releasing it early lets a retry spend the same budget twice (Section 19.18).¶
| Predicate | Example policy | Failure response |
|---|---|---|
| Asset | One stablecoin only | Deny other tokens |
| Beneficiary | Allowlisted treasury account | Hold new address |
| Per operation | At most 100 units | Deny 101 |
| Rolling window | At most 300 units per hour | Deny aggregate excess |
| Global cap | At most 400 units across all chains | Deny aggregate excess on any chain |
| Delegate | Pinned code hash | Hold code change |
| Time | Five-minute expiry | Require new authority |
EIP-7702 [EIP-7702] lets an externally owned account designate executable code through a signed authorization tuple containing a chain identifier, a delegation target address, and a nonce. A transaction carrying an authorization list installs a delegation designator on the account, so the account's own address then runs the delegated code. The delegation persists until replaced, and pointing it to the zero address clears it. The specification warns that poorly designed delegate contracts can allow near-complete control of the account, and it identifies replay protection and binding of value, gas, target, and calldata as security considerations.¶
Points that matter for defenders:¶
The on-chain network cannot consult an off-chain Finality Sink unless the delegated contract is explicitly written to require cryptographic proof or to enforce its own policy. If an attacker already holds the private key and can sign and submit an authorization directly, an off-chain policy cannot prevent it (Section 19.1).¶
Hot wallets favor availability and automated throughput. Cold wallets favor key isolation and deliberate authorization. Both can suffer semantic authorization failures if a signer approves malicious bytes, and the right control placement differs.¶
| Architecture | Primary enforcement | Operational concern |
|---|---|---|
| Hot-wallet exchange | Signer and withdrawal release; rolling budgets | Latency, throughput, batching; blast radius if key leaks |
| Cold multisig | Trusted payload rendering and contract policy | Semantic display integrity; slow response |
| MPC custody | Quorum policy and share release | Collusion and shared policy failures; policy expressiveness |
| HSM-backed signer | Policy engine adjacent to the HSM | HSM signs what the builder sends unless it decodes |
| Smart-account treasury | On-chain policy module | Upgrade authority and delegate security |
| EOA with direct key | Wallet signer only | Cannot stop externally submitted valid signatures |
For hot wallets, combine protected signer policies, rolling exposure budgets, per-beneficiary controls, code and delegate checks, withdrawal queues, and emergency circuit breakers. For cold wallets, use trusted transaction rendering, separated approvals, independent payload reconstruction, delayed high-risk upgrades, and verified on-chain settlement receipts.¶
A policy that freezes every routine withdrawal becomes operationally unacceptable and invites bypass. Tiered controls are RECOMMENDED: low-risk known-destination transfers receive deterministic fast checks; new beneficiaries, contract upgrades, delegation changes, and high-value transfers receive stricter verification and possibly timelocks.¶
Large hot-wallet fleets deserve extra caution. If many wallets share one key-derivation root, one signing service, or one deploy pipeline, a single compromise reaches all of them at once. Spreading risk across independent signers and capping per-wallet balances limits blast radius.¶
Independence is an architectural property. A second process with the same administrator, credentials, and deploy pipeline is not independent. The policy evaluator SHOULD receive independently attested context, while the signer or wallet enforces the resulting narrowly scoped decision.¶
Consider separate key domains, protected policy storage, quorum-based policy updates, attested signer binaries, anti-rollback versioning, independent code-hash verification, and key release only after validation. Do not let an administrator of the transaction builder modify both policy and signing logic.¶
Independence fails if the attacker compromises a common kernel, a shared CI/CD system, a hypervisor, a root cloud account, or a wallet upgrade authority. Deployments MUST therefore document shared-failure analysis explicitly and MUST NOT claim absolute non-bypassability.¶
A custody assistant may legitimately read balances, prepare transactions, and query risk limits. It MUST NOT inherit authority to finalize withdrawals. Tool discoverability, successful authentication, and valid arguments do not constitute transfer authority. Permission to prepare an operation is not permission to finalize it.¶
An apparent transfer can be implemented as a token transfer, approval, permit, delegated call, bridge lock, mint, swap, or multicall. The final effect can differ from the visible top-level function, so policy must account for transitive effects and stateful approvals.¶
Bridge transfers need matching source-chain lock and destination-chain release evidence, with reorganization and finality assumptions stated. Stablecoin issuers may offer pause or freeze functions, but availability and legal authorization vary. A sink MUST NOT assume every token can be frozen or clawed back after settlement.¶
These cases test whether an implementation holds its invariants at the boundaries. Each states the hazard and the required handling.¶
Each scenario states the attack, why conventional controls can miss it, the proposed mitigation, the residual risk, and the test. Scenarios are illustrative and synthetic. Where a scenario resembles a reported incident, that is for motivation only, and no claim is made about the actual incident trace. Scenario identifiers T1 to T24 are referenced by the simulator in Appendix A where one exists (S01 to S14).¶
This section describes how to evaluate the architecture and how to read the reference simulator in Appendix A. Expected outcomes are test hypotheses. The simulator is a model of policy logic and accounting. It is not a chain, wallet, or exchange, and its results are not evidence of real-world prevention.¶
Every experiment MUST run in three configurations, to avoid a weak baseline:¶
The security benefit is the difference between Arm C and Arm B, not between Arm C and Arm A.¶
A successful result demonstrates a property under a defined threat model. It does not establish universal protection, legal compliance, novelty, or prevention of any historical breach.¶
| Simulator | Scenario | Threat |
|---|---|---|
| S01 | Split withdrawal, unauthorized beneficiary | T6 |
| S02 | Split withdrawal, authorized beneficiary, aggregate cap | T6 |
| S03 | Concurrent race on rolling cap (stale counter) | T6, T2 |
| S04 | Retry during uncertain settlement | T18 |
| S05 | Delegation target substitution | T3, T4, T1 |
| S06 | Mutable-proxy delegate changed after approval | T4 |
| S07 | Builder requests 50 delegation authorizations | T5, T1 |
| S08 | Four-chain parallel drain versus global cap | T2 |
| S09 | Replay of one approval three times | T22, general replay |
| S10 | Validator outage, mixed workload | T19 |
| S11 | Stale policy bundle replayed | T22 |
| S12 | approve or permit to attacker spender | T7 |
| S13 | Break-glass abuse with one stolen credential | T13 |
| S14 | Raw key leaked, direct chain submission | T1 (limit) |
Threats T8 to T12, T14 to T17, T20, T21, T23, and T24 need chain-level or organizational tests that the model does not cover. They are listed with a test in Section 19.¶
Do not put heavyweight approval in every token-generation step or blockchain polling loop. Enforce at high-consequence signing and effectuation transitions. Precompute trusted policy, maintain local protected counters, and use deterministic cryptographic verification for low-risk operations. The goal is not zero overhead. It is a measured trade-off that does not push operators to disable the control.¶
| Workload | Approach | Measurement |
|---|---|---|
| Routine withdrawal to known beneficiary | Local signed policy and counter | p99 gate latency |
| New beneficiary | Enhanced review and delay | Time to safe release |
| Contract upgrade or delegation change | Multi-party approval and timelock | Unmediated upgrade attempts |
| Mass agent requests | Atomic global budget | Overspend under concurrency |
| Validator outage | Hold high-risk effects; fast path for routine | Availability and recovery time |
Suggested metrics: p50, p95, and p99 gate latency; approvals per second; maximum reservation contention; false-hold rate; validator outage behavior; queue recovery time; reorganization reconciliation lag; and the percentage of protected effects reachable without mediation. No measured latency is reported in this document, and the simulator does not measure it.¶
Compatibility: some designs work through a protected signer or an on-chain module. Others need wallet or contract changes and cannot be retrofitted transparently.¶
| Metric | Acceptance criterion |
|---|---|
| Unauthorized transfers | Zero in protected, tested paths |
| Aggregate overspend | Zero above the atomic budget, including under concurrency |
| Replay | At most one effective act per bound nonce |
| Delegate substitution | 100 percent of test substitutions rejected |
| Unapproved delegation authorizations signed | Zero |
| Bypass coverage | All enumerated protected paths mediated |
| False denials on a legitimate mix | Reported empirically against a stated target |
| p99 latency | Reported empirically, not presumed |
| Compromised root key or upgrade admin | Explicit limitation disclosed |
The strongest falsification tests are: demonstrate a protected high-value transfer through an unmediated route, or a budget breach under concurrent requests. Either one shows the claim does not hold for that deployment.¶
This entire document concerns security. Further points:¶
Candidate Act descriptors, ledgers, and Receipts can reveal balances, counterparties, and operational patterns. Operators SHOULD minimize retained detail, protect these records, apply retention limits consistent with applicable law, and avoid publishing wallet addresses or limits in ways that help attackers.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
The reference simulator is a short Python program, finality_sim.py, distributed with this draft. It is deterministic, uses synthetic units, and contacts no chain, wallet, HSM, or exchange. It runs with "python3 finality_sim.py" and exits non-zero if an acceptance assertion fails. "python3 finality_sim.py --json" prints machine-readable results.¶
Results follow from these definitions, so the table checks that the designed logic and accounting behave as specified. It is a regression and acceptance harness. It does not show that real attackers would be stopped.¶
Several Arm B weaknesses (per-chain counters, fail-open, no epoch check, release on timeout) are modelling assumptions. Deployments that already close them would see smaller differences. This is why Section 20.1 requires a strengthened baseline in real experiments.¶
| ID | Scenario | Metric | A | B | C |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 | Split withdrawal, unauthorized beneficiary | units released | 900 | 0 | 0 |
| S02 | Split withdrawal, authorized beneficiary (overspend vs 300 cap) | units above cap | 600 | 0 | 0 |
| S03 | Concurrent race on rolling cap (stale counter) | units above cap | 150 | 150 | 0 |
| S04 | Retry during uncertain settlement | duplicate units | 270 | 90 | 0 |
| S05 | Delegation target substitution (display H1, bytes H2) | takeover (1/0) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| S06 | Mutable-proxy delegate changed after approval | takeover (1/0) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| S07 | Builder requests 50 delegation authorizations (nonce range) | takeover (1/0) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| S08 | Four-chain parallel drain vs global cap | units above cap | 1760 | 680 | 0 |
| S09 | Replay of one approval three times | replayed units | 270 | 180 | 0 |
| S10 | Validator outage, mixed workload | units released | 500 | 500 | 0 |
| S11 | Stale signed policy bundle replayed (epoch 3 vs 5) | units above cap | 700 | 700 | 0 |
| S12 | approve()/permit to attacker spender | exposure granted | 1000 | 1000 | 0 |
| S13 | Break-glass abuse with one stolen credential | units released | 500 | 500 | 0 |
| S14 | Raw signing key leaked, direct chain submission | units released | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 |
Reading the table: the metric column states what is counted (units released, units above the cap, duplicate units, a takeover flag, or exposure granted). Lower is better. In S03 and S08 the result in Arm B comes from the stale counter and per-chain ledgers described above, which Arm C removes by reserving atomically against one shared ledger. In S08 Arm C still releases 360 units, which is below the 400 global cap, so "units above cap" is zero.¶
Additional checks: in S10, Arm C blocked 0 legitimate units, because the routine transfers ran on the local fast path while the five high-risk transfers were held. In a separate mix of 100 in-policy transfers, Arm C produced 0 false denials. For S14, a mandatory on-chain module with the same limits (modelled as 300 minus a 30-unit margin) would cap the loss at 270 units, against 1000 when only an off-chain gate exists.¶
S14 is a documented limit. When a leaked key submits directly to an unrestricted account, all three arms lose the full balance. This result is intended: the document states that an off-chain gate cannot stop it.¶
To move from a model to evidence, replace each scenario function with a harness against a local test chain (for example a forked development node) and a real signer, record the items listed in Section 20.2, and keep the acceptance assertions unchanged. Add vectors for the threats the model does not cover (T8 to T12, T14 to T17, T20, T21, T23, T24).¶
The answers describe proposed design patterns and conditions for enforceability. They are not deployed or empirically validated results.¶
This document is based on the Mothership application PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and published as WO 2026/150382 A2 on 16 July 2026. The full filing can be read by searching "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE, by searching PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615), or at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/ . The underlying invention is human-originated. Preparation of this draft, its summaries, and any mapping to third-party systems or incidents used AI assistance and may contain errors or omissions, so readers MUST verify against the original filings and primary sources. Nothing here implies endorsement, collaboration, licensing, or an allegation of infringement by any third party. The author is open to acquihire or strategic collaboration.¶
License: CC BY-NC 4.0. The license does not grant patent rights.¶
The author thanks the security researchers and journalists whose public reporting made the incident discussion possible.¶