| Internet-Draft | IPN dot ARPA | November 2026 |
| Kline | Expires 24 May 2027 | [Page] |
This document requests the creation of ipn.arpa, an infrastructure DNS
namespace for the Bundle Protocol (BP). It maps a Fully Qualified
Node Number to the DNS base name N.A.ipn.arpa., where N is the Node
Number and A is the Allocator Identifier. A BP Agent can use that
name to discover a convergence-layer endpoint at the destination or
at a relay. This document specifies an SRV binding for version 4 of
the TCP Convergence-Layer Protocol (TCPCLv4).¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ekline.github.io/draft-dtn-ipn-arpa/draft-ek-dtn-ipn-arpa.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ek-dtn-ipn-arpa/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking mailing list (mailto:dtn@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dtn/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dtn/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/ekline/draft-dtn-ipn-arpa.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The Bundle Protocol (BP) [RFC9171] supports communication in networks subject to delay and disruption. In the ipn URI scheme [RFC9758], IANA assigns Allocator Identifiers, and Allocators assign Node Numbers. An Allocator can hold more than one identifier. The pair of Allocator Identifier and Node Number forms a Fully Qualified Node Number (FQNN).¶
A BP Agent can know an IPN destination without knowing a DNS domain associated with its allocator. The ipn.arpa namespace provides a common starting point for discovery and links DNS administration to allocator assignments. The FQNN determines the DNS base name (Section 3.1); the convergence-layer (CL) discovery binding determines which name and record type to query.¶
Discovery is optional. It supplies candidate next hops, not routes or contact plans. The BP Agent makes forwarding decisions under its configured policy. Not all FQNNs have public discovery data (Section 7.2).¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the following terms from [RFC9758]:¶
A 32-bit unsigned integer that identifies the Allocator that assigned a Node Number (Section 3.2 of [RFC9758]).¶
A 32-bit unsigned integer that identifies a node in the context of an Allocator (Section 3.3 of [RFC9758]).¶
The pair (Allocator Identifier, Node Number), for example (978879,2) (Section 3.3.1 of [RFC9758]).¶
An unsigned integer that identifies a service on a node (Section 3.5 of [RFC9758]).¶
A URI in the 'ipn' URI scheme. It contains an FQNN and a Service Number (Section 3 of [RFC9758]). An ipn URI used as a BP Endpoint Identifier (EID) is an "ipn EID" (Section 5 of [RFC9758]).¶
This document defines the following terms:¶
The DNS name beneath ipn.arpa that represents an FQNN (Section 3.1).¶
The specification of DNS discovery for one CL. It defines the query names, record types, processing rules, and fallback behavior. This document specifies the TCPCLv4 binding (Section 3.2).¶
The name at or beneath the DNS base name that a BP Agent queries first under a discovery binding. Alias and service targets can be elsewhere.¶
The entity that provisions and operates the ipn.arpa zone (Section 7.1).¶
A BP Agent can use DNS discovery alongside configuration and other sources to populate its forwarding information base.¶
Before constructing a DNS name, a BP Agent MUST parse and interpret
the destination ipn URI or ipn EID according to [RFC9758]. In the
two-field text form, the omitted Allocator Identifier is zero; the
DNS name still includes the label 0 (Section 4 of [RFC9758]).
In the two-element CBOR scheme-specific part, the first integer
encodes both the Allocator Identifier and the Node Number
(Section 6.2 of [RFC9758]).¶
For Allocator Identifier A and Node Number N, the DNS base name MUST be:¶
N.A.ipn.arpa.¶
Each of N and A MUST be represented as a single label containing its
unsigned decimal value, using ASCII digits without leading zeroes.
Zero is the single digit 0. Neither label is padded or split.¶
The Service Number is not part of the DNS base name. URIs with the same FQNN give the same name, regardless of the Service Number or the encoding of the FQNN (Section 6.4 of [RFC9758]):¶
| ipn URI | DNS base name |
|---|---|
ipn:978879.2.345
|
2.978879.ipn.arpa.
|
ipn:978879.2.0
|
2.978879.ipn.arpa.
|
ipn:16384.345
|
16384.0.ipn.arpa.
|
ipn:0.16384.345
|
16384.0.ipn.arpa.
|
The last two rows are usable in locally served instances, not for public discovery. The same local scope applies to discovery for Experimental Use Allocator Identifiers (Section 7.2, Section 4.3).¶
A BP Agent MUST NOT perform DNS discovery for the Null ipn URI or a LocalNode ipn URI. Neither identifies a remote destination. The BP Agent tests the interpreted pair (A,N), not the Node Number alone:¶
(0,0): ipn:0.0.0 is the Null ipn URI (Section 3.1 of [RFC9758]).
A URI with this FQNN and a nonzero Service Number is invalid;
Section 3.4.1 of [RFC9758] requires processors to treat it as Null.¶
(0,4294967295): a LocalNode ipn URI identifies a resource on the local node (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC9758]). Section 5.4 of [RFC9758] prohibits publication of LocalNode ipn EIDs in node identification directories, including DNS.¶
Neither special case applies under a nonzero Allocator Identifier.¶
This document specifies TCPCLv4 [TCPCL] discovery with SRV records [RFC2782] at the following CL-specific query name:¶
_dtn-bundle._tcp.N.A.ipn.arpa.¶
The BP Agent constructs this name directly from the FQNN. It needs no preliminary PTR lookup as used in in-addr.arpa or ip6.arpa.¶
The registered service name for TCP port 4556 is dtn-bundle
(Section 8.1 of [TCPCL]). The BP Agent uses priority and weight to
select an SRV record under [RFC2782], then uses its Target and Port.
The Port need not be 4556. A Target of . indicates that the
specified service is unavailable at that domain.¶
Without a usable SRV record, this binding supplies no new candidate. After an unsuccessful SRV lookup, the BP Agent MUST NOT fall back to resolving the DNS base name for addresses and connecting to TCP port 4556 as part of this binding. This exception to the suggested usage in [RFC2782] does not affect other bindings, independently obtained forwarding information, or retained results (Section 3.5, Section 4.1, Section 4.2).¶
In this deployment, a fictional space agency offers one public ingress service for three destinations. Its Allocator Identifier, 978879, and the identifiers in Section 4.4 come from the Example Range in Section 9.1 of [RFC9758]. The zone excerpts omit routine SOA, NS, and DNSSEC records.¶
| FQNN | Destination | DNS base name |
|---|---|---|
| (978879,1) | mission operations center |
1.978879.ipn.arpa.
|
| (978879,2) | mars-orbiter |
2.978879.ipn.arpa.
|
| (978879,3) | lunar-lander |
3.978879.ipn.arpa.
|
The agency chose the destination names independently of the Node Numbers. Its two ingress relays are separate BP nodes with their own Node IDs. Both have onward routes to all three destinations through the agency's cislunar and deep-space ground facilities.¶
Examples A and B are alternative configurations of the allocator's zone (Section 3.4). Both use these relay addresses:¶
$ORIGIN space-agency.example. $TTL 3600 relay-a IN A 192.0.2.10 relay-a IN AAAA 2001:db8::10 relay-b IN A 192.0.2.11 relay-b IN AAAA 2001:db8::11
The allocator's zone contains the SRV records for each destination:¶
$ORIGIN 978879.ipn.arpa. $TTL 3600 _dtn-bundle._tcp.1 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-a.space-agency.example. _dtn-bundle._tcp.1 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-b.space-agency.example. _dtn-bundle._tcp.2 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-a.space-agency.example. _dtn-bundle._tcp.2 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-b.space-agency.example. _dtn-bundle._tcp.3 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-a.space-agency.example. _dtn-bundle._tcp.3 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-b.space-agency.example.¶
For a bundle destined for ipn:978879.2.345, the BP Agent queries
for SRV at _dtn-bundle._tcp.2.978879.ipn.arpa. and orders the two
relay candidates according to [RFC2782]. If it selects
relay-a.space-agency.example., it resolves that target and attempts
a TCPCLv4 connection to [2001:db8::10]:4556 or 192.0.2.10:4556.
If it cannot reach that relay, it can try the other. The BP Agent
transfers the bundle over a session that its policy accepts
(Section 5.1).¶
Instead of publishing an SRV RRset at each service name, the agency makes each name an alias for the same SRV owner:¶
$ORIGIN 978879.ipn.arpa.
$TTL 3600
_dtn-bundle._tcp.1 IN CNAME (
_dtn-bundle._tcp.ingress.space-agency.example. )
_dtn-bundle._tcp.2 IN CNAME (
_dtn-bundle._tcp.ingress.space-agency.example. )
_dtn-bundle._tcp.3 IN CNAME (
_dtn-bundle._tcp.ingress.space-agency.example. )
¶
The agency publishes the shared SRV RRset in its own zone:¶
$ORIGIN space-agency.example.
$TTL 3600
_dtn-bundle._tcp.ingress IN SRV (
10 1 4556 relay-a.space-agency.example. )
_dtn-bundle._tcp.ingress IN SRV (
10 1 4556 relay-b.space-agency.example. )
¶
The BP Agent sends the same query as in Example A. DNS resolution follows the CNAME to the shared SRV RRset. The agency can now change the relay selection for all three destinations in one place.¶
A CNAME redirects only its owner name (Section 3.6.2 of [RFC1034]).
In Example B the CNAME is at the full service name. A CNAME at
2.978879.ipn.arpa. would not redirect the SRV lookup. A CNAME
record and an SRV RRset cannot coexist at the same owner name.¶
The SRV lookup can follow a CNAME or DNAME. In contrast, an SRV
Target other than . must have address records at that name, without
CNAME or DNAME redirection ([RFC2782]; Section 5.1 of [RFC6672]).¶
Other CLs can define bindings that use the same DNS base name. For
SVCB, [RFC9460] and the applicable binding govern AliasMode,
ServiceMode, parameter compatibility, endpoint selection, and fallback.
SRV rules do not carry over: in ServiceMode, an SVCB TargetName of
. denotes the record's owner name in the response, not service
unavailability (Section 2.5.2 of [RFC9460]).¶
A BP Agent need not query for every CL it supports. This document specifies no order in which to try them.¶
Discovery succeeds when a BP Agent obtains usable connection information. A valid DNS answer need not contain a usable candidate: the discovery binding and the record-type specification determine compatibility and candidate selection (Section 3.2, Section 3.5). A candidate is an endpoint at the destination or at a relay. Discovery does not guarantee current reachability, acceptance of a session or bundle, or eventual delivery.¶
Negative answers concern the name at the end of any alias chain (Section 2 of [RFC2308]):¶
That name does not exist.¶
That name exists, but has no RRset of the requested type. The response code is NOERROR; the answer can still contain aliases.¶
A SERVFAIL response, a timeout, or another resolution failure gives no answer about service availability. None of these outcomes makes the FQNN invalid. Absence of one CL's records does not rule out another CL's service.¶
An unsuccessful lookup does not invalidate independently obtained forwarding information or require deletion of a bundle. The BP Agent's existing policies govern retries and route precedence.¶
Resolvers cache positive answers ([RFC1034]), negative answers ([RFC2308]), and resolution failures ([RFC9520]). A negative answer to a refresh is a completed lookup, not a resolution failure.¶
A BP Agent need not repeat discovery for each bundle. For a retained candidate, the first TTL to expire among the RRsets used to obtain it limits its freshness. These can include alias, service, and address RRsets. Copying the candidate into a forwarding table does not refresh it. TTL expiry does not require closing an established CL session or deleting a bundle; refreshed data informs later connections.¶
If the BP Agent cannot refresh an expired result, explicit operational policy governs its continued use. Endpoints, aliases, or administrative control may have changed. This differs from a resolver serving stale DNS data under [RFC8767].¶
TTL expiry also differs from signature expiry. DNSSEC validation checks the RRSIG validity period (Section 5.3.1 of [RFC4035]); the signature expiration time limits the TTL of authenticated data (Section 5.3.3 of [RFC4035]). Retaining a candidate does not extend that validity period (Section 5.2.1).¶
Local discovery under 0.ipn.arpa. or an Experimental Use allocator
subtree (Section 7.2) requires explicit DNS
configuration. A resolver can serve the local zone itself or send
queries to a configured server for that subtree. This document
requests neither automatic resolver behavior nor additions to the
IANA "Locally-Served DNS Zones" registry [RFC6303].¶
The signed public hierarchy can authenticate the absence of a name in public DNS, but not a conflicting local answer. A validator can authenticate a signed local zone with a configured local trust anchor (Section 7 of [RFC6303]; for nested anchors, see Section 5.10 of [RFC6840]). The trust configuration belongs where validation takes place: at the trusted resolver (Section 5.2.1) or at a BP Agent that validates independently.¶
A deployment can accept unsigned local data under explicit policy; that is not successful DNSSEC validation. Administrators should scope local resolution and trust settings to the relevant subtrees, not to all of ipn.arpa. Queries should stay within that scope even when local resolution fails. Public fallback cannot supply the local data and can disclose the queried identifiers ([RFC6303]; Section 5.4).¶
An Allocator can hold a range of Allocator Identifiers
(Section 3.2.1 of [RFC9758]). Each identifier has a separate name
under ipn.arpa.; DNS has no numeric-range syntax. An agency that
wants to keep discovery records in its existing zone can request one
parent-side DNAME per identifier (Section 7.3.2).¶
For example, the agency in Section 3.3 also holds identifiers 974848
and 974849. The ipn.arpa. operator publishes:¶
$ORIGIN ipn.arpa. $TTL 3600 974848 IN DNAME 974848.space-agency.example. 974849 IN DNAME 974849.space-agency.example.¶
The agency publishes both sets of records in its existing
space-agency.example. zone. Neither DNAME target needs to be a
zone cut. The relay names below are relative to the agency's zone
(Figure 1).¶
$ORIGIN space-agency.example. $TTL 3600 ; ipn:974848.2.345 _dtn-bundle._tcp.2.974848 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-a _dtn-bundle._tcp.2.974848 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-b ; ipn:974849.2.345 _dtn-bundle._tcp.2.974849 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-a _dtn-bundle._tcp.2.974849 IN SRV 10 1 4556 relay-b¶
For ipn:974848.2.345, the BP Agent queries for SRV at
_dtn-bundle._tcp.2.974848.ipn.arpa. (Section 3.2). DNS
substitutes 974848.space-agency.example. for the matching suffix and
continues the lookup at
_dtn-bundle._tcp.2.974848.space-agency.example.. A DNAME redirects
descendants of its owner; it does not redirect the owner itself
([RFC6672]).¶
Distinct target names keep node 2 in each allocator space distinct, even though both use the same relays. Using the allocator number as a label is a convenience. If both DNAMEs had the same target, both queries would reach the same SRV owner.¶
Tools such as BIND's $GENERATE directive [BIND-ARM] can abbreviate
repetitive zone-file entries. They produce ordinary DNS records.¶
DNSSEC authenticates DNS data (Section 5.2), not the live session peer. The CL specification and configured security policy govern peer authentication (Section 5.3).¶
A BP Agent uses DNS-derived forwarding information according to its configured forwarding policy. That policy may permit automatic use of authenticated discovery mappings, subject to the security requirements of the applicable CL.¶
Forged discovery information can redirect connection attempts and bundle transfers to an endpoint an attacker selects. DNSSEC [RFC9364] provides data origin authentication and integrity, not a guarantee of service availability (see also Section 7.1 of [RFC6116] on ENUM).¶
Operators publishing discovery data for this mechanism in the public DNS SHOULD provide DNSSEC authentication of that data, including the necessary chain of trust. This includes every RRset used for discovery, even outside ipn.arpa: aliases and redirections (CNAME, DNAME, or SVCB AliasMode), service and connection parameters (such as SRV or SVCB ServiceMode), and addresses.¶
Signing ipn.arpa (Section 7.1) does not authenticate data in delegated zones or external target namespaces. Likewise, validating a service RRset does not authenticate address RRsets supplied with it. A CNAME synthesized from a validated DNAME needs no signature of its own. The validator checks the substitution (Section 5.3.1 of [RFC6672]).¶
BP Agents using public DNS discovery SHOULD use DNSSEC validation, either locally or through a trusted validating resolver. When a BP Agent relies on validation by another resolver, the resolver and the channel to it need to satisfy the trust requirements of Section 4.9.3 of [RFC4035].¶
Section 4.3 of [RFC4035] distinguishes secure, insecure, bogus, and indeterminate RRsets. Insecure means the validator has established that no chain of trust reaches the RRset from any configured trust anchor, for example through proof of an unsigned delegation. An insecure RRset can still have signatures. Missing signatures where a secure chain requires them can make the result bogus. If the validator cannot determine whether to expect signatures, the status is indeterminate.¶
A BP Agent may not know the resolver's validation result. A missing authentication indication does not establish that an RRset is insecure. The BP Agent's configured policy governs acceptance of insecure results and results whose status it does not know.¶
A known validation failure is a failure of that discovery path (Section 4.1). It should not trigger automatic acceptance of the same data through an unvalidated path. The BP Agent can still retrieve DNSSEC data for independent validation. For local trust configuration, see Section 4.3.¶
For TCPCLv4, Section 4.4 of [TCPCL] specifies session security. In Example A (Section 3.3), three identifiers have different roles:¶
_dtn-bundle._tcp.2.978879.ipn.arpa. is the SRV query name. It
comes from the destination FQNN.¶
If the BP Agent selects relay-a.space-agency.example., it resolves
that SRV Target to establish the TCP connection. When policy calls
for network-level authentication, that host name is the DNS-ID
reference identifier (Section 4.4.4.2 of [TCPCL]). If the TLS
client sends the server_name extension, it uses the relay host name,
not the query name (Section 4.4.3 of [TCPCL]).¶
The relay can supply its own Node ID in SESS_INIT. The DNS-ID check does not authenticate that Node ID, and discovery supplies no expected peer Node ID. Section 4.6 of [TCPCL] specifies how to handle absent, unexpected, or unauthenticated peer Node IDs.¶
The bundle's destination EID remains ipn:978879.2.345.¶
Public records can associate destination identifiers with services, relays, and addresses (Section 3.3.3). Queries can reveal to resolvers and other observers which destinations a BP Agent tries to reach and when. DNSSEC does not provide confidentiality. [RFC9076] discusses resolver selection and encrypted DNS transports; Section 4.3 covers containment of local queries.¶
Traffic for many distinct FQNNs can consume resolver, memory, and connection resources. Implementations SHOULD bound outstanding discovery work, retained discovery state, and connection attempts, for example with resolver, queue, and connection limits.¶
This document requests IAB approval for ipn.arpa as an infrastructure namespace under Section 3 of [RFC3172]. The two 32-bit components of an FQNN, the Allocator Identifier and Node Number, determine the DNS base name for discovery (Section 3.1). The precedent is e164.arpa: an ENUM client derives a name from an E.164 telephone number and queries it for NAPTR records [RFC6116].¶
Following IAB approval under Section 3 of [RFC3172], IANA is requested to add ipn.arpa to the arpa domain for names derived from FQNNs (Section 3.1).¶
IANA is requested to arrange ongoing administration, including request processing (Section 7.3), as approved by the IAB. The ipn.arpa operator provisions and operates the zone; IANA need not operate the authoritative servers itself.¶
The ipn.arpa operator MUST sign the public ipn.arpa zone using DNSSEC and maintain a chain of trust through the arpa zone. For the recommendation to operators of delegated zones and other namespaces, see Section 5.2.¶
This document excludes two sets of names from public DNS discovery. The restrictions do not change any allocation or its Bundle Protocol semantics under [RFC9758]. At or beneath each restricted name, they cover discovery records, NS delegations to servers that publish such records, and CNAME or DNAME redirections that expose discovery data elsewhere in the global DNS.¶
The public ipn.arpa zone omits these allocator names and their descendants. Queries for them receive ordinary DNS negative answers with normal DNSSEC processing. For home.arpa, an insecure public delegation accommodates validators without local trust configuration (Section 6.2 of [RFC8375]; Section 7 of [RFC8375]); this document requests no such delegation. See Section 4.3 for local resolution and trust configuration.¶
Allocator Identifier zero denotes the Default Allocator
(Section 3.2.2 of [RFC9758]). Public DNS discovery for its FQNNs is
outside this document's scope. A populated 0.ipn.arpa. zone
MUST NOT be published in the public ipn.arpa hierarchy. Local
resolvers or servers MAY serve it authoritatively, as with the reverse
zones for [RFC1918] private address space
(Section 4.1 of [RFC6303]).¶
The restriction covers assigned Node Numbers as well as Private Use Node Numbers 1 through 16383 (Section 3.4.3 of [RFC9758]) and Node Numbers 2097152 through 268435455 reserved for Private or Experimental Use (Section 3.2.1 of [RFC7116]; Section 9.2 of [RFC9758]). Public support would require administration and delegation procedures for existing assignments and a way to handle private ranges and locally served data.¶
Note to the Working Group (to be removed before publication as an RFC): The working group can reconsider public DNS support for Allocator Identifier zero if it chooses to take on that scope.¶
Section 9.1 of [RFC9758] designates Allocator Identifiers 1073741824 through 2147483647 (0x40000000 through 0x7FFFFFFF) as Experimental Use. Independent experiments can reuse these identifiers (Section 4.2 of [RFC8126]), so no single public mapping can represent them all.¶
For each Experimental Use Allocator Identifier A, a populated subtree
beneath A.ipn.arpa. MUST NOT be published in the public ipn.arpa
hierarchy. Local DNS resolvers or servers MAY serve names beneath
A.ipn.arpa. within the scope of an experiment.¶
IANA and the ipn.arpa operator are requested to maintain a procedure
that links each provisioning request for A.ipn.arpa. to the entry
for Allocator Identifier A in the "'ipn' Scheme URI Allocator
Identifiers" registry
(Section 9.1 of [RFC9758]). They determine the request interface,
storage format, and presentation of provisioning information.¶
A requester can seek DNS provisioning at assignment or later. An allocator assignment remains valid and usable without a DNS entry. Only Allocator Identifiers assigned for operational use are eligible for public provisioning. This excludes Allocator Identifier zero (Section 7.2.1), Experimental Use Allocator Identifiers (Section 7.2.2), unassigned or reserved identifiers, and the Example Range, 974848 through 978943 (Section 9.1 of [RFC9758]).¶
The allocator's authorized DNS administrators manage node-level records and further delegations. Neither IANA nor the ipn.arpa operator needs to provision individual Node Numbers.¶
A requester chooses one parent-zone configuration for A.ipn.arpa.:¶
The requester supplies the domain names of the authoritative nameservers, any addresses needed for glue, and any DS records (Section 7.3.3).¶
The requester supplies the fully qualified target domain name (Section 4.4).¶
A parent-side DNAME cannot coexist with a delegation NS RRset or its DS records at the same name (Section 2.3 of [RFC6672]).¶
One request can cover several identifiers in the requester's allocation. It specifies the configuration for each identifier; each allocator name has its own parent-zone records.¶
The ipn.arpa operator MUST support authenticated requests to add, update, and remove DS records for delegated allocator zones. Section 7.3.1 applies to these requests. The child-zone operator coordinates signing-key changes that affect a parent DS record with updates to that record. Support for DS does not require every delegated zone to be signed.¶
DS records apply to NS delegations, not parent-side DNAMEs. The ipn.arpa operator signs a DNAME as data in ipn.arpa. Authentication of data at its target depends on the target namespace's own chain of trust.¶
Section 9.1 of [RFC9758] governs numeric assignments, including Expert Review. The ipn.arpa operator checks DNS provisioning requests under its published technical procedures. IANA's requirements for delegations [IANA-NS-REQS] provide background for NS requests; [RFC6672] specifies the DNS requirements for DNAME redirection.¶