Internet-Draft IP Enclave Boundary Signaling November 2026
Kline Expires 23 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling-04
Published:
Intended Status:
Experimental
Expires:
Author:
E. Kline
Aalyria Technologies Inc.

IP Enclave Boundary Signaling

Abstract

This document defines optional ICMP extension objects that a gateway at the boundary between an IP enclave and a managed constrained long-haul link, such as a scheduled deep-space link, can attach to existing Destination Unreachable messages. On the unreachable errors generated when an admitted packet cannot be forwarded because the required link is presently unusable, the objects convey the expected time until the link becomes usable, the time the estimate was generated, and the expected one-way delay of the link. On the administrative prohibition errors generated when the link's admission policy refuses a packet, a presence-only object identifies boundary-link admission policy as the source of the refusal. The underlying codes retain their existing meanings, and this document requests no new ICMP type or code. It specifies when the objects may be attached and what they convey, not how transports, applications, or hosts react to them; making the boundary's knowledge available to senders is intended to enable experimentation with such reactions.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ekline.github.io/draft-icmp-boundary-signaling/draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the INTAREA Working Group mailing list (mailto:int-area@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/int-area/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/ekline/draft-icmp-boundary-signaling.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Some IP enclaves reach other networks only over managed long-haul links, such as a satellite link available during scheduled passes. A boundary gateway can report a forwarding failure in a local round-trip time even when the interruption lasts hours. An ordinary Destination Unreachable error does not tell the sender when the link is expected to become usable. An administrative prohibition error alone does not identify which policy refused the packet.

This document defines optional ICMP extension objects [RFC4884] for existing Destination Unreachable errors. If an admitted packet cannot be forwarded because its required link is unusable, the gateway can report the message generation time, the expected time until the link is usable, and the expected one-way link delay. If the managed service's admission policy refuses the packet, a presence-only object can identify that policy as the source of the refusal. The gateway follows its usual rules to decide whether to send an error and which code to use (Section 5.2.1). The objects describe why a packet could not be forwarded. They do not advertise services in advance. This document does not specify how a sender reacts to the error (Section 7.2, Section 10).

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Enclave:

an IP network whose connectivity to other networks passes over one or more managed constrained long-haul links.

Constrained long-haul link:

a link connecting enclaves whose usability is high-delay, scheduled, intermittent, or otherwise restricted according to knowledge held by the managing domain, and whose use is governed by admission policy. Ordinary transient interface or carrier failure does not by itself make a link a managed constrained long-haul link (Section 3).

Managed service:

the domain's knowledge that a particular constrained long-haul link, or a sequence of link opportunities, is intended to carry particular traffic, together with the associated schedule, admission policy, and forwarding state. A managed service may exist while no route to its destination is currently installed.

Orchestration function:

the logical function, possibly distributed across cooperating administrative domains and not necessarily continuously reachable, that manages the constrained long-haul links, distributes routing and policy updates for them, and supplies gateways with the knowledge on which the objects in this document are based.

Contact:

an interval during which a constrained long-haul link is planned to carry traffic between a gateway and its remote counterpart.

Contact plan:

the schedule of contacts for a link or set of links, distributed to gateways in advance of execution. A contact plan is one form of managed-service knowledge, not the only one.

Gateway:

the router at the boundary between an enclave and a constrained long-haul link, holding the managed-service knowledge for that link and attaching the objects defined in this document.

Coordination scope:

the set of links, routes, and admission policies under the same orchestration function, whose current state a gateway's assertions describe.

Disclosure scope:

the administrative boundary within which the objects are generated and within which their contents are considered appropriate to reveal. It is at most the coordination scope and may be narrower.

Trans-boundary traffic:

traffic whose path crosses a gateway onto a constrained long-haul link.

Admission:

a gateway's determination, against local policy, that particular traffic may use a constrained long-haul link.

Link Condition Object:

an ICMP extension object of the class defined in Section 5.3, carrying constrained long-haul link metadata on a Destination Unreachable message.

Carrier code:

an existing Destination Unreachable code on which one or more Link Condition Objects may be carried (Section 5.2.1).

Expected Time Until Link Usability (ETU):

the gateway's estimate, at generation of a notification, of the interval from generation until the relevant constrained long-haul link is expected to become usable for forwarding (Section 5.3.3).

Enclave time reference:

the shared time reference, established by the specification or provisioning of the managed deployment, against which Generation Time is expressed (Section 5.3.2). Its time scale, epoch, and discontinuity treatment are deployment choices, not protocol prerequisites; UTC is one permitted choice.

3. Applicability

The mechanisms in this document apply to deployments in which one or more constrained long-haul links connect IP enclaves, and in which the links, the routes over them, and the admission policies governing them are managed by a common orchestration function. When several long-haul options exist for the same traffic, this document assumes they participate in the same logical orchestration. This does not require a single physical controller, a particular routing protocol, or continuous connectivity between gateways and the controller (Section 4.3). The objects are specified for use under a single administrative authority or cooperating authorities sharing the coordination and disclosure scopes defined below. [RFC8799] provides broader context on limited-domain deployments.

The coordination scope is the set of links, routes, and policies the participating domains manage together for the affected traffic. A failed interface alone does not establish that the managed service is unavailable. If a usable, policy-permitted path within that scope can serve the traffic, the gateway uses it (Section 6).

The disclosure scope is the administrative boundary within which the domains agree to share the objects. Gateways send them only toward senders in their local enclave, not across the constrained long-haul link. This lets a sender learn of an outage while the information is still useful. A policy refusal does not depend on an outage. Agreement on disclosure does not authenticate ICMP messages (Section 11).

4. Concept of Operations

This section is informative. It describes a representative deployment: an IP-based enclave in Mars orbit and on the Martian surface, connected to terrestrial networks through scheduled deep-space contacts. Host and application behaviors described here are illustrations of what the signals make possible, not requirements (Section 7.2).

4.1. Reference Scenario

The enclave consists of surface assets and orbiters interconnected by conventional IP links, with propagation delays of milliseconds to low seconds and continuous or near-continuous connectivity. Standard IP routing and transports operate normally within it.

The enclave connects to Earth through gateway nodes on relay orbiters equipped with deep-space links. These links are scheduled: contacts with ground stations occur in windows determined by orbital geometry and antenna allocation, known in advance through a contact plan. They are high-delay: one-way light time to Earth is roughly 3 to 22 minutes. And they are policy-managed: contact capacity is allocated to specific senders or traffic classes, and traffic outside those allocations is not authorized to use the link.

A gateway may also offer a Bundle Protocol version 7 [RFC9171] or application-layer gateway service that accepts traffic under its own policy. The ICMP cases here concern packets refused or not forwarded by the IP forwarding service; they do not describe traffic accepted for delivery by a separate service. BP is not required for this ICMP mechanism.

The Provisioning Domain (PvD) option in IPv6 Router Advertisements identifies a PvD and indicates whether PvD Additional Information is available ([RFC8801]). Hosts can retrieve that information as a JSON object over HTTPS, independently of ICMP.

Future work could define JSON keys for local services, such as an SMTP submission or relay service or a Bundle Protocol agent. This would reuse PvD discovery without a new Router Advertisement option. If the information and everything needed to retrieve it are available within the enclave, hosts can consult it even during an external-link outage. This document defines no service keys or application behavior and does not require PvD support.

The same structure exists on the Earth side. A terrestrial sender's traffic crosses an Earth-side gateway that holds the same contact plan and enforces its own admission policy, and that gateway generates the same signals toward terrestrial senders. This section describes the Mars side for concreteness.

4.2. Roles

Enclave hosts originate and receive application traffic. Some are DTN-aware, running a BP agent or a stack extension that can hand traffic to one; others are unmodified IP hosts, including legacy instruments and commercial payloads whose stacks predate this specification. Where a performance-enhancing proxy (PEP) terminates transport sessions on behalf of such hosts, the PEP can consume these signals for them, so that the mechanism's benefit need not depend on universal host adoption.

Gateways hold the managed-service knowledge for their deep-space links, enforce admission and precedence policy on contact capacity, and attach the objects defined in this document: availability metadata on the unreachable error generated when admitted trans-boundary traffic arrives while the link is not usable, and the Denied by Link Policy object on the administrative prohibition error generated when traffic arrives that policy does not admit.

An orchestration function, which may be Earth-based, distributes contact plans, routing updates, and admission policy to gateways in advance (Section 4.3). It is intended to steer trans-boundary traffic toward whichever gateway and link can serve it. Routing, link, and policy updates are not installed atomically, however, and distribution itself crosses the deep-space link; during transitions, or when plan and reality diverge, a gateway may receive traffic that another gateway could have served. Gateways operate autonomously between management contacts on their most recent applicable knowledge and omit assertions they cannot currently support (Section 6).

Intra-enclave traffic is unaffected; hosts that never originate trans-boundary traffic need not implement the objects.

4.3. Orchestration Example

This subsection illustrates one feasible path by which a gateway obtains the knowledge on which it bases the objects. It describes conceptual information, not a management protocol, data model, or scheduling algorithm; any existing management channel, controller interface, or local provisioning may carry it.

Times in this example are expressed in the enclave time reference (Section 5.3.2) as seconds from its epoch; the deployment has chosen the reference, and nothing here depends on which one. The orchestration function determines that traffic for a terrestrial destination prefix should, for an upcoming period, leave the enclave via a particular relay orbiter's deep-space link, whose next contact begins at reference time 12,400 s. Allowing for antenna pointing, acquisition, and modem configuration, it expects the link to be ready to forward traffic at reference time 12,520 s, and it estimates the one-way delay over the link at that time as 20 minutes. It installs or schedules the routing and admission policy needed for that link, and supplies an associated record. In this example, the gateway uses the following information:

  • the traffic-to-service binding: the destination prefix and the routing or policy context to which the record applies, associated with the relevant link or next managed opportunity;

  • a revision identifier or equivalent coherence mechanism, an applicability period, and validity or expiry information;

  • optionally, the expected data-plane-ready time, or a duration with an explicit reference time;

  • optionally, a directional one-way link-delay estimate applicable to that opportunity; and

  • the admission and disclosure policy that applies, together with whatever local evidence the gateway has about the link's actual usability.

Delivering this record is only part of the implementation. The gateway's error-generation path must be able to consult it when forwarding fails, including when the route to the destination has been withdrawn between contacts and the failure is reported as a no-route error. Any absolute time the controller supplies must either be expressed in, or come with a known conversion into, the gateway's enclave time reference (Section 5.3.2); alternatively the controller may supply a duration anchored to a reference time the gateway can interpret. A readiness time the gateway cannot relate to its own reference is not a basis for ETU.

At reference time 10,000 s, a packet for the prefix arrives at the gateway. No usable route exists, so ordinary rules produce a Destination Unreachable error. The gateway consults its record, finds it current and applicable, confirms the traffic is admitted, and attaches Generation Time (10,000 s), ETU (the interval from 10,000 s to 12,520 s, 2,520,000 ms), and Expected Link Delay (1,200,000 ms). Generation Time is the time the ICMP message was generated, not the time the orchestrator created or distributed the plan.

Several operational cases follow from this model, and Section 9 draws the corresponding lessons:

  • A later plan revision selects a different link or changes the readiness estimate. Subsequent notifications use the current applicable information; earlier notifications cannot be recalled.

  • The planned readiness time passes but acquisition fails. The gateway does not continue reporting a countdown clamped to zero; it either has a newly supported estimate, or it omits ETU. An Expected Link Delay that remains valid for the selected link need not be omitted.

  • Controller connectivity is lost. A still-valid local record remains usable unless contradicted by local evidence; when it expires or becomes incoherent, the basis for the affected objects is gone and they are omitted. Ordinary errors continue to be generated.

  • Routing state and metadata revisions temporarily disagree, for instance when a route has migrated to a second gateway but the first gateway's record has not yet been updated. The gateway omits assertions it cannot support rather than describing a service opportunity other than the one applicable to the traffic.

4.4. Use Cases

A surface host begins a bulk transfer toward Earth between contacts. The first packet reaches the gateway, which drops it and returns a Destination Unreachable error carrying an Expected Time Until Link Usability object. From the object, the host knows that the domain regards the path as transiently unavailable and roughly how long that is expected to last; from the bare error alone it would know only that the packet was not delivered. It might use the metadata to avoid repeated attempts that would elicit the same error, and to tell the application that the path is deferred rather than failed (Section 7.2).

4.4.2. Reconsidering the Communication Mechanism

An application that learns, from a Link Condition Object, that its present IP traffic will be deferred for a long interval or was refused by boundary-link admission policy may reconsider its end-to-end communication options. A DTN-aware host might hand the affected traffic to its local BP agent, which originates bundles toward the destination for forwarding during the next contact. An application with separately provisioned knowledge of an authorized application-layer gateway might direct its traffic there. An application with its own delay tolerance might instead compare the expected wait against that tolerance and fail fast.

The object is a trigger to reconsider, not a description of the alternatives. Configuration, discovery, or provisioning supplies the alternative mechanism and its authorization; the object does not prove that another mechanism exists, is admitted, or will succeed, and it does not require the application to change anything.

A misconfigured or newly integrated payload host sends best-effort traffic toward Earth during a contact whose capacity is allocated to command and telemetry classes. The gateway classifies the traffic against its local policy, which may consider DSCP, addresses, protocol and port, or any other criteria, and drops it. Ordinary rules and local response policy call for a Destination Unreachable, Communication Administratively Prohibited error; the gateway attaches the Denied by Link Policy object to it. From the object, the host learns that the refusal came from the admission policy of the long-haul service rather than from some other administrative control such as a firewall; from the bare error it would know only that communication was administratively prohibited. The object does not say why the traffic was refused or what traffic would be admitted: admission policy is multidimensional and local, and coaching senders on acceptable markings would invert an admission model in which access is granted through the control plane. The operator debugging the flow consults the gateway's own logs and counters (Section 9); obtaining admission is a provisioning action. The application may reconsider its communication mechanism (Section 4.4.2).

A contact can start with a flow admitted. To serve higher-precedence traffic, the admission policy can later withdraw that flow's permission to use the managed service. The gateway can attach the object if ordinary ICMP rules and local response policy call for an administrative prohibition error (Section 6).

If the flow remains admitted, scheduling preference, queue overflow, or congestion does not constitute refusal. An internal label such as "preemption" or "resource allocation" does not determine whether the object applies.

4.4.4. Plan/Reality Divergence

Notifications that conflict with the currently applicable service expectation can be evidence of divergence between the control plane's model and the data plane's state. Examples include ETU or ELD reporting unavailability after expected data-plane readiness, or a Denied by Link Policy object for traffic that installed policy should admit. A planned contact alone does not establish readiness: preparation may continue after contact start (Section 4.3). Authorized traffic between contacts can legitimately elicit availability metadata. Gateway counters provide diagnostic evidence, not proof of failure (Section 9).

4.5. Interaction of the Two Signals

A sender can receive both signals for the same flow at different times. If admission policy refuses a packet, the sender may receive an administrative prohibition error with the Denied by Link Policy object. If policy later admits the flow but the required link is still unusable, its next packet may elicit an unreachable error with availability metadata. The gateway checks admission before it discloses link state (Section 6); Section 5.4 lists the objects permitted on each carrier group.

An unreachable error alone does not establish permanent failure: routing transients can cause it (Section 3.2.2.1 of [RFC1122]), and [RFC6069] used such errors experimentally to indicate disruption.

5. Message Formats and Extension Objects

This section is normative. The Link Condition Object class is shown as TBD5 pending IANA assignment (Section 12); prior to assignment, experiments use a locally coordinated Private Use class as described in Section 10.1. The carrier codes of Section 5.2.1 are already assigned, and this document requests no new ICMP type or code.

5.1. Common Message Format

The objects are carried in Destination Unreachable messages: ICMPv6 Type 1 [RFC4443] and ICMPv4 Type 3 [RFC0792]. [RFC4884] already permits an ICMP Extension Structure on the existing Destination Unreachable message types of both IP versions; no new type or code is needed to carry the objects defined here. The message layout is the extended Destination Unreachable message of [RFC4884]; this document adds no fields. The Length field, original-datagram truncation and padding, extension header, and checksum rules follow Section 4 of [RFC4884] and Section 7 of [RFC4884]. Attaching extension objects to Destination Unreachable is an established pattern ([RFC4950], [RFC5837], [RFC8883]).

 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|     Type      |     Code      |            Checksum           |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|    Length     |                    Unused                     |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
~   As much of the invoking packet as possible, zero-padded    ~
|   per Section 4 of RFC 4884                                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
~              ICMP Extension Structure (RFC 4884)              ~
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Extended Destination Unreachable (ICMPv6 layout shown; ICMPv4 places Length in the second octet of the second word)

The objects add to a Destination Unreachable message; they never change what its code means. A message that carries no Link Condition Objects, whether because the gateway attached none or because the receiver ignores or does not process extensions, is an ordinary Destination Unreachable message and means only what its code has always meant. Absence of an object supplies no inference: it does not indicate that admission succeeded or failed, that a constrained long-haul link was or was not involved, or that any prediction exists. A message carrying no objects defined here need not carry an extension structure at all, and an extension structure, when present, may also carry other independently applicable [RFC4884] objects. Recognition of a carrier code implies nothing about extension support; the extension structure lies beyond the portion of the original datagram that extension-unaware receivers examine.

A receiver that processes extensions MUST ignore Link Condition Objects with an unrecognized C-Type, and MUST process at most one object of each C-Type per message, taking the first if several are present. A receiver MUST ignore a Link Condition Object that is not applicable to the received Destination Unreachable code (Section 5.4), and MUST ignore a Link Condition Object whose Length is not valid for its C-Type (Section 5.3). An unrecognized, inapplicable, or invalid-length Link Condition Object does not by itself invalidate the underlying ICMP error; this tolerance does not extend to malformed extension framing or an invalid extension checksum, which are handled per [RFC4884].

When a gateway does not forward an otherwise admitted packet because the constrained long-haul link required to reach its destination is presently unusable, it generates whatever Destination Unreachable error the ordinary rules of [RFC1812] or [RFC4443] call for, according to its own forwarding state. This document does not change which code is generated or when. It permits the gateway to attach availability metadata -- the Generation Time, Expected Time Until Link Usability, and Expected Link Delay objects -- to that error, subject to the conditions in this section.

A gateway MAY attach availability metadata to a Destination Unreachable message only when all of the following hold:

  • the gateway holds a sufficiently current and applicable managed-service association between the invoking traffic and a constrained long-haul link, or next managed opportunity, within its coordination scope;

  • according to the current coordinated forwarding state, no other policy-permitted path within the coordination scope is presently available to serve that traffic;

  • the traffic is admitted to that service;

  • the link is presently unusable, and the managed-service knowledge represents that unusability as a transient interruption of a service that is intended to resume;

  • the invoking packet was not forwarded; and

  • the message's code is an eligible availability carrier code (Section 5.2.1).

The second condition is an assertion about the current managed forwarding state for the affected traffic within the coordination scope (Section 3). The transient interruption may coincide with absence of an installed route: a domain may withdraw the route to a destination between contacts while retaining the managed-service knowledge that explains the failure, and the resulting no-route error is an eligible carrier. A gateway that meets these conditions but has no estimate to supply, or withholds estimates by policy, sends the ordinary error without the objects; the gateway need not know when the condition will clear.

These assertions are carried by the Expected Time Until Link Usability and Expected Link Delay objects and attach to nothing else (Section 5.1). A Generation Time object supplies a timestamp and is not by itself evidence of any particular cause of failure.

5.2.1. Eligible Carrier Codes

Link Condition Objects are applicable only to the Destination Unreachable codes listed in this section, and each object is applicable only to the carrier group indicated (Section 5.4). Link Condition Objects MUST NOT be attached to other Destination Unreachable codes or to other ICMP error types. In every case the code is selected by existing ICMP rules according to the gateway's forwarding state and response policy; this document neither alters that selection nor redefines any code.

5.2.1.1. Availability Carriers

The availability metadata objects (Generation Time, Expected Time Until Link Usability, Expected Link Delay) may be carried on the following codes.

For ICMPv6, per Section 3.1 of [RFC4443]:

Table 1: Eligible ICMPv6 Availability Carrier Codes
Type 1 Code Name Eligibility
0 No route to destination Eligible when the forwarding table lacks a matching entry for the destination and the gateway holds the managed-service knowledge required by Section 5.2.
3 Address unreachable Eligible when the gateway retains a route whose required link is unusable and no more specific code applies. [RFC4443] names a link-specific problem as an example of this code.

For ICMPv4, per Section 4.3.3.1 of [RFC1812] and Section 5.2.7.1 of [RFC1812]:

Table 2: Eligible ICMPv4 Availability Carrier Codes
Type 3 Code Name Eligibility
0 Network unreachable Eligible when ordinary forwarding failure warrants Network Unreachable, such as absence of any route to the destination network.
1 Host unreachable Eligible when ordinary forwarding failure warrants Host Unreachable; see the IPv4 scope clarification below.

A domain can withdraw a route between contacts and still retain knowledge of the future service. In IPv6, if the gateway instead retains the route but the required link is unusable, Address Unreachable can apply when no more specific code applies.

For IPv4, this specification defines no new code-selection rule for a retained route whose required transit link is unusable. An otherwise valid ICMPv4 Type 3 Code 0 or Code 1 error can carry availability metadata when all conditions in Section 5.2 are met. Carrier eligibility does not change when the gateway generates the underlying error. If ordinary ICMP processing produces no eligible error, this specification provides no availability-metadata notification for that case. A gateway need not change the selected code or withdraw a route to obtain an eligible carrier.

5.2.1.2. Policy Carriers

A gateway can attach the Denied by Link Policy object only if the error it generates under ordinary ICMP rules uses a code listed below. If ordinary processing selects another code, the gateway retains that code and omits the object.

Table 3: Eligible Policy Carrier Codes
IP version Type Code Existing meaning
IPv4 3 13 Communication Administratively Prohibited (Section 5.2.7.1 of [RFC1812])
IPv6 1 1 Communication with destination administratively prohibited (Section 3.1 of [RFC4443])

[RFC4443]'s reference to a firewall filter is an example of administrative prohibition, not an exclusive definition. The object identifies boundary-link admission policy as the particular administrative control that refused the packet; it does not introduce a different meaning for the base code.

5.3. Extension Objects

The objects below share a single ICMP Extension Object class, the Link Condition Object class (Class-Num TBD5), distinguished by C-Type. The object header is as defined in Section 8 of [RFC4884]. No object is mandatory. Which objects a message may carry depends on the Destination Unreachable code it reports (Section 5.4); within that set, each object is optional and absence means only that the gateway did not supply that information (Section 5.1). No sentinel values are defined for absent data. Because the class includes both availability metadata and a policy indication, each assertion in this document is attributed to the specific object that carries it.

Each object has exactly one valid Length: 12 octets for Generation Time, 8 for Expected Time Until Link Usability and Expected Link Delay, and 4 for Denied by Link Policy. A receiver MUST ignore a Link Condition Object whose Length does not match the value for its C-Type (Section 5.1).

The two duration objects, Expected Time Until Link Usability and Expected Link Delay, are defined and encoded independently of the Generation Time object. Their interpretation does not depend on the absolute timestamp representation, so that representation could later be revised or superseded without changing them.

5.3.1. Duration Format

Both duration objects carry an unsigned 32-bit integer count of milliseconds. Millisecond precision is not intrinsically necessary for every value of Expected Time Until Link Usability, but a single representation for both duration-valued objects reduces implementation complexity and the risk of unit-conversion errors. [RFC4884] defines the extension object framework but no duration datatype; the representation is defined here.

The maximum representable duration, 0xFFFFFFFF milliseconds, is 4,294,967.295 seconds, approximately 49.7 days. It is a valid finite value, not a sentinel. If an otherwise available estimate exceeds the maximum representable duration, the corresponding object MUST NOT be included. No value is reserved to mean infinite, unknown, or greater than the maximum, and no saturation is defined; absence of an object means only that no representable estimate was supplied, and the protocol does not distinguish an unknown estimate from one that is known but not representable.

5.3.2. Generation Time

 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|         Length = 12           |  Class-Num =  |  C-Type = 1   |
|                               |     TBD5      |               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
+                       Generation Time                         +
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Generation Time Object

Generation Time is the gateway's reading of the applicable enclave time reference at the moment it generated the ICMP message. It is the time of the notification, not the time at which any underlying plan was created or distributed, and not an arbitrary device-local clock.

Following the timestamp specification template of Section 3 of [RFC8877], this document fixes the timestamp syntax and units and leaves the remaining semantics to the deployment:

Size:

64 bits in network byte order: a 32-bit unsigned count of whole seconds followed by a 32-bit unsigned binary fraction of a second.

Units and resolution:

seconds and 2^-32 seconds respectively; 1,000 milliseconds per second, consistent with the duration objects. No planetary or calendar units are used on the wire.

Wraparound:

the seconds field wraps every 2^32 seconds. No era number is carried; era resolution is performed against the applicable enclave time reference, not against an implicit wall clock.

Epoch, time scale, and leap seconds:

supplied by the enclave time reference. The specification or provisioning of the managed deployment MUST establish the time scale, epoch, treatment of discontinuities such as leap seconds or clock resets, and era or wraparound interpretation, and MUST define the relationship needed to interpret elapsed seconds so that Generation Time can be combined with ETU. Choosing an epoch alone does not settle time-scale or discontinuity behavior. UTC with a conventional epoch is one permitted choice; it is not a protocol prerequisite, and this document does not presuppose the time scale a future deployment will adopt.

Synchronization aspects:

a receiver MAY use Generation Time for a calculation only when it knows the applicable enclave time reference and can relate it to its own clock with confidence sufficient for that calculation. A shared time-scale name alone does not establish clock synchronization, and a common orchestration function is not by itself evidence of a shared reference or a known conversion; cooperating administrative domains need one or the other before their receivers compare timestamps. Where the reference, the conversion, the era, or the effect of a clock discontinuity is unknown or ambiguous, the receiver ignores Generation Time for that calculation. No synchronization accuracy is required by this document and no synchronization protocol is specified.

The seconds/fraction layout is the same as the 64-bit timestamp format of Section 6 of [RFC5905], and implementations may reuse code that handles it. Reusing the layout is separate from adopting NTP's timestamp semantics: the NTP epoch, the UTC time scale, and NTP's era conventions are not imported by this document, and apply only where a deployment selects them as its enclave time reference. No time-scale identifier or negotiation is carried in this version; the applicable reference is established through the managed deployment context. Reference changes and clock resets require operational handling so that receivers do not unknowingly interpret timestamps generated under one reference using another (Section 9).

Generation Time identifies when the notification and any estimates in it were generated. It is principally intended to allow a receiver that can interpret it to account for the time elapsed since an accompanying ETU estimate was generated (Section 5.3.3). A receiver that cannot interpret it ignores it; nothing else in the message depends on it, it remains independently parseable, and ignoring it does not invalidate ETU, any other applicable object, or the ordinary ICMP error. In the absence of ETU this document defines no use for Generation Time, so a message SHOULD NOT include Generation Time unless it also includes ETU (Section 5.4).

 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|          Length = 8           |  Class-Num =  |  C-Type = 2   |
|                               |     TBD5      |               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|              Expected Time Until Link Usability               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Expected Time Until Link Usability Object

Expected Time Until Link Usability (ETU) is the gateway's estimate, at the moment it generated the notification, of the interval from generation until the constrained long-haul link selected for the invoking traffic is expected to become usable for forwarding it. It is an unsigned 32-bit integer count of milliseconds, in the format of Section 5.3.1. ETU refers to expected data-plane usability, not to the start of a scheduled contact or of preparation for one. Preparatory operations necessary to make the link usable, such as antenna pointing, modem configuration, acquisition, synchronization, or analogous link-establishment operations, are expected to have completed by the end of the reported interval and are not represented separately.

ETU is measured from notification generation, not from receipt. It is an estimate, not a guarantee. It is not a retry interval and not an instruction to transmit at any particular time. It does not include Expected Link Delay, which describes traversal of the link once usable. When ETU and Expected Link Delay appear in the same message they MUST describe the same link or managed opportunity; a gateway MUST NOT combine the earliest usability of one exit with the delay of another.

ETU is meaningful on its own. A receiver that can interpret a supplied Generation Time against the enclave time reference (Section 5.3.2) may compute the expected usability time in that reference as Generation Time + ETU, and may thereby account for the time the notification spent in delivery; any era or wraparound considerations apply only to that interpretation and are resolved against the enclave reference. A receiver without Generation Time, or unable to interpret it, may apply ETU from the moment of receipt. Doing so is a conservative interpretation of the same forecast: it expires no earlier than the forecast itself, and later by however long the notification spent in delivery. It is not a guarantee about the link; actual recovery may occur later than either interpretation, or earlier. This document does not assume that ICMP delivery is prompt.

The finite range of Section 5.3.1 provides a practical horizon for this experimental network-layer signal. Unavailability on longer timescales is not represented by ETU; such timescales may instead bear on broader application, storage, provisioning, or communication-mechanism decisions, which this document does not address.

 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|          Length = 8           |  Class-Num =  |  C-Type = 3   |
|                               |     TBD5      |               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                     Expected Link Delay                       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Expected Link Delay Object

Expected Link Delay is the approximate one-way delay associated with traversal of the constrained long-haul link selected for the invoking traffic -- the link whose unavailability prevented forwarding or, where routing has migrated the traffic, the next managed opportunity that ETU describes -- as an unsigned 32-bit integer count of milliseconds in the format of Section 5.3.1. It is an estimate, not a bound; a quantity of the link, not an end-to-end path delay; and independent of ETU and of Generation Time. This document does not require receivers to combine it with other metadata or otherwise compute an end-to-end delivery time; how the estimate is used is a matter of endpoint and application policy.

For perspective only, the maximum representable duration, if it were pure propagation delay at the speed of light in vacuum, would correspond to a distance of approximately 1.29 x 10^12 km, roughly 1.29 trillion km. The range is therefore very large even for the long-delay environments that motivate this document. This observation is explanatory; Expected Link Delay remains an estimated one-way link delay comprising whatever components contribute to it.

 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|          Length = 4           |  Class-Num =  |  C-Type = 4   |
|                               |     TBD5      |               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Denied by Link Policy Object

The Denied by Link Policy object consists of the object header alone; it has no payload, and its Length is exactly 4. It is carried only on the policy carrier codes of Section 5.2.1.2.

Its presence asserts that the invoking packet was not forwarded because the applicable admission policy for the managed long-haul service refused it, independently of the current usability of any link. Presence alone supplies this classification; there is no Boolean, denial-reason field, allocation identifier, alternate gateway address, or retry time, and this document defines no way to convey why the traffic was refused or what would be admitted (Section 4.4.3). An error conveys this classification only when it contains a valid, applicable Denied by Link Policy object; an object of any other length does not establish it (Section 5.1), and absence of the object does not establish that the refusal came from some other control, that no boundary-link policy exists, or that the application has no alternatives.

For traffic that remains admitted, congestion, queue overflow, or scheduling competition does not justify attaching this object (Section 4.4.3).

Generating the object is optional and subject to disclosure policy (Section 6). Its presence does not promise permanent denial, prove that waiting could never help, require the receiver to change mechanisms, or authorize evading policy.

5.4. Object Applicability by Code

Each Link Condition Object is applicable to one group of carrier codes, as summarized in Table 4. Availability carriers are ICMPv4 Type 3 codes 0 and 1 and ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0 and 3 (Section 5.2.1.1); policy carriers are ICMPv4 Type 3 code 13 and ICMPv6 Type 1 code 1 (Section 5.2.1.2).

Table 4: Link Condition Object Applicability by Carrier Group
Object Availability carriers Policy carriers
Generation Time (C-Type 1) MAY; SHOULD NOT without ETU SHOULD NOT; no use defined here without ETU
Expected Time Until Link Usability (C-Type 2) MAY, subject to Section 5.2 MUST NOT
Expected Link Delay (C-Type 3) MAY, subject to Section 5.2 MUST NOT
Denied by Link Policy (C-Type 4) MUST NOT MAY, subject to Section 6

A policy carrier MUST NOT carry Expected Time Until Link Usability or Expected Link Delay: they reveal characteristics of a link to which the invoking traffic was not admitted, and admission is evaluated before any link state is disclosed (Section 6). An availability carrier MUST NOT carry Denied by Link Policy. Under these rules Denied by Link Policy is never emitted with ETU or ELD. Generation Time may accompany it, subject to the guidance below.

Generation Time SHOULD NOT be sent without Expected Time Until Link Usability on either carrier group, since this document defines no other use for it and unnecessary absolute-time information should not normally be disclosed. This is discouraged rather than inapplicable or prohibited: a receiver that finds Generation Time without ETU simply has no defined use for it, and experimentation or later experience may identify one.

These are sender restrictions; receiver tolerance for inapplicable objects is specified in Section 5.1 and does not relax them.

6. Generation Rules

The rules in this section govern gateways. General ICMP generation rules apply in addition: Section 2.4 of [RFC4443] for ICMPv6, including its rate-limiting requirements, and [RFC1812] for ICMPv4. Nothing in this document permits generating an error in response to an ICMP error, to a packet addressed to a multicast destination, or in the other cases those documents prohibit. Nothing in this document suppresses a Destination Unreachable error that those documents otherwise require, and uncertainty about whether an optional object can be supported never suppresses the underlying error.

This specification does not define congestion signaling. A gateway MUST NOT generate a Destination Unreachable error only to report congestion or to carry a Link Condition Object. In particular, Section 3.1 of [RFC4443] prohibits generating an ICMPv6 message when the invoking packet is dropped because of congestion.

On receiving trans-boundary traffic, a gateway proceeds as follows:

  1. Assess the current coordinated forwarding and service state for the traffic, including whether a policy-permitted path within the coordination scope is presently available to serve it. If so, use that path and attach nothing.

  2. Apply the long-haul service's admission policy before disclosing any link state or prediction.

  3. If the traffic is not admitted, drop it. Generate an error only as called for by ordinary ICMP rules and local response policy. If the error uses an eligible policy carrier (Section 5.2.1.2) and disclosure policy permits, the gateway may attach the Denied by Link Policy object (Section 5.4). If ordinary processing selects another code, retain it and omit the object. Denial of admission to one long-haul service does not by itself mean no policy-permitted managed alternative exists; step 1 addresses that.

  4. If the traffic is admitted but cannot be forwarded because the selected link is presently unusable, drop it and generate the Destination Unreachable error that ordinary ICMP rules call for. If the conditions of Section 5.2 are satisfied and the code is an eligible availability carrier (Section 5.2.1.1), the gateway MAY attach Expected Time Until Link Usability, Generation Time, and Expected Link Delay objects.

  5. If the traffic is admitted and the link is usable, forward it normally. A forwarded packet MUST NOT elicit a Destination Unreachable error.

The restrictions in this section govern attaching Link Condition Objects; they do not alter when ordinary Destination Unreachable errors are generated. A gateway MUST NOT attach any Link Condition Object whose assertion it cannot establish from a sufficiently current and applicable association between the traffic, the managed service, the forwarding state, the admission policy, and any advertised prediction (Section 4.3). In particular, a gateway MUST NOT attach availability metadata when another policy-permitted path within the coordination scope is presently available for the traffic, and MUST NOT attach it on the basis of observed local interface or carrier state alone (Section 3). Whenever an object's basis is missing, the object is withheld by policy, or an estimate is out of range (Section 5.3.1), the gateway omits that object and sends the ordinary error.

A gateway MUST NOT send an ETU value not derived from its current managed-service knowledge, and MUST NOT report an expired estimate clamped to zero. A gateway MAY send ETU without Generation Time; it SHOULD NOT send Generation Time without ETU (Section 5.4).

An operator MUST be able to control disclosure of each Link Condition Object independently of whether the gateway sends the underlying error (Section 11). For refused traffic, the operator MUST be able to select silent discard or an administrative prohibition error where ordinary ICMP rules permit that choice. Policy can use criteria such as source, prefix, or traffic class.

A gateway MUST NOT attach Link Condition Objects to messages sent toward the constrained long-haul link, and MUST NOT attach them in response to traffic arriving from it (Section 3).

A gateway MUST NOT assume that a sender received an earlier notification. If it attaches objects to a later error, it uses its current applicable knowledge.

7. Receiver Processing

7.1. Validation

Ordinary validation and handling of a Destination Unreachable error are governed by the receiver's existing ICMP and transport rules; this document does not change them, and the checks below apply only to the objects. Disregarding an object never requires rejecting, or changing the ordinary handling of, the base error.

Before acting on Link Condition Objects, a receiver MUST validate the message as an ICMP error per [RFC4443] and the mitigations of [RFC5927]: the invoking packet excerpt is matched against existing connection or flow state, and objects on a message matching nothing the receiver sent are disregarded. A receiver SHOULD disregard Link Condition Objects on a message that arrives on an interface facing outside its disclosure scope.

The carrier code does not prove that a message originated inside the domain, and a filter that acts on Type and Code alone cannot selectively remove Link Condition Objects without also affecting ordinary errors of the same code. A deployment that requires selective containment of the objects at a boundary needs extension-aware enforcement; this document does not specify one and does not mandate filtering of the carrier codes.

7.2. Consumer Behavior

This section is informative. The examples below describe possible uses of the objects. None of these responses is required for interoperability.

A host might record availability metadata to avoid immediately repeating attempts likely to elicit the same error. How such state would be keyed, how widely it would apply, how long it would live, how it would be invalidated when the domain's knowledge changes, and how it would interact with routing are all open questions. Because ETU is an estimate reflecting the domain's coordinated state at generation time, and the gateway cannot revoke a notification, any such state is a hint and not an assurance of service at any later time.

A transport might use the metadata as an input to its timeout and failure decisions, for example by comparing the expected wait against a connection's tolerance. The remote endpoint receives no corresponding notification and continues to run its own timers, which bounds the usefulness of waiting. No TCP or QUIC behavior is defined here.

An application that can match an indication to its traffic might wait, report failure, or reconsider its communication mechanism (Section 4.4.2). To compare its options, it could consult service information obtained separately. For example, Section 4.1 describes how future service descriptions could use PvD Additional Information ([RFC8801]). The ICMP indication neither identifies an alternative service nor grants access to one. This document does not define an application interface.

Stronger reactions to unauthenticated ICMP information carry greater risk (Section 11); which reactions are worth their risk is itself an experiment question.

8. Legacy Host and Middlebox Behavior

A receiver that ignores the [RFC4884] extension objects can still process the underlying Destination Unreachable error (Section 5.1). How it responds to that error depends on the implementation.

For context, Section 3.9.2.2 of [RFC9293] classifies the availability carriers (ICMPv4 Type 3 codes 0 and 1, ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0 and 3) as soft errors for TCP, while noting widespread implementation behavior that treats soft errors as hard errors during connection establishment; [RFC5461] documents further divergence. This classification describes existing TCP processing; it is not the basis on which this document selects carriers and does not define permanent versus temporary failure. This document neither prescribes nor relies on a particular TCP reaction to either policy carrier.

Firewalls and stateful middleboxes inside the deploying domain may strip or discard messages carrying unfamiliar extension structures, or may already filter some Destination Unreachable codes. This fails safe but silently defeats the mechanism, so deployment includes reviewing ICMP filtering policy on the paths between gateways and the hosts they serve; [RFC4890] provides the ICMPv6 filtering framework. Legacy hosts generate nothing new and are unaffected as senders.

9. Operational Considerations

Gateways SHOULD count generation of object-bearing Destination Unreachable messages, including which Link Condition Objects were included, and expose the counters through network management; counts of the carrier codes alone do not identify this experiment's activity, since those codes are generated for other reasons as well. If the gateway knows why admission policy refused the packet, it MAY report that reason in local telemetry. The Denied by Link Policy object does not carry the reason. This document does not prescribe a management or telemetry mechanism. Operators can use the counters as diagnostic evidence of possible divergence from applicable service expectations, not as proof of failure (Section 4.4.4).

After a plan or route change, a gateway may have no current estimate for the selected link (Section 4.3). It can still send the ordinary ICMP error. The absence of an estimate does not by itself indicate a fault in the gateway or its controller.

When a contact ends, many flows can fail at once. ICMP rate limiting may prevent some senders from receiving a notification.

ETU is only as meaningful as the gateway's knowledge of the link. Using Generation Time additionally depends on the receiver knowing the enclave time reference and being able to relate it to its own clock (Section 5.3.2); receivers that cannot may apply ETU from receipt (Section 5.3.3). The deployment is responsible for establishing and distributing the reference. When the reference changes or a gateway's clock is reset, operators need to ensure that receivers do not interpret timestamps generated under the old reference using the new one; until that is assured, receivers fall back to ignoring Generation Time. Cooperating administrative domains need a shared reference or a known conversion before their receivers compare timestamps; sharing an orchestration function does not by itself provide either.

If a host uses stored metadata to delay another attempt, exposing that state to local diagnostics can help an operator explain the delay.

10. Experimental Status and Goals

This experiment asks two questions. Can gateways generate the objects under the conditions specified in Section 6? Do consumers make better decisions when they receive the objects than when they receive the same ICMP errors without them? This document specifies the objects for interoperability. It does not prescribe a consumer response (Section 7.2).

10.1. Scope of the Experiment

The experiment runs within domains meeting the criteria of Section 3: space networking testbeds and missions, other networks with scheduled or intermittently available managed links between enclaves, and laboratory emulations of the same topologies. Link Condition Objects are not intended to be exchanged across uncontrolled networks (Section 7.1). No behavior in this document affects hosts whose traffic never requires a trans-boundary link.

Prior to IANA assignment of the Link Condition Object class, experiments use a class value from the Private Use range 247-255 of the "ICMP Extension Object Classes and Class Sub-types" registry [RFC4884], with its interpretation and scope explicitly configured among the participants. Such a value is not globally unique, is not a claim on any permanent assignment, and is used only within the experiment's coordination scope. The carrier codes are already assigned and are used as is; no experimental ICMP type or code is involved. Interoperability reports from this phase are in scope for the experiment.

10.2. Network Signal Evaluation

The first layer of the experiment concerns the objects themselves:

  • Generation correctness: whether gateways attach each object only under the conditions of Section 6, whether the coordination-scope determination can be made reliably in deployed routing architectures and during transitions, and which carrier codes gateways actually produce for the long-haul conditions in each IP version (Section 5.2.1).

  • Information beyond the carrier code: does it help to know that an outage is transient, or that boundary-link admission policy refused the packet (Section 4.5)? For policy refusals, does experience show a need for more detail than the object provides?

  • Prediction accuracy and usefulness: how closely ETU tracks actual link usability, how often it is available at all, how often plan revisions or acquisition failures invalidate it, and whether Generation Time and Expected Link Delay are populated and used.

  • Orchestration feasibility: whether the information path of Section 4.3 can be realized with existing management channels, and whether gateways can consult applicable records on the error-generation path, including after route withdrawal.

  • Generation rate: gateway ICMP generation rates at gap onset under realistic fan-out, and the effect of rate limiting on which senders receive a notification.

  • Legacy and middlebox behavior: how unmodified hosts respond to object-bearing carrier errors across the stacks present in target environments, including embedded and flight-heritage implementations (Section 8); and what filtering changes deployments required, including whether middleboxes strip or discard extension structures.

  • Security and disclosure: whether the information disclosed by the objects is operationally acceptable, whether the disclosure controls of Section 6 are sufficient, and whether forged or stale objects caused harm.

10.3. Consumer Behavior Exploration

The second layer concerns what receivers do with the objects. None of these behaviors is specified here; the experiment is intended to discover which are worthwhile:

  • Whether hosts that record availability metadata to avoid repeated attempts reduce futile retransmission and offered load during link-unavailable periods, relative to hosts receiving the same ordinary errors without objects, and what keying, scope, lifetime, and invalidation rules work.

  • What transport reactions are appropriate, including whether comparing expected wait against connection tolerance is useful and whether connections that wait survive the peer's own timers.

  • Whether applications can receive and correlate the objects with their traffic at all, and whether the Denied by Link Policy classification improves their decisions relative to an ordinary administrative prohibition error, including selection among separately provisioned mechanisms such as IP transports, application-layer gateways, and bundle services.

  • Whether provisioning and orchestration systems can use the objects, and whether divergence telemetry (Section 4.4.4) exposed real faults ahead of existing monitoring.

10.4. Evidence for Advancement

The following evidence could inform later consideration for the standards track:

  • At least two independent implementations interoperate on both carrier groups.

  • Gateways generate the objects accurately in at least one operational domain outside the laboratory.

  • Each object retained for the standards track provides information that is useful beyond the ordinary error alone.

  • Tests with legacy hosts and middleboxes show manageable effects. Security and disclosure risks are acceptable.

  • Independent tests show a benefit to consumers without assuming a particular receiver strategy.

  • The same semantics and wire format serve more than one class of long-haul network.

Reports of failed or inconclusive experiments are as useful as reports of successful ones.

11. Security Considerations

ICMP carries no authentication, and the objects are actionable by implementations that choose to act on them, so the principal threats are forgery by off-path attackers and information disclosure to the senders these messages answer. The mitigations are the scoping of Section 3, validation against sender state (Section 7.1), rate limiting, and agreed disclosure policy among the cooperating authorities. None of them authenticates the carrier code or the objects; filtering and invoking-packet validation raise the cost of injection without confining it to trusted parties, and none is dependable across the open internet.

Three forgery cases arise. A forged ordinary Destination Unreachable or administrative prohibition error is an existing threat with existing mitigations ([RFC5927]); this document does not change it. Forged availability metadata on an otherwise plausible error could induce an implementation that acts on it to withhold trans-boundary traffic for the advertised interval. A forged Denied by Link Policy object could induce an application to abandon a working IP path for another mechanism, or to conclude that provisioning is needed; this influence on application choices is a capability beyond what forging the bare administrative prohibition error provides. This document does not require receivers to act on any object, and stronger reactions to unauthenticated ICMP information carry correspondingly greater risk; an implementation that does act should bound the effect of any single notification, treat ETU as an estimate that may be stale or wrong, treat Denied by Link Policy as a classification that may be forged, and consider that the gateway cannot revoke a notification whose basis has changed.

Because the objects ride on ordinary codes, containing them at a boundary requires extension-aware enforcement (Section 7.1). The absence of Link Condition Objects from a message is not a trustworthy indication that no long-haul condition exists (Section 5.1), since objects may be omitted by policy, by rate limiting, by middleboxes, or by an attacker.

The Denied by Link Policy object, although it has no payload, discloses that boundary-link admission policy refused particular traffic, and a gateway that attaches it is a probing oracle: an attacker varying markings, sources, and destinations can map which traffic the long-haul service admits, even without being told why any particular packet was refused. Section 6 therefore requires per-policy control over whether the object is attached and, independently, whether the base error is generated at all; toward any sender the operator does not trust, silent discard is the expected posture, consistent with existing firewall practice.

The availability metadata objects disclose link schedule information, which in some deployments is sensitive operational information. Section 6 permits omitting them per policy; operators of such deployments should protect the metadata as they protect the underlying schedule. Evaluating admission before link state (Section 6) prevents disclosure of schedule information to traffic that would not be admitted regardless.

Ordinary ICMP generation restrictions and rate limiting (Section 2.4 of [RFC4443], [RFC1812]) apply to all of these messages. Quoting and padding of the invoking packet and the optional objects affect response size; a message carrying all three availability objects is larger than a minimal Destination Unreachable error. This document makes no claim about the absence of amplification beyond what those restrictions provide.

12. IANA Considerations

This document requests no new ICMP type and no new Destination Unreachable code. It requests one assignment, shown as a TBD value throughout; no numeric value is proposed.

From the "ICMP Extension Object Classes and Class Sub-types" registry [RFC4884]: a new class TBD5, Link Condition Object, with C-Type 1, Generation Time; C-Type 2, Expected Time Until Link Usability; C-Type 3, Expected Link Delay; and C-Type 4, Denied by Link Policy, assigned by this document. Further C-Types are Specification Required. The class registry's procedure is First Come First Served for values 0-246.

This document requests no change to the already-assigned Destination Unreachable codes on which Link Condition Objects may be carried: ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0, 1, and 3, and ICMPv4 Type 3 codes 0, 1, and 13 (Section 5.2.1). Their existing meanings are unchanged.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[RFC0792]
Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc792>.
[RFC1812]
Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1812>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4443]
Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4443>.
[RFC4884]
Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro, "Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part Messages", RFC 4884, DOI 10.17487/RFC4884, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4884>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8877]
Mizrahi, T., Fabini, J., and A. Morton, "Guidelines for Defining Packet Timestamps", RFC 8877, DOI 10.17487/RFC8877, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8877>.

13.2. Informative References

[RFC1122]
Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1122>.
[RFC4890]
Davies, E. and J. Mohacsi, "Recommendations for Filtering ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls", RFC 4890, DOI 10.17487/RFC4890, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4890>.
[RFC4950]
Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro, "ICMP Extensions for Multiprotocol Label Switching", RFC 4950, DOI 10.17487/RFC4950, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4950>.
[RFC5461]
Gont, F., "TCP's Reaction to Soft Errors", RFC 5461, DOI 10.17487/RFC5461, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5461>.
[RFC5837]
Atlas, A., Ed., Bonica, R., Ed., Pignataro, C., Ed., Shen, N., and JR. Rivers, "Extending ICMP for Interface and Next-Hop Identification", RFC 5837, DOI 10.17487/RFC5837, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5837>.
[RFC5905]
Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5905>.
[RFC5927]
Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927, DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5927>.
[RFC6069]
Zimmermann, A. and A. Hannemann, "Making TCP More Robust to Long Connectivity Disruptions (TCP-LCD)", RFC 6069, DOI 10.17487/RFC6069, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6069>.
[RFC8799]
Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8799>.
[RFC8801]
Pfister, P., Vyncke, É., Pauly, T., Schinazi, D., and W. Shao, "Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data", RFC 8801, DOI 10.17487/RFC8801, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8801>.
[RFC8883]
Herbert, T., "ICMPv6 Errors for Discarding Packets Due to Processing Limits", RFC 8883, DOI 10.17487/RFC8883, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8883>.
[RFC9171]
Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, III, "Bundle Protocol Version 7", RFC 9171, DOI 10.17487/RFC9171, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9171>.
[RFC9293]
Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)", STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293>.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Mark Andrews for helpful discussions.

The author used AI-assisted tooling in preparing this document, including drafting and editing text and converting it to the kramdown-rfc source format. All technical content, design decisions, and the final text are the responsibility of the author.

Author's Address

Erik Kline
Aalyria Technologies Inc.