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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-geng-acme-idp-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="ACME PK Challenge">Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Delegated Identity Control Validation Framework Using Identity Providers</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-geng-acme-idp-01"/>
    <author initials="F." surname="Geng" fullname="Feng Geng">
      <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>gengfeng@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="P." surname="Wu" fullname="Panyu Wu">
      <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>wupanyu3@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="X." surname="Chen" fullname="Xin Chen">
      <organization>TrustAsia</organization>
      <address>
        <email>palos.chen@trustasia.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>
    <workgroup>Automated Certificate Management Environment Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword/>
    <keyword/>
    <keyword/>
    <abstract>
      <?line 96?>

<t>This document defines a Delegated Identity Control Validation (Delegated ICV) framework for the ACME protocol <xref target="RFC8555"/>. It addresses a core problem: how an ACME server can obtain proof that "the client controls the identifier" without directly validating the identifier. The solution is for an Identity Provider (IdP) to issue an identity assertion, <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt>, enabling the ACME server to delegate identifier control validation to a trusted IdP, with the CA validating the IdP's assertion.</t>
      <t>The framework defines two trust models: PKI certificate binding (<tt>x509-chain</tt>), in which the CA pre-configures a trust anchor that anchors the IdP certificate; and dual-PoP public key binding (<tt>idp-pop</tt>), in which IdP static mapping and ACME-PoP are combined back-to-back. Implementations MUST support at least one model; they are not required to support both.</t>
      <t>The normative scope of this document is limited to dedicated trust environments or private CAs. Identity validation rules for publicly trusted certificates are defined by external rules; this document does not define, interpret, or replace those rules. This document composes orthogonally with <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-pop"/>: the constrained ACME-PoP internalized by <tt>idp-pop</tt> is used only for identifier binding and does not replace the generic <tt>pop-01</tt> authorization.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 104?>

<section anchor="intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <section anchor="background">
        <name>Background</name>
        <t>The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol <xref target="RFC8555"/> provides a standardized mechanism for automated issuance and management of X.509 certificates. ACME's core design is centered on Domain Control Validation (DCV). As ACME use cases extend from web server certificates to S/MIME, code signing, device identity, enterprise identity, and cloud-native workloads, certificate subject identifiers extend from domain names to email addresses, user accounts, private-domain SIP numbers, device identifiers, or SPIFFE IDs. Traditional DCV challenges cannot validate an applicant's control over such identity identifiers.</t>
        <t>The ACME community has explored several identity validation paths: <xref target="RFC8823"/> defines email control validation; <xref target="RFC9447"/> defines the <tt>tkauth-01</tt> challenge (TNAuthList profile in <xref target="RFC9448"/>); <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-pop"/> defines the ACME <tt>pop</tt> authorization; and <xref target="I-D.rasmussen-acme-wif"/> attempts to define a workload identity challenge. The relationship between this framework and these efforts is described in Section 3.4 and Appendix D.</t>
        <t>Beyond IETF draft work, industry also has deployment practice combining SSO authorization with the ACME certificate lifecycle (for example, related solutions in Cisco's Zero Trust Access architecture <xref target="Cisco-Live-BRKSEC-3027"/>). Such practice typically places user or device identity validation outside the ACME protocol boundary, with a separate Registration Authority (RA) component performing authorization based on SSO assertions, while the ACME protocol itself still executes traditional control challenges. The goal of this document is to standardize such identity control validation capability inside the ACME protocol, making the IdP identity assertion a verifiable input to the CA rather than relying on out-of-band RA logic.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="motivation">
        <name>Motivation</name>
        <t>If a new challenge type were defined independently for each class of identity identifier, the result would be protocol fragmentation, increased client implementation complexity, and an inability to reuse existing identity authentication infrastructure. The goal of the Delegated ICV framework is to decouple identity validation from the CA and delegate it to already-deployed IdPs, while preserving the CA's ultimate control over certificate issuance.</t>
        <t>This document addresses a core problem: how an ACME server can obtain proof that "the client controls the identifier" without directly validating the identifier.</t>
        <t>The solution is to delegate identifier control validation to a trusted IdP, with the CA validating the IdP's assertion. This document defines two trust models to implement this delegation; both serve the same motivation and apply to different deployment scenarios.</t>
        <t>This document does not attempt to be a "generic framework for identity validation", nor does it attempt to cover all identity identifier types. It defines only one <tt>idp</tt> identifier type and two trust models, addressing the single problem of "delegated ICV". <xref target="RFC8823"/> has already registered the <tt>email</tt> type for email addresses; STIR/telephony telephone number authority is carried by the TNAuthList of <xref target="RFC9448"/>; private-domain SIP identities (for example, an enterprise-internal SIP URI) have no existing ACME type and are carried by the <tt>idp</tt> type of this document; workload identities are handled by <xref target="I-D.rasmussen-acme-wif"/>. This document does not redefine validation mechanisms for those types. Telephone-number-form SIP URIs and TEL URIs are carried by RFC 9448; the <tt>sip:</tt> in this document is used only for non-telephone-number AoRs.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="problem-statement">
        <name>Problem Statement</name>
        <t>The standard ACME protocol faces four core challenges in delegated identity identifier validation scenarios:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Missing identity identifier type: ACME's <tt>dns</tt>, <tt>ip</tt>, and similar types cannot express identity identifiers such as "account", "device identifier", or "SPIFFE ID"; although email addresses have the <tt>email</tt> type, there is no "asserted by an IdP" validation path.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Missing delegation mechanism for identity validation: the CA needs a standardized way to delegate identity validation to an external IdP and to securely validate the identity assertion returned by the IdP.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Timeliness of identity revocation: identity state changes occur on the IdP side, while the certificate may already have been issued and is in circulation; the time window between an identity revocation event and certificate revocation needs to be shortened.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Certificate subject carriage and relying party parsing: after an <tt>idp</tt> identifier enters the certificate subject, relying parties must be able to reliably parse, compare, and make security decisions based solely on RFC 5280 and the referenced identifier specification; URI SAN authority constraints and <tt>otherName</tt> encoding must be addressed head-on.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="solution-overview">
        <name>Solution Overview</name>
        <t>This document defines a Delegated Identity Control Validation framework:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>An <tt>idp</tt> identifier type carrying URI-form identity identifiers (<tt>spiffe:</tt>, <tt>urn:</tt>, <tt>oidc:</tt>, <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A base framework (Section 4): <tt>idp</tt> identifier type, certificate subject mapping rules, IdP routing, and <tt>idp_config</tt> retrieval framework. Both trust models share this base framework.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>PKI certificate binding (Section 5): <tt>x509-chain</tt>, reusing the <xref target="RFC9447"/> and <xref target="RFC9448"/> architecture and extending the <tt>atc</tt> semantics of <tt>tkauth-01</tt> with <tt>tkauth-type = "idp"</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Dual-PoP public key binding (Section 6): <tt>idp-pop</tt>, defining an independent <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> challenge. The challenge response carries a JWK public key and a JWS PoP signature; at <tt>finalize</tt>, the CA re-checks that the CSR public key matches the bound public key.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Trust model selection guidance (Section 7).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The two models have different trust anchors: <tt>x509-chain</tt> uses a pre-configured certificate trust anchor; <tt>idp-pop</tt> uses a JWKS obtained through OIDC Discovery under the Web PKI, plus the IdP's static mapping. Both achieve "the CA obtains proof that the client controls the identifier without directly validating the identity identifier".</t>
        <t>Implementations MUST support at least one model; they are not required to support both. The CA declares which model it supports via <tt>idp_config.supported_models</tt>, and the client selects based on the deployment scenario. If the CA and client share no common model, the CA MUST return <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="scope-and-positioning">
        <name>Scope and Positioning</name>
        <t>The ICV framework defined in this document applies to dedicated trust environments or private CA deployments that require an identity identifier (rather than a domain name) as the certificate subject identifier, including but not limited to: S/MIME end-entity certificates (private trust environment), code signing certificates (private trust environment), device identity certificates, enterprise identity certificates, private-domain SIP certificates, and cross-organization PKI bridging.</t>
        <t><strong>Scope statement by CA type</strong>:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">CA Type</th>
              <th align="left">Within Normative Scope</th>
              <th align="left">Notes</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Public Web PKI TLS CA</td>
              <td align="left">No</td>
              <td align="left">The business model is built around domain control validation and does not include identity validation delegation. This document does not change existing Web PKI rules.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Publicly Trusted S/MIME CA</td>
              <td align="left">Not in normative scope</td>
              <td align="left">Certificate validity periods and identity validation rules are defined by CA/B Forum rules. This document provides no compliance guidance.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Publicly Trusted Code Signing CA</td>
              <td align="left">Not in normative scope</td>
              <td align="left">As above.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">STIR/Telephony Certificate CA</td>
              <td align="left">No (carried by RFC 9448)</td>
              <td align="left">Telephone-number-form SIP URIs and TEL URIs are carried by RFC 9448; the <tt>sip:</tt> in <tt>idp</tt> is used only for non-telephone-number AoRs.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Dedicated Trust Environment / Private CA</td>
              <td align="left">In scope</td>
              <td align="left">The target deployment scenario. Includes private-domain SIP identities: for example, an enterprise-internal <tt>sip:alice@internal.example.com</tt>, whose authority is asserted by the enterprise IdP. The <tt>idp</tt>/<tt>sip:</tt> in this document is used only for such non-telephone-number AoRs and does not assert telephone number authority.</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The applicability of publicly trusted certificates is entirely determined by external rules; this document does not define, interpret, or replace CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements or the identity validation rules of any publicly trusted certificate system. If a public trust profile wishes to reference the mechanisms of this document, it MUST define its own identity validation semantics in its external rules; this document does not provide compliance guidance.</t>
        <t>This document defines ACME authorization objects and token semantics, as well as the mapping rules the CA MUST follow when a deployment profile has already defined certificate subject carriage. This document does not define a generic <tt>otherName</tt> OID or ASN.1 module; certificate subject carriage for <tt>urn:</tt> and <tt>oidc:</tt> identifiers depends on an independent profile registering an OID. When no profile referencing a registered OID is available, the CA MUST NOT issue certificates containing those identifiers. The URI SAN allowance conditions for <tt>spiffe:</tt> and <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt> are defined in Section 4.2. Even for a private trust CA, when using <tt>urn:</tt> or <tt>oidc:</tt> identifiers, the deployment profile that defines the <tt>otherName</tt> encoding must still be referenced; issuance is prohibited without such a profile. This rule applies equally to private and public CAs.</t>
        <t>This document defines only the two trust models of Delegated ICV. It does not attempt to be a generic registry of identity types, nor does it redefine the validation mechanisms for email control (<xref target="RFC8823"/>), telephone number authority (<xref target="RFC9448"/>), or workload identity (<xref target="I-D.rasmussen-acme-wif"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>ACME Server: the entity implementing ACME protocol interactions.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Certification Authority (CA): the entity issuing and revoking X.509 certificates.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Identity Provider (IdP): an identity management service trusted by the CA to validate an applicant's control over the claimed identity.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>ACME-ICV Client: an ACME client requesting identity-bound certificates.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp</tt> identifier: an ACME identifier type whose value is a URI, used to identify a subject in an IdP namespace.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Trust model: a technical path implementing delegated ICV; this document defines two, <tt>x509-chain</tt> and <tt>idp-pop</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>acmeIdpToken</tt>: a JWT <xref target="RFC7519"/> issued by the IdP carrying an identity assertion.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>IdP trust anchor: the trusted public key or key set (such as a JWKS) or IdP certificate trust root used to validate the JWT issued by the IdP.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Identifier-mapping IdP: an IdP satisfying the normative requirements of Section 6.4, which is a precondition for deploying the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Bound public key: the public key K identified by <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> in <tt>idp-pop</tt>; the challenge response carries its JWK, and at <tt>finalize</tt> the CSR public key must match.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Deployment profile: the certificate profile or identifier profile followed by the deployment, defining the OID, ASN.1 encoding, and matching rules for certificate subject carriage.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Dedicated trust environment: a trust environment in which the CA explicitly configures the set of trusted identity sources and is not constrained by public trust program rules. Public Web PKI, publicly trusted S/MIME, and publicly trusted code signing are not dedicated trust environments.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>High-assurance certificate profile: a certificate profile explicitly marked as high-assurance in the deployment policy; its determination criteria are defined by the CA in its CPS or certificate policy. The MUST NOT provisions in this document that reference "high-assurance" apply only to profiles so marked.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="design-rationale">
      <name>Design Rationale</name>
      <section anchor="core-design-decisions">
        <name>Core Design Decisions</name>
        <t>Single motivation, two trust models: the sole motivation of this document is "Delegated ICV". The two trust models are two implementations of the same motivation, applicable to different scenarios; an implementation may support either one.</t>
        <t>Base framework independent of trust model: the <tt>idp</tt> identifier type, certificate subject mapping rules, IdP routing, and <tt>idp_config</tt> retrieval framework are the base framework shared by both trust models, defined once (Section 4) and referenced, not redefined, by both trust models.</t>
        <t><tt>x509-chain</tt> references the RFC 9448 architecture without redefining the mechanism: the token acquisition mechanism of <tt>x509-chain</tt> (dedicated request + certificate private key signature + <tt>x5c</tt> path validation) follows the same architecture as <xref target="RFC9448"/> Section 5.5. This document normatively references RFC 9448 Section 5.5 and lists the differences; the contribution of this document is to define the <tt>atc</tt> semantics of the <tt>idp</tt> identifier under the <tt>tkauth-01</tt> framework and the certificate subject mapping rules.</t>
        <t><tt>idp-pop</tt> replaces <tt>tkauth-01</tt> with dual PoP: the standard OIDC authorization request parameter set has no legitimate location to carry an ACME identifier (the identifier conveyance requirement of <xref target="RFC9447"/> Section 3.1 cannot be met). Therefore <tt>idp-pop</tt> does not reuse <tt>tkauth-01</tt>, but defines an independent <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> challenge, using dual PoP public key binding as the common anchor for both the IdP and ACME:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the IdP validates that "the identity identifier is securely bound to public key PK";</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>ACME validates that "the client securely holds the same public key PK";</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the two PoPs are back-to-back, constituting proof that "the client controls the identity identifier".</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>This internal PoP is used only to prove that the client holds the bound public key PK, and is not equivalent to the generic ACME <tt>pop-01</tt> authorization; if the deployment requires generic key possession proof, the <tt>pop-01</tt> challenge must be used separately.</t>
        <t>Protocol constraints for <tt>idp-pop</tt>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the client submits <tt>pop_key</tt> (JWK) and <tt>pop_signature</tt> (Flattened JWS) in the <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> challenge response;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA validates the public key thumbprint and PoP signature at the challenge stage, without comparing the CSR;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>at <tt>finalize</tt>, the CA enforces that the CSR public key matches the JWK Thumbprint of the bound public key, returning <tt>badPublicKey</tt> on mismatch;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>pop_signature</tt> uses Flattened JWS with payload being the JSON object <tt>{"nonce": ..., "binding": ...}</tt>; the <tt>protected</tt> header MUST contain <tt>alg</tt> and MUST NOT use <tt>b64=false</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>public key thumbprints use RFC 7638 JWK Thumbprint (SHA-256).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>MTI by trust model:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a CA implementation MUST support the complete validation flow of at least one of <tt>x509-chain</tt> or <tt>idp-pop</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a client implementation MUST support the token acquisition and submission of at least one of <tt>x509-chain</tt> or <tt>idp-pop</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>implementations are not required to support both. The CA declares via <tt>idp_config.supported_models</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="design-constraints">
        <name>Design Constraints</name>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Single motivation focus: serving only the one problem of Delegated ICV. Not redefining email control <xref target="RFC8823"/>, telephone number authority <xref target="RFC9448"/>, or workload identity (WIF).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Shared base framework: identifier type, certificate subject mapping, IdP routing, and configuration retrieval framework are defined once and referenced by both trust models.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference <xref target="RFC9448"/>: <tt>x509-chain</tt> normatively references <xref target="RFC9448"/> Section 5.5; this document defines only <tt>idp</tt>-specific <tt>atc</tt> semantics, <tt>fingerprint</tt> encoding, and mapping rules.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>CA ultimate control: trust anchors are explicitly configured by the CA (pre-configured trust root or OIDC Discovery), not resolved via external federation chains or the client.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Lifecycle compensation: the timeliness of identity revocation is compensated by short-lived certificates and mandatory re-validation; this document does not promise zero-delay revocation.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Algorithm agility: protocol fields and configuration must be able to express algorithm family migration; specific PQC profiles are defined by external documents, but the ICV framework itself must not hard-code cryptographic constants that cannot be migrated.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Explicit certificate subject carriage scope: this document does not define a generic <tt>otherName</tt> OID; certificate subject carriage for <tt>urn:</tt>/<tt>oidc:</tt> is defined and OID-registered by an independent profile. <tt>sip:</tt> is used only for non-telephone-number AoRs and does not assert telephone number authority.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="architecture-overview">
      <name>Architecture Overview</name>
      <section anchor="trust-models-of-delegated-icv">
        <name>Trust Models of Delegated ICV</name>
        <t>ICV is a validation dimension parallel to DCV in the ACME protocol suite; PoP is an independent key possession validation dimension that can be combined with DCV/ICV. This document defines two trust models of Delegated ICV. The relationship among the three validation dimensions is shown in Table 1 (informative).</t>
        <table anchor="three-validation-dimensions">
          <name>Three Validation Dimensions and Three Main Protocol Frameworks (Informative)</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Validation Dimension</th>
              <th align="left">Validation Framework</th>
              <th align="left">Core Question</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Domain Control Validation (DCV)</td>
              <td align="left">RFC 8555</td>
              <td align="left">Do you control this domain name?</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Proof of Possession (PoP)</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>pop-01</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Do you hold this private key?</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Delegated Identity Control Validation (Delegated ICV)</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
              <td align="left">Is this identity asserted by an IdP and controllable by the client?</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The correspondence between identifier types and the three validation frameworks is shown in Figure 1.</t>
        <figure anchor="identifier-validation-frameworks">
          <name>Relationship Between Identifier Types and Validation Frameworks (Informative)</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
                  ACME Identifiers (including domain identifiers and identity identifiers)
                      |
         +------------+------------+
         |            |            |
        dns          pk           idp
         |            |            |
        DCV          PoP          ICV (including delegated ICV and direct ICV)
         |  (auxiliary, does not directly validate identifiers) |
         +------------+------------+
         |                         |
     Domain Validation Mode   Identity Validation Mode
    DCV + (optional PoP)     ICV + (optional PoP)
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>The protocol trust chains of the two trust models are shown in Figure 2.</t>
        <figure anchor="trust-model-protocol-chains">
          <name>Protocol Trust Chains of the Two Trust Models (Informative)</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
PKI Certificate Binding (x509-chain):
  The IdP holds a PKI certificate issued by a CA pre-configured trust root.
  IdP --[JWS + atc, signed by certificate private key, x5c=IdP cert chain]--> Client --> CA
  CA validates: certificate chain to the pre-configured trust root + atc semantics

Dual-PoP Public Key Binding (idp-pop):
  The IdP validates "identifier I <-> public key PK" and issues a JWT containing
  idp_assertion.binding = JWK Thumbprint(PK).
  Client --[idp-pop-01: JWT + pop_key(JWK) + pop_signature(JWS)]--> CA
  CA validates: OIDC Discovery + JWK Thumbprint match + PoP signature
  finalize: CA re-checks CSR public key JWK Thumbprint == binding
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
      </section>
      <section anchor="shared-base-framework">
        <name>Shared Base Framework</name>
        <t>The shared base framework defined in Section 4 is used by both trust models:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp</tt> identifier type (Section 4.1): the value is a URI, carrying schemes such as <tt>spiffe:</tt>, <tt>urn:</tt>, <tt>oidc:</tt>, <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Certificate subject mapping rules (Section 4.2): how the identifier value maps to the certificate <tt>subjectAltName</tt>, including URI SAN allow/prohibit conditions and <tt>otherName</tt> usage conditions; this document does not define a generic <tt>otherName</tt> OID.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>IdP routing (Section 4.3): how the CA determines the validating IdP from the identifier.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_config</tt> retrieval framework (Section 4.4): the CA publishes trust configuration via the directory <tt>meta.idp_config_uri</tt> pointing to an independent HTTPS resource.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Whether the CA supports <tt>x509-chain</tt> or <tt>idp-pop</tt>, the identifier type and mapping rules are the same.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="component-relationships">
        <name>Component Relationships</name>
        <t>The Delegated ICV framework involves four components: the ACME-ICV client, the ACME server/CA, the IdP, and an optional aggregation gateway. The relationships among the four components are shown in Figure 3 (informative).</t>
        <figure anchor="delegated-icv-components">
          <name>Delegated ICV Component Relationships (Informative)</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
+----------------+       newOrder / challenge            +----------------+
| ACME-ICV Client | <-----------------------------------> | ACME Server/CA |
+----------------+                                       +----------------+
        |                                                        ^
        | obtain acmeIdpToken                                    | validate token
        v                                                        |
+----------------+                                       +----------------+
| Aggregation     | ---- IdP authentication / token -----> |      IdP       |
| Gateway (opt.)  |        issuance                        |                |
+----------------+                                       +----------------+
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>ACME-ICV client: initiates <tt>newOrder</tt>, completes the delegated identity control validation challenge, and submits <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> to the CA. The client does not directly validate the identity; it is responsible for obtaining the token from the IdP and presenting it to the CA.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>ACME server/CA: creates an authorization object for the identifier, generates a challenge <tt>nonce</tt>, validates the signature, <tt>atc</tt> or <tt>idp_assertion</tt>, claims, and binding of <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt>, and ultimately decides whether to issue the certificate. The CA is the ultimate subject of the trust decision.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>IdP: the issuer of identity assertions trusted by the CA. The IdP does not need to implement the ACME client/server role, but must construct token claims per this document.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Aggregation gateway (optional): located between the client and the IdP, it can convert other identity assertions such as SAML into an <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> conforming to this specification, or issue tokens with its own signing key. The aggregation gateway appears to the CA as an IdP.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Normative constraints for the aggregation gateway: when an aggregation gateway is used, the gateway is the trusted IdP from the CA's perspective; the CA has no direct trust in the backend original identity source. The deployment policy MUST record the trust relationship between the gateway and the backend identity source and the audit requirements; the gateway MUST fully retain the original identity authentication evidence for audit. The CA MUST configure the gateway as a separate IdP entry in <tt>idp_config</tt>, and must not merge the backend identity source and the gateway into the same trust anchor.</t>
        <t>A single Delegated ICV interaction can be summarized as: the client obtains an assertion from the IdP, the CA validates the assertion and issues the certificate; the trust relationship between the CA and the IdP is explicitly established by the CA via <tt>idp_config</tt>, a pre-configured certificate trust root, or OIDC Discovery, without resolution via the client or external federation chains.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relationship-to-existing-acme-extensions">
        <name>Relationship to Existing ACME Extensions</name>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Mechanism</th>
              <th align="left">Relationship</th>
              <th align="left">Notes</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">DCV (RFC 8555 core)</td>
              <td align="left">Parallel</td>
              <td align="left">DCV validates domain control; ICV validates identity identifiers. They can coexist in different authorization objects, but MUST NOT be mixed in the same authorization object.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>email-reply-00</tt> (<xref target="RFC8823"/>)</td>
              <td align="left">Orthogonal</td>
              <td align="left">Email control is handled by RFC 8823; this document does not define an email identifier type.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>tkauth-01</tt> (<xref target="RFC9447"/>)</td>
              <td align="left">Referenced by <tt>x509-chain</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>x509-chain</tt> references <tt>tkauth-01</tt>; the token acquisition mechanism normatively references RFC 9448 Section 5.5. <tt>idp-pop</tt> does not reuse <tt>tkauth-01</tt>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">TNAuthList (<xref target="RFC9448"/>)</td>
              <td align="left">Architecturally analogous, different authority model</td>
              <td align="left">The token acquisition mechanism of <tt>x509-chain</tt> follows the same architecture as RFC 9448 Section 5.5. Telephone number authority is carried by TNAuthList; the <tt>sip:</tt> in <tt>idp</tt> is used only for non-telephone-number AoRs; the mutual exclusion rules are in Section 9.3.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">PoP (<xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-pop"/>)</td>
              <td align="left">Orthogonal composition</td>
              <td align="left">ICV validates identity; PoP validates key possession. <tt>idp-pop</tt> internalizes a constrained ACME-PoP for identifier binding and <strong>does not replace</strong> the generic <tt>pop-01</tt> authorization. If the deployment requires generic key possession proof, <tt>pop-01</tt> is still needed.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Device attestation (<xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-device-attest"/>)</td>
              <td align="left">Complementary</td>
              <td align="left">Device attestation establishes device identity and trusted state; ICV establishes identity identifier validation.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">OpenID Federation (<xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-openid-federation"/>)</td>
              <td align="left">Orthogonal</td>
              <td align="left">ICV trust anchors are explicitly configured by the CA, not resolved via federation entity chains.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ACME PQC profile (<xref target="I-D.ar-acme-pqc-tlsjws"/> or a later RFC)</td>
              <td align="left">Orthogonal superposition</td>
              <td align="left">This document defines identity semantics and algorithm agility requirements; the PQC profile defines PQ/composite algorithm identifiers and migration rules (Sections 9.11, 9.13).</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">WIF (<xref target="I-D.rasmussen-acme-wif"/>)</td>
              <td align="left">Parallel</td>
              <td align="left">WIF (based on aud/ABV) targets workloads and lacks an IdP-enforced identifier-public-key static binding; the risk of a client requesting the wrong identifier is mitigated entirely by CA-local policy. <tt>idp-pop</tt> adds IdP-managed static mapping and dual PoP, with the IdP deriving the identifier from the authenticated subject, eliminating this class of risk. Deployment selection is by subject type. See Section 6.1 and Appendix C.</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="base-framework">
      <name>Base Framework</name>
      <section anchor="idp-identifier-type">
        <name><tt>idp</tt> Identifier Type</name>
        <t>The identifier type <tt>idp</tt> is added to the ACME Identifier Types registry (Section 10.1). Its value is a URI <xref target="RFC3986"/>, used to identify a subject in an IdP namespace.</t>
        <t><tt>idp</tt> carries only URI-form identity identifiers, currently including <tt>spiffe:</tt>, <tt>urn:</tt>, <tt>oidc:</tt>, and <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt>. Email address control validation is handled by <xref target="RFC8823"/>; telephone number authority is handled by <xref target="RFC9448"/>; this document does not define validation paths for those types.</t>
        <t>Examples:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
spiffe://example.org/ns/prod/sa/backend
urn:example:device:12345
oidc:https://accounts.google.com#1234567890
sip:alice@internal.example.com
]]></artwork>
        <t>The <tt>idp</tt> identifier value MUST NOT use the <tt>mailto:</tt> scheme; the CA MUST reject such requests with <tt>malformed</tt>. <tt>urn:example:</tt> is for illustrative purposes only and should not be used in production; the CA SHOULD restrict acceptable URN namespaces in the deployment policy and record that restriction in audit logs.</t>
        <t>URI normalization and comparison rules: all scenarios involving "compare after normalization" or "URI match" MUST use the following rules:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>scheme and host are compared case-insensitively in ASCII (converted to lowercase before comparison);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>default ports (80 for http, 443 for https) are removed before comparison;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>userinfo comparison follows scheme-specific rules; where no scheme-specific rule exists, it is compared as raw bytes without percent-decoding;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>path and query are compared as raw bytes: no dot-segment folding, no percent-decoding, no merging of consecutive slashes;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a trailing slash is a significant character;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the fragment of an <tt>oidc:</tt> identifier is handled separately: the fragment MUST carry the <tt>sub</tt> in percent-encoding; before comparison, the fragment is percent-decoded exactly once, and the resulting byte string is compared byte-by-byte with the <tt>sub</tt> in the token; no Unicode normalization, case folding, or any other equivalence determination may be performed; if decoding fails or the decoded result contains illegal characters, the CA MUST reject the identifier. The decoded <tt>sub</tt> byte string MUST NOT contain U+0000–U+001F or U+007F control characters; if present, the identifier is rejected.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA MUST NOT use string prefix or suffix matching not conforming to the above rules.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Applicability conditions for <tt>oidc:</tt> identifiers: <tt>oidc:&lt;issuer-url&gt;#&lt;subject&gt;</tt> requires that the <tt>sub</tt> value from the CA's perspective be known at order creation time. Under the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model, the IdP derives the <tt>sub</tt> via static mapping, and the CA knows the target value before order creation. Under the <tt>x509-chain</tt> model, the IdP sets <tt>atc.tkvalue</tt> after validation, and the client provides the target identifier to the IdP. Under both models the <tt>oidc:</tt> identifier is usable, but the <tt>oidc:</tt> identifier MUST NOT be mapped to a <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> SAN (Section 4.2).</t>
        <t>Relationship between the issuer URL in an <tt>oidc:</tt> identifier and the IdP entry: for an <tt>oidc:</tt> identifier, the <tt>&lt;issuer-url&gt;</tt>, after normalization per this section's URI rules, MUST equal the <tt>idp_config.idp_list[].issuer</tt> of the IdP to which the identifier is routed, and MUST equal the <tt>issuer</tt> of the OIDC Discovery document. On mismatch, the CA MUST reject the identifier or token and return <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>. The CA MUST NOT compare only the host part while ignoring the full issuer URL.</t>
        <t>Registration status of the <tt>oidc:</tt> scheme: the <tt>oidc:</tt> scheme is currently not registered in the IANA URI Scheme registry. This document uses it as internal syntax for <tt>idp</tt> identifier values and does not seek generic URI registration. When it is mapped to <tt>otherName</tt>, relying parties parse it according to the OID and ASN.1 encoding defined by the referenced profile; they must not rely on a generic scheme resolver to treat it as a dereferenceable URI.</t>
        <t>An order containing an <tt>idp</tt> identifier must complete at least one associated challenge.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="certificate-subject-mapping-requirements">
        <name>Certificate Subject Mapping Requirements</name>
        <t>This section defines the rules the CA MUST follow when the deployment profile has already defined certificate subject carriage. This document does not define a generic <tt>otherName</tt> OID or ASN.1 module; the <tt>otherName</tt> mapping for <tt>urn:</tt> and <tt>oidc:</tt> depends on an independent profile registering an OID. When no profile referencing a registered OID is available, the CA MUST NOT use <tt>otherName</tt> and MUST NOT issue certificates containing the identifier. This document does not require the CA to allocate OIDs itself; OID allocation and ASN.1 encoding are the responsibility of the independent profile.</t>
        <t>When mapping an <tt>idp</tt> identifier to the certificate subject identity, the CA MUST follow these requirements:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the CA MUST map the identifier value to the corresponding SAN type in <tt>subjectAltName</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA MUST NOT carry the identity identifier solely in the CN field of the Subject DN. If the certificate profile followed by the deployment cannot express the corresponding SAN type, the CA MUST NOT issue the certificate; there is no CN exception;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA MUST evaluate the constraints of <xref target="RFC5280"/> Section 4.2.1.6 on the URI authority in a <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> SAN. The URI must contain an authority in the form of a DNS-based hostname or IP address; identifiers not meeting this constraint MUST NOT be mapped to <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>this document does not retroactively apply to existing certificates; newly issued certificates MUST follow the requirements of this section.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Allowed and prohibited mappings:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">URI scheme</th>
              <th align="left">Allowed SAN Type</th>
              <th align="left">Prohibition/Condition</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>spiffe://</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> (full SPIFFE ID)</td>
              <td align="left">Allowed when the authority is a DNS name satisfying RFC 5280 constraints.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> (full SIP URI; semantics per <xref target="RFC5922"/>)</td>
              <td align="left">Only non-telephone-number AoRs are allowed; when the user part is in telephone-number form, the CA MUST reject with <tt>malformed</tt> (default identification rules in the body; deployment policy may extend); the client should switch to the TNAuthList profile of RFC 9448. The CA MUST evaluate whether the user part contains structures disallowed by RFC 5280 and RFC 3261; if not satisfied, the CA MUST NOT issue.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>urn:</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>otherName</tt> only, and only if the referenced profile has defined and registered an OID and ASN.1 encoding</td>
              <td align="left">MUST NOT be mapped to <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> (no authority part). When no registered <tt>otherName</tt> profile exists, the CA MUST NOT issue.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>oidc:</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>otherName</tt> only, and only if the referenced profile has defined and registered an OID and ASN.1 encoding</td>
              <td align="left">MUST NOT be mapped to <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt>; MUST NOT rely on the URI fragment as the certificate subject parsing path. When no registered <tt>otherName</tt> profile exists, the CA MUST NOT issue.</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Normalization and matching rules for <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt>: the SAN carries the full SIP URI, with semantics per <xref target="RFC5922"/>. <tt>sip:</tt> and <tt>sips:</tt> are different schemes and must not be substituted for each other in comparison; the comparison rules for the user part are defined by RFC 3261 and must not degrade to string equality. SAN matching rules follow RFC 5922; the CA and relying parties MUST use the same scheme and host matching rules. When routing per Section 4.3, the CA should extract the host part from the SIP URI for matching, rather than performing suffix comparison on the full URI. The <tt>atc.tkvalue</tt> (<tt>x509-chain</tt>) or <tt>idp_assertion.identifier</tt> (<tt>idp-pop</tt>) of <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt> carries the full SIP URI, and relying parties parse it per RFC 5922; the certificate <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> SAN and the identifier value in the token MUST be equal per the URI comparison rules of Section 4.1. For <tt>sip:</tt> URIs, the byte-by-byte comparison rules of Section 4.1 apply to the scheme and host; the comparison of the user part follows RFC 3261, but the CA MUST record its normalization and comparison rules in the deployment policy and ensure that the identifier value in the token and the certificate SAN use the same rules.</t>
        <t>RFC 5280 compliance argument and authority boundary for <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt>: the authority of a <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt> URI is the host, satisfying RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6. The user part MUST conform to the SIP URI character set of RFC 3261; the CA MUST NOT issue SIP URIs containing password-form userinfo or control characters. Example: <tt>sip:alice@internal.example.com</tt> is allowed; the deployment policy SHOULD prohibit <tt>sip:alice:password@internal.example.com</tt> (userinfo contains a password); this prohibition is a security policy recommendation, not a mandatory requirement of RFC 5280. The CA MUST record the allowed SIP URI forms in the deployment policy.</t>
        <t>The <tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt> certificate under the <tt>idp</tt> framework asserts only that "the IdP considers the AoR controlled by some authenticated subject"; it does not assert telephone number authority and does not replace the STI certificate of STIR/TNAuthList. The CA MUST define telephone-number-form identification rules in the deployment policy and at least use the following default identification rules:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>if the user part of the SIP URI matches <tt>^\+[0-9]{1,15}$</tt>, the CA MUST treat it as telephone-number form and reject;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>if the user part of the SIP URI matches <tt>^[0-9]{1,15}$</tt> (no <tt>+</tt>), the CA MUST by default treat it as a suspicious telephone-number form and reject, unless the deployment policy explicitly configures an exception (for example, an enterprise-internal short number range) and records the exception, its justification, and audit requirements;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>other PSTN-equivalent forms are defined by the deployment policy.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The rationale for this conservative default rule is that a digit-only user part without a leading <tt>+</tt> may be either an E.164 form or an enterprise-internal short number; when it cannot be reliably distinguished from the TNAuthList authority model, default rejection prevents the <tt>idp</tt> framework from overstepping to issue telephone-number-form identifiers. If an enterprise private-domain SIP deployment needs to accept digit-only short numbers, it MUST explicitly configure an exception in the deployment policy and record the risk acceptance rationale.</t>
        <t>If the user part of the SIP URI is in telephone-number form, the CA MUST NOT issue the certificate via the <tt>idp</tt> identifier, MUST reject with <tt>malformed</tt>, and must inform the client that the identifier should be handled by the TNAuthList profile of RFC 9448. For cases that cannot be determined, the CA MUST reject and guide the client to TNAuthList. The deployment policy may extend the default identification rules, but must not relax them to "accept when undetermined". The specific direction of the default rules is listed in Appendix D as an open issue.</t>
        <t><tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> and name constraints: if the certificate may be covered by <tt>nameConstraints</tt>, the CA MUST evaluate the expressibility of name constraints on <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> (RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.10). When the conclusion is "no meaningful restriction can be expressed", the CA MUST NOT map the identifier to <tt>uniformResourceIdentifier</tt> and MUST handle it per the <tt>otherName</tt> rules; if <tt>otherName</tt> is also unavailable, the CA MUST NOT issue the certificate. The CA MUST record this evaluation conclusion in the deployment policy.</t>
        <t><tt>otherName</tt> mapping rules:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the CA MAY use <tt>otherName</tt> to carry a structured identifier only if the certificate profile followed by the deployment has defined the <tt>otherName</tt> OID and ASN.1 encoding for the scheme and has registered the OID;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>this document does not define a generic <tt>otherName</tt> OID; the <tt>otherName</tt> mapping for <tt>oidc:</tt> and <tt>urn:</tt> depends on the referenced profile. When no profile referencing a registered OID is available, the CA MUST NOT use <tt>otherName</tt> and MUST reject issuance per the preceding paragraph;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA MUST record the <tt>otherName</tt> OID, encoding, and matching rules in the certificate policy and publish them in a manner discoverable by relying parties;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>relying parties MUST parse <tt>otherName</tt> per the OID and encoding defined by the deployment profile; this document does not define generic parsing rules.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Publication of the mapping table: the CA SHOULD record a "URI scheme → SAN type → expected identifier form" mapping table in the deployment policy and publish it in the CPS or certificate policy, so that auditors can derive the expected identifier value from the certificate SAN.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="idp-routing">
        <name>IdP Routing</name>
        <t>The identity identifier itself does not directly indicate which IdP should validate it. The CA MUST determine the IdP according to the following rules:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Exact match: if the CA has configured <tt>domain_suffixes</tt> (Section 4.4), and the domain part of the identifier matches a domain suffix declared by an IdP, that IdP is used. Domain extraction rules:  </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>oidc:</tt>: the host part of the issuer URL (parsed per RFC 3986), not applied to path, query, or fragment; at the same time the CA MUST verify per Section 4.1 that the full <tt>&lt;issuer-url&gt;</tt> equals the <tt>issuer</tt> of that IdP entry;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>sip:</tt>/<tt>sips:</tt>: the host part extracted per RFC 3261, with port and transport parameters removed before matching;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>other schemes: domain extraction rules defined by the deployment policy, or no domain suffix matching.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>
Domain suffix matching MUST be based on full label boundaries: <tt>example.com</tt> should match <tt>sub.example.com</tt> and <tt>example.com</tt>; MUST NOT match <tt>example.com.attacker.com</tt>; wildcard suffixes are not supported unless the CA explicitly configures and records an exception. If the <tt>domain_suffixes</tt> of multiple IdPs match simultaneously, the CA MUST use longest suffix matching; if the longest suffix still corresponds to multiple IdPs and the CA has not configured another deterministic selection rule, the CA MUST reject with <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Identifier type match: when exact match fails, the CA determines the IdP based on the URI scheme of the identifier and <tt>idp_config.idp_list[].supported_identifier_types</tt>. If multiple IdPs match and no domain suffix matches, the CA MUST reject with <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>, unless the CA has explicitly configured a multi-candidate selection rule.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Rejection: when the IdP cannot be determined, the CA MUST reject with <tt>urn:ietf:params:acme:error:rejectedIdpId</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Enterprise private-domain SIP routing restriction: for enterprise private-domain SIP deployments, the CA SHOULD restrict the <tt>domain_suffixes</tt> of the <tt>sip</tt> scheme in <tt>idp_config</tt> to enterprise-owned domains, and MUST NOT list public carrier SIP domains in <tt>domain_suffixes</tt>. If the host of the identifier belongs to a known PSTN carrier domain, the CA MUST reject the <tt>idp</tt> order and guide the client to the TNAuthList profile of RFC 9448.</t>
        <t>Association with JWKS routing security: for the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model, the CA SHOULD evaluate IdP routing and the routing security of JWKS retrieval as the same trust decision (Sections 6.6, 9.12).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="idpconfig-retrieval-framework">
        <name><tt>idp_config</tt> Retrieval Framework</name>
        <t>The ACME server MAY provide <tt>idp_config_uri</tt> in the <tt>meta</tt> of the directory object. The field is an HTTPS URL pointing to an independent <tt>idp_config</tt> JSON resource. When provided, the URI MUST accurately reflect the server's current IdP trust configuration and model support, and MUST be TLS-validated.</t>
        <t>The integrity of <tt>idp_config</tt> is part of the trust anchor: tampering with <tt>idp_config</tt> or its URI is equivalent to replacing the trust anchor; the CA SHOULD audit and alert on changes to <tt>idp_config</tt> (Section 9.12).</t>
        <t>Resource retrieval and caching:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the client SHOULD use a cache not exceeding the validity period defined by the deployment policy; re-fetch on cache expiry, on receiving <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>, or on CA version identifier change;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the client MUST NOT cache <tt>idp_config</tt> indefinitely; the cache validity period SHOULD be defined by the deployment policy, recommended not exceeding 24 hours;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the client library SHOULD provide an API for the caller to inject configuration and MUST provide an API to force refresh;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA SHOULD support <tt>ETag</tt> or <tt>Last-Modified</tt> for the <tt>idp_config</tt> resource; the client SHOULD use conditional requests;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA MUST define an upper bound on the size of the <tt>idp_config</tt> resource in the deployment policy; RECOMMENDED not exceeding 256 KiB. A single <tt>x5c_trust_anchors</tt> entry SHOULD not exceed 16 KiB; when exceeded, <tt>idp_list_ref</tt> SHOULD be used to separate it;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA SHOULD set <tt>Cache-Control</tt> for the <tt>idp_config</tt> resource and MUST update the version identifier on change.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t><tt>idp_config</tt> is a JSON object:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>supported_models</tt>: list of supported trust models, with values being at least one of <tt>"x509-chain"</tt> and <tt>"idp-pop"</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>supported_binding_algs</tt> (optional): list of <tt>binding_alg</tt> values accepted by the CA; currently only <tt>"jwk-sha256"</tt>; when absent, defaults to <tt>["jwk-sha256"]</tt>. The CA MUST reject <tt>binding_alg</tt> values not in the list. <tt>binding_alg</tt> values are managed by the registry in Section 10.7.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_list</tt>: list of trusted IdPs; each entry contains:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>issuer</tt>: IdP issuer identifier;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>idp_url</tt> (optional): IdP endpoint URL;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>jwks_uri</tt> (optional): JWKS endpoint; used by the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>x5c_trust_anchors</tt> (optional): IdP certificate trust roots used by the <tt>x509-chain</tt> model; each element is a base64url-encoded DER certificate or an HTTPS URL pointing to a trust root set. SHOULD use embedded DER; HTTPS URL retrieval MUST be an explicit deployment exception, specifying TLS validation, caching, pinning/audit, and MUST NOT be used for high-assurance certificate profiles.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>anchor_algs</tt> (optional): list of certificate signature algorithms allowed in the IdP's <tt>x5c</tt> chain, with values being PKIX algorithm OIDs in dotted-decimal form; the CA MUST verify that the signature algorithm OID of each certificate in the <tt>x5c</tt> chain is in the allowed set; when absent, the CA follows the deployment policy.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>supported_identifier_types</tt>: list of supported URI schemes (<tt>spiffe</tt>, <tt>urn</tt>, <tt>oidc</tt>, <tt>sip</tt>, <tt>sips</tt>); <tt>mailto</tt> MUST NOT appear in the list. If parsing <tt>idp_config</tt> finds that the list contains <tt>mailto</tt>, the CA MUST treat that <tt>idp_list</tt> entry as invalid configuration, refuse to load that IdP, and alert.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>supported_models</tt> (optional): list of models supported by the IdP; when absent, inherits the top-level <tt>supported_models</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>domain_suffixes</tt> (optional): list of domain suffix matches;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt> (optional): list of JWT signature algorithms allowed for the IdP; used as a whitelist only when <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> is absent; when absent, inherits <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>. When present, MUST be a subset of the top-level <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>; otherwise the CA configuration is invalid.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> (optional): list of JWT signature algorithms that the IdP must use; when present, the token <tt>alg</tt> MUST be in it, and <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> MUST be a subset of <tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt> (if the latter is present) and MUST be a subset of the top-level <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>; otherwise the CA configuration is invalid.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>recommended_revocation_delay</tt> (optional): recommended revocation delay reference value (seconds), used as described in Section 9.4;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>policy_version</tt> (optional, per-IdP): IdP authentication policy version or last review date.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_list_ref</tt> (optional): URL pointing to an independent HTTPS endpoint, used only to retrieve the IdP list. When <tt>idp_list_ref</tt> is present, <tt>idp_list</tt> MUST NOT be present. The CA MUST apply TLS validation, caching, and audit to that retrieval, and MUST NOT use it for dynamic retrieval of trust roots for high-assurance profiles. If <tt>idp_list</tt> and <tt>idp_list_ref</tt> are both present, the CA MUST judge <tt>idp_config</tt> as malformed, refuse to load all IdP configuration, and alert.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt> (optional): list of JWT signature algorithms accepted by the CA, using the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry; when absent, defaults to <tt>["ES256", "EdDSA"]</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>policy_version</tt> (optional, top-level): top-level configuration version or last review date, distinct from the per-IdP <tt>policy_version</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Sub-fields and registration: <tt>idp_config</tt> is an independent HTTPS resource, not a JSON extension of the directory object; the directory object carries only the <tt>idp_config_uri</tt> pointer. The internal fields of <tt>idp_config</tt> are defined by this document and are not registered separately; IANA registers only the directory metadata field <tt>idp_config_uri</tt> (Section 10.6).</t>
        <t>Example (transitional configuration; after migration, <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> can be added to enforce PQ algorithms):</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "supported_models": ["x509-chain", "idp-pop"],
  "supported_binding_algs": ["jwk-sha256"],
  "idp_list": [
    {
      "issuer": "https://idp.company.com",
      "idp_url": "https://idp.company.com/oauth2/v1/authorize",
      "jwks_uri": "https://idp.company.com/oauth2/v1/keys",
      "x5c_trust_anchors": ["MIICEXAMPLEBASE64URLDER"],
      "anchor_algs": ["1.2.840.10045.4.3.2", "1.3.101.112"],
      "supported_identifier_types": ["spiffe", "urn", "oidc", "sip"],
      "domain_suffixes": ["company.com"],
      "allowed_jwt_algs": ["ES256", "EdDSA"],
      "recommended_revocation_delay": 3600,
      "policy_version": "2026-11-01"
    }
  ],
  "supported_jwt_algs": ["ES256", "EdDSA"],
  "policy_version": "2026-11-15"
}
]]></artwork>
        <t>Note: <tt>"MIICEXAMPLEBASE64URLDER"</tt> in the example is a placeholder and not a valid base64url DER certificate; real certificates must be used in actual configuration.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="pki-certificate-binding-trust-model">
      <name>PKI Certificate Binding Trust Model</name>
      <section anchor="trust-model-overview">
        <name>Trust Model Overview</name>
        <t><tt>x509-chain</tt> is the PKI certificate binding model: the IdP signs the JWS of <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> with the private key of a PKI certificate anchored by a CA pre-configured trust root; the CA validates trust by verifying the certificate chain to the pre-configured trust root.</t>
        <t>Architectural relationship to RFC 9448: the token acquisition mechanism of <tt>x509-chain</tt> (the client sends a dedicated request to the IdP, the IdP validates and sets claims and signs the JWS with its certificate private key, <tt>x5c</tt> carries the IdP certificate chain) follows the same architecture as <xref target="RFC9448"/> Section 5.5. This document normatively references RFC 9448 Section 5.5; implementers should refer to that section, substituting the identifier type with <tt>idp</tt>. The differences between this document and RFC 9448 are as follows:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the identifier type is <tt>idp</tt>, with URI schemes in Section 4.1;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>tkauth-type = "idp"</tt> (Section 10.2);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>atc.fingerprint</tt> uses base64url without padding (Section 5.2), whereas RFC 9448 uses colon-separated hexadecimal;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>when <tt>atc.ca</tt> is <tt>true</tt>, the CA MUST reject.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The contribution of this document: defining the <tt>atc</tt> semantics of the <tt>idp</tt> identifier under the <tt>tkauth-01</tt> framework (<tt>tktype = "idp"</tt>, <tt>tkvalue</tt> is the <tt>idp</tt> identifier value, <tt>fingerprint</tt> is the SHA-256 digest of the challenge <tt>nonce</tt>) and the certificate subject mapping rules (Section 4.2).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="challenge-and-token-tkauth-01-atc">
        <name>Challenge and Token: <tt>tkauth-01</tt> + <tt>atc</tt></name>
        <t>Challenge object: <tt>tkauth-type</tt> is <tt>"idp"</tt>, and type-specific parameters are placed in the <tt>tkauth-params</tt> object; <tt>tkauth-params</tt> contains the <tt>idp_methods</tt> array (currently only <tt>x509-chain</tt>). <tt>idp_methods</tt> is currently used only for <tt>x509-chain</tt>; <tt>idp-pop</tt> uses the independent challenge <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> and does not appear in <tt>idp_methods</tt>.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "type": "tkauth-01",
  "url": "https://ca.example.com/acme/chall/WxFJbL",
  "status": "pending",
  "tkauth-type": "idp",
  "tkauth-params": {
    "idp_methods": [
      { "idp_method": "x509-chain", "nonce": "eHl6NDU2..." }
    ]
  }
}
]]></artwork>
        <t><tt>atc</tt> claim: <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> contains <tt>atc</tt> per <xref target="RFC9447"/> Section 4:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>tktype</tt>: MUST be <tt>"idp"</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>tkvalue</tt>: MUST be the <tt>idp</tt> identifier value; SHOULD store the same byte string as the challenge <tt>identifier.value</tt>, and the CA validates per the comparison rules of Section 4.1;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>fingerprint</tt>: MUST be <tt>"SHA256 " + base64url(SHA-256(UTF-8 bytes of the nonce string))</tt>; base64url without padding; the CA MUST recompute and compare exactly per this formula. The prefix <tt>"SHA256 "</tt> is for future support of other hash algorithms; currently MUST be <tt>"SHA256 "</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>atc.ca</tt>: if present and <tt>true</tt>, the CA MUST reject.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Representation difference from RFC 9448: RFC 9448 uses colon-separated hexadecimal <tt>fingerprint</tt>. This profile chooses base64url without padding because the input to <tt>fingerprint</tt> is the challenge <tt>nonce</tt>, not the ACME account key; this is a profile-level choice, and the normative deviation is declared in Section 5.1. RFC 9447 defines the generic claim framework of <tt>atc</tt>, and the specific format of <tt>fingerprint</tt> is defined by the profile corresponding to <tt>tkauth-type</tt>; this document, as the profile for <tt>tkauth-type = "idp"</tt>, defines that format. The CA implementation MUST dispatch <tt>fingerprint</tt> parsing logic by <tt>tkauth-type</tt>.</t>
        <t>Mandatory <tt>fingerprint</tt> format: when <tt>tkauth-type</tt> is <tt>"idp"</tt>, the CA MUST accept only <tt>fingerprint</tt> in base64url without padding; if colon-separated hexadecimal is received, the CA MUST reject with <tt>badIdpToken</tt>. For other <tt>tkauth-type</tt> values, the CA MUST follow the original parsing rules of RFC 9448 and must not apply the base64url rules of this profile.</t>
        <t>Other required claims: <tt>iss</tt> (IdP identifier), <tt>sub</tt> (IdP local subject identifier), <tt>aud</tt> (CA directory URL), <tt>iat</tt>, <tt>exp</tt> (SHOULD not exceed 15 minutes), <tt>nonce</tt>. Optional claims: <tt>jti</tt> (SHOULD), <tt>amr</tt>, <tt>acr</tt>, <tt>auth_time</tt>; the CA validates per the deployment policy.</t>
        <t>IdP token issuance responsibilities (normative): the IdP MUST set <tt>atc</tt>, <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>exp</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>, <tt>nonce</tt>, and <tt>sub</tt> itself, and MUST NOT accept values specified by the client. <tt>atc.tkvalue</tt> is the identity assertion body of the IdP. The IdP MUST determine <tt>atc.tkvalue</tt> from its authoritative data or from a statically configured mapping; it MUST NOT accept the identifier value specified by the client as <tt>tkvalue</tt>. When the IdP cannot validate the binding between the applicant and the target <tt>idp</tt> identifier, it MUST NOT issue the token. When the IdP serves multiple CAs, it MUST configure <tt>aud</tt> separately per CA.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="protocol-flow">
        <name>Protocol Flow</name>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The client sends <tt>newOrder</tt> (with an <tt>idp</tt> identifier).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The CA returns an authorization object and a <tt>tkauth-01</tt> challenge (<tt>tkauth-type = "idp"</tt>, <tt>tkauth-params.idp_methods: [{idp_method: "x509-chain", nonce}]</tt>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The client requests <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> from the IdP, providing the <tt>nonce</tt>, the target identifier, and the CA directory URL. The specific format of this request is normatively referenced from RFC 9448 Section 5.5; differences are in Section 5.1.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>After validating the applicant's identity and the target identifier binding, the IdP sets <tt>atc</tt>, <tt>iss/aud/exp/jti/nonce</tt>, and <tt>sub</tt>, and signs as a JWS with its PKI certificate private key (the protected header contains <tt>x5c</tt> and <tt>alg</tt>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The client submits <tt>{"tkauth": "&lt;JWS&gt;"}</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The CA validates the JWS signature (Section 5.4) and marks the challenge <tt>valid</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Field adaptation with RFC 9448 Section 5.5: the dedicated request from the client to the IdP follows the request structure of RFC 9448 Section 5.5, with the target identifier field replaced by the <tt>idp</tt> identifier value of this document, <tt>nonce</tt> using the challenge <tt>nonce</tt>, and <tt>aud</tt> using the CA directory URL; in the JWS returned by the IdP, <tt>atc.tktype</tt>, <tt>atc.tkvalue</tt>, and <tt>atc.fingerprint</tt> are constructed per Section 5.2, and <tt>x5c</tt> carries the IdP certificate chain. Fields in RFC 9448 Section 5.5 specific to TNAuthList do not apply to this profile; implementers should reuse only its dedicated request and JWS submission mechanism, not its telephone number authority semantics.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ca-validation-process">
        <name>CA Validation Process</name>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Parse the JOSE protected header, confirm that <tt>alg</tt> is not <tt>none</tt>, and satisfy one of the following: if the IdP is configured with <tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt>, <tt>alg</tt> MUST be in it; otherwise <tt>alg</tt> MUST be in <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>. If the IdP is configured with <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt>, <tt>alg</tt> MUST be in it. Confirm that <tt>x5c</tt> is present.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Build the IdP certificate chain from <tt>x5c</tt> and validate to the pre-configured trust root: end-entity <tt>basicConstraints cA=false</tt>, <tt>keyUsage.digitalSignature</tt> set, revocation status (Section 5.5 fail-closed), chain length limit, <tt>alg</tt> matching the public key algorithm. If the IdP is configured with <tt>anchor_algs</tt>, the signature algorithm OID of every certificate in the <tt>x5c</tt> chain MUST be in the allowed set.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Verify the JWS signature with the end-entity certificate public key.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Validate <tt>atc</tt>: <tt>tktype</tt> is <tt>"idp"</tt>; <tt>tkvalue</tt> matches <tt>identifier.value</tt> per the comparison rules of Section 4.1; <tt>fingerprint</tt> recomputed per Section 5.2 matches; reject when <tt>atc.ca</tt> is <tt>true</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Validate <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>iat</tt>, <tt>exp</tt>, <tt>nonce</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>, <tt>sub</tt>. If <tt>amr</tt>/<tt>acr</tt>/<tt>auth_time</tt> are present, validate per the deployment policy.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Mark the challenge <tt>valid</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Authorization expiry validation: after re-checking that the authorization is <tt>valid</tt> at <tt>finalize</tt>, the CA MUST, before issuing the certificate, re-confirm that the authorization <tt>expires</tt> is strictly greater than the current time; use a monotonic clock.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trust-establishment-pre-configured-trust-root">
        <name>Trust Establishment: Pre-configured Trust Root</name>
        <t>The CA MUST pre-configure the trust root of the IdP certificate, declared via <tt>idp_config.idp_list[].x5c_trust_anchors</tt> (Section 4.4) or out-of-band deployment configuration. The CA MUST validate the certificate path, end-entity EKU (if required by the deployment), revocation status (OCSP/CRL), and chain length limit.</t>
        <t>Revocation status: when the revocation status cannot be determined (OCSP unreachable/unverifiable/unknown/soft-fail; CRL unfetchable/expired/signature unverifiable/certificate not covered; deployment cannot obtain both OCSP and CRL and has no equivalent mechanism), the CA MUST reject with <tt>badIdpToken</tt>. The deployment policy may explicitly configure an exception and record the risk acceptance rationale, but that exception MUST NOT apply to high-assurance certificate profiles.</t>
        <t>Trust anchor constraints: trust roots in <tt>x5c_trust_anchors</tt> may carry trust anchor constraints (for example, name constraints, policy constraints). The CA MUST apply these constraints during path validation (per the semantics of <xref target="RFC5937"/>).</t>
        <t>Algorithm family migration: <tt>x5c_trust_anchors</tt> may contain trust anchors of multiple algorithms. The CA MUST express per-IdP JWT algorithm constraints via <tt>idp_list[].allowed_jwt_algs</tt> and <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt>; during the transition period, classical and PQ algorithms may coexist; after migration, <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> MUST enforce PQ algorithms. When <tt>x5c</tt> contains PQ or composite signatures, the CA's chain validation logic MUST support the corresponding PKIX PQC specification (for example, the LAMPS WG ML-DSA certificate specification), or MUST reject and record the limitation (Section 9.11). The CA SHOULD use <tt>idp_list[].anchor_algs</tt> to constrain the certificate chain signature algorithms, avoiding a situation where the JWT <tt>alg</tt> has migrated while the certificate chain remains classical.</t>
        <t>The PKI certificate binding (<tt>x509-chain</tt>) trust model is shown in Figure 4 (informative).</t>
        <figure anchor="x509-chain-trust-model">
          <name>x509-chain Pre-configured Trust Chain Trust Model (Informative)</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
CA pre-configured trust root
      |
      v
+----------------+      issue       +------------------+
| IdP Cert Trust  | --------------> | IdP End-Entity   |
| Root            |                 | Certificate      |
+----------------+                 +-------------------+
                                          |
                                          | sign
                                          v
                                   +----------------+
                                   | acmeIdpToken   |
                                   | (JWS, x5c=IdP) |
                                   +----------------+
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="dual-pop-public-key-binding-trust-model">
      <name>Dual-PoP Public Key Binding Trust Model</name>
      <section anchor="trust-model-overview-1">
        <name>Trust Model Overview</name>
        <t><tt>idp-pop</tt> is the dual-PoP public key binding model. It does not reuse <xref target="RFC9447"/>'s <tt>tkauth-01</tt>; it defines an independent <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> challenge that completes the proof of "the client controls the identity identifier" via two back-to-back PoPs:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
Identifier Id  --(IdP-PoP validation)-->  Public Key PK  --(ACME-PoP validation)-->  Client
    |                            |                           |
    +-- IdP assertion: Id belongs to PK --+                           |
                                 |                           |
                                 +-- CA validation: client holds PK --+
                                                             |
                                                             v
                                          Conclusion: client controls Id (certificate can be issued)
]]></artwork>
        <t>Core design: the two PoPs validate the same public key PK. The IdP does not need to know the ACME protocol, and ACME does not need to directly validate the identifier — the public key is the common anchor on both sides.</t>
        <t>Different from WIF's threat model:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>WIF (<tt>draft-rasmussen-acme-wif-00</tt>) relies on <tt>aud</tt>/ABV assertions and targets workload scenarios. WIF does not have the IdP establish a static forced binding from identifier to public key. In threat scenarios where the client can influence the requested target identifier, a potential man-in-the-middle risk arises: a client holding a legitimate workload token may attempt to request a certificate for an identifier inconsistent with the token claims. Mitigation of this risk relies entirely on CA-side local policy, checking whether the order content matches the token claims.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>In contrast, the incremental security property of <tt>idp-pop</tt> derives from the IdP-maintained static mapping of subject-identifier-public key, superposed with dual PoP possession proof validation. Under the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model, the target identifier is independently derived by the IdP from the authenticated subject state, rather than accepting the identifier passed in by the client. This eliminates the above risk of "the client inducing the IdP to issue an assertion for an unrelated identifier".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>WIF and <tt>idp-pop</tt> target different deployment scenarios. Operators should choose the mechanism based on the requested subject type: WIF may be selected when the workload platform fully controls identifier allocation; <tt>idp-pop</tt> is selected for interactive human or enterprise identity scenarios that require IdP-side enforcement of the identifier-public-key binding. See Section 6.1 and Appendix C for details.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Relationship to RFC 9447 Section 3.1: <tt>idp-pop</tt> does not claim to satisfy the requirement of RFC 9447 Section 3.1 that "the identifier type and value be conveyed to the Token Authority via the request protocol" — the IdP obtains the identifier via out-of-band static mapping, not via the request protocol. However, <tt>idp-pop</tt> achieves a stronger binding via dual PoP: the reliability of identifier binding is guaranteed by "the IdP validating public key possession", not by "protocol conveyance".</t>
        <t>Applicability precondition: <tt>idp-pop</tt> requires the IdP to satisfy the "identifier-mapping IdP" requirements of Section 6.4 — it must be able to validate that the user holds the private key of the certificate public key PK (for example, via a signature challenge or public key registration mechanism) and maintain a static <tt>subject → identifier → public key</tt> mapping. General-purpose public OIDC IdPs (Google, Entra) typically do not satisfy this requirement, and <tt>idp-pop</tt> is not applicable to such IdPs. A WebAuthn assertion cannot directly serve as <tt>pop_signature</tt>; if the IdP uses WebAuthn for internal user authentication, <tt>pop_signature</tt> must still be generated by the client with the private key of the certificate public key PK. Deployers should confirm IdP capability before selection.</t>
        <t>IdP capability evaluation checklist (informative): before selecting <tt>idp-pop</tt>, deployers should evaluate whether the IdP: supports public key registration or signature challenge; maintains a static <tt>subject → identifier → public key</tt> mapping; provides audit logs and access control for mapping changes; can compute JWK Thumbprint per RFC 7638; supports the <tt>binding_alg</tt> required by the <tt>idp-pop</tt> token; supports the OIDC authorization request parameters <tt>idp_pop_key</tt> and <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt>. Deployers should also confirm that the client platform allows the private key corresponding to the certificate public key to be used for ACME-PoP signing, or that an independent profile defines a hardware-supported signature mapping.</t>
        <t>Deployment reality note (informative): from a deployment-reality perspective, <tt>x509-chain</tt> places lower requirements on the IdP (it only needs to hold a PKI certificate) and may be implemented more widely earlier; <tt>idp-pop</tt> requires the IdP to support public key registration and static mapping, suitable for scenarios where the IdP is deeply integrated with the CA. The two are not interchangeable.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="challenge-idp-pop-01">
        <name>Challenge: <tt>idp-pop-01</tt></name>
        <t><tt>idp-pop-01</tt> is an independent challenge type, registered in the "ACME Validation Methods" registry (Section 10.3). Challenge object:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "type": "idp-pop-01",
  "url": "https://ca.example.com/acme/chall/XyZAbC",
  "status": "pending",
  "idp_url": "https://idp.company.com",
  "nonce": "eHl6Nzg5...",
  "pop_alg": "ES256"
}
]]></artwork>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_url</tt>: IdP endpoint URL;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>nonce</tt>: random value, ≥128 bits, base64url without padding;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>pop_alg</tt> (optional): expected public key algorithm, using the IANA JOSE Algorithms registry. When set by the CA, the client MUST use that algorithm; when not set, the CA accepts algorithms in its <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>. If <tt>pop_alg</tt> is present in the challenge and the client does not support it, the client MUST abort the order and report to the upper layer that the <tt>pop_alg</tt> is unsupported, and should not submit a challenge response.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Client response format:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "idp_token": "<acmeIdpToken JWT>",
  "pop_key": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "...", "y": "..." },
  "pop_signature": {
    "protected": "<base64url>",
    "payload": "<base64url>",
    "signature": "<base64url>"
  }
}
]]></artwork>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_token</tt>: the JWT issued by the IdP, containing <tt>idp_assertion</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>pop_key</tt>: the JWK of the bound public key K; its JWK Thumbprint must match <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>pop_signature</tt>: Flattened JWS JSON Serialization. The <tt>protected</tt> header MUST contain <tt>alg</tt>; <tt>b64</tt> if present MUST be <tt>true</tt> and MUST NOT be <tt>false</tt>; SHOULD contain <tt>kid</tt> or <tt>jwk</tt>; if it contains <tt>jwk</tt>, the CA MUST verify it matches <tt>pop_key</tt>. The payload is the UTF-8 JSON object <tt>{"nonce": "&lt;challenge nonce&gt;", "binding": "&lt;idp_assertion.binding&gt;"}</tt>; the JSON string values of <tt>nonce</tt> and <tt>binding</tt> MUST contain only ASCII visible characters. The client SHOULD use canonical JSON construction; the CA MUST first validate the JWS signature per RFC 7515, then parse the payload as a JSON object and compare the parsed string values field by field; the CA MUST NOT require that the raw payload byte string contain no optional escaping. The signature uses the private key corresponding to <tt>pop_key</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-idpassertion">
        <name>Token: <tt>idp_assertion</tt></name>
        <t><tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> is a JWT signed by the IdP, containing the <tt>idp_assertion</tt> container:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
"idp_assertion": {
  "identifier_type": "idp",
  "identifier": "<idp identifier value>",
  "issuer": "<IdP issuer URL>",
  "method": "idp-pop",
  "binding": "urn:ietf:params:acme:idppop:jwk-sha256:<base64url(JWK Thumbprint)>",
  "binding_alg": "jwk-sha256",
  "subject": "<IdP local subject identifier>",
  "pop_alg": "ES256"
}
]]></artwork>
        <t><tt>idp_assertion</tt> MUST be a top-level claim of the JWT payload; unknown members in the object MUST be ignored by the CA; it MUST NOT be nested under other claims.</t>
        <t>For tokens of the <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> challenge, if the JWT payload also contains <tt>atc</tt>, the CA MUST ignore <tt>atc</tt> and process only <tt>idp_assertion</tt>; it must not judge the token invalid due to the presence of <tt>atc</tt>.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>binding</tt>: MUST be <tt>"urn:ietf:params:acme:idppop:jwk-sha256:" || base64url(JWK Thumbprint(K))</tt>, with JWK Thumbprint computed per <xref target="RFC7638"/> using SHA-256; base64url without padding. The algorithm identifier in the <tt>binding</tt> prefix MUST match <tt>binding_alg</tt>; on mismatch the CA MUST reject. The URN sub-namespace and <tt>binding_alg</tt> registration of <tt>binding</tt> are in Sections 10.7 and 10.8.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>binding_alg</tt>: MUST be <tt>"jwk-sha256"</tt>; future migration to other hashes or serializations is defined by the profile with new values registered in the registry of Section 10.7. <tt>binding_alg</tt> MUST be in <tt>idp_config.supported_binding_algs</tt>; if not, the CA MUST reject.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>pop_alg</tt> (SHOULD): expected public key algorithm, using the IANA JOSE Algorithms registry. If present, MUST match the challenge <tt>pop_alg</tt>; if the challenge is not set, SHOULD be set to a value matching the <tt>pop_key</tt> algorithm; on mismatch the CA MUST reject.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Other required claims: <tt>iss</tt> (IdP identifier), <tt>sub</tt> (IdP local subject identifier), <tt>aud</tt> (CA directory URL), <tt>iat</tt>, <tt>exp</tt> (SHOULD not exceed 5 minutes). Optional claims: <tt>jti</tt> (SHOULD), <tt>amr</tt>, <tt>acr</tt>, <tt>auth_time</tt>; the CA validates per the deployment policy.</t>
        <t>The upper bound of <tt>exp</tt> for <tt>idp-pop</tt> is shorter than for <tt>x509-chain</tt> because the man-in-the-middle risk surface of static mapping and dual PoP is larger, and a shorter token validity period is needed to limit the attack window.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="protocol-flow-including-normative-idp-responsibilities">
        <name>Protocol Flow (Including Normative IdP Responsibilities)</name>
        <t>The <tt>idp-pop</tt> model completes the proof of "the client controls the identity identifier" via two back-to-back PoPs:</t>
        <t>IdP-PoP (IdP side): the IdP confirms that "identifier Id is controlled by an authenticated user, and that user holds the private key of public key PK";
ACME-PoP (ACME side): the CA confirms that "the client submitting the JWT and <tt>pop_signature</tt> holds the private key of public key PK".</t>
        <t>The two PoPs are connected via <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> in the JWT (the JWK Thumbprint of public key PK).</t>
        <t><strong>OIDC Authorization Request Parameters (Normative)</strong>: when initiating an OIDC authentication request to the IdP, the <tt>idp-pop</tt> client MUST use the following authorization request parameters to convey public key binding information:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_pop_key</tt>: MUST be a UTF-8 JWK JSON string, transmitted as an OAuth 2.0 authorization request parameter value and encoded by the HTTP layer per <tt>application/x-www-form-urlencoded</tt>. The parameter value is the JWK JSON string; <tt>pop_key</tt> in the challenge response is the JSON object representation of the same JWK. The IdP MUST parse the JWK, verify that the authenticated user holds the corresponding private key, and compute the JWK Thumbprint accordingly; the IdP MUST NOT accept a public key without possession validation. The JWK SHOULD contain only required members (<tt>kty</tt>, <tt>crv</tt>/<tt>n</tt>/<tt>e</tt>, <tt>x</tt>/<tt>y</tt>, etc.) and MUST NOT carry <tt>kid</tt>, <tt>use</tt>, <tt>key_ops</tt>, or other fields unrelated to binding. The client and IdP SHOULD evaluate the authorization request URL length limit; if URL length becomes a problem, the deployment profile may consider POST authorization requests (<tt>request_uri</tt> or PAR), but this document does not mandate it.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt>: the client SHOULD always carry it, with the value being the full URI string of the <tt>idp</tt> identifier in <tt>newOrder</tt>. The IdP MUST verify that the value belongs to the static mapping of the authenticated <tt>subject</tt>; on validation failure it MUST reject. <tt>idp_assertion.identifier</tt> is still set by the IdP, and the IdP MUST NOT directly copy client input that has not been mapping-validated. If <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt> is not provided and the mapping of that <tt>subject</tt> contains multiple identifiers, the IdP MUST refuse to issue (see responsibility 6). In the single-identifier case, if <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt> is not provided, the IdP may still issue, setting <tt>identifier</tt> to the sole mapped value.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If the IdP does not support these parameters, it MUST reject with the OIDC <tt>invalid_request</tt> error, and must not ignore them and then issue a token.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>These parameters are OAuth 2.0 authorization request extension parameters defined by this document for <tt>idp-pop</tt>. OAuth 2.0 permits such extension parameters; this document does not request IANA registration. Deployers should declare support for these two parameters in IdP metadata or deployment documentation.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Deployers should confirm that the IdP does not use <tt>idp_pop_key</tt> and <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt> for other purposes; if there is a conflict, use the prefix variant defined by the deployment profile and record it in <tt>idp_config</tt> or deployment documentation.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t><strong>Protocol Flow</strong>:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The client generates a key pair PK and its private key. PK MUST be the certificate public key in the final CSR; the private key of PK is used for IdP-PoP (step 4b) and ACME-PoP (step 6). If the deployment requires separation of the identity key and the certificate public key, an independent document must define the "public key binding proof" mechanism; this is not defined in this document.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The client sends <tt>newOrder</tt> (with an <tt>idp</tt> identifier).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The CA returns an authorization object and an <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> challenge (<tt>idp_url</tt>, <tt>nonce</tt>, <tt>pop_alg</tt>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The client initiates OIDC authentication to the IdP, carrying the JWK JSON string of public key K via <tt>idp_pop_key</tt> and the target <tt>idp</tt> identifier value via <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt> (SHOULD always carry). The IdP completes IdP-PoP:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>4a. Identity authentication: the IdP authenticates the user identity, obtaining <tt>subject S</tt>. The authentication method is defined by the IdP deployment configuration (WebAuthn, password + MFA, etc.).</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>4b. Public key binding validation: the IdP validates that "user S holds the private key of public key PK". The source of PK is the <tt>idp_pop_key</tt> carried by the client in the OIDC authorization request in step 4, or the public key record pre-registered at the IdP. The validation method is defined by the IdP deployment configuration (signature challenge, hardware key registration, or other public key registration mechanism). The IdP MUST verify that the received PK matches the subsequent <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt>; on mismatch it MUST NOT issue the token. A WebAuthn assertion cannot directly serve as <tt>pop_signature</tt> unless an independent profile defines the mapping.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The IdP derives <tt>identifier</tt> via static mapping and issues the JWT:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>idp_assertion.identifier</tt> is derived by the IdP via the statically configured <tt>subject → identifier</tt> mapping; the IdP MUST verify that <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt> (if provided) belongs to the mapping of the authenticated <tt>subject</tt>, and sets <tt>identifier</tt> accordingly; if not provided and the mapping contains multiple identifiers, the IdP MUST refuse to issue; the IdP MUST NOT accept client-specified values that have not been mapping-validated;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> is <tt>"urn:ietf:params:acme:idppop:jwk-sha256:" || base64url(JWK Thumbprint(K))</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>idp_assertion.binding_alg</tt> is <tt>"jwk-sha256"</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>idp_assertion.subject</tt> is <tt>S</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>idp_assertion.method</tt> is <tt>"idp-pop"</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>idp_assertion.identifier_type</tt> is <tt>"idp"</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>the JWT top-level claims <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>iat</tt>, <tt>exp</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The client completes ACME-PoP: constructs the <tt>pop_signature</tt> Flattened JWS, with payload <tt>{"nonce": "&lt;challenge nonce&gt;", "binding": "&lt;binding&gt;"}</tt>, signed with the private key of PK; the protected header <tt>alg</tt> is set per <tt>pop_alg</tt> or the PK algorithm.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The client submits the challenge response:</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "idp_token": "<acmeIdpToken JWT>",
  "pop_key": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "...", "y": "..." },
  "pop_signature": {
    "protected": "<base64url>",
    "payload": "<base64url>",
    "signature": "<base64url>"
  }
}
]]></artwork>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The CA validates (Section 6.5) and marks the challenge <tt>valid</tt>. The client submits the CSR at <tt>finalize</tt>; the CA re-checks that the CSR public key matches <tt>binding</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>IdP normative responsibilities ("identifier-mapping IdP" requirements): when issuing an <tt>idp-pop</tt> token, the IdP MUST satisfy the following requirements:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t><tt>idp_assertion.subject</tt> MUST be derived by the IdP from its authenticated identity, and MUST NOT accept client specification;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_assertion.identifier</tt> MUST be derived by the IdP via the statically configured <tt>subject → identifier</tt> mapping; the IdP MUST verify that the target identifier provided by the client via <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt> (if provided) belongs to the mapping of the authenticated <tt>subject</tt>, and still sets <tt>identifier</tt> itself; MUST NOT accept client-specified values that have not been mapping-validated;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> MUST be computed by the IdP from the public key K it validated, and MUST NOT accept client specification;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the IdP MUST, during authentication, validate that the user holds the private key corresponding to the public key K claimed in <tt>binding</tt>. The validation method is defined by the IdP deployment configuration (signature challenge, public key registration, etc.);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>if the IdP cannot validate public key possession, it MUST NOT issue the <tt>idp-pop</tt> token;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>if the same <tt>subject</tt> corresponds to multiple identifiers in the IdP mapping, and the client has not provided <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt>, the IdP MUST refuse to issue; if provided, the IdP MUST validate per responsibility 2.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>An IdP satisfying the above requirements is referred to in this document as an "identifier-mapping IdP". An IdP not satisfying the requirements MUST NOT deploy the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model.</t>
        <t>Why static mapping is security-critical: if the IdP allows the client to influence <tt>identifier</tt> or <tt>subject</tt>, an attacker can use their own legitimate identity to have the IdP issue a token with <tt>identifier = someone else's identifier</tt>, opening the man-in-the-middle attack surface. Static mapping ensures that the <tt>identifier</tt> issued by the IdP always corresponds to the authenticated identity. WIF does not provide this binding and therefore cannot replace this security property of <tt>idp-pop</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ca-validation-process-1">
        <name>CA Validation Process</name>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Validate JWT base claims: signature, <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>iat</tt>, <tt>exp</tt>, <tt>jti</tt> (if present). <tt>iss</tt> MUST exactly match <tt>idp_config.idp_list[].issuer</tt>; <tt>aud</tt> MUST equal the CA directory URL. If <tt>amr</tt>/<tt>acr</tt>/<tt>auth_time</tt> are present, validate per the deployment policy.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Validate <tt>idp_assertion</tt> structure: present, a top-level JSON object of the JWT payload, containing required elements; <tt>identifier_type</tt> is <tt>"idp"</tt>; <tt>issuer</tt> matches <tt>iss</tt>; <tt>method</tt> is <tt>"idp-pop"</tt>; <tt>binding</tt> is correctly formatted and <tt>binding_alg</tt> is <tt>"jwk-sha256"</tt> and in <tt>idp_config.supported_binding_algs</tt>, and the algorithm identifier in the <tt>binding</tt> prefix matches <tt>binding_alg</tt>; <tt>identifier</tt> matches the challenge <tt>identifier.value</tt> per the comparison rules of Section 4.1. For <tt>oidc:</tt> identifiers, the CA MUST also verify that the <tt>&lt;issuer-url&gt;</tt> in <tt>identifier</tt> normalizes per Section 4.1 to equal the <tt>issuer</tt> of that IdP entry; on mismatch it MUST reject with <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Validate public key thumbprint match: parse <tt>pop_key</tt> as JWK; compute the JWK Thumbprint (SHA-256) per <xref target="RFC7638"/>, construct <tt>binding</tt>, and verify equality with <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt>. The CA MUST derive the acceptable JWS <tt>alg</tt> set from <tt>pop_key</tt>'s <tt>kty</tt>/<tt>crv</tt> and cross-validate with the challenge <tt>pop_alg</tt> (if set) and <tt>idp_assertion.pop_alg</tt> (if set); if <tt>pop_key</tt>'s <tt>alg</tt> is present it MUST match. Recommended mappings follow; the CA may add constraints in the deployment policy, but MUST NOT accept algorithms mismatched to the key type:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>EC P-256 → <tt>ES256</tt>; EC P-384 → <tt>ES384</tt>; EC P-521 → <tt>ES512</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Ed25519 → <tt>EdDSA</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>RSA (≥2048 bits) → <tt>PS256</tt> or <tt>RS256</tt>; if <tt>pop_key</tt> is RSA and the modulus is less than 2048 bits, the CA MUST reject with <tt>badIdpToken</tt>. The CA MUST accept both <tt>PS256</tt> and <tt>RS256</tt>; if the deployment policy requires accepting only <tt>PS256</tt>, it MUST express that via <tt>idp_config</tt> or the challenge <tt>pop_alg</tt> and reject <tt>RS256</tt>. The CA MUST NOT reject a valid <tt>RS256</tt> signature merely because <tt>PS256</tt> is recommended;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>PQ or composite algorithms are mapped per the ACME PQC profile or JOSE PQ drafts; this document does not define new <tt>alg</tt> values.
On mismatch, the CA MUST reject with <tt>badIdpToken</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Validate ACME-PoP: verify that <tt>pop_signature</tt> is a valid Flattened JWS signature of the payload by the private key corresponding to <tt>pop_key</tt>. The CA MUST first verify the signature per RFC 7515, then parse the payload; the <tt>protected</tt> header MUST contain <tt>alg</tt>; MUST NOT contain <tt>b64=false</tt>; if it contains <tt>jwk</tt>, the CA MUST verify it matches <tt>pop_key</tt>. The payload MUST be a JSON object; the parsed <tt>nonce</tt> is byte-by-byte equal to the challenge <tt>nonce</tt> string value, and the parsed <tt>binding</tt> is byte-by-byte equal to the <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> string value; the CA MUST NOT require that the raw payload byte string contain no optional escaping. The signature algorithm is specified by the protected header <tt>alg</tt> and MUST be within the algorithms supported by the CA.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Trust the IdP's static mapping: the consistency of <tt>subject</tt> and <tt>identifier</tt> is guaranteed by the IdP's "identifier-mapping IdP" responsibilities (Section 6.4); the CA does not compare the two strings unless otherwise required by the deployment policy. The CA has already verified that <tt>identifier</tt> matches the challenge (step 2), so no additional comparison of <tt>subject</tt> and <tt>identifier</tt> is needed.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Mark the challenge <tt>valid</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Finalize re-check: after the client submits the CSR, the CA MUST construct a JWK from the CSR public key per the JWK parameters defined in <xref target="RFC7517"/> and <xref target="RFC7518"/> and per the SPKI-to-JWK mapping specification referenced by the deployment; compute the JWK Thumbprint (SHA-256) per <xref target="RFC7638"/>, and verify equality with <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt>. When the algorithm mapping is unsupported, it MUST reject with <tt>badPublicKey</tt> and record. For PQ algorithms, reference the JOSE PQ drafts for the mapping. On mismatch, the CA MUST reject with <tt>badPublicKey</tt>. This re-check prevents the client from substituting the public key after the challenge.</t>
        <t>Trust chain closure:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>IdP-PoP proves "identifier Id is controlled by the authenticated user S, and S holds public key PK" — realized jointly by the IdP's identity authentication (Section 6.4 step 4a), public key possession validation (Section 6.4 step 4b), static mapping (<tt>subject S → identifier Id</tt>), and JWT signature (Section 6.4 step 5).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>ACME-PoP proves "the client submitting the JWT holds public key PK" — realized by the validation of <tt>pop_signature</tt> (step 4 of this section).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Back-to-back connection: <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> in the JWT (the JWK Thumbprint of PK) is the anchor connecting the two PoPs. IdP-PoP confirms "PK belongs to the controller of identifier Id", ACME-PoP confirms "the submitter holds PK", and the two together yield "the submitter controls identifier Id".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The finalize re-check confirms that the final certificate public key is the already-bound public key PK.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Authorization expiry validation: same as Section 5.4. After re-checking that the authorization is <tt>valid</tt> at <tt>finalize</tt>, the CA MUST, before issuing the certificate, re-confirm that the authorization <tt>expires</tt> is strictly greater than the current time; use a monotonic clock.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trust-establishment-oidc-discovery">
        <name>Trust Establishment: OIDC Discovery</name>
        <t>The CA obtains the JWKS via OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 (https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html); the trust root is the Web PKI.</t>
        <t><tt>issuer</tt> match: the <tt>issuer</tt> of the Discovery document MUST exactly match <tt>idp_config.idp_list[].issuer</tt>; on mismatch it MUST reject. For <tt>oidc:</tt> identifiers, the issuer URL constraint of Section 4.1 also applies.</t>
        <t><tt>jwks_uri</tt> constraint: MUST be an HTTPS URL. The CA MUST NOT follow redirects to hosts not configured in <tt>idp_config</tt>. When both <tt>idp_config</tt> and Discovery provide <tt>jwks_uri</tt>, the CA MUST preferentially use the explicit configuration of <tt>idp_config</tt> and record it.</t>
        <t>Routing security of the JWKS retrieval path: the path by which the CA connects to the JWKS endpoint via DNS and TLS may be subject to BGP hijacking. The CA SHOULD incorporate the routing security of this path into the trust decision, and SHOULD implement mechanisms such as DANE TLSA, static fingerprint pinning, multi-perspective retrieval, or RPKI/ROV observability per the deployment policy. On fixed or multi-perspective validation failure, the CA MUST reject the token and alert. The deployment baseline is in Section 9.12. If the JWKS retrieval path cannot satisfy the routing security baseline of Section 9.12, that IdP MUST NOT be used for high-assurance certificate profiles.</t>
        <t>Key rotation: the CA should cache the JWKS per <tt>Cache-Control</tt>/<tt>Expires</tt>; when <tt>kid</tt> is not in the cache or signature validation fails, it should refresh the cache and re-validate. After rotation, old public keys SHOULD be retained in the JWKS for at least one token <tt>exp</tt> window (recommended 30 days). During algorithm family migration, <tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt>/<tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> control the transition and enforcement periods.</t>
        <t>Self-referencing chains: the CA MUST be able to detect trust chain self-references and should limit the recursion depth to one hop.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="trust-model-selection-guidance">
      <name>Trust Model Selection Guidance</name>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Dimension</th>
            <th align="left">PKI Certificate Binding (x509-chain)</th>
            <th align="left">Dual-PoP Public Key Binding (idp-pop)</th>
            <th align="left">WIF (Informative, draft-rasmussen-acme-wif-00)</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">IdP capabilities required</td>
            <td align="left">Holds a PKI certificate issued by a CA pre-configured trust root</td>
            <td align="left">Can validate that the user holds the certificate public key private key (signature challenge/public key registration) + static <tt>subject→identifier→public key</tt> mapping</td>
            <td align="left">Produces OIDC-conforming workload JWT; <strong>no public key registration or identifier-public key static mapping required</strong></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Trust establishment</td>
            <td align="left">Pre-configured certificate trust root</td>
            <td align="left">JWKS obtained via OIDC Discovery under Web PKI + IdP static mapping</td>
            <td align="left">JWKS obtained via OIDC Discovery; trust anchor entirely locally configured by the CA</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Identifier conveyance</td>
            <td align="left">Via dedicated request (normatively referenced from RFC 9448 Section 5.5)</td>
            <td align="left">Via out-of-band static mapping; the IdP independently derives the target identifier, <strong>not accepting client-provided identifiers that have not been mapping-validated</strong></td>
            <td align="left">Identifier comes from CA validation of order and JWT claims; the identifier may be specified by the client in <tt>newOrder</tt>, and validation logic resides entirely in CA-side policy</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Interactive scenario</td>
            <td align="left">Not applicable</td>
            <td align="left">Applicable (signature challenge/hardware key)</td>
            <td align="left">Not applicable; targets automated workloads</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Non-interactive scenario</td>
            <td align="left">Applicable</td>
            <td align="left">Not applicable</td>
            <td align="left">Applicable (CI/CD, cloud-native workloads)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Applicable IdP</td>
            <td align="left">Enterprise self-built PKI IdP</td>
            <td align="left">Enterprise self-built OIDC IdP (supporting public key registration/signature challenge)</td>
            <td align="left">Cloud platforms, K8s SPIFFE/SPIRE and similar native workload IdPs; general-purpose public OIDC IdPs can be used directly</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Relationship to RFC 9448</td>
            <td align="left">Architecturally analogous, but telephone number authority is still carried by TNAuthList</td>
            <td align="left">Independent mechanism; non-telephone-number AoRs</td>
            <td align="left">No relationship; does not reuse the <tt>tkauth-01</tt> framework</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Man-in-the-middle attack surface</td>
            <td align="left">Low (pre-configured trust root + IdP binding responsibilities)</td>
            <td align="left">Low (static mapping + requires possession of the target public key private key)</td>
            <td align="left">Conditional risk: when the client can manipulate the requested identifier, mitigation relies entirely on <strong>CA-local policy validation of order and JWT claim match</strong>; risk is lower when the platform fully controls identifier allocation</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Certificate lifecycle match</td>
            <td align="left">Matches the source CA</td>
            <td align="left">Medium-short recommended; pair with certificate revocation in identity-change scenarios</td>
            <td align="left">Highly compatible with short-lived certificates; the JWT itself is a short-lived workload credential</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>Selection guidance references:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The CA can pre-configure the IdP certificate trust root, and the IdP holds a certificate issued by that root → select <tt>x509-chain</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The IdP can validate that the user holds the certificate public key private key and can maintain static mapping → select <tt>idp-pop</tt> (especially for interactive user scenarios);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If the subject is a workload and the platform token already provides a trusted identifier with the platform fully controlling identifier allocation, WIF may be preferred; if the subject is an interactive user or an enterprise IdP requiring IdP-side enforcement of the identity identifier and public key binding, use <tt>idp-pop</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>For enterprise private-domain SIP deployments, the CA SHOULD restrict the <tt>domain_suffixes</tt> of the <tt>sip</tt> scheme to enterprise-owned domains; MUST NOT list public carrier SIP domains in <tt>domain_suffixes</tt>; when the identifier host belongs to a known PSTN carrier domain, the CA MUST reject the <tt>idp</tt> order and guide the client to RFC 9448;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Telephone-number-form SIP URIs and TEL URIs MUST use the TNAuthList profile of RFC 9448 and are not handled within the <tt>idp</tt> framework of this document;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Lifecycle matching is a deployment heuristic, not a security boundary: WIF suits scenarios where the platform issues short-lived workload tokens and the certificate profile is short-lived; <tt>idp-pop</tt> suits scenarios where the IdP maintains stable identity identifiers, an identifier-public-key static binding is required, and the certificate validity period is medium or short. Short-lived tokens/certificates do not relieve the CA of its responsibility to enforce policy validation in WIF mode; long-lived identity identifiers do not imply that certificates should be configured with long validity periods;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The three (<tt>x509-chain</tt> / <tt>idp-pop</tt> / WIF) target different subjects and IdP capabilities and are not interchangeable;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>When both Delegated-ICV models are available, select per deployment policy and user scenario;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>When neither Delegated-ICV model is available, the CA should reject with <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="client-behavior">
      <name>Client Behavior</name>
      <section anchor="general-constraints">
        <name>General Constraints</name>
        <t>The client must recognize the <tt>idp</tt> identifier type, the <tt>tkauth-01</tt> (<tt>tkauth-type = "idp"</tt>) and the <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> challenge. The client should discover the models supported by the CA via the directory <tt>meta.idp_config_uri</tt>; when the CA does not provide it, equivalent information must be obtained via out-of-band configuration.</t>
        <t>Model selection: the client MUST select the model based on the target IdP entry: if that entry is configured with <tt>supported_models</tt>, the client MUST use that entry; otherwise use the top-level <tt>supported_models</tt>. If the intersection of those with the models supported by the client is empty, the interaction MUST fail, and the CA returns <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>. If the CA returns a challenge unsupported by the client in the same authorization object, the client MUST ignore that challenge and SHOULD re-read <tt>idp_config_uri</tt>; if there is still no common model, the client MUST fail and report <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt>.</t>
        <t>Identifier pass-through unchanged: the identifier value provided by the client to the IdP MUST be byte-by-byte identical to the <tt>identifier.value</tt> in <tt>newOrder</tt>; the client MUST NOT perform normalization, case conversion, or encoding conversion.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="pki-certificate-binding-x509-chain-client">
        <name>PKI Certificate Binding (<tt>x509-chain</tt>) Client</name>
        <t>The client MUST obtain from the IdP a JWS signed by the IdP certificate private key and submit it in the <tt>tkauth</tt> field. The client MUST provide the challenge <tt>nonce</tt>, the target identifier, and the CA directory URL to the IdP. The client MUST NOT construct or modify by itself claims such as <tt>x5c</tt>, <tt>atc</tt>, <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>exp</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>, or <tt>sub</tt> for which the IdP is responsible.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="dual-pop-public-key-binding-idp-pop-client">
        <name>Dual-PoP Public Key Binding (<tt>idp-pop</tt>) Client</name>
        <t>The client MUST generate a key pair K (or reuse an existing key), and complete public key possession proof via <tt>idp_pop_key</tt> (JWK JSON string) during IdP authentication; the client SHOULD always carry the target identifier value from <tt>newOrder</tt> via <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt>. The client MUST submit <tt>idp_token</tt>, <tt>pop_key</tt>, and <tt>pop_signature</tt> in the challenge response.</t>
        <t><tt>pop_signature</tt> MUST be a Flattened JWS with payload <tt>{"nonce": "&lt;challenge nonce&gt;", "binding": "&lt;idp_assertion.binding&gt;"}</tt>, signed with K's private key. The client MUST verify that <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> in the IdP token corresponds to the public key K it holds; on mismatch it MUST refuse to submit.</t>
        <t>Error handling:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">CA Error</th>
              <th align="left">Order/Authorization State</th>
              <th align="left">Client Behavior</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>badIdpToken</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Authorization remains <tt>pending</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Re-perform IdP authentication; after retries per the count defined by the deployment policy, report the error</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>badPublicKey</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Authorization is <tt>valid</tt> but finalize failed</td>
              <td align="left">The client MUST create a new order; MUST NOT reuse an already-<tt>valid</tt> challenge or the same CSR</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The order SHOULD be marked by the CA as not continuable</td>
              <td align="left">Report a configuration error, do not retry; SHOULD re-read <tt>idp_config_uri</tt>; the client MUST NOT retry the same order, and must create a new order or contact the CA</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>malformed</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Authorization remains <tt>pending</tt> or is invalidated per the CA policy</td>
              <td align="left">Report an implementation error, do not retry</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="adversary-model">
        <name>Adversary Model</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Network adversary: can observe, inject, drop, and replay ACME and IdP traffic; can hijack DNS/BGP. Mitigation: TLS, <tt>nonce</tt>, <tt>atc.fingerprint</tt>/<tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, routing security baseline (Section 9.12).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Malicious client: holds a legitimate ACME account and attempts to obtain a certificate for an identifier not belonging to it. Mitigation: account specificity of the challenge <tt>nonce</tt>, IdP-side applicant validation and static mapping, <tt>idp-pop</tt> public key thumbprint match + JWS PoP signature + finalize re-check.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Malicious IdP operator: can issue assertions for any identifier. The trust models of this document explicitly trust the IdP; this threat is out of mitigation scope.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Malicious CA operator: can directly issue certificates without going through ICV. This document does not claim to defend against a malicious CA.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>End user holding legitimate IdP credentials: an inherent limitation of ICV, out of mitigation scope; the CA can only reduce impact via <tt>amr/acr/auth_time</tt> and short-lived certificates.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Deployment warning: deployers must fully understand that the security foundation of Delegated ICV rests entirely on the trustworthiness of the IdP; a compromised IdP can generate legitimate cryptographic assertions for any identity identifier, and the CA cannot detect it. High-assurance deployments need security auditing of the IdP, access control, and audit of changes to the <tt>idp-pop</tt> <tt>subject → identifier → public key</tt> mapping.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="security-properties-of-the-two-trust-models">
        <name>Security Properties of the Two Trust Models</name>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Threat/Property</th>
              <th align="left">PKI Certificate Binding (x509-chain)</th>
              <th align="left">Dual-PoP Public Key Binding (idp-pop)</th>
              <th align="left">WIF (Informative, draft-rasmussen-acme-wif-00)</th>
              <th align="left">Notes</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Attacker holds legitimate IdP credentials</td>
              <td align="left">Requires the IdP certificate private key</td>
              <td align="left">Requires the target public key private key</td>
              <td align="left">Requires obtaining a legitimate workload JWT credential</td>
              <td align="left">Out of mitigation scope</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">IdP key compromise</td>
              <td align="left">Handled via certificate trust root revocation</td>
              <td align="left">Handled via JWKS rotation + public key validation history</td>
              <td align="left">Handled via JWKS key rotation of the compromised signing key</td>
              <td align="left">The CA should retain <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> as audit evidence</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">IdP static mapping tampering</td>
              <td align="left">Not applicable (no static mapping)</td>
              <td align="left">Medium: mapping tampering can lead to tokens issued for the wrong identifier</td>
              <td align="left">Not applicable; no IdP-side static subject-identifier mapping</td>
              <td align="left">The CA cannot detect IdP internal mapping errors; relies on IdP audit (Section 9.6)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Identifier binding reliability</td>
              <td align="left">Relies on IdP authoritative data and dedicated request conveyance</td>
              <td align="left">Relies on IdP validation of public key possession + static mapping</td>
              <td align="left">No IdP-side identifier-public-key binding; identifier match validation entirely delegated to CA-local policy</td>
              <td align="left">The reliability of <tt>idp-pop</tt> is guaranteed cryptographically</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Client inducing the IdP to issue for another identifier</td>
              <td align="left">Possible if the IdP does not fulfill its Section 5.2 responsibilities; the IdP controls the identifier in the assertion</td>
              <td align="left">Static mapping prevents this attack; the IdP independently derives the target identifier</td>
              <td align="left">Conditional risk: the client may specify the identifier in <tt>newOrder</tt>; mitigation relies entirely on CA validation of order identifier and JWT claims</td>
              <td align="left">Risk precondition: the client can influence the requested target identifier</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">DNS/BGP hijacking</td>
              <td align="left">Low (pre-configured trust root)</td>
              <td align="left">Medium-high (JWKS retrieval path)</td>
              <td align="left">Medium-high (JWKS retrieval path)</td>
              <td align="left">Deployment baseline in Section 9.12</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Cross-CA replay</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>atc.fingerprint + nonce + aud</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>idp_assertion.binding + nonce + aud</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Relies solely on JWT <tt>aud</tt> and short validity; there is no ACME challenge nonce binding</td>
              <td align="left">Account specificity of the challenge nonce provides isolation (WIF does not use ACME challenge)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Trust anchor retrieval</td>
              <td align="left">Pre-configured</td>
              <td align="left">OIDC Discovery + JWKS cache</td>
              <td align="left">OIDC Discovery + JWKS cache</td>
              <td align="left">The latter can be cached</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Implementation complexity</td>
              <td align="left">Low</td>
              <td align="left">Medium (requires public key registration/signature challenge and JWK handling)</td>
              <td align="left">Low; no IdP public key registration capability required</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Security property notes: <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> proves "the IdP's assertion about the identifier", not "the applicant currently controls the identity". The dual PoP of <tt>idp-pop</tt> provides a stronger binding and internalizes a constrained ACME-PoP; if the identity public key and the certificate public key differ, <tt>pop-01</tt> is still required.</t>
        <t>SIP message layer boundary: a <tt>sip:</tt> certificate issued under the <tt>idp</tt> framework does not provide PASSporT signature or SIP message layer identity validation guarantees; if the deployment uses the certificate for SIP message signing (for example, the <tt>x5u</tt> of PASSporT), the binding of From/AoR to the certificate SAN, replay protection, and <tt>orig</tt>/<tt>dest</tt> validation are handled by SIP layer security mechanisms and are outside the scope of this document. An <tt>idp</tt> certificate does not replace PASSporT or STI certificates.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="limitations-of-identity-control-validation-and-downgrade-protection">
        <name>Limitations of Identity Control Validation and Downgrade Protection</name>
        <t>ICV cannot distinguish a legitimate user from an attacker who has stolen IdP credentials. The CA should accept cautiously and reduce risk via short-lived certificates.</t>
        <t>The CA MUST NOT provide ICV and DCV challenges in the same authorization object simultaneously. When simultaneous validation is required, create different authorization objects, and the order enters <tt>ready</tt> only after both are <tt>valid</tt>.</t>
        <t>Mixed restriction with WIF: the same ACME order MUST NOT use both the WIF identity token mechanism and Delegated ICV challenges (<tt>tkauth-01</tt> with <tt>tkauth-type="idp"</tt>, or <tt>idp-pop-01</tt>); if an implementation allows a single authorization object to carry multiple identifier types, mixing is likewise MUST NOT within the same authorization object. If the deployment needs to validate both workload identity and delegated ICV, create different authorization objects, and the order enters <tt>ready</tt> only after both are <tt>valid</tt>. If the WIF document has defined stricter mixing rules, the stricter ones prevail, and the cross-reference is recorded in the deployment policy.</t>
        <t>Mixed restriction with TNAuthList: the same authorization object MUST NOT contain both an <tt>idp</tt> identifier (<tt>sip:</tt> scheme) and a TNAuthList identifier. Telephone number authority MUST use RFC 9448; the <tt>sip:</tt> of the <tt>idp</tt> framework is used only for non-telephone-number AoRs and does not assert TNAuthList semantics.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trust-chain-liability-and-revocation">
        <name>Trust Chain, Liability, and Revocation</name>
        <t>The CA should clarify responsibility allocation; the IdP is advised to undergo independent audit. Handling of IdP key compromise or trust failure: <tt>x509-chain</tt> handles it via certificate trust root revocation, CRL/OCSP, and trusted root updates; <tt>idp-pop</tt> handles it via JWKS rotation, pinning alerts, and trusted IdP list updates.</t>
        <t>Use of <tt>idp_config.idp_list[].recommended_revocation_delay</tt>: the CA SHOULD use the value as a recommended delay reference for propagation of IdP identity revocation to certificate revocation, for designing certificate validity periods, re-validation cycles, and revocation strategy; the client MAY use it for caching and retry policy. The value is not a mandatory revocation deadline, and the CA MUST record the revocation propagation assumptions it actually adopts in the deployment policy.</t>
        <t>Issuance evidence retention: the CA SHOULD retain <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> evidence sufficient to independently validate the issuance decision (full token, or cryptographic binding digest + validation result). The retention period SHOULD at least cover the certificate validity period plus the post-revocation retention period required by the PKI system in which the deployment resides. The CA MUST record its choice in the deployment policy.</t>
        <t>In the event of a liability dispute between the CA and the IdP, the <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> retained by the CA can serve as audit evidence; its probative value depends on the IdP's key management, signing key lifecycle, and CA log integrity. OIDC ID Tokens and generic JWS assertions are not designed for non-repudiation; this document does not claim that they constitute non-repudiable cryptographic evidence.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-replay-and-cross-ca-isolation">
        <name>Token Replay and Cross-CA Isolation</name>
        <t>Multi-layer protection: <tt>atc.fingerprint</tt>/<tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> (the SHA-256 of the challenge <tt>nonce</tt>, or the public key JWK Thumbprint), <tt>nonce</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>jti/exp</tt>, and the <tt>iat</tt> threshold (defined by the deployment policy, RECOMMENDED not exceeding 60 seconds). The <tt>jti</tt> deduplication cache is a SHOULD-level protection for multi-instance deployments: if the token contains <tt>jti</tt>, when the CA deploys multiple directory instances, it should ensure that all instances share the deduplication cache or use a unified <tt>aud</tt>.</t>
        <t>Cross-CA isolation: <tt>atc.fingerprint</tt>/<tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt> is based on the challenge <tt>nonce</tt>/public key of each CA, so cross-CA replay is necessarily rejected; <tt>aud</tt> restricts the token to a specific CA. The CA MUST use the challenge <tt>nonce</tt> of the current authorization object during validation and MUST NOT accept binding values from other sources.</t>
        <t>Account isolation: the challenge <tt>nonce</tt> is generated by the server for that account's authorization object.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="idp-key-compromise-administrative-privileges-and-audit">
        <name>IdP Key Compromise, Administrative Privileges, and Audit</name>
        <t>Key compromise: impact is limited to identifier forgery. High-value IdPs are recommended to use multi-signature and threshold schemes, and are advised to accept the same audit standard as the CA (WebTrust or SOC 2).</t>
        <t>IdP-side administrative privilege attacks: the CA should evaluate the IdP's administrative privilege controls (dual confirmation, audit logs, batch change rate limiting). Under high-assurance certificate profiles, the CA should require <tt>auth_time</tt> and at least one strong authentication <tt>amr</tt> (RECOMMENDED).</t>
        <t>Audit of IdP static mapping (<tt>idp-pop</tt>-specific): the CA SHOULD require the <tt>idp-pop</tt> IdP to provide audit evidence of its <tt>subject → identifier → public key</tt> mapping table, including logs of creation, modification, and deletion of mappings and access control. For high-assurance certificate profiles, the CA SHOULD require mapping changes to undergo dual approval. This is a key precondition for the security of the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model.</t>
        <t>IdP authentication policy changes: the CA SHOULD establish a periodic re-evaluation mechanism and track it via <tt>policy_version</tt> (Section 4.4); re-evaluation conclusions SHOULD be recorded in audit logs.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="privacy-pseudonymity-and-protection-of-idp-source-attributes">
        <name>Privacy, Pseudonymity, and Protection of IdP Source Attributes</name>
        <t>Pairwise pseudonymity and <tt>sub</tt> minimization are basic requirements. The IdP should generate <tt>sub</tt> using the pairwise pseudonymity mechanism defined by OIDC; the CA should treat <tt>sub</tt> as an opaque string. The static mapping of <tt>idp-pop</tt> requires <tt>sub</tt> to be predictable (stable <tt>sub</tt>), which weakens the privacy protection of pairwise pseudonymity; deployments should evaluate this privacy impact in <tt>idp_config</tt> or the CPS.</t>
        <t>Assertion content minimization: the IdP SHOULD NOT include attributes unrelated to identity validation in <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt>. The CA SHOULD retain only the cryptographic hash of <tt>sub</tt> and the identifier value in audit logs.</t>
        <t>The privacy impact of writing email addresses into the SAN and CT should be evaluated by the CA in the deployment policy (<xref target="RFC6962"/>).</t>
        <t>Enumeration risk of low-entropy identifiers (informative): predictable identifiers may be enumerated to probe identities that the IdP has validated. When publishing <tt>domain_suffixes</tt> and the trusted IdP list, the CA SHOULD evaluate this risk and apply account-level rate limiting to <tt>newOrder</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="nonce-and-pop-signature-generation">
        <name>Nonce and PoP Signature Generation</name>
        <t>CSPRNG, ≥128 bits, at most 256 bits. In a distributed CA, each instance should use a CSPRNG seeded independently.</t>
        <t><tt>jti</tt> deduplication cache lifetime: if the token contains <tt>jti</tt>, the deduplication cache MUST retain at least until one <tt>skew</tt> window after the token <tt>exp</tt>.</t>
        <t><tt>pop_signature</tt> construction: the client MUST construct a Flattened JWS with payload <tt>{"nonce": "&lt;challenge nonce&gt;", "binding": "&lt;binding&gt;"}</tt>, signed with PK's private key; the signature algorithm is specified by <tt>pop_alg</tt> or the protected header <tt>alg</tt>. The client SHOULD use canonical JSON construction. The CA MUST first verify the JWS signature, then parse the payload as a JSON object and compare the parsed string values field by field; the CA MUST NOT require that the raw payload byte string contain no optional escaping. The signature base string of <tt>pop_signature</tt> is the payload serialization submitted by the client; the CA's validation covers both "the JWS signature is valid" and "the parsed <tt>nonce</tt>/<tt>binding</tt> field values match", but does not claim that the signature covers canonicalized field values.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="layered-proof-of-possession-and-defense-in-depth">
        <name>Layered Proof of Possession and Defense in Depth</name>
        <t>PoP can be performed at two layers: IdP-PoP (the IdP validates during authentication that the applicant holds the public key) and ACME-PoP (the CA directly validates that the applicant holds the certificate private key).</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>x509-chain</tt>: signed by the IdP certificate private key, providing the IdP's strong signature over the assertion, but not proving that the applicant holds the final certificate private key; applicant PoP must be handled independently (<tt>pop-01</tt>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>idp-pop</tt>: internalizes IdP-PoP (the IdP validates public key possession) and a constrained ACME-PoP (the CA validates a JWS PoP signature of the same public key). If the identity public key = the certificate public key, <tt>idp-pop</tt> simultaneously completes identity validation and constrained key possession proof; but this constrained PoP does not replace the generic <tt>pop-01</tt> authorization. If the deployment requires generic key possession proof, <tt>pop-01</tt> is still required. If the identity public key ≠ the certificate public key, an independent document must still define the public key binding proof and <tt>pop-01</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Recommendation: <tt>idp-pop</tt> deployments SHOULD use identity public key = certificate public key, simplifying the protocol and internalizing the constrained ACME-PoP.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="certificate-lifecycle-and-authentication-strength-informative">
        <name>Certificate Lifecycle and Authentication Strength (Informative)</name>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Authentication Method</th>
              <th align="left">Certificate Lifetime (Example)</th>
              <th align="left">Additional PoP</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Low entropy (password)</td>
              <td align="left">Hours to days</td>
              <td align="left">Recommended</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Hardware-bound two-factor authentication</td>
              <td align="left">Months to one year</td>
              <td align="left">Optional</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">PKI certificate chain (<tt>x509-chain</tt>)</td>
              <td align="left">Matches the source CA</td>
              <td align="left">Recommended</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Dual-PoP public key binding (<tt>idp-pop</tt>)</td>
              <td align="left">Short to medium (examples in body)</td>
              <td align="left">Recommended if the identity public key differs from the certificate public key; constrained PoP does not replace <tt>pop-01</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Publicly trusted S/MIME / code signing</td>
              <td align="left">Defined by CA/B Forum rules</td>
              <td align="left">Per profile; not in normative scope of this document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The CA should apply differentiated policy based on <tt>amr/acr</tt>, and SHOULD reference <tt>recommended_revocation_delay</tt> (Section 9.4) when designing re-validation and revocation propagation assumptions.</t>
        <t>For <tt>idp-pop</tt> access certificates (for example, EAP-TLS device onboarding, mTLS client authentication), the CA SHOULD use short or medium validity periods (for example, days to months) and pair them with IdP account status checks and revocation; it should not issue multi-year access certificates merely because the identity identifier is stable. The mapping of network-layer identity to policy is defined by the deployment profile.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="algorithm-agility-and-pqc-boundary">
        <name>Algorithm Agility and PQC Boundary</name>
        <t>This document remains algorithm-neutral, but algorithm neutrality is not PQ security. The default algorithm set <tt>ES256</tt> and <tt>EdDSA</tt> is a classical cryptography security baseline. Deployments using ICV MUST evaluate classical algorithm risk in their quantum threat analysis.</t>
        <t>Algorithm namespace: <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>, <tt>pop_alg</tt>, and the JWS protected header <tt>alg</tt> MUST use the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry <xref target="RFC7518"/>. PQ or composite algorithm identifiers are defined by the ACME PQC profile or JOSE PQ drafts; this document does not define new JOSE <tt>alg</tt> values.</t>
        <t>Per-IdP algorithm constraints: <tt>idp_config.idp_list[].allowed_jwt_algs</tt> and <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> allow the CA to express transition and enforcement periods. When <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> is present, the token's <tt>alg</tt> MUST be in it; <tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt> serves as a whitelist only when <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> is absent. When both are present, <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> MUST be a subset of <tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt>, and both MUST be subsets of the top-level <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>; otherwise the CA configuration is invalid. After migration, the CA SHOULD set <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> to PQ algorithms and remove classical algorithms. The coexistence and phase-out rules for classical and PQ roots in <tt>x5c_trust_anchors</tt> MUST be recorded in the CA deployment policy; <tt>idp_list[].anchor_algs</tt> is used to constrain certificate chain signature algorithms. The CA MUST verify <tt>anchor_algs</tt> (constraining <tt>x5c</tt> chain certificate signature algorithms) and <tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt>/<tt>required_jwt_algs</tt> (constraining JWT <tt>alg</tt>) separately, and MUST NOT infer that one constraint implies the other.</t>
        <t><tt>binding_alg</tt> migration: <tt>idp_config.supported_binding_algs</tt> allows the CA to accept multiple <tt>binding_alg</tt> values simultaneously; old values may be removed after the transition period. The <tt>binding_alg</tt> in the IdP token MUST be in the list, and the algorithm identifier in the <tt>binding</tt> prefix MUST match it. The CA MUST extract the <tt>&lt;binding_alg&gt;</tt> segment from the <tt>binding</tt> string and interpret the encoding of <tt>&lt;binding-value&gt;</tt> per the registry of Section 10.7, and MUST NOT rely solely on the <tt>binding_alg</tt> field while ignoring the URN prefix. Future migration to other hashes or serializations is defined by the profile with new values added to <tt>supported_binding_algs</tt>; new <tt>binding_alg</tt> values MUST be registered in the registry of Section 10.7 to avoid proliferation of private values. Future registered values may define non-URN <tt>binding</tt> forms, but must also define coexistence and phase-out rules with the existing URN form.</t>
        <t>PQC risk of <tt>x509-chain</tt>: if the IdP certificate is RSA or ECDSA, its lifetime is several years. An attacker recording a signature today could, after CRQC emerges, forge that IdP's assertions for any identifier, while the CA's pre-configured trust root still trusts that key. Therefore:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>when the deployment plans to still use <tt>x509-chain</tt> within the example timeline (2030–2035), the IdP certificate SHOULD use composite or PQ signatures, or the deployment policy MUST record the quantum risk acceptance rationale for classical certificates;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the CA MUST NOT conclude that the whole process is PQ-secure merely because the ICV end-entity certificate uses PQ algorithms;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>PQ certificate path validation MUST reference a specific PKIX PQC specification (for example, the LAMPS WG ML-DSA certificate specification), and must not merely state "supports the corresponding algorithm".</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>PQC risk of <tt>idp-pop</tt>: it involves three algorithm layers — the IdP's JWT signing algorithm, the bound public key K's algorithm, and the <tt>pop_signature</tt> JWS algorithm. The three have different risks, and the deployment's quantum threat analysis should cover each separately:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the quantum risk of the IdP JWT signing key is the same as <tt>x509-chain</tt>; the pre-collected signature and post-quantum forgery risk also applies to the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model IdP's JWT signing key; high-assurance deployments should shorten the IdP JWT signing key lifetime or use PQ/composite signature algorithms;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the algorithm risk of the bound public key PK is jointly constrained by IdP-PoP and the finalize re-check;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the JWS algorithm risk of <tt>pop_signature</tt> is constrained by <tt>pop_alg</tt> and <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>binding_alg = "jwk-sha256"</tt> uses SHA-256; high-assurance deployments SHOULD evaluate whether 128-bit effective security is sufficient, and future profiles may define new <tt>binding_alg</tt> values.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Interface boundary with the ACME PQC profile: the PQC profile defines the specific identifiers, token validity periods, and certificate lifecycle rules for PQ/composite algorithms; this document defines identity semantics and algorithm agility requirements; the two compose orthogonally. The PQC profile MAY declare its algorithm identifiers in <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>. Until the PQC profile defines a client-side algorithm negotiation field, the CA selects algorithms per <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>, <tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt>, and <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt>, and the client cannot express algorithm preferences; this is a known limitation of the current version.</t>
        <t>Store-now-decrypt-later (also known as harvest-now-decrypt-later): when the CA retains <tt>acmeIdpToken</tt> as audit evidence, it SHOULD evaluate the long-term confidentiality of identity attributes and public key thumbprints in the token; for high-assurance deployments, it SHOULD use short-lived tokens, minimize retained content, or encrypt the retained content. When retaining tokens, the CA SHOULD also retain the algorithm identifiers, <tt>binding_alg</tt>, and trust anchor version at validation time, so that the token's trustworthiness under CRQC can be evaluated in the future.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="configuration-integrity-and-routing-security">
        <name>Configuration Integrity and Routing Security</name>
        <t>The integrity of <tt>idp_config_uri</tt> and the <tt>idp_config</tt> resource is part of the trust anchor. The CA MUST provide this resource over TLS, SHOULD support <tt>ETag</tt> or <tt>Last-Modified</tt>, SHOULD set <tt>Cache-Control</tt>, and MUST audit and alert on changes. The CA SHOULD incorporate the generation of <tt>idp_config</tt> into configuration management and audit processes, and MUST NOT allow manual ad hoc editing. The CA SHOULD monitor the <tt>idp_config</tt> resource for unexpected content changes (for example, hash pinning + alerting). When revoking an IdP, the CA SHOULD pair short <tt>Cache-Control</tt> with an active invalidation mechanism and record the client cache window in the deployment policy.</t>
        <t>JWKS and <tt>idp_list_ref</tt> retrieval path: the CA SHOULD incorporate DNS/BGP routing security into the trust decision, and SHOULD implement mechanisms such as DANE TLSA, static fingerprint pinning, multi-perspective retrieval, or RPKI/ROV observability. On fixed or multi-perspective validation failure, the CA MUST reject the token and alert. If the JWKS retrieval path cannot satisfy the above routing security baseline, that IdP MUST NOT be used for high-assurance certificate profiles.</t>
        <t>High-assurance restriction: HTTPS URL retrieval of <tt>x5c_trust_anchors</tt> and dynamic retrieval of <tt>idp_list_ref</tt> MUST NOT be used for trust roots of high-assurance certificate profiles.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="priority-with-the-pqc-profile">
        <name>Priority with the PQC Profile</name>
        <t>When the server policy of the ACME PQC profile conflicts with <tt>supported_jwt_algs</tt>, <tt>allowed_jwt_algs</tt>, <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt>, or <tt>supported_binding_algs</tt> of this document, the CA MUST adopt the stricter one and record the conflict resolution rule in the deployment policy. The PQC profile must not relax the IdP binding responsibilities, <tt>binding</tt> integrity, or finalize re-check requirements of this document.</t>
        <t>Example: if the PQC profile requires <tt>required_jwt_algs = ["ML-DSA-44"]</tt>, while this document configures <tt>allowed_jwt_algs = ["ES256", "ML-DSA-44"]</tt>, the CA must adopt the mandatory set of <tt>required_jwt_algs</tt>, i.e., accept only tokens signed with <tt>ML-DSA-44</tt>. If the PQC profile requires <tt>supported_binding_algs = ["jwk-sha384"]</tt> while this document configures <tt>["jwk-sha256"]</tt>, the CA must support both, or reject tokens not meeting the stricter requirement per the deployment policy.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="new-acme-identifier-type">
        <name>New ACME Identifier Type</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following in the "ACME Identifier Types" registry (<xref target="RFC8555"/> Section 9.7.7):</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Label</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>idp</tt></td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Registration policy is "Specification Required"; Change Controller is the IETF.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="new-acme-authority-token-challenge-types">
        <name>New ACME Authority Token Challenge Types</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following in the "ACME Authority Token Challenge Types" registry (<xref target="RFC9447"/> Section 6.3):</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Label</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>idp</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The <tt>tkauth-type</tt> used by the <tt>x509-chain</tt> model; the token is a JWS containing an <tt>atc</tt> claim, signed by the IdP's PKI certificate private key. Type-specific parameters are located in <tt>tkauth-params</tt>, containing <tt>idp_methods</tt>.</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Registration policy is "Specification Required"; Change Controller is the IETF.</t>
        <t>Differences from RFC 9447: the <tt>idp</tt> type of this document reuses the <tt>tkauth-01</tt> challenge and retains the <tt>atc</tt> claim, but does not reuse the token transfer model of RFC 9447. <tt>atc.fingerprint</tt> is defined by this profile as the SHA-256 digest of the challenge <tt>nonce</tt> (base64url without padding), differing from the colon-separated hexadecimal representation of RFC 9448; RFC 9447 defines the generic claim framework of <tt>atc</tt>, and the specific format of <tt>fingerprint</tt> is defined by the profile corresponding to <tt>tkauth-type</tt>; this document, as the profile for <tt>tkauth-type = "idp"</tt>, defines that format. The CA implementation MUST dispatch <tt>fingerprint</tt> parsing logic by <tt>tkauth-type</tt>. The <tt>tkauth-01</tt> challenge itself is registered by RFC 9447, and this document does not re-register it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="acme-validation-methods-registration">
        <name>ACME Validation Methods Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following in the "ACME Validation Methods" registry:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Label</th>
              <th align="left">Identifier Type</th>
              <th align="left">ACME</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>idp-pop-01</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>idp</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">This document (<tt>idp-pop</tt> model)</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Note: the <tt>tkauth-01</tt> challenge itself is defined by <xref target="RFC9447"/>, and <tt>tkauth-type = "idp"</tt> is registered in Section 10.2; <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> is a new challenge type defined by this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="new-acme-error-types">
        <name>New ACME Error Types</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following in the "ACME Error Types" registry:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Error Type</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>badIdpToken</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Delegated ICV validation failure, including IdP token invalid, signature validation failed, or (<tt>idp-pop</tt>) bound public key/PoP signature validation failed</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Identifier or IdP selection rejected; including inability to determine the IdP, multiple IdPs matching with no deterministic rule, <tt>oidc:</tt> issuer URL mismatch, etc.</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>badPublicKey</tt></td>
              <td align="left">CSR public key does not match the public key pre-bound in <tt>idp_assertion.binding</tt></td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Registration policy is "Specification Required"; Change Controller is the IETF.</t>
        <t>Client behavior after receiving <tt>badPublicKey</tt> is defined in Section 8.3; the IANA registration entry describes only the error semantics and does not include client implementation requirements. The CA SHOULD provide a distinguishable rejection reason in the <tt>detail</tt> field of the <tt>problem</tt> document (for example, "IdP not in the trust list", "issuer URL mismatch", "multiple IdPs matched with no deterministic rule") and SHOULD record the specific reason in audit logs; this document does not define sub-error codes.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="idpmethod-registry">
        <name><tt>idp_method</tt> Registry</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to create the "ACME <tt>idp_method</tt> Values" registry with registration policy "Specification Required". The registry title is "ACME <tt>idp_method</tt> Values"; entry fields are: method name (string), description (string), status (Required or Optional), reference (RFC).</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Method Name</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">Status</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>x509-chain</tt></td>
              <td align="left">PKI certificate binding</td>
              <td align="left">Optional</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The status column takes values Required or Optional. <tt>x509-chain</tt> is marked Optional because implementations MUST support at least one model but are not required to support both. <tt>idp-pop</tt> is the independent challenge <tt>idp-pop-01</tt> and is not registered as an <tt>idp_method</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="acme-directory-metadata-field-registration">
        <name>ACME Directory Metadata Field Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following in the "ACME Directory Metadata Fields" registry:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Field Name</th>
              <th align="left">Field Type</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>idp_config_uri</tt></td>
              <td align="left">string</td>
              <td align="left">HTTPS URL pointing to an independent <tt>idp_config</tt> JSON resource</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Sub-field note: <tt>idp_config</tt> is an independent HTTPS resource, not a JSON extension of the directory object; the directory object carries only the <tt>idp_config_uri</tt> pointer. The internal fields of <tt>idp_config</tt> are defined by this document and, as components of an independent resource, are not registered separately. Change Controller is the IETF.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="acme-idp-pop-binding-algorithms-registry">
        <name>ACME idp-pop Binding Algorithms Registry</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to create the "ACME idp-pop Binding Algorithms" registry with registration policy "Specification Required". Entry fields are: <tt>binding_alg</tt> value (string), description (string), reference (RFC).</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">binding_alg</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>jwk-sha256</tt></td>
              <td align="left">JWK Thumbprint (SHA-256), base64url without padding</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Future new values MUST be registered through this registry and define the corresponding <tt>binding</tt> URN prefix and encoding rules. The URN form of <tt>binding</tt> is <tt>urn:ietf:params:acme:idppop:&lt;binding_alg&gt;:&lt;binding-value&gt;</tt>, where <tt>&lt;binding_alg&gt;</tt> must be a value in this registry. Future registered values may define non-URN <tt>binding</tt> forms, but must also define coexistence and phase-out rules with the existing URN form.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="urnietfparamsacmeidppop-urn-sub-namespace">
        <name><tt>urn:ietf:params:acme:idppop</tt> URN Sub-namespace</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register <tt>urn:ietf:params:acme:idppop</tt> in the "IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameters", referencing this document. This sub-namespace is used for the <tt>binding</tt> URN of <tt>idp-pop</tt>; the <tt>&lt;binding_alg&gt;</tt> values under it are managed by the registry of Section 10.7.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="registrations-not-requested-and-conflict-handling">
        <name>Registrations Not Requested and Conflict Handling</name>
        <t>This document does not request registration of <tt>atc</tt> (already registered by RFC 9447); it does not request registration of <tt>nonce</tt> or <tt>acr</tt> (already registered by OpenID Core) or <tt>amr</tt> (already registered by RFC 8176). <tt>idp_assertion</tt> is a JWT top-level container defined by this document; this document does not request registration in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry; implementations MUST parse <tt>idp_assertion</tt> only when the <tt>iss</tt> of the same JWT is a configured IdP. If a claim with the same name is registered by IANA in the future, the CA MUST process it per the registered definition; if the registered definition is incompatible with this document, the deployment policy MUST explicitly choose which definition to use, record it in audit logs, and reject <tt>idp-pop</tt> or upgrade per the registered definition, avoiding silent inconsistency. The <tt>idp_assertion</tt> parsing of this document applies only to JWTs whose <tt>iss</tt> is a configured IdP. <tt>otherName</tt> OIDs are registered by the referenced profile; this document does not define a generic OID.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>This version contains no implementation statements. Per the convention of <xref target="RFC7942"/>, after WG adoption this document should add: CAs and clients that have implemented the <tt>x509-chain</tt> model, CAs and IdPs that have implemented the <tt>idp-pop</tt> model, and interoperability results with RFC 8823/RFC 9448.</t>
      <t>Until then, this document does not claim the existence of any specific implementation.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3986" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5922" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5922" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5922.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Domain Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)</title>
            <author fullname="V. Gurbani" initials="V." surname="Gurbani"/>
            <author fullname="S. Lawrence" initials="S." surname="Lawrence"/>
            <author fullname="A. Jeffrey" initials="A." surname="Jeffrey"/>
            <date month="June" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how to construct and interpret certain information in a PKIX-compliant (Public Key Infrastructure using X.509) certificate for use in a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) over Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection. More specifically, this document describes how to encode and extract the identity of a SIP domain in a certificate and how to use that identity for SIP domain authentication. As such, this document is relevant both to implementors of SIP and to issuers of certificates. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5922"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5922"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7515.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7517.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7518" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7518.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7518"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7518"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7519.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7638" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7638.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a JSON Web Key (JWK). It defines which fields in a JWK are used in the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form for those fields, and how to convert the resulting Unicode string into a byte sequence to be hashed. The resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting the key represented by the JWK that is the subject of the thumbprint.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7638"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7638"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8555" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8555.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
            <author fullname="J. Hoffman-Andrews" initials="J." surname="Hoffman-Andrews"/>
            <author fullname="D. McCarney" initials="D." surname="McCarney"/>
            <author fullname="J. Kasten" initials="J." surname="Kasten"/>
            <date month="March" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates are used for a number of purposes, the most significant of which is the authentication of domain names. Thus, certification authorities (CAs) in the Web PKI are trusted to verify that an applicant for a certificate legitimately represents the domain name(s) in the certificate. As of this writing, this verification is done through a collection of ad hoc mechanisms. This document describes a protocol that a CA and an applicant can use to automate the process of verification and certificate issuance. The protocol also provides facilities for other certificate management functions, such as certificate revocation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8555"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8555"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8725" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8725.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token Best Current Practices</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs, are URL-safe JSON-based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed and/or encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a simple security token format in numerous protocols and applications, both in the area of digital identity and in other application areas. This Best Current Practices document updates RFC 7519 to provide actionable guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment of JWTs.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="225"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8725"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8725"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9447" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9447" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9447.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Challenges Using an Authority Token</title>
            <author fullname="J. Peterson" initials="J." surname="Peterson"/>
            <author fullname="M. Barnes" initials="M." surname="Barnes"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hancock" initials="D." surname="Hancock"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wendt" initials="C." surname="Wendt"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Some proposed extensions to the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) rely on proving eligibility for certificates through consulting an external authority that issues a token according to a particular policy. This document specifies a generic Authority Token Challenge for ACME that supports subtype claims for different identifiers or namespaces that can be defined separately for specific applications.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9447"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9447"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9448" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9448" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9448.xml">
          <front>
            <title>TNAuthList Profile of Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token</title>
            <author fullname="C. Wendt" initials="C." surname="Wendt"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hancock" initials="D." surname="Hancock"/>
            <author fullname="M. Barnes" initials="M." surname="Barnes"/>
            <author fullname="J. Peterson" initials="J." surname="Peterson"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a profile of the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token for the automated and authorized creation of certificates for Voice over IP (VoIP) telephone providers to support Secure Telephone Identity (STI) using the TNAuthList defined by STI certificates.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9448"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9448"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OpenID">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0</title>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="N. Sakimura">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="J. Bradley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B. de" surname="Medeiros" fullname="B. de Medeiros">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Mortimore" fullname="C. Mortimore">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC5937" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5937" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5937.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path Processing</title>
            <author fullname="S. Ashmore" initials="S." surname="Ashmore"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wallace" initials="C." surname="Wallace"/>
            <date month="August" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how to use information associated with a trust anchor public key when validating certification paths. This information can be used to constrain the usage of a trust anchor. Typically, constraints are used to limit the certificate policies and names that can appear in certification paths validated using a trust anchor. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5937"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5937"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6943" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6943" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6943.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Issues in Identifier Comparison for Security Purposes</title>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Thaler"/>
            <date month="May" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Identifiers such as hostnames, URIs, IP addresses, and email addresses are often used in security contexts to identify security principals and resources. In such contexts, an identifier presented via some protocol is often compared using some policy to make security decisions such as whether the security principal may access the resource, what level of authentication or encryption is required, etc. If the parties involved in a security decision use different algorithms to compare identifiers, then failure scenarios ranging from denial of service to elevation of privilege can result. This document provides a discussion of these issues that designers should consider when defining identifiers and protocols, and when constructing architectures that use multiple protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6943"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6943"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6962" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6962.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Certificate Transparency</title>
            <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
            <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
            <author fullname="E. Kasper" initials="E." surname="Kasper"/>
            <date month="June" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.</t>
              <t>Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6962"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6962"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7942.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
              <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>
              <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t>
              <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8823" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8823" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8823.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Extensions to Automatic Certificate Management Environment for End-User S/MIME Certificates</title>
            <author fullname="A. Melnikov" initials="A." surname="Melnikov"/>
            <date month="April" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue certificates for use by email users that want to use S/MIME.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8823"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8823"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-pop" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-acme-pop-01" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-acme-pop.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Extension for Proof-of-Possession</title>
            <author fullname="Feng Geng" initials="F." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Yinwang Intelligent Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Panyu Wu" initials="P." surname="Wu">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Liang Xia" initials="L." surname="Xia">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="陈鑫" initials="C." surname="陈鑫">
              <organization>TrustAsia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol [RFC8555] requires a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) at the finalization stage. This document defines an optional extension that allows a client to prove possession of a private key directly, without constructing a CSR. The extension is motivated by use cases where the CSR-based flow is problematic: KEM-only keys that cannot generate self-signatures, resource-constrained devices that benefit from reduced encoding overhead, and issuance models where the certificate is constructed from order and profile data (e.g., via the ACME Profiles extension [I-D.ietf-acme-profiles]) rather than a client-generated CSR. This is particularly relevant when combined with compact encodings such as C509 certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]. In the "newOrder" request, the client declares the public key via a popKey field and includes a pop identifier whose value is the empty string. The server creates a dedicated pop authorization containing a single pop-01 challenge, processed using the same state machine as any other ACME authorization. When all authorizations (including the pop authorization) are valid, the ACME server issues a certificate using the validated public key and the authorized identifiers, eliminating the need for a CSR at finalization. The extension is additive and strictly optional: clients that do not use it, and servers that do not support it, continue to use the standard CSR- based flow defined in [RFC8555] without any changes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-pop-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-telephone" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-acme-telephone-01" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-acme-telephone.xml">
          <front>
            <title>ACME Identifiers and Challenges for Telephone Numbers</title>
            <author fullname="Jon Peterson" initials="J." surname="Peterson">
              <organization>Neustar</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
              <organization>Mozilla</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue certificate for telephonoe numbers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-telephone-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.biggs-acme-sso" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-biggs-acme-sso-01" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.biggs-acme-sso.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Extension for Single Sign On Challenges</title>
            <author fullname="Andrew Biggs" initials="A." surname="Biggs">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Moynihan" initials="R." surname="Moynihan">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="8" month="April" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies an extension to the ACME protocol [RFC8555] to enable ACME servers to validate a client's control of an email identifier using single sign-on (SSO) technologies. An extension to the CAA [RFC8659] resource record specification is also defined to provide domain owners a means to declare a set of SSO providers that ACME servers may rely upon when employing SSO for identifier validation on their domain.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-biggs-acme-sso-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-client" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-acme-client-14" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-acme-client.xml">
          <front>
            <title>ACME End User Client and Code Signing Certificates</title>
            <author fullname="Kathleen Moriarty" initials="K." surname="Moriarty">
              <organization>SecurityBiaS</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="11" month="August" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) core protocol addresses the use case of web server certificates for TLS. This document extends the ACME protocol to add 3 challenge types that may support service account authentication credentials, micro-service accounts credentials, device client, code signing, document signing certificates and keys.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-client-14"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-openid-federation" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation-00" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-acme-openid-federation.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) with OpenID Federation 1.0</title>
            <author fullname="Giuseppe De Marco" initials="G." surname="De Marco">
              <organization>independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brandon Pitman" initials="B." surname="Pitman"/>
            <author fullname="Tim Geoghegan" initials="T." surname="Geoghegan">
              <organization>ISRG</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="David Cook" initials="D." surname="Cook">
              <organization>ISRG</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="J.C. Jones" initials="J." surname="Jones">
              <organization>ISRG</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="16" month="December" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol allows server operators to obtain TLS certificates for their websites, based on a demonstration of control over the website's domain via a fully-automated challenge/response protocol. OpenID Federation 1.0 defines how to build a trust infrastructure using a trusted third-party model. It uses a trust evaluation mechanism to attest to the possession of private keys, protocol specific metadata and miscellaneous administrative and technical information related to a specific entity. This document defines how X.509 certificates associated with a given OpenID Federation Entity can be issued by an X.509 Certification Authority through the ACME protocol to the organizations which are part of a federation built on top of OpenID Federation 1.0.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-device-attest" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-acme-device-attest-10" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-acme-device-attest.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Device Attestation Extension</title>
            <author fullname="Brandon Weeks" initials="B." surname="Weeks">
              <organization>Google Inc</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ganesh Mallaya" initials="G." surname="Mallaya">
              <organization>AppViewX Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sven Rajala" initials="S." surname="Rajala">
              <organization>Keyfactor</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Corey Bonnell" initials="C." surname="Bonnell">
              <organization>TurboLight Solutions</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ryan Hurst" initials="R." surname="Hurst">
              <organization>Peculiar Ventures</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="9" month="August" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies new identifiers and a challenge for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol which allows validating the identity of a device using attestation. This document updates RFC 8555 to enable a privacy-preserving mode for the identifiers defined in this document.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-device-attest-10"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.rasmussen-acme-wif" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rasmussen-acme-wif-01" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.rasmussen-acme-wif.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Workload Identity Tokens in Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Orders</title>
            <author fullname="Scott Rasmussen" initials="S." surname="Rasmussen">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="16" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Enterprises hold large certificate inventories, yet few of their certificates are managed through ACME. Many workloads, such as CI/CD jobs, containers, virtual machines, cloud services and the automation that manages appliances, cannot complete ACME's challenges. Certification Authorities (CAs) and Certificate Lifecycle Management (CLM) systems that serve them fall back to External Account Binding (EAB) with long-lived shared secrets, or to proprietary APIs. OpenID Connect (OIDC) provides a short-lived cryptographically verified identity token to the workload. This document lets an ACME client send that token with each newOrder request. The token can be bound to the request's nonce and account key through its audience claim, so identity providers need no changes. The CA/CLM verifies the token and, under its own policy, may pre-authorize the identifier in the order, as RFC 8555 already allows. This replaces the EAB secret with a fresh, per-order proof of workload identity. It does not change how CAs validate control of identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-rasmussen-acme-wif-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ar-acme-pqc-tlsjws" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ar-acme-pqc-tlsjws-01" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ar-acme-pqc-tlsjws.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Quantum-Ready ACME Mechanism</title>
            <author fullname="Aritra Banerjee" initials="A." surname="Banerjee">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="28" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document updates RFC 8555 (ACME) to specify post-quantum and PQ/ T hybrid cryptographic requirements for quantum-ready deployments. The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) automates certificate issuance, validation, and management over HTTPS using JSON Web Signatures (JWS) to authenticate client request payloads. Current ACME deployments rely on traditional public-key algorithms in both JWS and TLS, which are vulnerable to attacks from Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs). This specification defines PQC or PQ/T hybrid TLS 1.3 key establishment and specifies PQC or PQ/T authentication mechanisms for JWS and TLS under the quantum-ready ACME mechanism. This specification enables ACME clients and servers to achieve quantum-resistant confidentiality and authentication.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ar-acme-pqc-tlsjws-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-jose-pq-composite-sigs" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-pq-composite-sigs-06" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-jose-pq-composite-sigs.xml">
          <front>
            <title>PQ/T Hybrid Composite Signatures for JOSE and COSE</title>
            <author fullname="Lucas Prabel" initials="L." surname="Prabel">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sun Shuzhou" initials="S." surname="Shuzhou">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="John Gray" initials="J." surname="Gray">
              <organization>Entrust Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="20" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) serializations for Post- Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid composite signatures. The composite algorithms described combine the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) as the post-quantum component and either the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) or the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) as the traditional component.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-jose-pq-composite-sigs-06"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Cisco-Live-BRKSEC-3027">
          <front>
            <title>Deep Dive into Cisco's Use of QUIC, MASQUE and OS Native Capabilities to Deliver Frictionless Zero Trust Access</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Cisco Live" value="BRKSEC-3027"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1108?>

<section anchor="pki-certificate-binding-x509-chain-interaction-example-informative">
      <name>PKI Certificate Binding (<tt>x509-chain</tt>) Interaction Example (Informative)</name>
      <t>The example in this appendix does not involve telephone-number-form SIP URIs; the <tt>sip:</tt> of the <tt>idp</tt> framework is used only for non-telephone-number AoRs.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
Client                      CA                         IdP
  |                          |                          |
  |-- newOrder ------------->|                          |
  |   identifiers: [{idp, "spiffe://..."}]              |
  |<-- tkauth-01 challenge --|                          |
  |   tkauth-type: idp                                  |
  |   tkauth-params.idp_methods: [{x509-chain, nonce:N}]|
  |                          |                          |
  |------ token request (dedicated, normatively RFC 9448 Section 5.5) ----> |
  |   identifier + nonce + CA directory URL              |
  |                          | IdP validates identity and target identifier binding |
  |                          |  sets atc/iss/aud/...     |
  |<-- JWS (contains atc, x5c=IdP cert chain) ------------|
  |                          |                          |
  |-- POST challenge ------->|                          |
  |   {"tkauth": "<JWS>"}    |                          |
  |                          | validate x5c chain to trust root |
  |                          | validate atc.tktype/tkvalue/ |
  |                          | fingerprint              |
  |<-- valid ----------------|                          |
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="dual-pop-public-key-binding-idp-pop-interaction-example-informative">
      <name>Dual-PoP Public Key Binding (<tt>idp-pop</tt>) Interaction Example (Informative)</name>
      <t>The example in this appendix does not involve telephone-number-form SIP URIs; the <tt>sip:</tt> of the <tt>idp</tt> framework is used only for non-telephone-number AoRs.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
Client                        CA                                 IdP
  |                          |                                   |
  |-- newOrder ------------->|                                   |
  |   identifiers: [{idp, "oidc:https://idp#alice"}]             |
  |<-- idp-pop-01 challenge -|                                   |
  |   idp_url + nonce + pop_alg                                  |
  |                          |                                   |
  |----- OIDC auth + idp_pop_key + idp_pop_identifier + key possession proof --->|
  |   (IdP validates user holds private key of PK)               |
  |                          |   IdP static mapping derivation   |
  |                          |   identifier                      |
  |<----- JWT (contains idp_assertion, binding=JWK Thumbprint)  |
  |                          |                                   |
  | (K = CSR public key)     |                                   |
  |  construct pop_signature JWS = Sign(K_priv, {"nonce","binding"}) |
  |-- POST challenge ------->|                                   |
  |   {"idp_token":"<JWT>",  |                                   |
  |    "pop_key":{...},      |                                   |
  |    "pop_signature":{...}}|                                   |
  |                          | validate JWT signature + idp_assertion |
  |                          | validate pop_key thumbprint == binding |
  |                          | validate pop_signature JWS        |
  |<-- valid ----------------|                                   |
  |                          |                                   |
  |-- finalize (CSR) ------->|                                   |
  |                          | re-check CSR public key thumbprint == binding |
  |<-- certificate ----------|                                   |
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="mobile-oidc-idp-pop-eap-tls-deployment-example-informative">
      <name>Mobile OIDC + <tt>idp-pop</tt> + EAP-TLS Deployment Example (Informative)</name>
      <t>This example describes an enterprise employee logging into an enterprise OIDC account on a mobile phone, then automatically obtaining a client certificate via <tt>idp-pop</tt> for EAP-TLS access to enterprise WiFi/LAN. This example is informative and does not define network access policy or platform key APIs.</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>The employee logs into the enterprise OIDC account on the mobile phone.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The IdP validates, via passkey, device key, or platform key attestation, that the user/device holds the private key of public key K.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The IdP derives <tt>identifier</tt> via static mapping (for example, <tt>oidc:https://idp.example.com#employee-123</tt>) and issues <tt>idp_assertion</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The mobile ACME client completes <tt>pop_signature</tt> with K's private key; after validation, the CA issues the client certificate.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The certificate is used for EAP-TLS access to enterprise WiFi/LAN.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Deployment preconditions and boundaries:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>PK must be the CSR public key, and the private key is used for IdP-PoP and ACME-PoP; deployers should confirm that the mobile platform or hardware key allows the private key to be used for ACME-PoP signing, or that an independent profile defines a hardware-supported signature mapping.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If an <tt>oidc:</tt> identifier is used, the certificate SAN depends on an independent <tt>otherName</tt> OID profile; when undefined, issuance must not occur, or a scheme allowing URI SAN (such as <tt>spiffe:</tt>) should be used instead.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The mapping of EAP-TLS identity to network policy (VLAN, role, access control) is defined by the deployment profile and is outside the scope of this document.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Access certificates SHOULD use short or medium validity periods and pair with IdP account status checks and revocation; multi-year access certificates should not be issued merely because the identity identifier is stable.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>This example does not change the certificate subject mapping rules of Section 4.2 or the lifecycle recommendations of Section 9.10.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues-informative">
      <name>Open Issues (Informative)</name>
      <t>The WG is invited to consider the following questions:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Parallel relationship with WIF: whether the WG endorses the WIF/<tt>idp-pop</tt> motivation split in Section 6.1, and agrees to cross-reference Sections 6.1 and 9.3 in the WIF document. Lifecycle matching is a deployment selection heuristic, not a basis for security division; the security division still depends on the identity identifier and public key static binding, and on CA policy validation.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Whether the WG agrees that this document uses the currently unregistered <tt>oidc:</tt> scheme as internal <tt>idp</tt> syntax without seeking generic URI registration.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Whether the OIDC authorization request parameters <tt>idp_pop_key</tt> and <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt> of <tt>idp-pop</tt> need to be defined in an independent document or registered by an OpenID Foundation registry, and whether the WG considers the normative definition in this document sufficiently interoperable.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>One-to-many static mapping in <tt>idp-pop</tt>: this document allows indicating the target identifier via <tt>idp_pop_identifier</tt> with IdP mapping validation; whether the WG considers this mechanism sufficient to cover multi-identifier subjects, or whether a more structured mapping discovery mechanism is needed.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Whether <tt>rejectedIdpId</tt> should be renamed to <tt>rejectedIdentifier</tt> or <tt>rejectedIdpIdentifier</tt> to more accurately express the semantics of "identifier or IdP selection rejected".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Whether SIP URI user parts in digit-only form without a leading <tt>+</tt> (for example, enterprise-internal short numbers) should be by default treated as telephone-number form and rejected, or left to the deployment policy to explicitly configure exceptions; this document currently adopts conservative default rejection with deployment policy exceptions, and the WG is invited to consider this direction.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="document-revision-history-informative">
      <name>Document Revision History (Informative)</name>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Version</th>
            <th align="left">Date</th>
            <th align="left">Revision</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>-01</tt></td>
            <td align="left">2026-11-15</td>
            <td align="left">Major revision. Defines the Delegated ICV framework, proposes two trust models, and gives the relationship between this document and <tt>draft-rasmussen-acme-wif-00</tt>.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>-00</tt></td>
            <td align="left">2026-05-19</td>
            <td align="left">Initial version.</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Over time, the motivation and design of this document have benefited from exploratory work by many experts in the ACME Working Group on non-DCV authentication methods.</t>
      <t>The authors thank <xref target="I-D.biggs-acme-sso"/> for pioneering the concept of third-party identity providers participating in ACME validation. Thanks to <xref target="RFC8823"/> for its contribution to defining email identifiers and automated issuance of end-user S/MIME certificates. We acknowledge <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-client"/> for first identifying the automation needs of end-user, device, and code signing certificates. Thanks to <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-telephone"/> for exploring the applicability of non-domain identifiers validated via external authoritative entities. We thank <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-device-attest"/> for leveraging trusted hardware roots to validate device identity. Finally, thanks to <xref target="RFC9447"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-openid-federation"/> as core references for the generic authority token challenge framework and multi-layer trust chain mechanism design.</t>
      <t>The authors also thank all members of the ACME Working Group for their valuable feedback during discussions of ACME identity-related proposals.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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