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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-04" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Agent Audit Record">An Audit Record Format for AI Agent Authorization Decisions</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-04"/>
    <author fullname="Sankalp Gilda">
      <address>
        <email>sankalp.gilda@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <keyword>audit</keyword>
    <keyword>agent</keyword>
    <keyword>attestation</keyword>
    <keyword>tamper-evident</keyword>
    <abstract>

<t>This document defines a record format for AI agent authorization decisions and the effects that followed them. The format is one in-toto predicate type, signed inside a DSSE envelope. A record carries the decision and the observed effect with a derived agreement between them, whether the decision point could evaluate the request and how fresh each input it relied on was, and a canonicalization contract under which a party that trusts neither the agent nor its operator recomputes the record's consistency from its bytes. The document also defines what a party that retains a record keeps beside it, so that the record can later be dated from anchors that party does not control. The format carries the seven minimum audit fields of the WIMSE AI Identity Management System framework, and it is offered as a data model for the audit records the proposed AUDIT working group would specify. It defines no policy.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        AUDIT Birds of a Feather mailing list (<eref target="mailto:audit@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/audit/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/audit/"/>.
      </t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>This document defines one record format for an agent's authorization decisions and their effects, and it defines nothing else. It specifies no policy model, no compliance criteria and no retention period, and it does not extend or amend <xref target="AIMS"/>.</t>
      <t>Two bodies of text ask for such a format. Section 11 of <xref target="AIMS"/> requires audit records for agent authorization decisions and leaves their form open. The proposed charter of the AUDIT working group <xref target="AUDIT-CHARTER"/> asks for data models that represent "interaction records, references to the identities of participating entities, delegation context, authorization state over time, or action provenance", and states that "audit information must be verifiable by a party that trusts neither the agent nor its operator". <xref target="audit-map"/> maps each problem the AUDIT BoF request <xref target="AUDIT-BOFREQ"/> and that charter name to the section of this document that addresses it, and names the ones this document leaves to other work.</t>
      <t>This document replaces draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02. Sections 1 to 8 and Appendices A and B keep the numbers they had there, so a reference to one of those sections of that revision resolves to the same section here.</t>
      <t>The goals are:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>to make an audit record from one deployment comparable with one from another;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>to make "tamper-evident" a property a verifier can test on the bytes it holds;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>to carry the authorization decision and the observed effect in one signed record, so a disagreement between them is detectable;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>to give the seven minimum fields of Section 11 of <xref target="AIMS"/> one member each.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Two implementations that each satisfy Section 11 in their own format produce audit trails that cannot be compared, correlated across a service boundary, or checked by a party that trusts neither producer. Section 11 asks for all three.</t>
      <t>Comparable has a narrow meaning here. Two records are comparable when a third party holding both can decide, from the bytes alone, whether they describe the same request, whether their decisions agree, and whether either was enforced.</t>
      <t>Two deployments that each hash a request differently cannot join their records on a request digest, so a delegation that crossed between them is reconstructable in neither log.</t>
      <t>Section 11 of <xref target="AIMS"/> is normative about the existence of agent audit records and silent about their form. It requires that "deployments <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> produce durable audit logs covering authorization decisions and subsequent remediations", that "Audit records <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be tamper-evident and retained according to the security policy of the deployment", and that audit events record seven minimum fields.</t>
      <t>Section 12 then places the policy model and document format out of scope, stating that they are "not recommended as a target for standardization within this specification". Section 13 places compliance criteria out of scope, and Section 16 records no IANA actions. <xref target="rationale"/> sets out the canonicalization contract and the reason the decision and the observed effect belong in one record.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

</section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>The following terms are used throughout this document. <em>Observer</em>, <em>decision point</em>, <em>interval</em>, <em>retaining party</em>, <em>anchor</em>, <em>skew tolerance</em> and <em>tier</em> are defined here; the rest are taken from the documents named beside them.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Agent, Tool, Service, Resource, LLM:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>as <xref target="AIMS"/> uses them.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Agent identifier:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>a WIMSE identifier as defined in <xref target="WIMSE-ID"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Statement, subject, predicate:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>as <xref target="IN-TOTO"/> uses them.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Observer:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>the party that produces a record under this document. An observer watches from a layer the agent cannot address. A host-side view of a guest filesystem, a hypervisor-level read of guest state, and kernel-level supervision below the observed process are such layers. An in-process library, a wrapper the agent links, and an importer holding another party's log are not.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Decision point:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>the party that evaluated the authorization request, whatever its architecture.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Interval:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>the period between the before-state and the after-state that one record covers.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Retaining party:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>a party that keeps a record as evidence, whether it produced the record or received it from another party.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Anchor:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>evidence, obtained from a source the retaining party does not control, that a given digest existed no later than a given time: an <xref target="RFC3161"/> time-stamp token, an inclusion proof in an append-only log <xref target="RFC9162"/>, or an OpenTimestamps proof.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Skew tolerance:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>300 seconds. Every comparison in this document between times written by two different parties allows it, except a comparison with the time of an <tt>opentimestamps</tt> anchor, which allows the larger tolerance <xref target="anchor-rules"/> gives for that kind. A relying party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> apply a smaller tolerance and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> apply a larger one.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Tier:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>the degree to which a record's own members corroborate what it claims about how it was observed. A verifier derives the tier under the rule in <xref target="observation"/> and never reads it from the record.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Every digest in this document is written as lowercase hexadecimal in the algorithm the record declares in its <tt>hashAlgorithm</tt> member, except where the member that carries the digest states its own algorithm or encoding.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="spec">
      <name>Audit record specification</name>
      <t>A record is an in-toto Statement <xref target="IN-TOTO"/> carried in a DSSE envelope <xref target="DSSE"/>. Its <tt>predicateType</tt> is</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
=========== NOTE: "\" line wrapping per RFC 8792 ============

https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/\
agent-audit-record
]]></artwork>
      <t>Seventeen required predicate members and four optional members are defined in <xref target="members"/>. Each of the seventeen <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present unless a rule in that section makes it conditional, no member has a default, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> supply one for an absent member (vectors <tt>F1</tt> and <tt>EV3</tt>). Two members are conditional on a sibling value, <tt>resource.argumentsDigest</tt> and <tt>correlation.externalAnchor</tt>, and each is specified where it is defined. The optional members are <tt>principal</tt> (<xref target="principal"/>), whose absence says nothing about how the request was authenticated beyond <tt>agent.authentication</tt>; <tt>dataSubject</tt> (<xref target="data-subject"/>), whose absence says nothing about whose data the call read; <tt>oversight</tt> (<xref target="oversight"/>), whose absence says nothing about whether a person acted; and <tt>sequence</tt> (<xref target="sequence"/>), whose absence says nothing about how many records the producer issued.</t>
      <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a value outside any closed vocabulary this document defines, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> ignore the member (vector <tt>V1</tt>). The closed vocabularies reuse terms registered in <xref target="VOCABULARY"/>. This document cites a registered term by its term URI, <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/</tt> followed by the term key, and a registered value by its value URI, the term URI with the value key as its fragment. The registry is release 0.8.0. Its registryDigest, the SHA-256 of its exact bytes, is
76233ba8924cebdf053f0449ce023186805156aedca4121b9b156bd747a411b4, and the bytes are published under <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/registry/</tt> with the file name <tt>sha256-</tt>, then the digest, then <tt>.yaml</tt>. Registration gives a value its identity; which values a member accepts is set by this document alone.</t>
      <t>A closed vocabulary is extended only by a revision of this document. Once a revision has frozen the predicate type URI (<xref target="iana"/>), a revision that adds a value to any closed vocabulary publishes the extended set under a new predicate type URI and leaves the set under the earlier URI unchanged, so a verifier never meets, under a URI it accepts, a value it is required to refuse. A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a value outside the set because it is well formed, prefixed, registered elsewhere or accompanied by a description. No closed vocabulary in this document carries a catch-all value such as <tt>other</tt>, because a catch-all satisfies the vocabulary while saying nothing two records can be compared on.</t>
      <section anchor="canonical">
        <name>Canonical form</name>
        <t>Two implementations derive the same bytes from the same Statement only if they agree on the serialization and on what makes a Statement malformed. Both are fixed below.</t>
        <section anchor="json-profile">
          <name>JSON profile</name>
          <t>Producers and verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> canonicalize the Statement with <xref target="RFC8785"/>, and the signature covers those bytes and no other serialization (vector <tt>T2</tt>). Producers and verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> enforce the <xref target="RFC7493"/> I-JSON safe-integer profile: an integer of magnitude at or above 2^53 makes the Statement malformed (vector <tt>T5</tt>).</t>
          <t>Every number in a Statement <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an integer, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be written as one: an optional minus sign followed by digits, with no fraction part and no exponent. A number written with a fraction part or an exponent makes the Statement malformed whatever its value, so <tt>0.5</tt>, <tt>1.0</tt> and <tt>1e2</tt> are each refused (vector <tt>X1</tt>). A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> round, truncate or convert such a number, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept it as the integer it equals. <xref target="RFC8785"/> serializes a number by the ECMAScript algorithm, which writes <tt>1.0</tt> as <tt>1</tt> and <tt>1e2</tt> as <tt>100</tt>, so a verifier that accepted those tokens would derive the same canonical bytes from two different documents, and a signature made over one would verify over the other. No member this document defines takes a number that is not an integer, so the rule costs a producer nothing.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="duplicate-members-and-nesting-depth">
          <name>Duplicate members and nesting depth</name>
          <t>A member name repeated at any depth makes the Statement malformed. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject such a Statement and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> retain any one occurrence (vector <tt>T3</tt>). A Statement nested deeper than 128 levels <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected (vector <tt>T4</tt>).</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="subject">
        <name>Subject convention</name>
        <t>A record carries two subject entries. The first is the request, by digest: its <tt>name</tt> is the correlation identifier and its <tt>sha256</tt> digest is the request digest defined in <xref target="members"/>. The second is the after-state root of the interval the predicate carries, and its <tt>name</tt> is the first entry's <tt>name</tt> with the suffix <tt>/after</tt>.</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
"subject": [
  { "name": "urn:example:corr:7f3a",
    "digest": { "sha256": "9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015..." } },
  { "name": "urn:example:corr:7f3a/after",
    "digest": { "sha256": "60303ae22b998861bce3b28f33eec1be..." } }
]
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> bind on the <tt>digest</tt> map and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> bind on either <tt>name</tt>. A name is a correlation identifier a producer chooses; a digest is a value a verifier recomputes from the bytes it holds. The names exist so that a reader can tell the two entries apart.</t>
        <t>The second entry <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present if and only if the predicate carries an interval (vectors <tt>S1</tt> and <tt>I1r</tt>), and its digest <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the interval's after-state root (vector <tt>S2</tt>).</t>
        <t>A decision that was denied, and a permit under which nothing was written, still carry an observed interval. The condition on the interval is what was observed in it, not what was decided: an interval with no writes has equal before-state and after-state roots (vectors <tt>A2</tt> and <tt>E6</tt>), and a write the observer saw in the interval is retained whatever the decision. A write attributed to a denied request yields <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>disagree</tt> under <xref target="decision-effect"/> (vector <tt>A3</tt>), and a write attributed to another request moves the roots and leaves this record's agreement as it is (vector <tt>A7</tt>). A consumer therefore reads an absence of effect from the members of a record it holds, and never from a record it does not have.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="timestamps">
        <name>Timestamps and correlation</name>
        <t>Every time value in a record <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an <xref target="RFC3339"/> date-time. A producer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> express it in UTC with the "Z" offset, so that two records from different deployments sort together without a conversion step. The correlation identifier is the first subject entry's <tt>name</tt>, so one identifier binds the request digest, the interval and the record.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="tamper">
        <name>Tamper-evidence</name>
        <t>A record satisfies the tamper-evidence requirement of Section 11 of <xref target="AIMS"/> when all three of the following hold.</t>
        <t>The DSSE pre-authentication encoding covers the <xref target="RFC8785"/> canonical bytes of the whole Statement, and every one of the seven minimum fields is inside that pre-image.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
DSSE PAE = "DSSEv1" SP len("application/vnd.in-toto+json") SP
           "application/vnd.in-toto+json" SP
           len(JCS(statement)) SP JCS(statement)
]]></artwork>
        <t>The request digest, the ordered write chain of the effect, and both <tt>agreement</tt> values are recomputable from other members of the same record. A verifier therefore still refuses a record that the key holder altered inconsistently and signed again (vector <tt>T1</tt>).</t>
        <t>These recomputations detect internally inconsistent alterations even when the altered record is signed again by the key holder. They do not detect a coherent replacement in which the dependent members are changed consistently and signed again. A key holder that keeps <tt>authorityDigest</tt>, <tt>beforeRoot</tt>, <tt>recordId</tt> and <tt>witnessNonce</tt>, so that the commitment digest still recomputes, and replaces the writes, <tt>afterRoot</tt>, the second subject entry and every value derived from them, produces a record that every recompute accepts. A coherent replacement is found only by comparison with something the key holder does not control, such as a copy of the original envelope or an anchor over its digest that another party obtained (<xref target="retained"/>).</t>
        <t>The canonical form is fixed as in <xref target="canonical"/>, so two verifiers derive identical bytes from identical documents. Any one of the three failing is a refusal.</t>
        <t>The retention half of the Section 11 requirement is a property of a deployment, and a record cannot assert it about itself. A record under this document <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> state that in its <tt>doesNotAssert</tt> member, so that a reader need not infer coverage. <xref target="retained"/> defines what a retaining party keeps beside a record so that the record can still be dated and validated after its keys and algorithms age; how long a deployment keeps it remains the deployment's policy.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="mapping">
        <name>Mapping to the seven minimum fields</name>
        <table>
          <name>The seven minimum fields of Section 11 and the members that carry them</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Section 11 field</th>
              <th align="left">Members</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">authenticated agent identifier</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>agent.id</tt>, <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt>, <tt>agent.authentication</tt>, <tt>agent.signers</tt>, and <tt>principal</tt> when present</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">delegated subject, when present</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>delegation.subject</tt>, <tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt>, <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt>, and <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt> when present</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">resource or tool being accessed</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>resource.kind</tt>, <tt>resource.id</tt>, <tt>resource.binding</tt>, <tt>resource.argumentsDigest</tt>, and <tt>dataSubject</tt> when present</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">action requested and authorization decision</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>decision</tt>, <tt>evaluation</tt> and <tt>effect</tt>, with the derived <tt>agreement</tt>, and <tt>oversight</tt> when present</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">timestamp and correlation identifier</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>correlation</tt> and the interval timestamps, and <tt>sequence</tt> when present</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">posture assessment or risk state</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>posture</tt>, carrying both vantages and <tt>assessedAt</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">remediation or revocation events and cause</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>remediation</tt></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Each field also carries an evidence partition in <tt>fieldEvidence</tt>, stating whether the observing substrate covered the value or the producer asserted it. All seven fields can be recorded by an agent about itself. A record that says which ones were is checkable; a record that does not say is not.</t>
        <t>The fourth field pairs an action with a decision, and this format carries <tt>decision</tt>, <tt>effect</tt> and the derived <tt>agreement</tt> together. A record whose decision and effect disagree is well formed, and the disagreement is visible in signed bytes:</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
"decision": { "action": "write", "reported": "deny" },
"effect":   {
  "observed": "occurred",
  "writes": [ { "path": "/srv/ledger/settlements.jsonl" } ]
},
"agreement": "disagree"
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>A log that carries the decision alone records that case as a clean denial, because it has no other value to disagree with.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verifying">
        <name>Verifying a record</name>
        <t>A verifier holds a DSSE envelope and reaches a verdict from the bytes inside it. The checks below are the ones this document has already stated, in the order a verifier can apply them without reading a member twice.</t>
        <t>The JSON profile comes first, applied while the payload is parsed: the safe-integer bound of <xref target="RFC7493"/>, no member name repeated at any depth, no nesting past 128 levels, and no number written with a fraction part or an exponent. Each of the four makes a Statement malformed, so a verifier that finds one of them has nothing further to check. It has to come first because the signature covers <xref target="RFC8785"/> bytes, and a verifier derives those bytes from the parsed Statement: a parser that keeps one occurrence of a repeated name has already done what <xref target="canonical"/> forbids before any signature is checked (vector <tt>T3</tt>).</t>
        <t>The envelope's signature comes second, over the <xref target="RFC8785"/> canonical bytes of the Statement that parse produced. A statement whose signature does not verify over those bytes is malformed, and nothing further is read from it. That includes a statement signed over the bytes it carries, which is what a DSSE verifier that does not derive the canonical form checks (vector <tt>T2</tt>).</t>
        <t>Membership comes third. It starts with the Statement's two type members (<xref target="statement-type"/>), and then every one of the seventeen required members is present unless a rule in <xref target="members"/> makes it conditional on a sibling value, and every value sits inside the closed vocabulary its member declares.</t>
        <t>The recomputes come next, and a signature cannot supply them. The three recomputes that <xref target="tamper"/> requires come first: a verifier derives the request digest from the four members <xref target="members"/> names and compares it with the first subject entry, it replays the write chain from the before-state root and compares the result with the second subject entry, and it derives both agreement values from the members they are functions of.</t>
        <t>A fourth recompute binds the prior commitment. It does not bind the record's content. A verifier recomputes the commitment digest, checks that the commitment precedes the interval, and checks that the commitment key is absent from <tt>agent.signers</tt>. A fifth derives, from <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt>, the set of inputs that were stale or never established at <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt>, and compares it with <tt>evaluation.status</tt> and <tt>unavailableInput</tt> (<xref target="evaluation"/>).</t>
        <t>A record that carries <tt>principal</tt> is then checked under <xref target="principal"/>, and one that carries <tt>dataSubject</tt> under <xref target="data-subject"/>, in that order. Each check binds the member to other members of the same record: the principal to <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt>, <tt>delegation</tt> and <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt>, and the data subject to <tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt>. A record failing either is malformed.</t>
        <t>The tier follows from those results. A verifier reads the five clauses of <xref target="observation"/> against the members it has just checked and assigns <tt>authoritative</tt> or <tt>voluntary</tt> itself.</t>
        <t>A verifier that holds a retained record (<xref target="retained"/>) applies one more check, the dating check, after all of the above. It validates each anchor over the envelope digest under the offline rule for its kind, takes the time of the earliest anchor that validates as the time the record is established to have existed, and, for a record received from another party, checks the stated receipt time against the bracket <xref target="retained"/> defines. The dating check produces its own result beside the record's verdict: an envelope that is well formed stays well formed when none of its anchors validates, and it is then simply not dated.</t>
        <t>For a record that carries <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt>, the same verifier also establishes the delegation root. It decodes the <tt>delegation-root</tt> element, checks that its digest under <tt>hashAlgorithm</tt> equals <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt>, and derives from the material the algorithm the chain's root rested on (vector <tt>R13</tt>). An element whose digest differs makes the entry malformed (vector <tt>R15</tt>). Where the verifier holds no such element, or the record carries no <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt>, it reports the root as not established, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report that as a pass (vector <tt>R14</tt>). This result too sits beside the record's verdict and does not change it.</t>
        <t>This document requires no particular order beyond the first two checks, and no particular reporting shape. A verifier that stops at the first failure and a verifier that reports every failure are both conformant.</t>
        <t>A party that holds several records and runs the checks across them (<xref target="consumption"/> and <xref target="sequence"/>) reads them as a set, which <xref target="sets"/> defines.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="retained">
        <name>Retained records</name>
        <t>A record's signature says who signed it and nothing about when. A party that keeps a record as evidence therefore keeps a retention entry beside the envelope: a JSON object under the profile of <xref target="canonical"/>, which the producer did not sign and which this section defines. A retaining party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> keep the entry in any container. The entry carries no predicate member and changes none, so a record's verdict under <xref target="verifying"/> never depends on it.</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "envelopeDigest": "...",
  "received": true,
  "receivedAt": "2026-09-19T11:04:20Z",
  "anchorWithin": 300,
  "anchors": [
    { "kind": "rfc3161", "origin": "retainer", "proof": "..." },
    { "kind": "transparency-log", "origin": "received",
      "proof": "..." }
  ],
  "validationData": [
    { "for": "envelope", "mediaType": "application/pkix-cert",
      "value": "..." },
    { "for": 0, "mediaType": "application/pkix-cert",
      "value": "..." },
    { "for": "delegation-root",
      "mediaType": "application/jwk-set+json",
      "value": "..." }
  ]
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <t><tt>envelopeDigest</tt> is the digest, under the record's <tt>hashAlgorithm</tt>, of the <xref target="RFC8785"/> canonical bytes of the DSSE envelope object, so it covers the payload and every signature. Every anchor in the entry is over this value.</t>
        <t><tt>anchors</tt> is an array in the order the retaining party obtained its members. A retaining party appends to it and never removes from it or rewrites an element in place. Upgrading a proof, such as completing a pending OpenTimestamps proof once its commitment is in a block, appends the upgraded proof as a new element and keeps the pending one where it was. The pending element never validates and dates nothing (vector <tt>R8</tt>), and the upgraded element dates the record (vector <tt>R12</tt>). Rewriting in place would change the order the array records and the index by which <tt>validationData</tt> names an anchor. Each anchor carries <tt>kind</tt>, one of the three values of <tt>correlation.externalAnchor.kind</tt> (<xref target="correlation"/>); <tt>origin</tt>, one of <tt>retainer</tt> and <tt>received</tt>; and <tt>proof</tt>, the base64 of the time-stamp token, inclusion proof or OpenTimestamps proof. An anchor of origin <tt>retainer</tt> is one the retaining party obtained itself, and one of origin <tt>received</tt> arrived with the record from the party that sent it. The entry carries no time and no algorithm family for an anchor: a verifier derives both from the proof when it validates it (<xref target="anchor-rules"/>), and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> read either from anywhere else.</t>
        <t><tt>validationData</tt> carries what a verifier needs to validate the envelope's signature and each anchor offline, after the sources it came from may be gone: the certification path or key set of the record's signing key, status information as the retaining party obtained it, and each time-stamping authority's own path and status. It also carries, for a record that names <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt>, the certification path or key set of the delegation chain's root key as the chain verifier held it at decision time. Each element names what it is for, one of <tt>envelope</tt>, the zero-based index of an anchor, and <tt>delegation-root</tt>, gives a media type, and carries the value in base64. An entry carries at most one <tt>delegation-root</tt> element, and only for a record that carries <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt>; an entry that breaks either rule is malformed. Where status information was already unobtainable when the retaining party first anchored the record, the entry carries no status element for it, and that absence is the record of the fact.</t>
        <t>The member <tt>received</tt> is <tt>true</tt> for a record the retaining party received from another party and <tt>false</tt> for one it produced. The member <tt>receivedAt</tt> is the time the retaining party states it received the record. It is present if and only if <tt>received</tt> is <tt>true</tt>, and an entry that carries it beside <tt>received</tt> of <tt>false</tt>, or omits it beside <tt>received</tt> of <tt>true</tt>, is malformed (vector <tt>R9</tt>). The member <tt>anchorWithin</tt> is the maximum interval, in seconds, that the retaining party commits to between issuance, or receipt for a received record, and its own first anchor. Only an anchor that validates meets it. An OpenTimestamps proof stays pending at a calendar until its commitment is in a block, and a pending proof does not validate offline, so for a retaining party whose anchors of origin <tt>retainer</tt> are all <tt>opentimestamps</tt>, <tt>anchorWithin</tt> covers that confirmation latency and is an interval of hours, not the 300 seconds of the skew tolerance.</t>
        <section anchor="dating">
          <name>The dating check</name>
          <t>A verifier validates each anchor under <xref target="anchor-rules"/>. The established time of the record is the time of the earliest anchor, of either origin, that validates over <tt>envelopeDigest</tt>. An anchor that does not validate dates nothing and makes nothing malformed (vector <tt>R8</tt>). No issuance time a record states establishes when it existed.</t>
          <t>A retaining party that sets <tt>received</tt> to <tt>true</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> obtain an anchor of origin <tt>retainer</tt> on receipt, within the <tt>anchorWithin</tt> it declares, and an entry with <tt>received</tt> of <tt>true</tt> and no such anchor is malformed (vector <tt>R4</tt>). The retention time is the time of the earliest anchor of origin <tt>retainer</tt> that validates. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the entry as malformed when any of these holds:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>receivedAt</tt> is earlier than the record's <tt>issuedAt</tt> by more than the skew tolerance (vector <tt>R6</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>receivedAt</tt> is later than the retention time by more than the skew tolerance (vector <tt>R3</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>the retention time is later than <tt>receivedAt</tt>, or than <tt>issuedAt</tt> for a record the retaining party produced, by more than <tt>anchorWithin</tt> plus the skew tolerance (vector <tt>R7</tt>).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>A malformed entry does not change the envelope's verdict. A relying party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> apply an allowance it grants to received records, such as dating a record from its receipt, on a malformed entry or on an entry in which no anchor of origin <tt>retainer</tt> validates.</t>
          <t>This check is a consistency check, not proof of receipt. Its lower edge, <tt>issuedAt</tt>, is a value the sender signed, and the signature binds the value without saying anything about the sender's clock. Its upper edge is an anchor over a digest, which shows only that the retaining party held the digest by that time, and a retaining party can hold the digest before the envelope arrives. A digest anchored before delivery therefore does not establish when the retaining party received the record. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> report a <tt>receivedAt</tt> that passes the check as asserted and consistent with the anchors, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report it as established (vector <tt>R5</tt>). The check rests on two assumptions, stated so that a relying party can decide whether it holds them: that the sender's clock was correct when it signed, and that the retaining party anchored on delivery and not before.</t>
          <t>A retaining party also chooses when it anchors. One that anchors late can state a correspondingly late receipt, and nothing in the entry contradicts it, because the bracket's upper edge is an anchor whose time the retaining party chose. The check removes the cheaper case, a receipt time stated with no anchor at all, and what remains is an assumption that the retaining party anchored promptly after the true receipt, within the <tt>anchorWithin</tt> it declared. That assumption is narrower than trusting the retaining party's statement of receipt, and no function of the entry tests it. An <tt>opentimestamps</tt> anchor widens the room it leaves: its time can lie up to 7200 seconds after the moment its block existed, so a retaining party whose upper edge is such an anchor can state a receipt up to that much later than a prompt anchor of another kind would allow.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="anchor-rules">
          <name>Anchor validation rules</name>
          <t>Each kind of anchor rests on one of two bases. A hash commitment is validated by recomputation to a value the verifier holds independently, and a signed token is validated by a signature under a path the verifier trusts.</t>
          <t>A kind names the proof format and not only its basis. A verifier validates an anchor offline from the proof alone, and both the recomputation or signature check and the source of the anchor's time differ by format; a value that named only the basis would tell a verifier neither. The verifier derives the basis from the kind, as stated for each kind below. A Merkle root that commits to <tt>envelopeDigest</tt> and is published in a Bitcoin transaction is a hash commitment of kind <tt>opentimestamps</tt> when its proof is carried in the OpenTimestamps serialization, which expresses the path from <tt>envelopeDigest</tt> through the tree and the transaction to the block header as a sequence of commitment operations (vector <tt>R16</tt>). A hash commitment published in another public ledger has no kind in this revision, because the bound on its time depends on that ledger's own rules for its timestamps. A revision that adds a kind for such a ledger states that bound, as the <tt>opentimestamps</tt> rule below states it for Bitcoin.</t>
          <dl>
            <dt><tt>rfc3161</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>a signed token. It validates when its message imprint equals <tt>envelopeDigest</tt> and its signature verifies under the time-stamping authority's certificate, by a certification path in <tt>validationData</tt> from that certificate to a trust anchor the verifier holds. Its time is the token's genTime.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>transparency-log</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>an inclusion proof that recomputes from <tt>envelopeDigest</tt> to a tree head. It is a hash commitment when the verifier holds that tree head by a means other than its signature, such as a checkpoint the verifier already witnessed, and a signed token otherwise: it then validates when the tree head's signature verifies under the log's key, by a key or path in <tt>validationData</tt> that the verifier trusts. Its time is the tree head's timestamp.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>opentimestamps</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>a hash commitment. It validates when the proof recomputes from <tt>envelopeDigest</tt> to the Merkle root in the header of a Bitcoin block that the verifier holds independently, as a block of the chain with the most work. Its time is the timestamp in that block header. A miner sets that value and consensus bounds it only loosely: it must exceed the median timestamp of the eleven blocks before it, and it must be no more than 7200 seconds ahead of the clock of a node that validates it. A header time can therefore lie tens of minutes before or after the moment the block existed. Every comparison in <xref target="dating"/> that uses the time of an <tt>opentimestamps</tt> anchor allows 7200 seconds in place of the skew tolerance (vectors <tt>R10</tt> and <tt>R11</tt>). The 7200 seconds is a consensus bound on one side only. On the later side a header time can be at most 7200 seconds ahead of the clock of a node that validates it. On the earlier side consensus bounds the time only by the median time past of the eleven preceding blocks, so a header time can lie further before the moment the block existed, and 7200 seconds there is an allowance this document chooses and not a bound the Bitcoin consensus rules supply. Where both times compared are times of <tt>opentimestamps</tt> anchors, as when a verifier finds the earliest anchor, it compares the heights of their blocks and not their timestamps.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <t>An anchor rests only on post-quantum assumptions when its validity rests on no quantum-vulnerable algorithm: a hash commitment under a hash with an output of at least 256 bits, or a signed token whose signature and whole path use post-quantum signature algorithms. A verifier derives this from the proof and the path. A retaining party <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> hold at least one anchor that rests only on post-quantum assumptions, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> append a new anchor on a schedule its policy sets, before the algorithms protecting its existing anchors weaken, using the renewal procedures of <xref target="RFC4998"/> or an equivalent. Where a relying party requires post-quantum anchoring from a transition date, as <xref target="PQ-AGENT-ID"/> proposes, this section supplies the anchors, their order and the material to validate each one, and the date is the relying party's.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="statement-type">
        <name>The Statement and predicate types</name>
        <t>A record's Statement carries two type members. A verifier checks each against a value it holds, and never against anything the record says about itself, because a record that named the type it expects would set its own check.</t>
        <t><tt>_type</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the string <tt>https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1</tt>, compared byte for byte (vector <tt>X4</tt>). A Statement whose <tt>_type</tt> is any other value is malformed. That includes another version of the in-toto Statement, a Statement type defined by another specification, a string that differs from the one above only in case or a trailing slash, an absent member, and a value that is not a string. A verifier reads nothing further from such a Statement, because the members <xref target="members"/> defines are the members of the predicate of a v1 Statement and are defined for no other Statement type.</t>
        <t><tt>predicateType</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the predicate type URI the verifier was configured to accept: the URI of <xref target="spec"/>, or the <tt>v2</tt> URI <xref target="iana"/> defines for the extended set of <xref target="evaluation"/>. The comparison is byte for byte, and the verifier takes the expected URI from its own configuration and not from the record (vector <tt>X5</tt>). A Statement whose <tt>predicateType</tt> differs from it is malformed, even where the predicate under it meets every other rule of this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sets">
        <name>Sets of records</name>
        <t>Two checks in this document need more than one record: the checks across records of <xref target="consumption"/> and the checks of <xref target="sequence"/>. A party that runs them is handed the records together, as a set. This section defines the set, so that two verifiers read one set the same way.</t>
        <t>A set is one JSON text, read under the JSON profile of <xref target="json-profile"/>. Its value is an object with one defined member, <tt>records</tt>, an array. Each element of <tt>records</tt> is one record: a DSSE envelope <xref target="DSSE"/>, written as the JSON object that specification defines and not as a string or as the base64 of one. The set carries each envelope exactly as it was signed. It adds no signature and asserts nothing of its own, so it makes a record no more valid than the envelope it carries.</t>
        <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a set as malformed, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> run no check on any record in it, when any of these holds (vector <tt>X17</tt>):</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the text is not JSON;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the text breaks the JSON profile of <xref target="json-profile"/>: a member name repeated at any depth, an integer of magnitude at or above 2^53, a number written with a fraction part or an exponent, or nesting past 128 levels;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the value is not an object;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the object has no <tt>records</tt> member;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>records</tt> is not an array.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A verifier judges each record in <tt>records</tt> on its own, under <xref target="verifying"/>. When any record is not valid the set is malformed, however many of its other records are valid, and the checks across records are not run: a record that is itself malformed leaves the set unjudged (vector <tt>X18</tt>). Only when every record is valid does a verifier run the checks of <xref target="consumption"/> and <xref target="sequence"/>, and the set's verdict is then the verdict of those checks.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="members">
      <name>Predicate members</name>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "recordId": "...",
  "tier": "authoritative",
  "hashAlgorithm": "sha256",
  "agent": {
    "id": "spiffe://prod.example.org/ns/payments/sa/reconciler",
    "credentialDigest": "...",
    "authentication": "wimse-wpt",
    "signers": ["..."]
  },
  "delegation": {
    "subject": "user:alice@example.org",
    "subjectKind": "user",
    "authorityDigest": "...",
    "rootDigest": "..."
  },
  "resource": {
    "kind": "tool",
    "id": "mcp://files/write",
    "binding": "digest-bound",
    "argumentsDigest": "..."
  },
  "decision": {
    "action": "write",
    "requestDigest": "...",
    "reported": "deny",
    "decisionPointId": "pdp://prod.example.org/authz-1",
    "policyDigest": "...",
    "reportedAt": "2026-09-19T11:04:02Z"
  },
  "evaluation": {
    "status": "evaluated",
    "inputs": [
      { "input": "policy-source",
        "lastResult": "2026-09-19T10:00:00Z", "maxAge": 86400 },
      { "input": "standing-source",
        "lastResult": "2026-09-19T11:00:00Z", "maxAge": 3600 }
    ]
  },
  "effect": {
    "observed": "occurred",
    "interval": {
      "beforeRoot": "...",
      "afterRoot": "...",
      "baseResolution": "supplied",
      "openedAt": "2026-09-19T11:04:01Z",
      "sealedAt": "2026-09-19T11:04:06Z"
    },
    "pathScope": ["/srv/ledger/"],
    "writes": [
      {
        "path": "/srv/ledger/settlements.jsonl",
        "preStateDigest": "...",
        "postStateDigest": "...",
        "requestDigest": "...",
        "inScope": true
      }
    ]
  },
  "agreement": "disagree",
  "correlation": {
    "id": "req:7f3a91c4",
    "scope": "cross-party",
    "timeBasis": "beacon-anchored",
    "externalAnchor": { "kind": "rfc3161", "digest": "..." }
  },
  "posture": {
    "reported": "sinkhole",
    "reportedDigest": "...",
    "observed": "allowlist",
    "observedDigest": "...",
    "assessedAt": "2026-09-19T06:00:00Z",
    "agreement": "disagree"
  },
  "remediation": [
    {
      "cause": "session-revoked",
      "signalReceivedAt": "2026-09-19T11:04:07Z",
      "enforcedAt": "2026-09-19T11:04:09Z",
      "enforcement": "session-terminated",
      "postEnforcementEffect": "none",
      "postEnforcementRoot": "..."
    }
  ],
  "observation": {
    "vantage": "below-observed",
    "coverage": { "scopeComplete": true, "gaps": [] },
    "priorCommitment": {
      "committedAt": "2026-09-19T11:03:58Z",
      "witnessNonce": "...",
      "commitmentDigest": "...",
      "keyid": "...",
      "sig": "..."
    }
  },
  "fieldEvidence": {
    "agent": "producer-asserted",
    "correlation": "producer-asserted",
    "decision": "producer-asserted",
    "delegation": "producer-asserted",
    "posture": "substrate-covered",
    "remediation": "substrate-covered",
    "resource": "substrate-covered"
  },
  "doesNotAssert": ["..."],
  "issuedAt": "2026-09-19T11:04:11Z"
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <section anchor="hashalg">
        <name>Record identity and hash algorithm</name>
        <t><tt>recordId</tt> is the producer's identifier for this record. It is opaque to a verifier except where the commitment digest is recomputed, which reads it as one of its four inputs.</t>
        <t><tt>hashAlgorithm</tt> names the algorithm every digest in the record is taken under. One value governs the whole record: the subject digests, the credential, authority, policy and posture digests, the interval roots, the write pre-state and post-state digests, and the commitment digest are all taken under it.</t>
        <t>A record carrying digests in two algorithms is therefore not representable. A verifier comparing two roots has to know they were taken under the same algorithm, and a per-member choice would let a producer choose which comparison a reader could make.</t>
        <t><tt>issuedAt</tt> is the time the producer sealed the record, and it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be at or after the interval's <tt>sealedAt</tt> because the record cannot be issued before the interval it describes has closed. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a record whose <tt>issuedAt</tt> is earlier than <tt>effect.interval.sealedAt</tt>, however far earlier, including a record whose <tt>issuedAt</tt> falls on a day before the interval opened (vectors <tt>IS1</tt> and <tt>IS2</tt>). The signature binds the value and does not make it true, so the check is on the two stated times and not on any clock.</t>
        <t>A verifier that does not implement the declared algorithm cannot recompute anything the record binds. It has no verdict to reach on such a record, and its outcome is a report that it could not read one. That is not a refusal on the record's content.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identity-delegation-and-resource">
        <name>Identity, delegation and resource</name>
        <t><tt>agent.id</tt> carries the WIMSE identifier verbatim, and <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt> the digest of the credential the identifier was read from. <tt>agent.authentication</tt> is the mechanism, over the closed set <tt>wimse-wpt</tt>, <tt>http-message-signature</tt>, <tt>mtls</tt>, <tt>oauth-access-token</tt>, <tt>api-key</tt>, <tt>none</tt>. All but <tt>api-key</tt> are drawn from Section 9 of <xref target="AIMS"/>. <tt>api-key</tt> is a bearer secret presented with the request that is not an OAuth access token, such as a key an API issued for the agent or its operator (vector <tt>A21</tt>). <tt>none</tt> means the request carried no authentication, and a record <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry it for a request that presented any credential. For the two bearer mechanisms, <tt>oauth-access-token</tt> and <tt>api-key</tt>, <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt> is a digest of a bearer secret, against which anyone holding the record can test a guess of that secret; a deployment <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> record a bearer secret with less than 128 bits of entropy under this format. <tt>agent.signers</tt> is the set of key identifiers the agent signs its own records with, as the observer knows them, and it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be empty.</t>
        <t><tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt> is one of <tt>user</tt>, <tt>system</tt>, <tt>none</tt>. Field 2 of Section 11 is the only conditional one, so an absent delegated subject is conformant and is spelled <tt>subjectKind</tt> of <tt>none</tt> beside a <tt>subject</tt> of the literal <tt>none</tt>.</t>
        <t>A <tt>subjectKind</tt> of <tt>none</tt> beside any other subject value is malformed and a verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> prefer either member (vector <tt>F2</tt>). <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present in every record, and a decision taken under no authority carries the digest of the explicit deny-all document.</t>
        <t><tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt> is optional. When the decision rested on a delegation chain, it is the digest of the certification path or key set of the root key that the chain verifier trusted for that chain at decision time, as the verifier held it, and a record <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carry it. Verification of a chain as Section 6 of <xref target="DELEGATION-CHAIN"/> describes it reaches every token in the chain and stops at the root key, so without this member a later reader cannot reconstruct what the chain rested on. The member records what the verifier held and says nothing about how the verifier came to hold it, so it requires no trust-anchor distribution and no anchor topology, online or offline. The material itself is kept by a retaining party in <tt>validationData</tt> (<xref target="retained"/>), from which a later reader derives the algorithm the chain's root rested on, as it derives the algorithm of the record's own signing key. The digest is taken over the material's bytes as that element carries them.</t>
        <t><tt>resource.kind</tt> is one of <tt>path</tt>, <tt>uri</tt>, <tt>tool</tt>, the three shapes the single category of external endpoints in Section 4 of <xref target="AIMS"/> takes. <tt>resource.binding</tt> of <tt>digest-bound</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>argumentsDigest</tt>, and <tt>not-bindable</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry it in any spelling, including <tt>null</tt> and the empty string (vectors <tt>F3</tt>, <tt>F3b</tt> and <tt>F3c</tt>).</t>
        <t>Where a decision point can canonicalize the arguments of a call, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> bind them by digest. A tool call whose arguments it cannot canonicalize has nothing to bind, so that call is representable and it cannot reach the strongest tier.</t>
        <section anchor="principal">
          <name>The authenticated principal</name>
          <t>A decision point that authenticated a call through an identity provider knows which principal the call ran under: the issuer, the subject, the client, the audience and the key the issuer signed with. <tt>agent</tt> and <tt>delegation</tt> do not say which authenticated principal the decision point accepted, or that the credential <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt> names is the one that principal was established from. <tt>principal</tt> carries that answer inside the signed bytes, bound by digest to the agent's credential and by thumbprint to the issuer's key. The token itself is never carried.</t>
          <t><tt>principal</tt> is optional. When present it is the principal the decision point established from a signed token it validated, and it is an object that <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry each of the members below except <tt>tenant</tt>, which it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry any other member (vectors <tt>PR7</tt> and <tt>PR11</tt>):</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>issuer</tt>, the <tt>iss</tt> of the token, an <tt>https</tt> URL;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>subject</tt>, the <tt>sub</tt> of the token;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>clientId</tt>, the OAuth <tt>client_id</tt> of the client the token was issued to;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>audience</tt>, the <tt>aud</tt> of the token, a non-empty array of distinct strings;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>authMethod</tt>, how the client authenticated to the issuer, one of the values of the IANA registry "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" <xref target="RFC7591"/>: <tt>none</tt>, <tt>client_secret_post</tt>, <tt>client_secret_basic</tt>, <tt>client_secret_jwt</tt>, <tt>private_key_jwt</tt>, <tt>tls_client_auth</tt>, <tt>self_signed_tls_client_auth</tt> (vectors <tt>PR2</tt> and <tt>PR3</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>source</tt>, what the decision point validated: <tt>jwt-access-token</tt> for a JWT access token <xref target="RFC9068"/>, <tt>id-token</tt> for an ID token <xref target="OIDC-CORE"/>, or <tt>jwt-assertion</tt> for a JWT assertion <xref target="RFC7523"/> (vectors <tt>PR1</tt> and <tt>PR3</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>tokenDigest</tt>, the digest of the token bytes the agent presented;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>issuedAt</tt> and <tt>expiresAt</tt>, the token's <tt>iat</tt> and <tt>exp</tt> as <xref target="RFC3339"/> date-times, <tt>expiresAt</tt> later than <tt>issuedAt</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>kid</tt>, the <tt>kid</tt> of the token's JWS header;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>key</tt>, the public JWK <xref target="RFC7517"/> of the issuer's key set that <tt>kid</tt> selects, of key type <tt>RSA</tt>, <tt>EC</tt> or <tt>OKP</tt> <xref target="RFC8037"/>, carrying no private member, each member the thumbprint hashes a non-empty string;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>keyThumbprint</tt>, the SHA-256 JWK thumbprint of <tt>key</tt> <xref target="RFC7638"/>, in base64url without padding;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>jwksDigest</tt>, the digest of the <xref target="RFC8785"/> bytes of the issuer's key set as the decision point held it;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>tenant</tt>, the issuer's tenant or organization identifier.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t><tt>subject</tt>, <tt>clientId</tt>, <tt>kid</tt>, <tt>keyThumbprint</tt> and <tt>tenant</tt> are non-empty strings, and <tt>tokenDigest</tt> and <tt>jwksDigest</tt> are digests. A value of the wrong form makes the record malformed.</t>
          <t>The members are bound to the rest of the record, and a verifier checks each binding:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>When <tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt> is <tt>user</tt>, <tt>subject</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal <tt>delegation.subject</tt> (vector <tt>PR8</tt>). Under <tt>system</tt>, <tt>subject</tt> names the client itself (vector <tt>PR2</tt>).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>tokenDigest</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt>, so the principal is bound by digest to the credential the agent presented (vector <tt>PR6</tt>).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>At <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> the token <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have been issued and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> have expired, each within the skew tolerance: a <tt>principal</tt> whose <tt>issuedAt</tt> is later than <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> (vector <tt>PR10</tt>), or whose <tt>expiresAt</tt> is earlier (vector <tt>PR5</tt>), by more than the skew tolerance is malformed.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The <tt>kid</tt> member of <tt>key</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal <tt>kid</tt> (vector <tt>PR9</tt>).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>keyThumbprint</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recompute from <tt>key</tt> (vector <tt>PR4</tt>).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>A record failing any of these is malformed. <tt>principal</tt> does not establish that the issuer's key set held <tt>key</tt> at the time, which a party that retained that key set answers by recomputing <tt>jwksDigest</tt> and finding <tt>key</tt> in it; that the token's signature verified, which the decision point checked and the record names the key for; or that the subject is who the issuer says it is.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="data-subject">
          <name>The data subject</name>
          <t>A server reached through an agent acting for a member of staff can read the account history of a customer. When the customer later asks who accessed their data and why, the record holds the staff member as the delegated subject and the customer's identifier only inside <tt>resource.argumentsDigest</tt>. <tt>dataSubject</tt> says whose data the call read and the purpose of the call, without carrying the customer's identifier, so that the server can answer an access request from its signed records.</t>
          <t><tt>dataSubject</tt> is optional. When present it is an object that <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry each of the members below except <tt>delegateReference</tt>, whose presence the rule below sets, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry any other member, a raw identifier included (vectors <tt>DS4</tt> and <tt>DS5</tt>):</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>scheme</tt>, the literal <tt>salted-sha256-jcs</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>saltId</tt>, the name under which the server keeps the salt the references were made with, a non-empty string;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>reference</tt>, the keyed reference to the data subject: the SHA-256 digest, in lowercase hexadecimal, of the <xref target="RFC8785"/> bytes of the object <tt>{"salt": S, "subject": I}</tt>, where <tt>S</tt> is the salt in base64url and <tt>I</tt> the data subject's identifier. A value that is not such a digest, such as the identifier itself, makes the record malformed (vector <tt>DS6</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>relation</tt>, <tt>delegate</tt> when the data subject is the user the agent acts for (vector <tt>DS2</tt>), and <tt>other</tt> when it is another person (vector <tt>DS1</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>delegateReference</tt>, the reference made the same way for the delegated user, a digest;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>purpose</tt>, the purpose of the call, a non-empty string;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>purposes</tt>, the purposes the server declares for the call, a non-empty array of distinct strings, such as the enumeration of a tool parameter in the server's schema (vector <tt>DS3</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>purposesDigest</tt>, the SHA-256 digest of the <xref target="RFC8785"/> bytes of <tt>purposes</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t><tt>delegateReference</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present exactly when <tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt> is <tt>user</tt> and <tt>relation</tt> is <tt>other</tt>, so the record shows both people, and it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> differ from <tt>reference</tt> (vector <tt>DS7</tt>). A <tt>relation</tt> of <tt>delegate</tt> beside a <tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt> other than <tt>user</tt> makes the record malformed, because no user is there to be the data subject (vector <tt>DS8</tt>). <tt>purposesDigest</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recompute from the <tt>purposes</tt> the record carries (vector <tt>DS10</tt>), and <tt>purpose</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be one of <tt>purposes</tt> (vector <tt>DS9</tt>). A record failing any of these is malformed.</t>
          <t>The server recomputes <tt>reference</tt> from the salt and the identifier when it answers an access request. A holder of the record alone cannot recover the identifier. <tt>dataSubject</tt> does not establish that the reference names the person the call really read, which the server vouches for when it recomputes it; that <tt>purposes</tt> is the list the server published, which the digest binds the record to without proving; or that the purpose was the true reason for the call or a lawful one.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="decision-effect">
        <name>Decision, effect and agreement</name>
        <t><tt>decision.reported</tt> is one of <tt>permit</tt>, <tt>deny</tt>, <tt>permit-with-conditions</tt>. <tt>decision.requestDigest</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the first subject entry's sha256 digest and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the <xref target="RFC8785"/> digest over the members <tt>action</tt>, <tt>argumentsDigest</tt>, <tt>resourceId</tt> and <tt>resourceKind</tt> (vector <tt>F4</tt>). The hashed object holds <tt>argumentsDigest</tt> exactly when <tt>resource.binding</tt> is <tt>digest-bound</tt>. Under <tt>not-bindable</tt> it holds the other three members and no <tt>argumentsDigest</tt> member at all, so every conforming implementation derives one digest for a given request (vector <tt>A6</tt>). Altering the action, the resource or the arguments after signing, without replacing the request digest and the first subject entry to match, therefore breaks a recompute even where the signature was applied again. A key holder that replaces all of them consistently has made the coherent replacement of <xref target="tamper"/>, which no recompute detects.</t>
        <t>Each write carries <tt>requestDigest</tt>: the request digest of the request the observer attributes the write to, or the literal <tt>unattributed</tt> where the observer cannot attribute it. An attribution is an observation, and an observer that cannot tie a write to a request says so and does not guess.</t>
        <t><tt>effect.observed</tt> describes this record's request, not the whole interval, and it is one of <tt>occurred</tt>, <tt>none</tt>, <tt>unknown</tt>. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be derivable from the write set: <tt>occurred</tt> when at least one write is attributed to <tt>decision.requestDigest</tt>; <tt>none</tt> when no write is attributed to it and no <tt>unattributed</tt> write lies inside <tt>pathScope</tt>; and <tt>unknown</tt> otherwise. A write attributed to a different request belongs to that request's record and does not enter this one's value (vectors <tt>A7</tt> and <tt>T1</tt>). A value of <tt>none</tt> beside a write attributed to this record's request is malformed (vector <tt>E1</tt>).</t>
        <t>The ordered write chain <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reproduce the after-state root from the before-state root. A verifier replays it with a running root that starts at <tt>beforeRoot</tt>. Each write in <tt>effect.writes</tt>, in array order and whatever its <tt>requestDigest</tt> or <tt>inScope</tt>, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry a <tt>preStateDigest</tt> equal to the running root, and its <tt>postStateDigest</tt> then becomes the running root. The running root after the last write <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal <tt>afterRoot</tt>, so a record with no write carries equal roots. Vector <tt>E4</tt> breaks only the start, <tt>E2</tt> a link between two writes, <tt>E5</tt> only the end, and <tt>E6</tt> is the case with no write. A <tt>baseResolution</tt> of <tt>empty-tree</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry the empty-tree constant for the declared hash algorithm (vector <tt>E3</tt>); for <tt>sha256</tt> the constant is the digest of Git's empty tree object (the bytes <tt>tree 0</tt> followed by a NUL byte), <tt>6ef19b41225c5369f1c104d45d8d85efa9b057b53b14b4b9b939dd74decc5321</tt>.</t>
        <t>A member of <tt>pathScope</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain a glob metacharacter, and a universal scope is the single literal <tt>/</tt> (vector <tt>V2</tt>). A write outside <tt>pathScope</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>inScope</tt> of <tt>false</tt>, which is derived from the path and never a producer opinion (vector <tt>V3</tt>).</t>
        <t><tt>agreement</tt> is one of <tt>agree</tt>, <tt>disagree</tt>, <tt>not-exercised</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt>, <tt>one-sided</tt>, and it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be derivable from <tt>decision.reported</tt> and <tt>effect.observed</tt> by the table below (vectors <tt>D1</tt>, <tt>D2</tt> and <tt>D3</tt>). <tt>posture.agreement</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be derivable from the two carried postures on the same terms: <tt>agree</tt> when they are equal byte for byte, <tt>disagree</tt> when both are present and unequal (vector <tt>F6</tt>).</t>
        <table>
          <name>Deriving agreement from the reported decision and the observed effect</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">decision.reported</th>
              <th align="left">effect.observed</th>
              <th align="left">agreement</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>permit</tt> or <tt>permit-with-conditions</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>occurred</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>agree</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>deny</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>none</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>agree</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>deny</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>occurred</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>disagree</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>permit</tt> or <tt>permit-with-conditions</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>none</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>not-exercised</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">any</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>unknown</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>A permit allows an action and does not require it, so a permitted call that failed or was never made is <tt>not-exercised</tt>, and a deny that leaked is <tt>disagree</tt>. The two are different facts and an incident review needs to tell them apart (vector <tt>A9</tt>). An unattributed write inside <tt>pathScope</tt> leaves the observer unable to rule the request's effect in or out, so the record says <tt>indeterminate</tt> and does not choose (vector <tt>A8</tt>).</t>
        <t><tt>one-sided</tt> is in the closed set and the table never produces it, because <tt>decision</tt> and <tt>effect</tt> are both required and neither side can be absent. It is reserved so that a version admitting a record with one side missing does not have to change a closed vocabulary, and a record carrying it under this version is malformed (vector <tt>D2</tt>).</t>
        <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reject a record because either agreement value is <tt>disagree</tt>, <tt>not-exercised</tt> or <tt>indeterminate</tt> (vectors <tt>A3</tt>, <tt>A8</tt> and <tt>A9</tt>). What a disagreement means for admission is a consumer policy decision.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="evaluation">
        <name>Evaluation</name>
        <t><tt>evaluation</tt> says whether the decision point evaluated the request, and how fresh each input it relied on was. <tt>evaluation.status</tt> is one of <tt>evaluated</tt>, <tt>not-evaluated</tt> (vector <tt>EV11</tt>). A decision point records <tt>evaluated</tt> when its reported decision does not depend on any input it could not obtain, and <tt>not-evaluated</tt> otherwise. Where delegation paths are judged independently (Section 4.2 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/>), a permit on a fully valid path is <tt>evaluated</tt> even when an input for another path was unavailable, because no value of that input could change the decision. A deny is <tt>not-evaluated</tt> whenever a path the decision point could not judge might have been valid.</t>
        <t><tt>decision.reported</tt> always records what the decision point enforced. Under <tt>evaluated</tt> it is the outcome of evaluating the policy. Under <tt>not-evaluated</tt> it is the outcome the decision point fell back to, and it is the member that says whether the decision point failed closed (<tt>deny</tt>) or failed open (<tt>permit</tt> or <tt>permit-with-conditions</tt>). A record from a decision point that lost an input and denied therefore carries <tt>deny</tt>, and beside an effect of <tt>none</tt> derives <tt>agree</tt>. Without <tt>evaluation</tt> that record is byte for byte the record of a correctly enforced denial (vectors <tt>A2</tt> and <tt>A10</tt>), and an incident review cannot tell the two apart. <tt>decision.policyDigest</tt> names the policy the decision point enforced. Where the policy was the unavailable input, the decision point cannot name that policy's digest, so <tt>decision.policyDigest</tt> is the digest of the fallback it applied, as <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt> names the deny-all document for a decision taken under no authority (vectors <tt>A18</tt> and <tt>A20</tt>). A decision point that holds the profile a request names and finds that it grants no comparison has evaluated the request, and records <tt>evaluated</tt> with <tt>deny</tt> (vector <tt>A2</tt>); one that does not hold the profile records <tt>not-evaluated</tt> with <tt>policy-source</tt> (vector <tt>A20</tt>).</t>
        <t><tt>evaluation</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>inputs</tt> under both statuses (vector <tt>EV13</tt>). It is an array with one entry for each input the reported decision depended on, each input named at most once (vector <tt>FR10</tt>). An entry <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry each of these three members (vectors <tt>FR5</tt> and <tt>FR6</tt>) and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry any other except the <tt>consumption</tt> member that <xref target="consumption"/> defines (vector <tt>FR11</tt>):</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>input</tt>, a value from the closed set in the table below (vector <tt>FR12</tt>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>lastResult</tt>, the time at which the source produced the last value of that input the decision point held, or the literal <tt>none</tt> if it never held one;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>maxAge</tt>, the maximum age in seconds, a non-negative integer, that the decision point applies to that input (vector <tt>FR13</tt>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The reference time for every entry is <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt>, the time the decision point reported its decision. An input's age is <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> minus <tt>lastResult</tt>. An input is fresh when its age is at most <tt>maxAge</tt>, so an age equal to <tt>maxAge</tt> is fresh (vector <tt>FR2</tt>); it is stale when its age is greater (vector <tt>FR3</tt>); and it was never established when <tt>lastResult</tt> is <tt>none</tt> (vectors <tt>A10</tt> and <tt>FR4</tt>). A <tt>lastResult</tt> later than <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> by more than the skew tolerance of 300 seconds is malformed, because a decision cannot rest on a value produced after it was reported (vector <tt>FR9</tt>). Where the decision depended on more than one value of one input, as when several delegation paths are judged, the entry's <tt>lastResult</tt> and <tt>maxAge</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be taken from the same value. If any of those values was never held, <tt>lastResult</tt> is <tt>none</tt> and <tt>maxAge</tt> is the smallest bound among the values never held. Otherwise the entry carries the pair whose <tt>lastResult</tt> plus <tt>maxAge</tt> is earliest, and of two such pairs the one with the earlier <tt>lastResult</tt> (vector <tt>FR14</tt>). At one reference time every held value is fresh exactly when that time is at most the smallest <tt>lastResult</tt> plus <tt>maxAge</tt> among them, so the entry is fresh exactly when every value is, and an age equal to <tt>maxAge</tt> stays fresh as vector <tt>FR2</tt> requires. Taking the oldest <tt>lastResult</tt> from one value and the smallest <tt>maxAge</tt> from another can report two fresh values as one stale input (vector <tt>FR15</tt>). The entry summarizes the freshness of the values and does not enumerate them. A permit on a fully valid path depends only on the values that path used, so its entries carry those values and not the values of the other paths. <tt>issuedAt</tt> is the time the record was sealed, and it is not a reference time for any input.</t>
        <t>A held value older than the maximum age the decision point applies to its input is one it could not obtain, as Section 3.5 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/> treats standing that cannot be established within the pinned maximum age. The entries are therefore enough to derive the unavailable inputs, and a verifier derives them: the set of entries that are stale or were never established. Under <tt>evaluated</tt> that set <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be empty (vector <tt>FR8</tt>). Under <tt>not-evaluated</tt> the member <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>unavailableInput</tt>, a non-empty array naming each input of that set exactly once and no other (vectors <tt>EV1</tt>, <tt>EV5</tt>, <tt>EV6</tt>, <tt>EV7</tt> and <tt>FR7</tt>), from the closed set in the table below (vector <tt>EV4</tt>). Under <tt>evaluated</tt> it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry <tt>unavailableInput</tt> in any spelling, including <tt>null</tt>, the empty array and the empty string (vectors <tt>EV2</tt>, <tt>EV8</tt>, <tt>EV9</tt> and <tt>EV10</tt>). No member other than <tt>status</tt>, <tt>inputs</tt> and <tt>unavailableInput</tt> is defined, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject an <tt>evaluation</tt> member carrying one (vector <tt>EV12</tt>). A free-text reason beside the closed set would name an input no other record can be compared with.</t>
        <t>A decision point that receives an input's value from another hop and not from its source copies the source's <tt>lastResult</tt> into its entry unchanged, so the input's age runs from the source and not from the hop (vectors <tt>FR1</tt>, <tt>FR3</tt> and <tt>FR4</tt>). It applies its own <tt>maxAge</tt> in its own record. A hop that later obtains an input an earlier record named as unavailable writes a new record with its own evaluation, and never amends the earlier record, which its producer's signature has sealed. An entry carries what REQ-4 of <xref target="EVALUATION-STATE"/> asks a decision point to record for each input, its as-of time and whether it was accepted, stale or never established, and a forwarded entry carries what REQ-6 asks a hop to preserve: the input name, its evaluation state and its freshness bound.</t>
        <table>
          <name>The inputs an evaluation entry or unavailableInput names</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">input</th>
              <th align="left">what it names</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>standing-source</tt></td>
              <td align="left">the source issuer standing is established from (Section 3.5 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/>)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>key-source</tt></td>
              <td align="left">the source of the issuer or evaluator keys a decision verifies under (Section 3.4 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/>)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>consumption-state</tt></td>
              <td align="left">the record of which approvals have been consumed (Section 4.3 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/>)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>policy-source</tt></td>
              <td align="left">the policy the decision point evaluates the request against, including a profile the request names that the decision point does not hold</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>principal-standing-source</tt></td>
              <td align="left">the source the standing of the principal the agent acts for is established from (Section 3.6 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/>), kept apart from <tt>standing-source</tt>, which names the source issuer standing is established from (Section 3.5); valid only under the predicate type URI of <xref target="iana"/> that ends in <tt>v2</tt></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The first three are the inputs Section 5 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/> names as making a refusal transient. Whether a refusal for lack of principal standing is transient is for Section 5 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/> to say, and this document follows its classification when it states one. A refusal that document classifies as transient is recorded as <tt>not-evaluated</tt>, naming the inputs that were unavailable. A refusal it classifies as permanent (an unsupported entry type, a signature that does not verify, an expired grant, an issuer whose standing is withdrawn) is recorded as <tt>evaluated</tt> with <tt>deny</tt>. The record then carries what Section 5 requires a verifier's own record of a refusal to carry, and what the caller is told is unaffected.</t>
        <t>Principal standing <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be established from a signed standing commitment that the source publishes, together with a proof of the principal's standing that is checked against that commitment, with the relying party pinning that source and a maximum age. The <tt>principal-standing-source</tt> entry then carries, as <tt>lastResult</tt>, the as-of time of the commitment the decision point held, and, as <tt>maxAge</tt>, the pinned maximum age. Three cases follow from the rules above, each under the <tt>v2</tt> predicate type URI:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>With no commitment held, <tt>lastResult</tt> is <tt>none</tt>, the input was never established, and the record is <tt>not-evaluated</tt> naming <tt>principal-standing-source</tt> (vector <tt>PS3</tt>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>With a current commitment against which the proof shows the standing withdrawn, every entry is fresh, the record is <tt>evaluated</tt>, and the decision is <tt>deny</tt> (vector <tt>PS4</tt>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>With a current commitment and a proof that is missing or does not verify against it, the commitment does not establish standing, and the relying party cannot tell this case from a withdrawal. The record is <tt>evaluated</tt> with <tt>deny</tt>, and its entry carries the commitment's as-of time. A record that names the input as unavailable fails the recompute of <xref target="verifying"/>, because the input the decision depended on was current (vector <tt>PS5</tt>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>An input whose age at <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> equals its <tt>maxAge</tt> is fresh under this document (vector <tt>FR2</tt>). Section 3 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/> forbids using an input at or past its horizon, so for a source that does not answer when its last value is exactly at the bound, that document requires <tt>not-evaluated</tt> where this one derives an empty set of unavailable inputs. Vector <tt>PS1b</tt> is that record for <tt>principal-standing-source</tt>, and both <tt>valid</tt> and <tt>malformed</tt> are conforming verdicts for it.</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
"decision":   { "action": "write", "reported": "deny",
                "reportedAt": "2026-09-19T11:04:02Z" },
"evaluation": {
  "status": "not-evaluated",
  "inputs": [
    { "input": "policy-source",
      "lastResult": "2026-09-19T10:00:00Z", "maxAge": 86400 },
    { "input": "standing-source",
      "lastResult": "2026-09-19T09:30:00Z", "maxAge": 3600 }
  ],
  "unavailableInput": ["standing-source"]
},
"effect":     { "observed": "none", "writes": [] },
"agreement":  "agree"
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>The record above is a decision point whose last standing value was 5642 seconds old against a maximum of 3600, and which failed closed. Its <tt>agreement</tt> is <tt>agree</tt>, because the deny held, and its <tt>evaluation</tt> says the deny was not a policy outcome and which input was stale.</t>
        <t><tt>evaluation</tt> is not an input to <tt>agreement</tt>. "Could not evaluate" is not a decision, so it is not a fourth value of <tt>decision.reported</tt>, and the agreement table is unchanged: a deny enforced during an outage that leaked anyway is still <tt>disagree</tt> (vector <tt>A19</tt>). A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reject a record because <tt>evaluation.status</tt> is <tt>not-evaluated</tt>, whatever <tt>decision.reported</tt> and <tt>agreement</tt> are (vectors <tt>A10</tt>, <tt>A12</tt> to <tt>A14</tt>, and <tt>A18</tt> to <tt>A20</tt>). A permit recorded as <tt>not-evaluated</tt> is a decision point failing open, and the format represents it so that it can be found (vector <tt>A18</tt>). The evidence class of <tt>evaluation</tt> is the one <tt>fieldEvidence</tt> declares for <tt>decision</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oversight">
        <name>Oversight</name>
        <t><tt>oversight</tt> is optional. When present it records the kind of act a person took on this request before or at the decision, so that a permit bound to a user confirmation (Section 10.7 of <xref target="AIMS"/>) says whether that person observed the request, checked a stated property of it, chose, or released an action already within authority they held. The four kinds are those of <xref target="OVERSIGHT-ACTS"/>, Sections 2.3 to 2.9.</t>
        <t>An <tt>oversight</tt> member <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>oversight.act</tt>, which is one of <tt>observation</tt>, <tt>check</tt>, <tt>decision</tt>, <tt>release</tt> (vector <tt>OV1</tt>). <tt>oversight.recordDigest</tt> is optional and, when present, is the digest of the overseer's own signed record, bound as <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt> binds the authority document. No other member is defined, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject an <tt>oversight</tt> member carrying one (vector <tt>OV2</tt>). The act is producer-asserted: its evidence class is the one <tt>fieldEvidence</tt> declares for <tt>decision</tt>, and a verifier does not resolve <tt>recordDigest</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="correlation">
        <name>Correlation, posture and remediation</name>
        <t><tt>correlation.scope</tt> is one of <tt>producer</tt>, <tt>cross-party</tt>. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present, because Section 11 asks systems to "correlate events across Agents, Tools, Services, Resources and LLMs", which a producer-scoped identifier cannot do. A record a producer distributes beyond its own deployment <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carry a scope of <tt>cross-party</tt>.</t>
        <t><tt>correlation.timeBasis</tt> of <tt>beacon-anchored</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>externalAnchor</tt>, and <tt>asserted</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry it (vector <tt>F5</tt>). <tt>externalAnchor.kind</tt> is one of <tt>rfc3161</tt>, <tt>transparency-log</tt>, <tt>opentimestamps</tt>, of which <xref target="RFC3161"/> and <xref target="RFC9162"/> define the first two. <tt>externalAnchor.digest</tt> is the digest of the anchor's proof and not the proof, so a verifier that holds only the record cannot validate the anchor. Such a verifier reads <tt>beacon-anchored</tt> as a statement the producer made, accepts the record, and does not date it from the anchor (vector <tt>N1</tt>). A record is dated from the anchors of a retention entry (<xref target="retained"/>), which are over the envelope digest and are validated under the rules in <xref target="anchor-rules"/>. The record's verdict and its dating are two results, and a verifier reports them separately, so vector <tt>N1</tt> has one conforming verdict where draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02 admitted two.</t>
        <t><tt>posture.reported</tt> and <tt>posture.observed</tt> are over the closed set <tt>no_network</tt>, <tt>allowlist</tt>, <tt>sinkhole</tt>, <tt>unsafe_bypass_egress</tt>, carried on the wire exactly as registered: they are the values <tt>#no_network</tt>, <tt>#allowlist</tt>, <tt>#sinkhole</tt> and <tt>#unsafe_bypass_egress</tt> of the term <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/containment_posture</tt>. Each comes with a digest pinning the posture document. <tt>posture.assessedAt</tt> carries the time the assessment was made, which <xref target="rationale"/> gives the reason for. A consumer weighing either posture <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> read <tt>assessedAt</tt> beside it.</t>
        <t><tt>remediation</tt> carries one member per event. Its <tt>cause</tt> is one of <tt>session-revoked</tt>, <tt>risk-elevated</tt>, <tt>subject-disabled</tt>, <tt>token-replay-suspected</tt>, <tt>policy-changed</tt>, <tt>operator-action</tt>. Its <tt>enforcement</tt> is one of <tt>access-attenuated</tt>, <tt>session-terminated</tt>, <tt>tokens-discarded</tt>, <tt>privileges-reduced</tt>, <tt>reevaluated</tt>, <tt>not-enforced</tt>. In each member <tt>enforcedAt</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be at or after <tt>signalReceivedAt</tt> (vector <tt>F7</tt>).</t>
        <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reject a record because <tt>enforcement</tt> is <tt>not-enforced</tt> (vector <tt>A4</tt>). A record carries that value when a remediation signal arrived and enforcement did not follow it.</t>
        <t><tt>postEnforcementEffect</tt> and <tt>postEnforcementRoot</tt> make the Section 11 delay requirement checkable by a third party. A revocation that arrived, was recorded, and was followed by an observed effect is a recorded enforcement failure. This document defines no bound on the delay, because Section 11 carries no unit for "undue", and vector <tt>N2</tt> records that case as indeterminate.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="observation">
        <name>Observation and tier</name>
        <t><tt>observation.vantage</tt> is one of <tt>below-observed</tt>, <tt>peer</tt>, <tt>self</tt>.</t>
        <t><tt>coverage.scopeComplete</tt> is true when the observer read every path inside <tt>pathScope</tt> throughout the interval, and false otherwise. <tt>coverage.gaps</tt> is an array of the paths the observer could not read. A gap is inside <tt>pathScope</tt> when it lies under a member of <tt>pathScope</tt>, as <tt>inScope</tt> is derived for a write. A gap inside <tt>pathScope</tt> contradicts a <tt>scopeComplete</tt> of true, and a record carrying both is malformed whatever tier it declares (vectors <tt>V4</tt> and <tt>V5</tt>). An observer that could not read part of <tt>pathScope</tt> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> name that path in <tt>coverage.gaps</tt>, because a reader learns which ground the record does not cover from the gap list and not from the observer's confidence. The coverage check is a check of the record's own declaration; it does not establish that the observer in fact read every path it did not list. <tt>observation.priorCommitment</tt> is the observer's commitment, made before the interval opened, to the before-state and to a nonce the observer chose.</t>
        <t>Its <tt>committedAt</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be strictly before the interval's <tt>openedAt</tt> (vector <tt>C2</tt>). Its <tt>commitmentDigest</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recompute as the <xref target="RFC8785"/> digest over <tt>authorityDigest</tt>, <tt>beforeRoot</tt>, <tt>recordId</tt> and <tt>witnessNonce</tt> (vector <tt>C3</tt>). Its <tt>keyid</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> appear in <tt>agent.signers</tt> (vector <tt>C1</tt>), and that disjointness is the check, made on bytes alone, that separates an observer from a self-observing party.</t>
        <t><tt>doesNotAssert</tt> is the negative-scope member the sections above refer to: an array of explicit statements about what this record does not claim. A record under this version <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carry two entries. The first entry records that it makes no claim about retention. The second records that it makes no claim that the reported decision is the decision the policy engine evaluated.</t>
        <t><tt>fieldEvidence</tt> carries exactly the seven keys named in the mapping table, each one of <tt>substrate-covered</tt> or <tt>producer-asserted</tt>. Each token denotes one registered value of the term <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/field_evidence_partition</tt>, by the table below. The registry spells its value keys with an underscore and this document's tokens carry a hyphen; the table, not a spelling rule, is the mapping, and a token outside it is malformed.</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Wire token</th>
              <th align="left">Registered value URI</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>substrate-covered</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/field_evidence_partition#substrate_covered</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>producer-asserted</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/field_evidence_partition#producer_asserted</tt></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>A missing key is malformed (vector <tt>FE1</tt>), and no key may declare <tt>substrate-covered</tt> while <tt>vantage</tt> is <tt>self</tt> (vector <tt>FE2</tt>).</t>
        <t><tt>tier</tt> is one of <tt>voluntary</tt>, <tt>authoritative</tt>. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recompute it and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> take the declared value as the tier. Vectors <tt>TI1</tt> through <tt>TI5</tt> each declare <tt>authoritative</tt> while failing one clause, so a verifier that reads the declared value passes all five.</t>
        <t>A record is <tt>authoritative</tt> if and only if all five of these hold, and <tt>voluntary</tt> otherwise: <tt>vantage</tt> is <tt>below-observed</tt> (vector <tt>TI1</tt>); <tt>priorCommitment</tt> is present and complete (vector <tt>TI2</tt>); <tt>pathScope</tt> is non-empty (vector <tt>TI3</tt>); <tt>coverage.scopeComplete</tt> is true, which by the rule above leaves no gap inside <tt>pathScope</tt> (vectors <tt>TI4</tt> and <tt>TI6</tt>); and <tt>resource.binding</tt> is <tt>digest-bound</tt> (vector <tt>TI5</tt>).</t>
        <t>A record declaring <tt>authoritative</tt> that fails a clause is malformed, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> downgrade it to <tt>voluntary</tt> (vector <tt>TI1</tt>). Downgrading would let a producer emit an authoritative-shaped record and rely on the verifier to relabel it.</t>
        <t>The opposite mismatch is well formed. A record declaring <tt>voluntary</tt> while meeting all five clauses is not malformed, and a verifier reads it at the tier the recompute gives. Treating the two directions differently is deliberate: a producer that over-claims is relying on somebody else to correct it, and a producer that under-claims is not.</t>
        <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> read a <tt>voluntary</tt> record as evidence that its content corresponds to any independently observed fact (vector <tt>A5</tt>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="worked">
        <name>A worked reading of the example</name>
        <t>The record at the head of <xref target="members"/> reports a write that was denied and happened anyway. Each rule above lands on one of its members.</t>
        <t><tt>decision.reported</tt> is <tt>deny</tt>, and the single write is attributed to the record's own request, so <tt>effect.observed</tt> derives as <tt>occurred</tt>. The third row of the agreement table maps that pair to <tt>disagree</tt>, which is the value the record carries, so the derivation holds and vector <tt>D1</tt> does not apply.</t>
        <t><tt>posture.reported</tt> is <tt>sinkhole</tt> and <tt>posture.observed</tt> is <tt>allowlist</tt>. Both are present and they are unequal, so <tt>posture.agreement</tt> derives as <tt>disagree</tt>, which is again the carried value.</t>
        <t>The tier recompute passes all five clauses. <tt>vantage</tt> is <tt>below-observed</tt>; <tt>priorCommitment</tt> carries all five of its own members; <tt>pathScope</tt> holds one entry; <tt>coverage.scopeComplete</tt> is true with no gaps; and <tt>resource.binding</tt> is <tt>digest-bound</tt>. The declared <tt>authoritative</tt> is therefore the tier a verifier derives.</t>
        <t><tt>evaluation.status</tt> is <tt>evaluated</tt> and the member names no unavailable input, so vector <tt>EV2</tt> does not apply. Each of its two inputs is fresh at <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt>, 11:04:02Z: the policy was produced 3842 seconds earlier under a <tt>maxAge</tt> of 86400, and the standing 242 seconds earlier under a <tt>maxAge</tt> of 3600, so the recompute gives an empty set of unavailable inputs and vector <tt>FR8</tt> does not apply. The record carries no <tt>oversight</tt> member and claims nothing about a human act.</t>
        <t>The ordering checks hold on the timestamps as written. Vector <tt>C2</tt> tests the first: <tt>committedAt</tt> at 11:03:58Z falls strictly before <tt>openedAt</tt> at 11:04:01Z. Vector <tt>F7</tt> tests the second: <tt>enforcedAt</tt> at 11:04:09Z falls two seconds after <tt>signalReceivedAt</tt> at 11:04:07Z.</t>
        <t>The single write lies under <tt>/srv/ledger/</tt>, the one member of <tt>pathScope</tt>, so its <tt>inScope</tt> of true is derived from the path and vector <tt>V3</tt> does not apply. <tt>fieldEvidence</tt> carries all seven keys, so vector <tt>FE1</tt> does not apply, and <tt>vantage</tt> is not <tt>self</tt>, so vector <tt>FE2</tt> does not either.</t>
        <t>What the record says, read whole, is that a write was denied and happened anyway, that the posture the decision point read was not the posture an observer saw, and that a revocation signal was enforced two seconds after it arrived. All three are well formed, and a verifier accepts the record.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="consumption">
        <name>Consumption under a cumulative limit</name>
        <t>A decision under a cumulative limit, such as a delegated spending limit, depends on the value of <tt>consumption-state</tt> and not only on its freshness. A permit is correct only when the amount already committed under the limit, plus the amount held for earlier permits that have not settled, plus this request's amount, is within the limit. An as-of time and a maximum age cannot show that, so an entry whose <tt>input</tt> is <tt>consumption-state</tt> and whose decision applied a cumulative limit <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry a fourth member, <tt>consumption</tt>, and an entry for any other input <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry it (vector <tt>CS6</tt>).</t>
        <t><tt>consumption</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry each of these members, except that <tt>unit</tt> is absent when <tt>asset</tt> is present. It <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry <tt>supersedes</tt>, <tt>asset</tt>, <tt>payee</tt> and <tt>settled</tt>, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry any other member (vector <tt>CS9</tt>):</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>limitDigest</tt>, the digest of the document that sets the limit: the delegated authority <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt> names, or a document that authority names;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>unit</tt>, the unit amounts are counted in; for money, an ISO 4217 alphabetic code. A record that carries <tt>asset</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry <tt>unit</tt> (vector <tt>CS37</tt>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>limit</tt>, <tt>consumed</tt>, <tt>reserved</tt> and <tt>requested</tt>, each a non-negative integer in the smallest subunit of <tt>unit</tt>, or of <tt>asset</tt> where the record carries it (vector <tt>CS5</tt>): the limit, the amount committed by earlier settled calls under it, the amount held for earlier permits under it that have not settled, and this request's amount, which for a payment that can settle below its authorized amount is the authorized maximum;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>held</tt>, an array with one entry for each unsettled earlier permit, whose amounts sum to <tt>reserved</tt> (vector <tt>CS3</tt>), and no two of which carry the same <tt>operationKey</tt> (vector <tt>CS13</tt>). Each entry carries exactly that permit's <tt>operationKey</tt>, <tt>requestDigest</tt> and <tt>amount</tt>, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry <tt>payee</tt> and <tt>deadline</tt>, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry any other member (vector <tt>X6</tt>). Its <tt>payee</tt> is the payee of that permit's payment, written as <tt>consumption.payee</tt> is written, and its <tt>deadline</tt> is the <xref target="RFC3339"/> date-time until which that permit can still settle;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>stateRevision</tt>, a non-negative integer naming the revision of the consumption state the decision point read. The entry's <tt>lastResult</tt> is the time that revision was produced;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>asset</tt>, for an amount counted in an asset that no ISO 4217 code names, such as a token on one chain. It is an object carrying exactly <tt>id</tt>, a <xref target="CAIP-19"/> asset identifier naming the chain and the asset (for a token, its contract), and <tt>decimals</tt>, a non-negative integer of at most 255 giving the decimal places of the smallest subunit every amount of the record is counted in (vectors <tt>CS34</tt>, <tt>CS35</tt> and <tt>CS36</tt>). USDC on Base, <tt>eip155:8453/erc20:0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913</tt> with <tt>decimals</tt> of 6, and USDC on Solana are two assets;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>supersedes</tt>, for a limit raised or cut while permits are held: the digest of the limit document that this record's <tt>limitDigest</tt> replaced. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a digest (vector <tt>CS24</tt>) and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> differ from <tt>limitDigest</tt> (vector <tt>CS23</tt>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>payee</tt>, the digest of the <xref target="CAIP-10"/> account identifier of the party this request's payment goes to, with the address written as its namespace's profile writes it (for <tt>eip155</tt>, the mixed-case checksum encoding);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>settled</tt>, the terms a paid call settled on, defined below.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A retry is identified by <tt>decision.operationKey</tt>, a string the agent assigns to one intended operation and carries in its signed request, so that every attempt at that operation carries the same key. A record whose <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt> carries <tt>consumption</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> (vector <tt>CS14</tt>); a record without <tt>consumption</tt> need not. Wherever <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> is present, with or without <tt>consumption</tt>, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a string of at least one character: a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a record whose <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> is the empty string, or is not a string (vector <tt>X7</tt>). The <tt>operationKey</tt> of each <tt>held</tt> entry is held to the same rule. An empty key would be one key that every caller without a key shares, so two different intended operations would read as a retry of each other, and the second would not be counted. The scope of the key is the one given for a claim below. A request whose <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> appears in <tt>held</tt> is the same operation as the permit held for it, as when a caller retries after a lost response: its <tt>decision.requestDigest</tt> and <tt>requested</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the held entry's (vectors <tt>CS4</tt> and <tt>CS10</tt>), its <tt>payee</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the held entry's <tt>payee</tt>, the two absent together or equal (vectors <tt>CS41</tt> and <tt>CS42</tt>), and it is not counted a second time. A request whose key is not held is a new operation and is counted, even when its <tt>decision.requestDigest</tt> equals a held entry's (vectors <tt>CS11</tt> and <tt>CS12</tt>). The request digest cannot identify a retry: it is a content digest over the action, arguments and resource, so two intended payments with the same content share it, and only the key tells them apart. A verifier derives <tt>withinLimit</tt>: true when <tt>consumed</tt> plus <tt>reserved</tt>, plus <tt>requested</tt> unless the request is held, is at most <tt>limit</tt>. A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reject a record because a <tt>permit</tt> or <tt>permit-with-conditions</tt> has <tt>withinLimit</tt> false (vectors <tt>CS2</tt> and <tt>CS19</tt>). A permit beyond the limit is a decision point exceeding its authority, and the format represents it so that it can be found, as it represents a fail-open in <xref target="evaluation"/>.</t>
        <t>A paid call that has settled carries <tt>settled</tt> beside the approved terms that <tt>requested</tt>, <tt>asset</tt> and <tt>payee</tt> carry from the signed payment. <tt>settled</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry exactly these members and no other:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>amount</tt>, the amount that moved, a non-negative integer in the smallest subunit of <tt>settled.asset</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>asset</tt>, the asset that moved, an object of the form of <tt>consumption.asset</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>payee</tt>, the digest of the account identifier the amount moved to, written as <tt>consumption.payee</tt> is written;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>source</tt>, the literal <tt>chain</tt>: the terms are read from the chain through the transaction the server returned. The signed payment shows only what was approved, and any other value makes the record malformed (vector <tt>CS47</tt>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>transaction</tt>, a string naming the transaction the terms were read from.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t><tt>settled.amount</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> exceed <tt>requested</tt>, the authorized maximum (vector <tt>CS44</tt>), and an amount below it is valid, as a payment scheme that authorizes up to a maximum settles (vector <tt>CS43</tt>). <tt>settled.asset</tt> and <tt>settled.payee</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal <tt>consumption.asset</tt> and <tt>consumption.payee</tt> (vectors <tt>CS45</tt> and <tt>CS46</tt>). A settlement of 0 moves nothing and sends no transaction, so <tt>settled.transaction</tt> is the empty string when <tt>settled.amount</tt> is 0 (vector <tt>CS50</tt>), and an empty <tt>settled.transaction</tt> beside any other amount makes the record malformed (vector <tt>CS51</tt>). A permit settled at 0 has not spent its authorization, which can still be settled up to its maximum until the permit's deadline, so a record whose <tt>settled.amount</tt> is 0 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> hold its own operation in <tt>held</tt>, and that entry <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>deadline</tt> (vector <tt>CS52</tt>).</t>
        <t>A permit stays in <tt>held</tt> until a record of the same operation settles it. It moves to <tt>consumed</tt> when that operation's record has <tt>effect.observed</tt> of <tt>occurred</tt>, at the amount <tt>settled</tt> carries where the record carries it and at the held amount otherwise, so a call that settled below its maximum leaves the rest of the limit available. It is released when that operation's record has <tt>effect.observed</tt> of <tt>none</tt>, except that a permit settled at 0 stays held until its deadline. A permit whose response was lost has no such record, so it stays held: a missing reply is not evidence that the call did not execute (vector <tt>CS8</tt>).</t>
        <t>Some checks need more than one record. A retaining party runs them over a set of records (<xref target="sets"/>) grouped into ledgers. Two <tt>limitDigest</tt> values belong to one ledger when a record names one as the other's <tt>supersedes</tt>, directly or through a chain of such records, and <tt>stateRevision</tt> orders the whole ledger, so a replaced limit does not restart it (vectors <tt>CS18</tt> to <tt>CS22</tt>). Limit documents that no <tt>supersedes</tt> links are separate ledgers, because a verifier cannot tell a document that replaced another from an unrelated one without the link (vector <tt>CS25</tt>). Every record of one ledger <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> name the same <tt>unit</tt>, or the same <tt>asset</tt> with the same <tt>decimals</tt> (vectors <tt>CS38</tt>, <tt>CS39</tt> and <tt>CS40</tt>).</t>
        <t>Within a ledger ordered by <tt>stateRevision</tt>, every permit <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear in the <tt>held</tt> or the <tt>consumed</tt> of each later record until it settles. A permit whose decision read a <tt>stateRevision</tt> older than a record that already held an unsettled permit, and which omits that permit from its own <tt>held</tt>, read a state that had not counted it, which is the window in which one limit is spent twice (vectors <tt>CS7</tt> and <tt>CS21</tt>). A release from <tt>held</tt> with no record of that operation showing <tt>none</tt> or <tt>occurred</tt> fails the check (vectors <tt>CS8</tt> and <tt>CS20</tt>), and passes when the set holds the record that releases it (vector <tt>CS22</tt>), and an <tt>unknown</tt> outcome does not release a permit (vectors <tt>CS29</tt> and <tt>CS30</tt>). A record of the ledger at a later <tt>stateRevision</tt> that no longer holds an operation whose record carries <tt>settled</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> count in <tt>consumed</tt> at least the <tt>consumed</tt> of the settling record plus the settled amount (vectors <tt>CS48</tt> and <tt>CS49</tt>); it may count more, since other calls can settle between the two records. A permit settled at 0 stays held until a later record of the ledger whose <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> is at or after the held entry's <tt>deadline</tt>, or until a record of the operation shows <tt>occurred</tt>; a later record dated before the deadline that no longer holds it fails the check, even though the record of the zero settlement shows <tt>none</tt> (vectors <tt>CS53</tt> and <tt>CS54</tt>).</t>
        <t>A held permit is a claim, and the claim is keyed by the principal (<tt>delegation.subject</tt>), the agent key (<tt>agent.signers</tt>) and <tt>decision.operationKey</tt>, never by the limit document. A call denied before its tool ran, or whose record shows <tt>effect.observed</tt> of <tt>none</tt>, leaves no claim, and a retry of it is a new operation under the limit then in force (vectors <tt>CS26</tt>, <tt>CS27</tt> and <tt>CS28</tt>). Any other call keeps its claim when the limit is replaced, and stays in <tt>held</tt> of every later record of the ledger as above (vector <tt>CS29</tt>). A permit whose operation key a record in the same scope holds, and which does not itself hold that key, presents a retry as a new operation, unless it is the original call at a lower <tt>stateRevision</tt> of the same ledger; a retaining party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the set as failing the check, whether or not the later limit document names the earlier one in <tt>supersedes</tt> (vectors <tt>CS31</tt> and <tt>CS32</tt>). The same operation key under another principal and another agent key is another claim (vector <tt>CS33</tt>).</t>
        <t>These checks follow permits by <tt>operationKey</tt> and not by request digest, so a second intended payment identical to a held one is still found (vector <tt>CS17</tt>). The reading of <tt>CS7</tt> and <tt>CS17</tt> puts no condition on when the held permit was issued, because the record that originated that permit is not in the set; the check follows the permit through <tt>held</tt> and <tt>consumed</tt> and tests nothing about its issuance. <tt>limitDigest</tt> names the document that states the limit, which is the delegated authority itself or a document it names (vectors <tt>CS15</tt> and <tt>CS16</tt>).</t>
        <t>A paid tool call under a delegated limit of 50000 pence, where the effect commits, the response is lost and the caller retries, reads as follows. The first call reads revision 41 with <tt>consumed</tt> of 30000 and nothing held, requests 12000, and is permitted. Its response is lost, so no record settles it. The retry carries the same operation key and request digest, reads revision 42 with <tt>consumed</tt> of 30000 and that call held for 12000, and is within the limit because the held call is not counted again. A different call for 12000 that reads revision 42 is beyond the limit (30000 plus 12000 plus 12000 is 54000) and is denied. A decision point that permitted that second call after reading revision 41 is found by the check across records (vector <tt>CS7</tt>).</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
"decision":   { "action": "pay", "reported": "permit",
                "operationKey": "op-7f3c",
                "requestDigest": "sha256:r1...",
                "reportedAt": "2026-10-19T09:00:05Z" },
"evaluation": {
  "status": "evaluated",
  "inputs": [
    { "input": "consumption-state",
      "lastResult": "2026-10-19T09:00:04Z", "maxAge": 5,
      "consumption": {
        "limitDigest": "sha256:...", "unit": "GBP",
        "limit": 50000, "consumed": 30000, "reserved": 12000,
        "requested": 12000, "stateRevision": 42,
        "held": [ { "operationKey": "op-7f3c",
                    "requestDigest": "sha256:r1...",
                    "amount": 12000 } ] } }
  ]
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>The record above is the retry. Its operation key is held, so <tt>withinLimit</tt> is true at 42000 of 50000.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sequence">
        <name>Sequence</name>
        <t><tt>sequence</tt> is optional. When present it places the record in a numbered series its producer issues, so that a party holding several records of the series can name one missing from them. It carries exactly two members, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a <tt>sequence</tt> member carrying any other (vector <tt>SQ2</tt>): <tt>boundary</tt>, a string the producer chooses to name one series, and <tt>seq</tt>, a positive integer (vector <tt>SQ3</tt>). Two records are in one series when they carry the same <tt>boundary</tt> and their envelopes verify under the same key, and a producer that changes its signing key starts a new series. A producer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> give the first record of a series a <tt>seq</tt> of 1 and each later record of that series a <tt>seq</tt> one greater than the record before it, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> give two records of one series the same <tt>seq</tt> (vector <tt>SQ1</tt>).</t>
        <t>Within a series, <tt>seq</tt> is also the running count of records issued, so the format carries no separate count member: a count beside a contiguous number that starts at 1 would repeat it and add no check.</t>
        <t>Two checks need more than one record, and a party holding records of one series runs them. A number below the highest it holds, which it does not hold, names a record that was issued and that it has not received: one withheld, or not yet delivered (vector <tt>SQ4</tt>). A record's identity for this check is the SHA-256 of its decoded DSSE payload bytes, the serialized in-toto Statement the signature covers. Two records of one series with the same <tt>seq</tt> and different identities are the producer issuing two different records at one place in the series, and the set fails the check (vector <tt>SQ5</tt>); the same record delivered twice has one identity and is not a conflict. Neither check reaches a record above the highest number held: a series whose last records were withheld reads the same as one whose producer stopped issuing, until a later record of it arrives. A consumer that needs that tail bounded <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> require a record of the series within an interval its policy sets.</t>
        <t><tt>sequence</tt> is producer-asserted, and its evidence class is the one <tt>fieldEvidence</tt> declares for <tt>correlation</tt>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>A record is checkable for internal coherence and says nothing about the world outside its own bytes. Where a consumer needs a fact about that world, it has to establish that fact somewhere else.</t>
      <section anchor="the-vantage-claim-is-not-self-proving">
        <name>The vantage claim is not self-proving</name>
        <t>The vantage claim in a record is an assertion about the world, and the record makes it coherent with its own members without making it self-proving. A consumer that requires the vantage to be true <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> anchor the observer's key out of band, exactly as it would anchor any signer. Such a consumer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> read <tt>authoritative</tt> as coherence with a claimed <tt>observation.vantage</tt>, and never as proof of one (vector <tt>A5</tt>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="a-producer-that-observes-only-itself">
        <name>A producer that observes only itself</name>
        <t>A producer that observes only itself can satisfy every field of this format, and the <tt>observation.priorCommitment</tt> member raises the cost of doing so. It binds the before-state, the authority and the record identifier under the observer's signature before the interval opens. A forgery therefore has to be decided on before the forger knows what it will be lying about.</t>
        <t>It does not reduce the cost to zero, and a producer holding two keys satisfies every clause. That residual is detectable by a key inventory outside the record and by no function of the bytes inside it. A consumer that depends on the vantage <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep such an inventory.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="withheld-rows">
        <name>Withheld rows</name>
        <t>A record can omit a remediation event, or a claimed access that the observer saw, and no function of a Statement detects a row that was never written. No quantity of extra carried material changes that, because extra material is material a withholding producer also declines to carry.</t>
        <t>A withheld record and a record never produced are different failures. Where records carry <tt>sequence</tt> (<xref target="sequence"/>), a record withheld from a party that holds a later record of the same series is detectable from the records alone, because its number is missing from them. A record never produced leaves no number missing, and neither does a withheld record numbered above the highest one held; no function of the records detects either.</t>
        <t>The <tt>coverage</tt>, <tt>fieldEvidence</tt> and <tt>doesNotAssert</tt> members exist so that a blind spot travels where the observer is honest about it. An observer that knows of a blind spot <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> record it in the <tt>doesNotAssert</tt> member. None of these members is a defence against a producer that conceals one.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="well-formed-disagreement">
        <name>Well-formed disagreement</name>
        <t>A disagreement between the reported decision and the observed effect is well formed, as is a disagreement between the two postures, and as is a remediation event recording that enforcement did not occur. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept all three (vectors <tt>A3</tt> and <tt>A4</tt>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="a-decision-that-was-not-evaluated">
        <name>A decision that was not evaluated</name>
        <t>A record whose <tt>evaluation.status</tt> is <tt>not-evaluated</tt> is well formed beside any reported decision and any agreement, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept it (vectors <tt>A10</tt>, <tt>A12</tt> to <tt>A14</tt>, and <tt>A18</tt> to <tt>A20</tt>). A deny that was not evaluated is a decision point failing closed, and a permit that was not evaluated is one failing open. Both are facts an audit trail exists to carry. A consumer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat a <tt>not-evaluated</tt> permit as an enforcement failure for policy purposes, and this document leaves that to the consumer.</t>
        <t>The reason is the one <xref target="well-formed-disagreement"/> gives for a disagreement. A format with no way to say that a decision point could not evaluate records every outage as policy: each lost standing source reads as a correctly enforced denial, and each fail-open reads as a permit somebody decided. An incident review that reads such a trail finds no outage, because none was ever written down.</t>
        <t>Every source a decision point reads is also a way to stop it (Section 5 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/>). An attacker who can make a source unavailable turns fail-closed evaluation into a denial of service, and the <tt>not-evaluated</tt> records are the evidence of it. A consumer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> read a rate of <tt>not-evaluated</tt> records naming one input as an availability event, not as a series of policy decisions.</t>
        <t><tt>evaluation</tt> is producer-asserted. A decision point that records <tt>evaluated</tt> for a decision that depended on an input it did not obtain is withholding, as in <xref target="withheld-rows"/>, and no function of the record's bytes detects it. The same holds for <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt>: the recompute catches an entry whose own times contradict the status, and it cannot catch a <tt>lastResult</tt> written later than the source produced the value, or a hop that wrote the time it received a forwarded value in place of the source's. A consumer that relies on freshness <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> read each entry's evidence class as the one <tt>fieldEvidence</tt> declares for <tt>decision</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="revocation-without-a-bound">
        <name>Revocation without a bound</name>
        <t>Section 11 of <xref target="AIMS"/> requires that revoked or downgraded authorization be enforced "without undue delay" and specifies no bound. This document carries <tt>signalReceivedAt</tt> and <tt>enforcedAt</tt>, and defines no bound of its own. A record with an arbitrarily large gap between them is well formed. A consumer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set a bound on that gap as policy and read a record that exceeds it accordingly.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relationship-to-other-tamper-evidence-mechanisms">
        <name>Relationship to other tamper-evidence mechanisms</name>
        <t>A signature over canonical bytes detects an editor who cannot sign. A trusted timestamp <xref target="RFC3161"/> adds an assertion about when the bytes existed, and an append-only log <xref target="RFC6962"/> <xref target="RFC9162"/> adds an assertion that they were published. This document requires neither, and a deployment <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry a record under this format in such a log.</t>
        <t>None of the three detects a producer that signed a false record. The recomputes in <xref target="tamper"/> refuse a record whose members contradict one another, whoever signed it. These recomputations check consistency among the represented fields and do not establish the truth of external events.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="two-implementations-that-both-differ-from-the-canonical-form">
        <name>Two implementations that both differ from the canonical form</name>
        <t><xref target="rationale"/> gives the mechanism by which two implementations can share a serialization that is not <xref target="RFC8785"/>. Neither party can see the failure from inside it. Every signature each of them produces verifies for the other, and the records fail only for a third party that canonicalizes correctly.</t>
        <t>A consumer therefore derives the canonical bytes itself and does not accept a producer's report of them. <xref target="canonical"/> is normative for that reason, and vector <tt>T2</tt> is the member that tests it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="receipt-time-and-late-anchoring">
        <name>Receipt time and late anchoring</name>
        <t>A retention entry's <tt>receivedAt</tt> is asserted by the retaining party, and <xref target="dating"/> makes it checkable for consistency, not true. A retaining party that anchors a digest before the envelope arrives, or anchors late and states a correspondingly late receipt, produces an entry that passes the check. A relying party that grants a received record an allowance, such as dating it from its receipt, not its issuance, is relying on the two assumptions <xref target="dating"/> states, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> limit the allowance to retaining parties it trusts to anchor on delivery.</t>
        <t>From the bytes of a retention entry, a source outage, anchoring that never happened in time and anchoring that happened late read the same. <tt>anchorWithin</tt> is a statement the retaining party made, and no member of the entry can prove that its anchoring source was down, so the format does not signal an outage (vector <tt>R17</tt>). A relying party that needs the commitment to bind requires a second anchor, taken after the outage, over the entry that carries <tt>anchorWithin</tt>. The commitment is fixed before the first anchor exists only if the entry that carries it is itself anchored. The time of an <tt>opentimestamps</tt> anchor is its block header time with the 7200-second allowance of <xref target="anchor-rules"/>, and two such times are ordered by block height.</t>
        <t>An anchor of origin <tt>received</tt> was obtained by the party that sent the record. It can date the record's existence, and it says nothing about when the retaining party received it, so it never forms the upper edge of the receipt bracket.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="retained-not-live">
        <name>A retained record is not a live decision</name>
        <t>A retained record is evidence that a decision was made, and a verifier that checks it later answers one question: did the producer sign this decision, and does the retention entry date it as <xref target="dating"/> states. It never answers whether the same action may be taken now. A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> submit a retained record, its <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> or any nonce, token or credential it carries to a live decision point, a nonce or replay ledger, or a consumption ledger to check it, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> read the present state of any of those as an input to the record's verdict. A nonce that today's ledger has already seen says nothing about a record signed before it, and a nonce today's ledger has not seen does not make an old decision current. A relying party that wants the action taken again obtains a new decision for it, under the authorization state in force at that time, and the new decision is a new record.</t>
        <t>The rule runs the other way too. A decision point <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a retained record, or any part of one, as authority for a new action. Under <xref target="consumption"/>, a verifier reads the cumulative limit from the records in the set it was given, never from a ledger it queries, so the verdict for a set of retained records is the same on every day it is computed.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>A record under this document carries an agent identifier, a delegated subject, a resource identifier and a set of paths. The delegated subject in particular may identify a natural person. Deployments <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> consider which of these a given consumer needs before distributing a record. The <tt>doesNotAssert</tt> member is the place to record what a distributed record deliberately omits.</t>
      <t>The format binds five documents by digest and carries none of them: the credential, the authority document, the policy, and both posture documents. A record that carries <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt> binds a sixth, the delegation root's path or key set, which a retaining party keeps beside the record. A consumer that needs their content <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> resolve them out of band.</t>
      <t><tt>principal</tt> names an issuer's subject, which may identify a natural person, and binds the token by digest without carrying it. <tt>dataSubject</tt> names the person whose data a call read only by a keyed reference: a holder of the record without the salt cannot recover the identifier, and a party that holds the salt can test a guess of it, so a server <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep the salt with the same care as the identifiers it protects. <tt>consumption.payee</tt> and <tt>settled.payee</tt> are digests of account identifiers that are public on their chains, so anyone can test a guessed address against them.</t>
      <t>That separation is deliberate and is the privacy-preserving default, because it lets a record travel to a party entitled to verify the decision without carrying the material the decision was made from. A consumer entitled to the decision receives the digest and resolves the document only if it needs the content.</t>
      <t>A retention entry's anchors are over the envelope digest alone, so an anchoring service, a transparency log or a time-stamping authority learns that a record existed and nothing in it. A retaining party that discloses an entry discloses its receipt time and the parties whose validation data it holds, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat the entry with the same care as the record.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions. The predicate type is a URI under a namespace the author controls and requires no registration to be used, consistent with the in-toto Attestation Framework's treatment of predicate type identifiers <xref target="IN-TOTO"/>.</t>
      <t>A registered identifier would be the alternative. It is not proposed here, because a record carries its predicate type inside the bytes its producer signed. A later revision <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> move the URI once records carrying it exist, since moving it invalidates every signature over them.</t>
      <t>Revision -02 of this document froze the predicate type URI, and its Document History says so. Before it, a revision could change what a record under the URI must carry, as draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02 did (vector <tt>EV3</tt>) and as draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-00 did (vector <tt>EV13</tt>). From that revision on, a change to what a record must carry, including a value added to a closed vocabulary, is published under a new URI, as <xref target="members"/> requires, and a record valid under the URI stays valid under every later revision that keeps it. The members of release 0.28.0 of <xref target="VECTORS"/> are the records that revision froze the URI against.</t>
      <t>This revision adds optional members under the <tt>v1</tt> URI: <tt>principal</tt> and <tt>dataSubject</tt> (<xref target="members"/>), and <tt>supersedes</tt>, <tt>asset</tt>, <tt>payee</tt> and <tt>settled</tt> of <tt>consumption</tt> with <tt>payee</tt> and <tt>deadline</tt> of a <tt>held</tt> entry (<xref target="consumption"/>). A record that carries none of them is judged as under the previous revision, apart from the rules the Document History lists as new in this revision, so these additions make no record of the previous revision invalid. An earlier revision does not define them, and a record that carries one of them is valid only under this revision and later ones.</t>
      <t>This revision adds one value to the closed set of <xref target="evaluation"/>, <tt>principal-standing-source</tt>, and so publishes the extended set under a second predicate type URI, <tt>https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v2/agent-audit-record</tt>, which is the URI of <xref target="spec"/> with <tt>v1</tt> read as <tt>v2</tt>. A record under the <tt>v2</tt> URI follows this document with the extended set, and a record under the <tt>v1</tt> URI follows this document with the set of the previous revision, so a verifier never meets under the <tt>v1</tt> URI a value it is required to refuse (vectors <tt>PS1</tt> and <tt>PS2</tt>). Every other rule is the same under both.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conformance">
      <name>Conformance</name>
      <t>This section states what another document may rely on when it references this one.</t>
      <t>A conforming producer emits records that meet every <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> of <xref target="spec"/> and <xref target="members"/> that applies to the members it emits. A conforming verifier applies the order of <xref target="verifying"/>, refuses what <xref target="members"/> makes malformed, and, for a retained record, applies <xref target="retained"/>.</t>
      <t>A verifier conforms to this revision when it reaches the verdict the manifest declares on every member of the <tt>vectors-agent-audit-record</tt> family that carries a <tt>draftRevision</tt> of this revision or an earlier one, in the first release of <xref target="VECTORS"/> whose manifest lists this revision under <tt>publishedRevisions</tt>. A member that carries <tt>proposed</tt> in place of <tt>draftRevision</tt> tests a rule no published revision states yet, and is not part of the claim. Passing the corpus is necessary and not sufficient: the three rules <xref target="vectors"/> names as having no member are checked by reading them.</t>
      <t>A document that references this one normatively <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> name the revision it relies on, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> name a release of <xref target="VECTORS"/> as its conformance test. The following identifiers are stable across revisions of this document and may be referenced by name:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>the predicate type URI of <xref target="spec"/>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the section anchors <tt>canonical</tt>, <tt>json-profile</tt>, <tt>subject</tt>, <tt>timestamps</tt>, <tt>tamper</tt>, <tt>mapping</tt>, <tt>verifying</tt>, <tt>retained</tt>, <tt>dating</tt>, <tt>anchor-rules</tt>, <tt>statement-type</tt>, <tt>sets</tt>, <tt>members</tt>, <tt>principal</tt>, <tt>data-subject</tt>, <tt>evaluation</tt>, <tt>oversight</tt>, <tt>consumption</tt>, <tt>sequence</tt> and <tt>vectors</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the member identifiers of <xref target="vectors"/>, which keep their row across revisions and are never reused for another row;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the terms this document takes from <xref target="VOCABULARY"/> (the four values of <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/containment_posture</tt> and the two values of <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/field_evidence_partition</tt> mapped in <xref target="observation"/>), which are cited by URI at release 0.8.0 with its registry digest. A term URI does not change; a later release changes the digest a revision cites, never the URI.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The predicate type URI is frozen (<xref target="iana"/>), so a record valid under it stays valid under every later revision that keeps the URI, and a referencing document may rely on the URI as well as on a revision.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="impl">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.</t>
      <t>This section records the status of known implementations at the time of writing, following <xref target="RFC7942"/>. Listing an implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.</t>
      <t><xref target="VECTORS"/> is an open conformance corpus for this format, licensed under Apache-2.0. Its <tt>vectors-agent-audit-record</tt> family publishes each member of <xref target="vectors"/> as a signed DSSE envelope with the verdict a conforming verifier must reach. It ships two verifiers written from the text, one in Python that uses only the standard library and one in Go. Release v0.28.0 carries 141 members, and anyone can rerun every one of them with a single command:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
uvx agent-evidence-vectors==0.28.0 \
    --corpus vectors-agent-audit-record
]]></artwork>
      <t>On release v0.28.0 the run reports 59 members to accept, 81 to reject and 1 indeterminate, each behaving as its manifest declares. Two parties outside the corpus's authorship ran an earlier revision's members themselves and posted their results on the issue tracker of <xref target="AIMS"/>: 47 of 47 members behaved as specified at release 0.14.1, and 47 of 47 at release 0.16.0.</t>
      <t>Release v0.27.0 added <tt>CS1</tt> to <tt>CS17</tt>, release v0.28.0 added <tt>A21</tt>, <tt>SQ1</tt> to <tt>SQ5</tt> and <tt>R10</tt> to <tt>R16</tt>, and other releases added every other row of <xref target="vectors"/>, each in the release its <tt>first in</tt> column names, so the only row waiting for a release is <tt>R17</tt>, marked <tt>next</tt>. Release v0.37.1 carries 225 members in the family, and the command above with <tt>==0.37.1</tt> reports 98 members to accept, 125 to reject and 2 indeterminate, each behaving as its manifest declares (run 19 November 2026).</t>
      <t>Each member of the manifest is labelled with the text whose rule it tests. A published member carries <tt>draftRevision</tt>, a revision listed under <tt>publishedRevisions</tt> with the SHA-256 of its text; a proposed member carries <tt>proposed</tt>, naming this revision and the proposed text. On 19 November 2026 the family's 225 members are 157 published and 68 proposed, and the 68 are the members that test a rule this revision states and no published revision does. When this revision is published, the corpus lists it under <tt>publishedRevisions</tt> and the 68 carry its <tt>draftRevision</tt> in one regeneration, and that release is the one <xref target="conformance"/> names.</t>
      <t>The package is published on PyPI as <tt>agent-evidence-vectors</tt>. The repository's GitHub Action, <tt>probityai/agent-evidence-vectors</tt>, replays a shipped corpus in a workflow and publishes its pass or fail result, so that a verifier can be held to the corpus in its own continuous integration.</t>
      <t>Lars Kroehl wrote a reader from Sections 4 and 5, outside the corpus's authorship (<tt>tests/conformance/aar_reader.py</tt> in MoltyCel/moltrust-api). Run against release v0.28.0, it reached the manifest verdict on all 141 members, and its dating and set results agreed on 21 of 21. It covers retention entries <tt>R1</tt> to <tt>R16</tt> and the set checks <tt>CS7</tt>, <tt>CS8</tt>, <tt>CS17</tt>, <tt>SQ4</tt> and <tt>SQ5</tt>, and implements the anchor validation of Section 4.7.2 for transparency logs and OpenTimestamps; RFC 3161 and signed tree heads are not implemented, and no member of the corpus carries either. A second run produced byte-identical output.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
<references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="AIMS">
          <front>
            <title>AI Identity Management System</title>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeff Lombardo" initials="J." surname="Lombardo">
              <organization>AWS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nick Steele" initials="N." surname="Steele">
              <organization>OpenAI</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document proposes best practices for authentication and
   authorization of AI agent interactions.  It leverages existing
   standards such as the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments
   (WIMSE) architecture and OAuth 2.0 family of specifications.  Rather
   than defining new protocols, this document describes how existing and
   widely deployed standards can be applied or extended to establish
   agent authentication and authorization.  By doing so, it aims to
   provide a framework within which to use existing standards, identify
   gaps and guide future standardization efforts for agent
   authentication and authorization.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-ID">
          <front>
            <title>Workload Identifier</title>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="23" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a canonical identifier for workloads, referred
   to as the Workload Identifier.  A Workload Identifier is a URI that
   uniquely identifies a workload within the context of a specific trust
   domain.  This identifier can be embedded in Workload Identity
   Credentials, including X.509 certificates and JWT-based tokens, to
   support authentication, authorization, and policy enforcement across
   diverse systems.  The Workload Identifier format ensures
   interoperability, facilitates secure identity federation, and enables
   consistent identity semantics.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3339">
          <front>
            <title>Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps</title>
            <author fullname="G. Klyne" initials="G." surname="Klyne"/>
            <author fullname="C. Newman" initials="C." surname="Newman"/>
            <date month="July" year="2002"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a date and time format for use in Internet protocols that is a profile of the ISO 8601 standard for representation of dates and times using the Gregorian calendar.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3339"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3339"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7493">
          <front>
            <title>The I-JSON Message Format</title>
            <author fullname="T. Bray" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Bray"/>
            <date month="March" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>I-JSON (short for "Internet JSON") is a restricted profile of JSON designed to maximize interoperability and increase confidence that software can process it successfully with predictable results.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7493"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7493"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8785">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
            <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results.</t>
              <t>This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7638">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a JSON Web Key (JWK). It defines which fields in a JWK are used in the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form for those fields, and how to convert the resulting Unicode string into a byte sequence to be hashed. The resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting the key represented by the JWK that is the subject of the thumbprint.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7638"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7638"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8037">
          <front>
            <title>CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)</title>
            <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
            <date month="January" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines how to use the Diffie-Hellman algorithms "X25519" and "X448" as well as the signature algorithms "Ed25519" and "Ed448" from the IRTF CFRG elliptic curves work in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8037"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8037"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IN-TOTO" target="https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/blob/main/spec/README.md">
          <front>
            <title>in-toto Attestation Framework Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>in-toto</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DSSE" target="https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse">
          <front>
            <title>Dead Simple Signing Envelope</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Secure Systems Lab</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CAIP-10" target="https://github.com/ChainAgnostic/CAIPs/blob/main/CAIPs/caip-10.md">
          <front>
            <title>CAIP-10: Account ID Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Chain Agnostic Standards Alliance</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2020"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CAIP-19" target="https://github.com/ChainAgnostic/CAIPs/blob/main/CAIPs/caip-19.md">
          <front>
            <title>CAIP-19: Asset Type and Asset ID Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Chain Agnostic Standards Alliance</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2020"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="EVALUATION">
          <front>
            <title>Verifier-Side Evaluation Semantics for Delegated Authority Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Wes Jackson" initials="W." surname="Jackson">
         </author>
            <date day="28" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Delegation chain specifications describe the shape of conveyed
   authority.  They leave the verifier's half of the exchange
   underdetermined.  Two verifiers can check the same chain, both report
   success, and enforce different policy.  This document states what a
   verifier must do: the explicit inputs evaluation depends on, how
   those inputs behave when their sources are stale or unavailable, and
   four rules that keep evaluation fail-closed.  The rules are drawn
   from the Grant &amp; Autonomy Lifecycle (GAL) and Provenance &amp; Trust
   Context (PTC) specifications and from a public reference
   implementation.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-jackson-wimse-evaluation-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATION-CHAIN">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Rafael Asor" initials="R." surname="Asor">
              <organization>Attenu</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents increasingly delegate tasks to other agents.  Each
   delegation should convey only a subset of the delegating party's
   authority, that subset should be bounded in scope, magnitude, and
   time, and any enforcement point should be able to verify -- offline,
   with no call to an authorization server -- that a token presented at
   hop N carries authority no greater than the token at hop N-1, back to
   a trusted root, and that every hop acts under the same accountable
   principal.  OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) models two-party
   delegation and records prior actors in a nested "act" claim, but that
   claim is informational only and cannot enforce attenuation across a
   chain of depth two or more.  This document defines the Agent
   Delegation Chain: a profile of OAuth 2.0 JWT access tokens (RFC 9068)
   that carries authority as Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396),
   binds the chain to one principal and names the agent acting at each
   hop, links each delegation to its parent by a cryptographic byte-
   commitment, and specifies a deterministic offline verification
   algorithm that enforces monotonic attenuation, bounded depth,
   monotonic expiry, and principal invariance.  It reuses existing JOSE,
   proof-of-possession (RFC 9449), and status-list machinery (the OAuth
   Status List draft) and introduces no new cryptography.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EVALUATION-STATE">
          <front>
            <title>Preserving Evaluation State in Agent Protocol Decisions</title>
            <author fullname="Girish Konda" initials="G." surname="Konda">
         </author>
            <date day="19" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Agent protocols often require a participant to establish a decision-
   time input before it acts: issuer standing, key availability,
   delegated authority, policy profile availability, consumption state,
   revocation status, or the outcome of a downstream operation.  A
   participant that establishes an input and receives a negative answer
   has learned a different fact from a participant that cannot establish
   the input at all.  Collapsing those facts into one denial or failure
   value changes retry behavior, alert routing, audit interpretation,
   incident ownership, and post-incident reconstruction.

   This document specifies requirements for preserving evaluation state
   across agent protocol boundaries: the value of an input, whether that
   value was established at decision time, the freshness of the source
   used to establish it, and whether the resulting policy decision was
   actually evaluated.  The requirements are stated independently of
   encoding, so that policy, authorization, revocation, routing, and
   audit documents can satisfy them in their own formats.  Test cases
   for the requirements are included, with a machine-readable form
   published separately.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-konda-agentproto-evaluation-state-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OVERSIGHT-ACTS">
          <front>
            <title>Terminology for Human Oversight Acts in Automated and Agentic Systems</title>
            <author fullname="Andreas Ehstand" initials="A." surname="Ehstand">
              <organization>Independent Researcher</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="26" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Records produced by automated and agentic systems often represent
   human oversight as a single, undifferentiated event, such as an
   approval flag or a confirmation.  Such a record does not say whether
   the person was shown an output, determined whether a named property
   of it holds, chose a course of action, or permitted an action, and
   consumers of the record may treat a confirmation click as if it were
   a check.

   This document defines terms for four kinds of human oversight act
   (observation, check, decision, and release) and for related concepts:
   the oversight act and the overseer, the named property, standing
   authority, the oversight record, the undifferentiated approval, the
   check step, error detectability, the fail-open check step, and the
   check test.  It states what a record of each kind of act is, and is
   not, evidence of, and relates the terms to existing vocabularies.
   The document defines terminology only.  It specifies no protocol,
   data format, procedure, or measurement method.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ehstand-oversight-acts-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PQ-AGENT-ID">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum Requirements for Software and AI Agent Identity</title>
            <author fullname="Venkata Karunakar Uppalapati" initials="V. K." surname="Uppalapati">
              <organization>Independent Researcher</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   A delegation record retained as evidence must remain verifiable long
   after the key that signed it is retired.  A signature of any
   algorithm establishes who signed, not when, so such a record needs
   anchoring in trusted time, renewed before the algorithms protecting
   it weaken.  That is long-settled practice for archived signatures.
   It is rarely required for agent delegation, and where it is, the
   anchor is not itself required to be post-quantum.  An anchor is only
   as good as the protection behind it, and an RFC 3161 timestamp is
   itself a signature: an adversary holding a cryptanalytically relevant
   quantum computer can mint one bearing any date it chooses.  Because
   such a machine may be built without announcement, anchoring must
   become post-quantum anchoring by a stated transition date, and be
   applied early, so that the only assumption left about when such a
   machine appeared is that none existed before a record was first
   anchored that way.  The earlier that date, the weaker the assumption,
   which makes choosing it a security decision and not only a scheduling
   one.

   This document states requirements that software and AI agent identity
   mechanisms should satisfy in order to remain sound across the
   transition, and identifies four that no such mechanism yet imposes on
   delegation credentials in general.  The algorithms binding each hop
   of a delegation chain to its trust anchor must be visible to a
   verifier and retained with any record kept as evidence; where a
   signing key is fetched from a key set over TLS, as OAuth deployments
   commonly do, that binding is rarely recorded and no mechanism for
   agent delegation requires it to be, so in practice it is absent.
   Trust anchors must migrate before the credentials issued under them.
   Every retained record must be anchored, that anchoring must become
   post-quantum anchoring from a stated transition date and be
   maintained by renewal, and credentials of any type kept as evidence
   must be signed post-quantum from that same date.  Delegation chains
   also propagate the weakest algorithm in the chain, and routinely
   cross organizational boundaries where no common trust anchor policy
   can be assumed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-uppalapati-wimse-pq-agent-identity-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3161">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Adams" initials="C." surname="Adams"/>
            <author fullname="P. Cain" initials="P." surname="Cain"/>
            <author fullname="D. Pinkas" initials="D." surname="Pinkas"/>
            <author fullname="R. Zuccherato" initials="R." surname="Zuccherato"/>
            <date month="August" year="2001"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the format of a request sent to a Time Stamping Authority (TSA) and of the response that is returned. It also establishes several security-relevant requirements for TSA operation, with regards to processing requests to generate responses. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3161"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3161"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4998">
          <front>
            <title>Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)</title>
            <author fullname="T. Gondrom" initials="T." surname="Gondrom"/>
            <author fullname="R. Brandner" initials="R." surname="Brandner"/>
            <author fullname="U. Pordesch" initials="U." surname="Pordesch"/>
            <date month="August" year="2007"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many scenarios, users must be able prove the existence and integrity of data, including digitally signed data, in a common and reproducible way over a long and possibly undetermined period of time. This document specifies the syntax and processing of an Evidence Record, a structure designed to support long-term non-repudiation of existence of data. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4998"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4998"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6962">
          <front>
            <title>Certificate Transparency</title>
            <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
            <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
            <author fullname="E. Kasper" initials="E." surname="Kasper"/>
            <date month="June" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.</t>
              <t>Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6962"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6962"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
              <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7523">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines the use of a JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer Token as a means for requesting an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for client authentication.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7523"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7523"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7591">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="M. Machulak" initials="M." surname="Machulak"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <date month="July" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines mechanisms for dynamically registering OAuth 2.0 clients with authorization servers. Registration requests send a set of desired client metadata values to the authorization server. The resulting registration responses return a client identifier to use at the authorization server and the client metadata values registered for the client. The client can then use this registration information to communicate with the authorization server using the OAuth 2.0 protocol. This specification also defines a set of common client metadata fields and values for clients to use during registration.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7591"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7591"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9068">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="V. Bertocci" initials="V." surname="Bertocci"/>
            <date month="October" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format. Authorization servers and resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to issue and consume access tokens in an interoperable manner.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9068"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9068"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9162">
          <front>
            <title>Certificate Transparency Version 2.0</title>
            <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
            <author fullname="E. Messeri" initials="E." surname="Messeri"/>
            <author fullname="R. Stradling" initials="R." surname="Stradling"/>
            <date month="December" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts.</t>
              <t>Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9162"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9162"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OIDC-CORE" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2</title>
            <author>
              <organization>OpenID Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December" day="15"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AUDIT-BOFREQ" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bofreq-kuhlewind-audit-agent-use-of-delegation-and-interaction-traceability/">
          <front>
            <title>AUDIT - Agent Use of Delegation and Interaction Traceability</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Kuehlewind" fullname="Mirja Kuehlewind">
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="08"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AUDIT-CHARTER" target="https://github.com/mirjak/audit-bof-preparation/blob/main/audit-charter.md">
          <front>
            <title>Agent Use of Delegation and Interaction Traceability (AUDIT) Working Group Charter (proposed)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>AUDIT BoF proponents</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="VECTORS" target="https://github.com/probityai/agent-evidence-vectors/tree/main/corpora/vectors-agent-audit-record">
          <front>
            <title>Agent evidence conformance vectors</title>
            <author>
              <organization>agent-evidence-vectors contributors</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="VOCABULARY" target="https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/">
          <front>
            <title>Agent evidence vocabulary, release 0.8.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>agent-evidence-vocabulary contributors</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="26"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>tag agent-evidence-vocabulary-v0.8.0, commit fe01f9108b577cbbd409f7b13635f94e91046ed4</refcontent>
        </reference>
      </references>

<section anchor="rationale">
      <name>Design rationale</name>
      <t>Two requirements of this document are not derivable from Section 11 of <xref target="AIMS"/> on its own: the canonicalization contract, and carrying the observed effect beside the reported decision. Neither is restated normatively here.</t>
      <section anchor="the-canonicalization-contract">
        <name>The canonicalization contract</name>
        <t>The word "tamper-evident" appears once in <xref target="AIMS"/> and is not defined there. Read narrowly it means a record whose alteration is detectable, which a signature provides. Two gaps remain.</t>
        <t>A signature over a serialization is only as good as the agreement on which bytes were signed, and that agreement is a property of a written contract between two implementations; neither one's code establishes it. Two implementations can agree with each other on a canonical form and both differ from <xref target="RFC8785"/>, and no amount of signing or hash-chaining detects that.</t>
        <t>Each verifies its own records and rejects the other's, or worse, accepts a record whose meaning it has silently changed. A canonicalization contract is therefore part of the tamper-evidence requirement; it is not an implementation detail, and <xref target="canonical"/> makes it normative.</t>
        <t>A signature also says nothing about the producer. The party that holds the signing key can alter a record and sign it again, and every signature check still passes.</t>
        <t>Detecting that requires fields whose values are recomputable from other fields in the same record, so that an internally inconsistent record is refusable regardless of who signed it. A hash chain catches an alteration by a party with no signing key; only a recompute catches the key holder, and <xref target="tamper"/> specifies three of them. A recompute catches the key holder only when the alteration leaves the record inconsistent with itself. A coherent replacement, signed again, passes every recompute, and <xref target="tamper"/> says what finds it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-decision-and-the-observed-effect">
        <name>The decision and the observed effect</name>
        <t>The fourth of the seven minimum fields pairs "action requested and authorization decision". A record carrying only the decision is a self-report: it states what an enforcement point concluded, and a deployment that mis-enforces its own conclusion produces a clean audit trail of the decision it failed to apply. Section 11 asks for enough to "reconstruct agent behavior and authorization context after execution", and behaviour is not reconstructable from a decision.</t>
        <t>This document therefore requires both sides in one record: the decision as reported by the enforcement point, and the effect as observed. It also requires an <tt>agreement</tt> between them, which a verifier derives from the two values by the table in <xref target="decision-effect"/>; it is not a claim the record makes. A decision reported as denied beside an effect observed as having occurred is then a well-formed disagreement in signed bytes, which a verifier accepts and a consumer can find (<xref target="well-formed-disagreement"/>). In a log that carries the decision alone it is undetectable.</t>
        <t>The same construction applies to the sixth field. Section 8 of <xref target="AIMS"/> defines posture assessment as an evaluation performed at credential provisioning, while the sixth field asks for the posture "influencing the decision".</t>
        <t>A conformant record may therefore carry a posture that was accurate at issuance and inaccurate at decision time, with nothing in the record to say which. Carrying <tt>posture</tt> as the decision point read it, beside the posture as it was observed and its <tt>assessedAt</tt>, makes that difference visible without constraining either value.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="why-the-tier-carries-five-clauses">
        <name>Why the tier carries five clauses</name>
        <t>Each clause of the tier recompute closes one route by which a record could claim an observer's vantage while carrying nothing that distinguishes it from a self-report.</t>
        <t><tt>vantage</tt> of <tt>below-observed</tt> is the claim itself, and the four clauses under it make the claim cost something. The prior commitment binds the before-state before the interval opens, so a producer cannot decide after the fact what it saw. A non-empty <tt>pathScope</tt> means the record names the ground it covers. A complete coverage claim, which no listed gap inside that ground may contradict, means the record does not quietly exclude the interesting part. A gap outside that ground does not count against it, because the record claims nothing there. And a digest-bound resource means the arguments of the call are pinned.</t>
        <t>Dropping any one of them admits a record that carries the authority of the rest while resting on nothing. That is why the corpus in <xref target="vectors"/> carries one reject member per clause.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="vectors">
      <name>Conformance vectors</name>
      <t>The table below is the conformance corpus for this format. Each row gives a member identifier, the accept member it derives from, its input, and the verdict a conforming verifier reaches. A reject differs from the accept member in its <tt>from</tt> column by one mutation, so refusing every input scores nothing on this corpus.</t>
      <t>An accept member has no parent and its <tt>from</tt> column reads <tt>root</tt>. An indeterminate member has more than one conforming verdict and its row gives each. A member whose input is a retained record (<tt>R1</tt> to <tt>R16</tt>) is an envelope with its retention entry, and its row gives the envelope's verdict and the result of the dating check separately.</t>
      <t>The <tt>first in</tt> column names the release of the agent-evidence-vectors corpus that first published a member under that identifier. Because <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt> is required here, every member published under draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02 is malformed under this revision (vector <tt>EV13</tt>), and release v0.26.0 regenerated the whole family under draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-00. Each member kept its identifier and its row, with the entries it needs in <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt>; vector <tt>A10</tt> carries <tt>standing-source</tt> with a <tt>lastResult</tt> of <tt>none</tt>, and vector <tt>N1</tt> changes verdict as <xref target="correlation"/> states. The family also carries eight members with no row here, each testing a rule of <xref target="evaluation"/>: <tt>FR13b</tt>, <tt>FR16</tt>, <tt>FR17a</tt> to <tt>FR17c</tt>, <tt>FR18</tt> and <tt>EV14</tt>, and <tt>PS1b</tt>, which has two conforming verdicts as <xref target="evaluation"/> states. Rows <tt>X1</tt> to <tt>X18</tt> are each an existing member with one field changed, so that the corpus reaches a refusal of the reference reader that no earlier member reached, and each row names the section whose rule it tests, so that a verifier written from this text reaches the same verdict. Eighteen paths are covered; the reference reader has other refusals that no member reaches yet.</t>
      <t>A row that tests a check across records (<tt>CS7</tt>, <tt>CS8</tt>, <tt>CS17</tt> to <tt>CS22</tt>, <tt>CS25</tt> to <tt>CS33</tt>, <tt>CS38</tt> to <tt>CS40</tt>, <tt>CS48</tt>, <tt>CS49</tt>, <tt>CS53</tt> and <tt>CS54</tt>, <tt>SQ4</tt> and <tt>SQ5</tt>, <tt>X17</tt> and <tt>X18</tt>) is a set of records as <xref target="sets"/> defines it, and its row gives the verdict of each record and of the set. The rows <tt>CS18</tt> to <tt>CS54</tt>, <tt>PS3</tt> to <tt>PS5</tt>, <tt>PR1</tt> to <tt>PR11</tt> and <tt>DS1</tt> to <tt>DS10</tt> are derived from the corpus manifest, each from the member's row, parent and expected verdict, and their <tt>first in</tt> column from the earliest release whose manifest carries the identifier.</t>
      <t>Every row names the rule it tests. Three rules this document adds have no member in the table: the binding on the digest map in <xref target="subject"/>, the <xref target="RFC3339"/> requirement in <xref target="timestamps"/>, and the single hash algorithm of <xref target="hashalg"/>. An implementation <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be run against every member of the corpus before it is described as conforming to this document, and the three rules above are checked by reading them.</t>
      <t>The corpus travels with the predicate schema: <xref target="VECTORS"/> publishes every member of the table in that repository's manifest layout, and <xref target="conformance"/> names the release that a claim of conformance to this revision is made against.</t>
      <table>
        <name>The conformance corpus, one member for every normative rule this document adds</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">id</th>
            <th align="left">from</th>
            <th align="left">what it is</th>
            <th align="left">expected</th>
            <th align="left">first in</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">every member present, <tt>permit</tt> beside <tt>occurred</tt>, all five tier clauses met</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>deny</tt> beside <tt>none</tt>, equal roots, empty write set</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with <tt>deny</tt> beside <tt>occurred</tt> and <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>disagree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> plus a remediation event with <tt>enforcement</tt> of <tt>not-enforced</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with <tt>vantage</tt> of <tt>self</tt>, no prior commitment, <tt>tier</tt> of <tt>voluntary</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with <tt>binding</tt> of <tt>not-bindable</tt>, <tt>argumentsDigest</tt> absent from the record and from the request-digest preimage, <tt>tier</tt> of <tt>voluntary</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt> plus one in-scope write inside the interval attributed to a different request, roots and chain moved to match</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A8</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt> plus one in-scope <tt>unattributed</tt> write inside the interval, <tt>effect.observed</tt> of <tt>unknown</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with <tt>permit</tt> beside an empty write set, equal roots, <tt>effect.observed</tt> of <tt>none</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>not-exercised</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt> with <tt>evaluation.status</tt> of <tt>not-evaluated</tt> and <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>standing-source</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> plus <tt>oversight</tt> with <tt>act</tt> of <tt>check</tt> and a <tt>recordDigest</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A12</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt> with <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>key-source</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt> with <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>consumption-state</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A14</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt> with <tt>unavailableInput</tt> naming all three inputs of -02, each once, in neither the table order nor sorted order</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A15</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A11</tt> with <tt>oversight.act</tt> of <tt>observation</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A16</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A11</tt> with <tt>oversight.act</tt> of <tt>decision</tt> and no <tt>recordDigest</tt>, which is optional</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A17</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A11</tt> with <tt>oversight.act</tt> of <tt>release</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A18</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with <tt>evaluation.status</tt> of <tt>not-evaluated</tt>, <tt>policy-source</tt> never established, <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>policy-source</tt> and the allow-all fallback's <tt>decision.policyDigest</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A19</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A3</tt> with <tt>evaluation.status</tt> of <tt>not-evaluated</tt>, <tt>key-source</tt> and <tt>consumption-state</tt> stale, and <tt>unavailableInput</tt> naming both</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>disagree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A20</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt> with <tt>evaluation.status</tt> of <tt>not-evaluated</tt>, a profile the request names not held, <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>policy-source</tt> and the deny-all fallback's <tt>decision.policyDigest</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A21</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with <tt>agent.authentication</tt> of <tt>api-key</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with the whole <tt>agent</tt> member removed</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>subjectKind</tt> of <tt>none</tt> beside a named subject</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>digest-bound</tt> with <tt>argumentsDigest</tt> removed</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F3b</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not-bindable</tt> carrying <tt>argumentsDigest</tt> of <tt>null</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F3c</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not-bindable</tt> carrying <tt>argumentsDigest</tt> of the empty string</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>action</tt> changed, <tt>requestDigest</tt> left at its original value</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>beacon-anchored</tt> with <tt>externalAnchor</tt> removed</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">two unequal postures declared as <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>F7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>enforcedAt</tt> one second before <tt>signalReceivedAt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>T1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>effect.observed</tt> edited to <tt>none</tt>, writes intact, signed again with the real key</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>T2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">serialized in declaration order, not <xref target="RFC8785"/> order</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>T3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a member name repeated at depth three</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>T4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">nesting 129 levels deep</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>T5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an integer of magnitude exactly 2^53</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>D1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>disagree</tt> with both sides agreeing</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>D2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>one-sided</tt> with both values present</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>D3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>disagree</tt> beside <tt>permit</tt> and <tt>none</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>S1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">second subject entry removed, interval left present</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>S2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">second subject entry's digest set to the before-state root</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>I1r</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">interval removed, second subject entry left present</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>TI1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authoritative</tt> declared with <tt>vantage</tt> of <tt>self</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>TI2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authoritative</tt> declared with no prior commitment</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>TI3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authoritative</tt> declared with an empty <tt>pathScope</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>TI4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authoritative</tt> declared with <tt>scopeComplete</tt> of false and a coverage gap inside <tt>pathScope</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>TI5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authoritative</tt> declared on <tt>A6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>TI6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authoritative</tt> declared with <tt>scopeComplete</tt> of false and gaps naming only paths outside <tt>pathScope</tt>, which draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-00 accepted</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>C1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">commitment <tt>keyid</tt> added to <tt>agent.signers</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>C2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>committedAt</tt> one second after <tt>openedAt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>C3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>witnessNonce</tt> changed, <tt>commitmentDigest</tt> left at its original value</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>E1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>observed</tt> of <tt>none</tt> with a non-empty write set</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>E2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a second write whose pre-state is not the first write's post-state</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>E3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>empty-tree</tt> under sha256 carrying the sha1 constant</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>E4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the only write's pre-state is not the before-state root, its post-state is the after-state root</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>E5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the only write starts from the before-state root and its post-state is not the after-state root</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>E6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an empty write set beside an after-state root unequal to the before-state root, second subject moved to match</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>V1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>enforcement</tt> of <tt>quarantined</tt>, outside the closed set</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>V2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a <tt>pathScope</tt> member carrying a glob metacharacter</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>V3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a write outside <tt>pathScope</tt> carrying <tt>inScope</tt> of <tt>true</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>V4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>scopeComplete</tt> of true beside a gap inside <tt>pathScope</tt>, all other tier clauses met</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>V5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>scopeComplete</tt> of true beside a gap inside <tt>pathScope</tt>, <tt>tier</tt> of <tt>voluntary</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FE1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">six of the seven <tt>fieldEvidence</tt> keys present</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FE2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>substrate-covered</tt> declared beside <tt>vantage</tt> of <tt>self</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> written by the second of two hops: each input fresh at <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt>, one carried from the first hop with the source's <tt>lastResult</tt> unchanged</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt> with one input's age at <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> exactly equal to its <tt>maxAge</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, the input fresh</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt> written by the second of two hops, the forwarded <tt>standing-source</tt> one second older than its <tt>maxAge</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt> written by the second of two hops, which received <tt>standing-source</tt> as never established, <tt>lastResult</tt> of <tt>none</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an entry with <tt>lastResult</tt> removed</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an entry with <tt>maxAge</tt> removed</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>unavailableInput</tt> naming <tt>key-source</tt>, whose entry is fresh, in place of <tt>standing-source</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR8</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluated</tt> beside an entry one second older than its <tt>maxAge</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an entry whose <tt>lastResult</tt> is later than <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> by more than the skew tolerance</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">one input named in two entries</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an entry carrying a fourth member this document does not define</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR12</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an entry whose <tt>input</tt> is <tt>network</tt>, outside the closed set</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an entry with a negative <tt>maxAge</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR14</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt> judging two delegation paths, two values of <tt>standing-source</tt> each fresh at <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt> (ages 30 and 3600 seconds under a <tt>maxAge</tt> of 60 and of 7200), the entry carrying the first value's pair</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR15</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>FR14</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the entry carrying the second value's <tt>lastResult</tt> beside the first value's <tt>maxAge</tt>, under <tt>evaluated</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not-evaluated</tt> with <tt>unavailableInput</tt> removed</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluated</tt> carrying <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>standing-source</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the <tt>evaluation</tt> member removed, which is the shape of a revision 01 record</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>network</tt>, outside the closed set</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not-evaluated</tt> with <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of the empty array</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not-evaluated</tt> with <tt>standing-source</tt> named twice</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not-evaluated</tt> with <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of the string <tt>standing-source</tt>, not an array</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV8</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluated</tt> carrying <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>null</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluated</tt> carrying <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of the empty array</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluated</tt> carrying <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of the empty string</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluation.status</tt> of <tt>partially-evaluated</tt>, outside the closed set</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV12</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluation</tt> carrying a free-text <tt>reason</tt> member this document does not define</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>EV13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt> removed, the shape of a record under draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>OV1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>oversight.act</tt> of <tt>approval</tt>, outside the closed set</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>OV2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>oversight</tt> carrying a member this document does not define</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>OV3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>oversight</tt> with <tt>act</tt> removed and <tt>recordDigest</tt> kept</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>SQ1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with <tt>sequence</tt> carrying a <tt>boundary</tt> and a <tt>seq</tt> of 1</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>SQ2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>SQ1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>sequence</tt> carrying a <tt>count</tt> member this document does not define</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>SQ3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>SQ1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>sequence</tt> with a <tt>seq</tt> of 0</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>SQ4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">records of one series with <tt>seq</tt> 1 and 3 held, <tt>seq</tt> 2 not held</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set names <tt>seq</tt> 2 as issued and not received</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>SQ5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">two records of one series with the same <tt>seq</tt> and different record identities (SHA-256 of the decoded payload bytes)</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set fails the check</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>N1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">an anchor token digest carried in <tt>correlation.externalAnchor</tt>, the proof not held</td>
            <td align="left">valid, not dated by the anchor</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1, verdict changed</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>N2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">enforcement forty days after the signal, ordering intact</td>
            <td align="left">indeterminate</td>
            <td align="left">v0.18.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> retained by its producer: <tt>received</tt> of <tt>false</tt> and one anchor of origin <tt>retainer</tt> inside <tt>anchorWithin</tt> of <tt>issuedAt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">record valid, dated at the anchor's time</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> received from another party, <tt>receivedAt</tt> between <tt>issuedAt</tt> and the retaining party's anchor obtained on delivery</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, receipt time asserted and consistent</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>receivedAt</tt> later than the retaining party's earliest anchor by more than the skew tolerance</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>received</tt> of <tt>true</tt> and no anchor of origin <tt>retainer</tt></td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R2</tt> with the retaining party's anchor obtained before delivery and <tt>receivedAt</tt> inside the bracket</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, receipt time asserted and consistent, never established</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>receivedAt</tt> earlier than <tt>issuedAt</tt> by more than the skew tolerance</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the retaining party's first anchor later than <tt>issuedAt</tt> by more than <tt>anchorWithin</tt> plus the skew tolerance</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R8</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the only anchor's proof is over a different envelope digest</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, not dated</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>receivedAt</tt> carried beside <tt>received</tt> of <tt>false</tt></td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.26.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the retaining party's anchor is <tt>opentimestamps</tt>, its block header time 600 seconds earlier than <tt>receivedAt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">record valid, receipt time asserted and consistent</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the block header time earlier than <tt>receivedAt</tt> by more than 7200 seconds</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R12</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>anchors</tt> holding a pending OpenTimestamps proof followed by its upgraded, complete proof</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, dated at the upgraded proof's block time, the pending element dating nothing</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt> for a record carrying <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt>, with a <tt>delegation-root</tt> element whose digest equals it</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, delegation root established, its algorithm derived from the element</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R14</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the <tt>delegation-root</tt> element omitted</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, delegation root not established, never reported as a pass</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R15</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the <tt>delegation-root</tt> element's digest unequal to <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt></td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R16</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the only anchor an <tt>opentimestamps</tt> proof whose path runs from <tt>envelopeDigest</tt> through a Merkle tree the retaining party built and a Bitcoin transaction carrying its root to the block header</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, dated at the block time</td>
            <td align="left">v0.28.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R17</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the same entry with an outage of the retaining party's anchoring source stated outside the record, since no member carries one</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed, as for <tt>R7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">next</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>IS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>issuedAt</tt> one second earlier than <tt>effect.interval.sealedAt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>IS2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>issuedAt</tt> one day earlier than <tt>effect.interval.sealedAt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">under the <tt>v2</tt> predicate type URI, <tt>not-evaluated</tt> with <tt>unavailableInput</tt> of <tt>principal-standing-source</tt> and the matching entry</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>agreement</tt> of <tt>agree</tt></td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the same record under the <tt>v1</tt> predicate type URI</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">principal standing from a published commitment and none held: <tt>principal-standing-source</tt> with <tt>lastResult</tt> of <tt>none</tt>, <tt>not-evaluated</tt> naming it (a commitment held past its <tt>maxAge</tt> is <tt>PS1</tt>, one exactly at it <tt>PS1b</tt>)</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">principal standing from a published commitment that is current and whose proof shows the standing withdrawn: <tt>evaluated</tt>, every entry fresh, decision <tt>deny</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PS4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the commitment current and the proof missing or not verifying against it: the commitment does not establish standing, and the record is <tt>evaluated</tt> with <tt>deny</tt> as <tt>PS4</tt>, never <tt>not-evaluated</tt>, its entry the commitment's as-of time</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> under a cumulative limit of 50000: a <tt>consumption-state</tt> entry with <tt>consumption</tt>, <tt>consumed</tt> 30000, nothing held, <tt>requested</tt> 12000</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt> with <tt>requested</tt> 25000, so 55000 of 50000, still a <tt>permit</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> false</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>reserved</tt> 12000 with nothing in <tt>held</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">the retry of the first call: its <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> and <tt>decision.requestDigest</tt> equal a <tt>held</tt> entry of 12000, within the limit only because it is not counted twice</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a negative <tt>requested</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>consumption</tt> also on the entry whose <tt>input</tt> is <tt>policy-source</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">two records under one <tt>limitDigest</tt>: the retry of <tt>CS4</tt>, which reads revision 42 and holds the first call, then a new operation that reads revision 41, omits the held call and is permitted</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set fails the check across records</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS8</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">two records under one <tt>limitDigest</tt>: the first, reading revision 42, holds an earlier operation; the second, reading revision 43, no longer holds it, and no record of that operation shows <tt>none</tt> or <tt>occurred</tt></td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set fails the check across records</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>consumption</tt> with <tt>stateRevision</tt> removed</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the <tt>held</tt> entry under the request's <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> carries another request's <tt>requestDigest</tt>: one operation key reused for a different request</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS4</tt> under another <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> with <tt>consumed</tt> 20000: the same intended payment made again, a new operation counted (44000 of 50000)</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS12</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS4</tt> under another <tt>decision.operationKey</tt>: counted, 54000 of 50000; read as a retry of the held call it would be 42000</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> false</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">two <tt>held</tt> entries under one operation key, 12000 each, summing to <tt>reserved</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS14</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> removed</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS15</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt> with <tt>limitDigest</tt> the digest of a limit document the authority names, not <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS16</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt> with <tt>limitDigest</tt> equal to <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt>, the authority document stating the limit itself</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS17</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS7</tt> where the second operation is the same intended payment: an identical <tt>requestDigest</tt> under another operation key</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set fails the check across records</td>
            <td align="left">v0.27.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS18</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">a call is held under the first limit document; the limit is raised, and the retry of the held call is read under the new document, which names the first in <tt>supersedes</tt> and carries the held entry unchanged</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.30.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS19</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS18</tt> where the new document cuts the limit below what is consumed and held: the retry is not counted twice and is beyond the cut limit, so its <tt>withinLimit</tt> is false</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.30.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS20</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">a call is held under the first limit document; the limit is cut, and the next record, under the new document that names the first in <tt>supersedes</tt>, is a new operation that omits the held call, with no record of that call showing <tt>none</tt> or <tt>occurred</tt></td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.30.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS21</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS20</tt> where the record under the new document read a <tt>stateRevision</tt> older than the record holding the permit and omits it</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.30.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS22</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS20</tt> where the set also holds the record of the held call's own operation, denied under the cut limit with <tt>effect.observed</tt> of <tt>none</tt>: the release is shown</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.30.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS23</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt> with <tt>supersedes</tt> the record's own <tt>limitDigest</tt>: a limit document cannot replace itself</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.30.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS24</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt> with <tt>supersedes</tt> a string that is not a digest</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.30.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS25</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS20</tt> without the link: a call is held under the first limit document, and the next record is a new operation under a different limit document that names no <tt>supersedes</tt> and omits the held call</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.30.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS26</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">a call refused before its tool ran under the first limit document (25000 on 30000 consumed of 50000) leaves no claim; its retry, the same operation key and request, is read under a raised limit document that names the first in <tt>supersedes</tt>, holds nothing and is counted as new: within the raise, permitted</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS27</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS26</tt> under a cut: a call of 12000 refused before its tool ran leaves no claim, and its retry is checked as new under the cut limit of 40000, where it is over the limit and refused</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS28</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">a call is held; the record of its retry shows the tool sent nothing (<tt>effect.observed</tt> of <tt>none</tt>), which ends the claim; under a raised limit document the same operation key is then a new operation, holds nothing and is counted</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS29</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">a call is held and the record of its retry shows an unknown outcome; the limit is raised, and a new operation under the new document carries the held entry unchanged: the claim survives the replacement</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS30</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS29</tt> where the new operation under the new document omits the held entry: an unknown outcome does not release a claim, so the release is unexplained</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS31</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">a call is held under the first limit document; a permit for the same operation key, under a raised document that names the first in <tt>supersedes</tt>, holds nothing and counts the request again as a new operation</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS32</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS31</tt> where the new limit document names no <tt>supersedes</tt>: the claim is keyed by the principal, the agent key and the operation key, never by the limit document, so leaving out the link does not make the retry new</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS33</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS32</tt> where the second permit is under another principal and another agent key: the same operation key in another scope is another claim</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS34</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt> counted in USDC on Base: no <tt>unit</tt>, <tt>asset</tt> carrying its CAIP-19 id and <tt>decimals</tt> 6, amounts in its smallest subunit</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS35</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS34</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS34</tt> with <tt>asset.id</tt> of <tt>USDC</tt>, a ticker that names no chain or contract</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS36</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS34</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS34</tt> with <tt>asset.decimals</tt> of 256, beyond any token's decimals</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS37</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS34</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS34</tt> that also carries <tt>unit</tt> of <tt>USD</tt>: the amounts would be read in two subunits</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS38</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">two operations under one limit document, the first counted in USDC on Base, the second in USDC on Solana: two assets in one ledger</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS39</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS38</tt> where both operations name USDC on Base and the second declares <tt>decimals</tt> 18: one amount read at two scales</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS40</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS38</tt> where the second operation is under another limit document that names no <tt>supersedes</tt>: two ledgers, each counting one asset</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS41</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS4</tt> paid in USDC on Base Sepolia: the retry of a held call whose payment is signed again to the same payee P; the held entry and the request carry P's payee digest, so it is the held operation and is not counted twice</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS42</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS41</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS41</tt> where the payment is signed again inside the same call to payee Q: the operation key, request digest and amount are the held entry's, the payee is not, so it is not a retry of the held permit</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS1</tt> paid in USDC on Base Sepolia to payee P under an x402 <tt>upto</tt> permit of 12 USDC: the call settled 7 USDC, and <tt>settled</tt> carries the amount, asset and payee read from the chain through the transaction beside the approved terms</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS44</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt> settled at 13 USDC, above the 12 USDC the permit authorized</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS45</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt> settled in USDC on Base, not the asset approved</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS46</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt> settled to payee Q, not the payee P approved</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS47</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt> with <tt>settled.source</tt> of <tt>signed-payload</tt>: the signed payment shows what was approved, and only the chain shows what moved</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS48</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS43</tt>, then a new operation under the same limit document that reads a later revision and counts the call at the 7 USDC it settled (consumed 37 USDC), not the 12 USDC it held</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS49</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS48</tt> where the later record counts 35 USDC consumed, less than the 30 USDC already committed plus the 7 USDC that settled</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS50</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS41</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS41</tt> where the facilitator settled the <tt>upto</tt> permit at 0: <tt>settled</tt> carries amount 0, <tt>source</tt> of <tt>chain</tt> and an empty transaction, since a zero settlement sends none, and the held entry keeps the operation key, its 12 USDC and the permit's deadline</td>
            <td align="left">valid, <tt>withinLimit</tt> true</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS51</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS50</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS50</tt> where <tt>settled</tt> carries 7 USDC and still an empty transaction: a settlement that moved funds names the transaction that moved them</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS52</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS50</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS50</tt> where the held entry carries no deadline: nothing says how long the permit can still settle</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS53</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS50</tt>, then a new operation under the same limit document that reads a later revision, is dated 24 minutes before the permit's deadline and no longer holds the call, which the first record shows as <tt>none</tt></td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS54</tt></td>
            <td align="left">root</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS53</tt> where the later record is dated at the permit's deadline</td>
            <td align="left">each record valid, the set valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.37.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with a <tt>principal</tt>: an RFC 9068 access token from an https issuer for the user the delegation names, the agent's credential digest equal to the token digest, the issuer key a P-256 JWK whose RFC 7638 thumbprint is recorded, and a <tt>tenant</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a client-credentials principal: <tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt> of <tt>system</tt>, the principal's subject the client itself, two audiences, <tt>client_secret_basic</tt>, no <tt>tenant</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt> established from an OpenID Connect ID token signed with the issuer's Ed25519 key, the client authenticated by <tt>tls_client_auth</tt></td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>keyThumbprint</tt> is the RFC 7638 thumbprint of the issuer's Ed25519 key while key is its P-256 key</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the assertion expired at 10:00:00, an hour before <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>tokenDigest</tt> is the digest of another token than the credential <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt> names: the key-hash binding is broken</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>principal</tt> without <tt>issuer</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR8</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the principal's subject is another user than the delegation's user subject</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>kid</tt> names a key of the snapshot other than the key carried</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the assertion was issued at 11:30:00, after <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>PR1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>principal</tt> carrying the raw token in a member this document does not define</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt> with a <tt>dataSubject</tt>: the call read customer C's data for the staff member the delegation names; the record carries C's keyed reference and the staff member's, <tt>relation</tt> of <tt>other</tt>, and a purpose on the server's declared list</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the person whose data was read is the user the agent acts for: <tt>relation</tt> of <tt>delegate</tt>, no separate delegate reference</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a system caller: <tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt> of <tt>system</tt>, so the data subject has no delegate to be told apart from, and the server's declared list is another</td>
            <td align="left">valid</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>dataSubject</tt> without <tt>reference</tt></td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>dataSubject</tt> carrying the raw customer identifier in a member this document does not define</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>reference</tt> the raw customer identifier instead of a keyed digest</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>relation</tt> of <tt>other</tt> while the data subject's reference is the delegate's: the two people merged</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS8</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>relation</tt> of <tt>delegate</tt> under a system caller, which has no user to be the data subject</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a purpose that is not on the list the server declared</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>DS1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>purposesDigest</tt> is the digest of another list than the one the record carries</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.36.3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a number with a fraction part in the Statement (<xref target="json-profile"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X2</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a payload that is not JSON (<xref target="verifying"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X3</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>issuedAt</tt> carrying no UTC offset (<xref target="timestamps"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>_type</tt> naming another Statement type (<xref target="statement-type"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X5</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>predicateType</tt> naming another predicate (<xref target="statement-type"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X6</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a <tt>held</tt> entry carrying a member that <xref target="consumption"/> does not define</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X7</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>CS4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>decision.operationKey</tt> the empty string (<xref target="consumption"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X8</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the first subject entry's digest another value (<xref target="subject"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X9</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>payloadType</tt> another media type (<xref target="tamper"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X10</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>predicate</tt> a string, correctly signed (<xref target="verifying"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X11</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>received</tt> a string and not a boolean (<xref target="retained"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X12</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>envelopeDigest</tt> the digest of another envelope (<xref target="retained"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a <tt>delegation-root</tt> element beside a record that carries no <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt> (<xref target="retained"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X14</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R13</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the <tt>delegation-root</tt> element's value not base64 (<xref target="retained"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">record valid, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X15</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">the retained record's payload not JSON (<xref target="verifying"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">record malformed, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X16</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>R1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a retained member with no retention entry (<xref target="retained"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">record malformed, entry malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X17</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>SQ4</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a set whose <tt>records</tt> member is named otherwise (<xref target="sets"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">set malformed, no record judged</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>X18</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>A1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">a set whose two records are each malformed, as <tt>IS1</tt> and <tt>IS2</tt> (<xref target="sets"/>)</td>
            <td align="left">set malformed, each record malformed</td>
            <td align="left">v0.31.0</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section anchor="audit-map">
      <name>Mapping to the AUDIT problem statement</name>
      <t>The table below takes each problem the AUDIT BoF request <xref target="AUDIT-BOFREQ"/> and the proposed charter <xref target="AUDIT-CHARTER"/> name, quoted or closely paraphrased from those texts, and gives the part of this document that addresses it. Where this document leaves a problem to other work, the row says so. The charter's first deliverable, an architecture, and its third and fourth, protocol extensions and deployment practice, are outside a record format; the rows below fall under its second deliverable, audit data models and semantics, unless a row names another.</t>
      <table>
        <name>AUDIT problems and the parts of this document that address them</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">AUDIT problem</th>
            <th align="left">where it is stated</th>
            <th align="left">this document</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">who initiated an action</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>agent.id</tt>, <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt>, <tt>delegation.subject</tt> and <tt>delegation.subjectKind</tt>, <xref target="members"/>, and the authenticated principal, <xref target="principal"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">under which authority it occurred</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt> and <tt>decision.policyDigest</tt>, with <tt>evaluation</tt> saying whether the authority was evaluated, <xref target="members"/> and <xref target="evaluation"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">how permissions evolved during execution</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request</td>
            <td align="left">one record per decision, joined by <tt>correlation.id</tt>; <tt>remediation</tt> for each revocation or downgrade with its enforcement and the effect after it, <xref target="correlation"/>. A record carries one delegation hop and no delegation chain</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">attributing actions to a user, an agent instance or a delegation context</td>
            <td align="left">charter, challenges</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>agent</tt> and <tt>delegation</tt>, with the request bound by digest to the action, resource and arguments, <xref target="members"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">visibility across long-running or distributed workflows</td>
            <td align="left">charter, challenges</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>correlation.id</tt> with <tt>correlation.scope</tt> of <tt>cross-party</tt>, and the subject convention that binds one identifier to the request, the interval and the record, <xref target="subject"/> and <xref target="correlation"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">delegation relationships, dynamic authorization context and identity transitions</td>
            <td align="left">charter, challenges</td>
            <td align="left">the authorization context of each decision, including the freshness of every input it relied on, <xref target="evaluation"/>; identity transitions are left to the identity work the charter relies on</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">interoperable means to exchange or verify audit information across domains</td>
            <td align="left">charter, challenges</td>
            <td align="left">the canonical form, <xref target="canonical"/>; the verification order, <xref target="verifying"/>; the open conformance corpus, <xref target="vectors"/> and <xref target="impl"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">verifiable by a party that trusts neither the agent nor its operator</td>
            <td align="left">charter</td>
            <td align="left">the recomputes, which refuse a record its own key holder altered inconsistently, <xref target="tamper"/>; the derived tier, <xref target="observation"/>; and what a record cannot prove, <xref target="security-considerations"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">user intent</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request, charter</td>
            <td align="left">not carried; a record can bind an intent record by digest as it binds the authority document, and keeps the user's statement apart from the decision</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">invoked or declined actions</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request, charter</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>decision.reported</tt> beside <tt>effect.observed</tt> and the derived <tt>agreement</tt>, so a declined action that took effect is visible, <xref target="members"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">exchanged data</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request, charter</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>resource.argumentsDigest</tt> binds the arguments by digest and carries none of them, <xref target="members"/> and <xref target="privacy-considerations"/>; <tt>dataSubject</tt> names whose data a call read, by keyed reference, and for which declared purpose, <xref target="data-subject"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">resulting outcomes</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request, charter</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>effect</tt>, its write chain and the before-state and after-state roots, <xref target="members"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">a common identifier linking user intent to resulting actions across boundaries</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request, charter</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>correlation.id</tt>, the first subject entry's name, <xref target="subject"/> and <xref target="timestamps"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">authorization as a time-evolving state</td>
            <td align="left">charter</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt>, <tt>posture.assessedAt</tt> and <tt>remediation</tt>, <xref target="evaluation"/> and <xref target="correlation"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">selective disclosure and privacy</td>
            <td align="left">charter</td>
            <td align="left">digests in place of the bound documents, and anchors over a digest alone, <xref target="privacy-considerations"/>; no mechanism for disclosing part of a record's own members</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">collecting, aggregating, verifying and transparency-logging records, possibly by an independent auditor</td>
            <td align="left">charter, scope and deliverable 2</td>
            <td align="left">what a retaining party keeps, the anchor kinds including a transparency log, and the dating check, <xref target="retained"/>; no protocol for collection or retrieval</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">a data model for records</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request, new work</td>
            <td align="left">this document</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">protocols to store and retrieve records</td>
            <td align="left">BoF request, new work</td>
            <td align="left">not defined; <xref target="retained"/> defines what is stored and leaves the protocol open</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <t>This document replaces draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record. Its target is the AUDIT BoF and the working group it proposes. The revisions listed below as -02, -01 and -00 are revisions of that document.</t>
      <t>Changes in draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-04:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="json-profile"/> states that a number written with a fraction part or an exponent makes a Statement malformed, whatever its value, and gives the reason in terms of <xref target="RFC8785"/>. The text of -03 stated the safe-integer bound and no rule on a fractional number, though the reference reader refused one. Vector <tt>X1</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="statement-type"/> is new. It states that <tt>_type</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <tt>https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1</tt> and that <tt>predicateType</tt> is compared with the URI the verifier was configured with. Under -03 the text said only that a record is an in-toto Statement. Vectors <tt>X4</tt> and <tt>X5</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="consumption"/> states that <tt>decision.operationKey</tt>, where present, is a non-empty string, and that each <tt>held</tt> entry's key is held to the same rule. Under -03 the text required the member and did not say that an empty string is refused. Vector <tt>X7</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="sets"/> is new. It defines the set of records that the checks across records of <xref target="consumption"/> and <xref target="sequence"/> take, with the conditions that make a set malformed, and says that a set holding a malformed record is malformed and is not checked further. Under -03 no section defined the set. Vectors <tt>X17</tt> and <tt>X18</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="verifying"/> lists the number rule with the other three parts of the JSON profile and places the type members at the start of the membership check.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="retained-not-live"/> is new. It states that a verifier checking a retained record never submits it, or anything it carries, to a live decision point or to a replay, nonce or consumption ledger, never reads the present state of one as an input, and that a decision point never takes a retained record as authority for a new action. Under -03 the text separated the retention entry from the verdict and did not say that a retained record is never replayed against present state.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="principal"/> is new. The optional <tt>principal</tt> member records the principal a decision point established from a signed token it validated, bound by digest to <tt>agent.credentialDigest</tt> and by thumbprint to the issuer's key, with the token's lifetime checked at <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt>. Vectors <tt>PR1</tt> to <tt>PR11</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="data-subject"/> is new. The optional <tt>dataSubject</tt> member records, by keyed reference, whose data a call read, kept apart from the delegated user, and the purpose of the call from the list the server declares. Vectors <tt>DS1</tt> to <tt>DS10</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="consumption"/> adds <tt>asset</tt>, for an amount counted in an asset no ISO 4217 code names, and <tt>supersedes</tt>, for a limit replaced while permits are held. The checks across records run over ledgers that <tt>supersedes</tt> links, a ledger counts one denomination, and a held permit is a claim keyed by the principal, the agent key and the operation key, never by the limit document. Vectors <tt>CS18</tt> to <tt>CS40</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="consumption"/> adds <tt>payee</tt> on the request and on each <tt>held</tt> entry, and <tt>settled</tt>, the terms a paid call settled on as read from the chain, beside the approved terms. A settled amount may be lower than the authorized maximum and never higher, <tt>consumed</tt> takes the settled amount, and a permit settled at 0 stays held until its deadline. Vectors <tt>CS41</tt> to <tt>CS54</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="consumption"/> states that a <tt>held</tt> entry carries exactly its members and no other. The text of -03 said "no other" of <tt>consumption</tt> only. Vector <tt>X6</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="evaluation"/> states how principal standing established from a published commitment is recorded, in three cases, and names vector <tt>PS1b</tt>, whose boundary differs from Section 3 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/>. Vectors <tt>PS3</tt> to <tt>PS5</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="conformance"/> defines conformance to this revision as reaching the manifest verdict on every member labelled with this revision or an earlier one, in the first release of <xref target="VECTORS"/> that lists this revision as published. Members labelled <tt>proposed</tt> are not part of the claim. Under -03 conformance was bound to release 0.28.0, whose members are a subset of those this revision states.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="vectors"/> adds rows <tt>X1</tt> to <tt>X18</tt>, each naming the section whose rule it tests, first published in release v0.31.0, and rows <tt>CS18</tt> to <tt>CS54</tt>, <tt>PS3</tt> to <tt>PS5</tt>, <tt>PR1</tt> to <tt>PR11</tt> and <tt>DS1</tt> to <tt>DS10</tt>, derived from the corpus manifest. <xref target="impl"/> names the package, the Action, the counts of release v0.37.1 and the split of the family into published and proposed members.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Changes in draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="consumption"/> says that the reading of <tt>CS7</tt> and <tt>CS17</tt> puts no condition on when the held permit was issued.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The empty-tree digest for <tt>sha256</tt> and the 300-second skew tolerance are printed where the text names them.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="anchor-rules"/> says that on the earlier side 7200 seconds is an allowance this document chooses and not a Bitcoin consensus bound, and keeps the ordering of two <tt>opentimestamps</tt> times by block height.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The section on receipt time and late anchoring says that an outage, anchoring that never happened in time and late anchoring read the same from the bytes, that <tt>anchorWithin</tt> binds only if the entry carrying it is anchored, and that a relying party needing the commitment requires a second anchor taken after the outage.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="evaluation"/> adds the input <tt>principal-standing-source</tt>, and <xref target="iana"/> publishes the extended set under a second predicate type URI that ends in <tt>v2</tt>, as the freeze requires. The <tt>v1</tt> URI and the records valid under it are unchanged.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="members"/> states that a record whose <tt>issuedAt</tt> is earlier than <tt>effect.interval.sealedAt</tt> is malformed.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Five rows are added to <xref target="vectors"/> and marked <tt>next</tt>, because the release that carries them is not published: <tt>R17</tt>, <tt>IS1</tt>, <tt>IS2</tt>, <tt>PS1</tt> and <tt>PS2</tt>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Changes in draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-02:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>This revision freezes the predicate type URI. <xref target="iana"/> and <xref target="conformance"/> state the freeze: from this revision on, a change to what a record must carry is published under a new URI.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="conformance"/>, <xref target="impl"/> and <xref target="vectors"/> name release v0.28.0 of <xref target="VECTORS"/>, which carries 141 members (59 accept, 81 reject, 1 indeterminate) and every row of <xref target="vectors"/>; no row is marked <tt>next</tt>. Release v0.27.0 first published <tt>CS1</tt> to <tt>CS17</tt>, and release v0.28.0 first published <tt>A21</tt>, <tt>SQ1</tt> to <tt>SQ5</tt> and <tt>R10</tt> to <tt>R16</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="consumption"/> identifies a retry by <tt>decision.operationKey</tt>, required on a record that carries <tt>consumption</tt>, and each <tt>held</tt> entry carries the key. Under -01 a retry was identified by its request digest, which two identical intended payments share, so a second payment could be read as a retry of the first and not counted. Eight members are added: <tt>CS10</tt> to <tt>CS17</tt>, and the rows <tt>CS1</tt> to <tt>CS9</tt> are restated to match the published members.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="sequence"/> defines a record's identity for the duplicate check as the SHA-256 of its decoded payload bytes (vector <tt>SQ5</tt>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Registered vocabulary terms and values are cited by their URIs under <tt>https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/</tt>, at vocabulary release 0.8.0 with its tag, commit and registry digest, and not by bare keys. <xref target="observation"/> maps the hyphenated <tt>fieldEvidence</tt> tokens to the underscored registered values; -01 described them as reused unchanged although the spellings differ. The wire tokens are unchanged.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Changes in draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-01:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="conformance"/> states what a conforming producer and verifier are, ties verifier conformance to release 0.26.2 of <xref target="VECTORS"/>, and lists the identifiers a referencing document may rely on. The intended status is Standards Track, so that a working group document can reference this one normatively.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="impl"/> and <xref target="vectors"/> name release v0.26.2, which regenerated the corpus under draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-00 and carries 111 members, and the <tt>first in</tt> column names v0.26.0 for the 36 members that release first published. <xref target="VECTORS"/> and <xref target="VOCABULARY"/> are referenced at tagged releases.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="consumption"/> adds the value a decision under a cumulative limit read. A <tt>consumption-state</tt> entry carries <tt>consumption</tt>: the limit's document digest, the unit, the limit, the amounts committed, held and requested, the permits held and the state revision read. A verifier derives <tt>withinLimit</tt>, a retried request held for a lost response is not counted twice, a held permit is released only by a record of that request showing <tt>none</tt>, and two checks across retained records find one limit spent twice. Under -00 an entry recorded the freshness of the consumption state and not the amount it showed.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Nine members are added to <xref target="vectors"/>: <tt>CS1</tt> to <tt>CS9</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Where a decision depended on several values of one input, an entry's <tt>lastResult</tt> and <tt>maxAge</tt> are taken from the same value, the one whose <tt>lastResult</tt> plus <tt>maxAge</tt> is earliest. Under -00 the entry took the oldest <tt>lastResult</tt> and the smallest <tt>maxAge</tt> from different values, which could report two fresh values as one stale input. Vectors <tt>FR14</tt> and <tt>FR15</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="subject"/> states the interval condition on what was observed. It does not rest on the decision. Under -00 it said a denied decision carries an empty write set, which contradicted vectors <tt>A3</tt> and <tt>A7</tt>; a write attributed to a denied request is retained and yields <tt>disagree</tt>. <xref target="rationale"/> describes a deny beside <tt>occurred</tt> as a well-formed disagreement, not a refusable inconsistency, and refers to the agreement table. It does not count its values.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="tamper"/>, <xref target="decision-effect"/>, <xref target="security-considerations"/> and <xref target="rationale"/> narrow the claim about a record the key holder signed again. The recomputes refuse an inconsistent alteration; a coherent replacement, in which every dependent member is changed to match and the record is signed again, passes them, and is found only by comparison with a copy or an anchor of the original that the key holder does not control.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="observation"/> defines <tt>coverage.scopeComplete</tt> and <tt>coverage.gaps</tt>. A gap inside <tt>pathScope</tt> beside a <tt>scopeComplete</tt> of true is malformed at any tier, and the coverage clause of the tier recompute is <tt>scopeComplete</tt> of true. Under -00 the clause was a disjunction that passed a record declaring complete coverage beside a listed gap inside its own scope, and one declaring incomplete coverage while naming no gap inside it. Vectors <tt>TI6</tt>, <tt>V4</tt> and <tt>V5</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="anchor-rules"/> defines the time of an <tt>opentimestamps</tt> anchor as the timestamp of the Bitcoin block header its proof reaches, and gives comparisons with that time a tolerance of 7200 seconds, the consensus limit on a header time ahead of a validating node's clock, in place of the 300-second skew tolerance. Two such times are ordered by block height. Under -00 the time was unspecified, and an honest retaining party could fail the receipt bracket. Vectors <tt>R10</tt> and <tt>R11</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="retained"/> states that only an anchor that validates meets <tt>anchorWithin</tt>, so for a retaining party that relies on <tt>opentimestamps</tt> alone, <tt>anchorWithin</tt> covers the latency before a pending proof is confirmed in a block.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="retained"/> states that an upgraded proof is appended as a new element beside the pending one it completes, which stays and dates nothing; no element is rewritten in place. Vector <tt>R12</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt>, optional, binds the certification path or key set of the delegation chain's root key that the chain verifier trusted at decision time, and <xref target="retained"/> keeps that material as a <tt>delegation-root</tt> element of <tt>validationData</tt>, from which a later reader derives the algorithm the chain rested on. It records what the verifier held and not how it came to hold it, and mandates no anchor topology. A retaining party that holds no such element reports the root as not established. Under -00 the record bound the authority document and not the root key the chain was verified under. Vectors <tt>R13</tt> to <tt>R15</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="anchor-rules"/> states why an anchor kind names the proof format and not only its basis, carries a Merkle root published in a Bitcoin transaction as an <tt>opentimestamps</tt> proof, and states what a revision adding a kind for another ledger has to define. Vector <tt>R16</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>agent.authentication</tt> gains <tt>api-key</tt>, for a bearer secret that is not an OAuth access token. Under -00 such a request matched no value, and <tt>none</tt> would have said that no authentication took place; <tt>none</tt> is now stated to mean exactly that. A digest of a bearer secret is stated to be testable against guesses. Vector <tt>A21</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Requirements stated with a lowercase "required" are restated with the BCP 14 keywords: the seventeen members, <tt>delegation.authorityDigest</tt>, <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt> and the members of each entry, the members of <tt>consumption</tt>, <tt>oversight.act</tt> and <tt>correlation.scope</tt>. No requirement changes.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="sequence"/> adds an optional <tt>sequence</tt> member, a series named by <tt>boundary</tt> and a <tt>seq</tt> that starts at 1 and rises by one, under the producer's signature. A party holding records of a series names a missing number below the highest it holds, and two records at one number fail the check. <xref target="withheld-rows"/> separates a withheld record, which a missing number shows, from a record never produced, which nothing shows. Vectors <tt>SQ1</tt> to <tt>SQ5</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="impl"/> states that the published command checks records under draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02 and is not a conformance check for this revision.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="consumption"/> and <xref target="sequence"/> follow <xref target="worked"/>, so that Sections 5.1 to 5.8 keep the numbers they had in -00 and in draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02, as <xref target="introduction"/> states.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The acknowledgments credit the reviewers whose comments led to these changes.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Changes in draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-00:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="retained"/> defines the retention entry a retaining party keeps beside a record: anchors over the envelope digest with their kind and origin, the validation data for the envelope and each anchor, and, for a received record, <tt>receivedAt</tt>. A verifier derives each anchor's time and algorithm family from its proof.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="verifying"/> gains the dating check. The earliest anchor that validates dates the record, and no issuance time a record states does. A received record must carry an anchor the retaining party obtained on delivery, and a <tt>receivedAt</tt> outside the bracket from <tt>issuedAt</tt> to that anchor, within the skew tolerance, makes the entry malformed. The check is stated to be a consistency check: it rests on the sender's clock and on the retaining party anchoring on delivery, a digest anchored before delivery does not establish receipt, and the late-anchor limit is stated as an assumption.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="anchor-rules"/> gives an offline validation rule for each anchor kind, and says when a transparency-log anchor is a hash commitment and when a signed token. The predicate's own <tt>correlation.externalAnchor</tt> dates nothing by itself, so vector <tt>N1</tt> has one conforming verdict.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="evaluation"/> gains <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt>, required under both statuses: one entry per input the decision depended on, with <tt>lastResult</tt> and <tt>maxAge</tt>, both required. Age is measured from <tt>lastResult</tt> to <tt>decision.reportedAt</tt>, an age equal to <tt>maxAge</tt> is fresh, and <tt>unavailableInput</tt> is derived from the entries and must match them. A forwarded value keeps the source's <tt>lastResult</tt>. Under draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02 freshness could not be recorded for an input that was accepted.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>unavailableInput</tt> gains <tt>policy-source</tt>, for a decision point that could not read its policy or does not hold the profile a request names. <tt>decision.policyDigest</tt> then names the fallback the decision point enforced.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The rule for <tt>evaluated</tt> is stated: the reported decision does not depend on any input the decision point could not obtain. <tt>decision.reported</tt> under <tt>not-evaluated</tt> is stated to be the outcome the decision point fell back to, so a fail-open is a <tt>permit</tt> and stays findable.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>evaluation</tt> carries no member other than <tt>status</tt>, <tt>inputs</tt> and <tt>unavailableInput</tt>. Under the earlier revision a free-text reason beside the closed set was not refused.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Each input is mapped to the section of <xref target="EVALUATION"/> that defines it, and a transient refusal under that document is mapped to <tt>not-evaluated</tt> and a permanent one to <tt>evaluated</tt> with <tt>deny</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The write-chain replay is stated in <xref target="members"/>: where the running root starts, what each write must match, and where it must end. Under the earlier revision the body required the replay without defining it.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="verifying"/> applies the JSON profile before the signature, because deriving the <xref target="RFC8785"/> bytes the signature covers requires a parse the duplicate-member rule constrains.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A closed vocabulary is extended only by a revision, and after the predicate type URI freezes only under a new URI. No vocabulary carries a catch-all value. <xref target="iana"/> states that no revision has yet frozen the URI.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A skew tolerance of 300 seconds is defined for every comparison between times written by two parties.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="impl"/> records the open implementation, and <xref target="audit-map"/> maps the problems the AUDIT BoF request and proposed charter name to this document.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A record under the earlier revision is malformed under this one, because it carries no <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt> (vector <tt>EV13</tt>). The corpus is regenerated, and 31 members are added to <xref target="vectors"/>: <tt>A18</tt> to <tt>A20</tt>, <tt>E4</tt> to <tt>E6</tt>, <tt>EV11</tt> to <tt>EV13</tt>, <tt>FR1</tt> to <tt>FR13</tt> and <tt>R1</tt> to <tt>R9</tt>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Changes in draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-02:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A required <tt>evaluation</tt> member records whether the decision point evaluated the request, and under <tt>not-evaluated</tt> names the unavailable inputs from a closed set (<xref target="evaluation"/>). Under -01 a verifier that lost its standing source and denied wrote a record identical to a correctly enforced denial. <tt>decision.reported</tt> and the agreement table are unchanged.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>An optional <tt>oversight</tt> member records the kind of act a person took behind a decision, and may bind the overseer's own signed record by digest (<xref target="oversight"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A record conforming to -01 is malformed under -02, because it carries no <tt>evaluation</tt> member and no member has a default (vector <tt>EV3</tt>). The predicate type URI does not change: no revision has yet frozen it, and the corpus in <xref target="VECTORS"/> is regenerated against this revision.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Eight members are added to <xref target="vectors"/>: <tt>A10</tt>, <tt>A11</tt>, <tt>EV1</tt> to <tt>EV4</tt>, <tt>OV1</tt> and <tt>OV2</tt>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Changes in draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-01:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The request-digest preimage under <tt>not-bindable</tt> is stated: three members, with no <tt>argumentsDigest</tt> member in any spelling. Under -00 the text named four members and forbade the fourth, so the preimage was open and three spellings gave three digests.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Each write carries the request digest it is attributed to, or <tt>unattributed</tt>. <tt>effect.observed</tt> describes this record's request, and it gains <tt>unknown</tt> for an unattributed write inside the scope. A write that belongs to another request no longer changes this record's agreement.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>agreement</tt> gains <tt>not-exercised</tt>, for a permit beside no effect, and <tt>indeterminate</tt>, for an effect the observer could not attribute. Under -00 a permitted call that was never made read as <tt>disagree</tt>, the value a leaked deny also takes.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A statement whose signature fails is malformed, so <xref target="verifying"/> and vector <tt>T2</tt> report the same verdict.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Six members are added to <xref target="vectors"/>: <tt>A7</tt>, <tt>A8</tt>, <tt>A9</tt>, <tt>F3b</tt>, <tt>F3c</tt> and <tt>D3</tt>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record-00 was the first revision.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Cliff Singletary pointed out that an earlier revision could not record a decision point that was unable to evaluate, and proposed the separate member that leaves <tt>decision.reported</tt> and the agreement table untouched. Girish Konda reviewed that member against Section 5 of <xref target="EVALUATION"/>, proposed adding the policy input to its closed set, and asked for the reference time, the boundary case and the freshness of accepted inputs that <tt>evaluation.inputs</tt> now carries. Wes Jackson proposed reading stale and never-established inputs from the as-of time and the maximum age. Venkata Uppalapati asked whether a receipt time could be bound to anything a later reader can check, which led to the receipt bracket, and named the late-anchor limit it leaves. Iman Schrock pointed out that the bracket is a consistency check and not proof of receipt, and proposed the case of a digest anchored before delivery. Andreas Ehstand asked whether the human act behind a permit belongs in this format and proposed the member that names its kind. Brian Campbell pointed this work to the AUDIT BoF. King Yew Choo asked how the record shows the amount already spent that a decision point read under a cumulative delegated limit, which led to <xref target="consumption"/>. Mikhail Sergeev found that aggregating freshness across values could report two fresh values as stale and proposed the pairing rule, found that the text on a denied decision contradicted vectors <tt>A3</tt> and <tt>A7</tt>, narrowed the claim about a record signed again, and found that a listed gap inside the scope did not override a declaration of complete coverage; the wording of all four follows his. Toshikatsu Oga, from running OpenTimestamps anchors, asked which time an <tt>opentimestamps</tt> anchor carries and proposed the 7200-second tolerance, the reading of <tt>anchorWithin</tt> that covers confirmation latency, and appending an upgraded proof. Rafael Asor named the delegation root key a chain verifier trusts as a gap in what is recorded, V.K. Uppalapati separated the recording gap from the gap in how the root key arrives, and Kieran Sweeney warned against closing either by mandating an anchor topology; <tt>delegation.rootDigest</tt> follows all three. Lars Kersten Kroehl asked whether an anchor kind should name its basis, which value a bearer API key takes, and why a requirement was written in lowercase. Henri Sirkkavaara proposed the sequence member and the distinction between a withheld record and one never produced. J S He ran the reference reader against the corpus, counted the refusals of the reader that no member reached, and found that <tt>issuedAt</tt> was not checked against <tt>sealedAt</tt>; the rules of <xref target="json-profile"/>, <xref target="statement-type"/> and <xref target="sets"/> and the rows <tt>X1</tt> to <tt>X18</tt> follow that count. King Yew Choo asked what happens to a held permit when its limit is replaced, Athar Nouman answered how an enforcement point keys the claim, and the contributor writing as vendrell46 wrote the stablecoin settlement cases against the messages x402 sends, and corrected two of them; <tt>supersedes</tt>, <tt>asset</tt>, <tt>payee</tt> and <tt>settled</tt> follow them. Laurent Lemonnier found that the corpus carried consumption members the published text did not define. Marc Molas Carol proposed recording principal standing from a published commitment. Joshua Moffat wrote the access-request cases that <tt>dataSubject</tt> follows. Konrad Gruszka ran a verifier written from the text against the corpus and found members labelled with revisions that did not state their rules, which led to the definition of conformance in <xref target="conformance"/>.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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