| Internet-Draft | x402-federation-zkp | November 2026 |
| Hopley | Expires 21 May 2027 | [Page] |
This document defines a protocol for composing independently-issued post-quantum ZKP credentials from different issuers into a single federation token, without requiring a shared trust root between issuers.¶
Each credential is a Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) signed Bulletproofs range proof asserting that an agent's trust score meets a threshold. A federation validator independently verifies each credential against its issuer's public key, then computes a composite commitment binding all verified proofs.¶
The resulting federation token is signed by the validator alone. No issuer needs to know about the others. This solves the cross-issuer attestation composition problem in agentic payment networks.¶
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Agentic payment networks are converging on a multi-issuer credential landscape. An agent may hold credentials from:¶
A payment-security evaluation service (e.g. ATB)¶
A KYC/AML identity provider¶
A domain-specific competency attestor¶
A gateway that requires proof of compliance with N issuers faces a composition problem: how does it accept a single credential that proves all N conditions are met, without requiring:¶
A shared trust root among the N issuers¶
The issuers to coordinate with each other¶
The agent to reveal its raw scores to the gateway¶
The naive solution — accept N separate credentials and verify each — works but has two drawbacks:¶
The gateway must manage N HTTP header slots and N cache entries.¶
Time-of-check / time-of-use windows differ per credential: if credential A is re-used from cache while credential B is fresh, they may represent different points in time.¶
This document specifies a federation composition protocol that:¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174].¶
Issuer: An entity that signs PQC credentials (ATB hub, identity provider, etc.). Each issuer has an independent Falcon-1024 or ML-DSA-65 key pair. Issuers have no knowledge of each other.¶
Federation Validator: An entity that holds the public keys of N trusted issuers and composes their credentials into a single federation token. The validator may be the payment gateway itself, or a separate service trusted by the gateway.¶
Federation Token: A short-lived HMAC-SHA256-signed token produced by the federation validator, containing the composite commitment and issuer list.¶
Composite Commitment: A SHA-256 hash binding the Pedersen commitments from all N input credentials together with a per-composition nonce.¶
Agent Validator Gateway | | | |-- [cred_A, cred_B] -->| | | | verify cred_A vs pk_A| | | verify cred_B vs pk_B| | | compose_commitments()| | | issue_fed_token() | |<--- federation_token--| | | | |--- Bearer <fed_token> ---------------------->| | | HMAC-verify | | spend_cap check |<-------------- 200 OK ----------------------|¶
The agent presents two or more PQC credentials (each from an independent issuer) to the federation validator. The validator verifies each, composes the commitments, and returns a federation token. The agent then uses this token on the gateway.¶
The gateway only needs to: 1. Verify the HMAC on the federation token. 2. Verify expiry. 3. Check spend cap.¶
No Falcon-1024 verification happens on the gateway hot path.¶
Each credential presented to the federation validator MUST conform to
[CREDENTIALBINDING] §2 (ATB Phase 2, atb_cert_version = "2").¶
Specifically:
- alg MUST be "Falcon-1024" or "ML-DSA-65".
- commitment_b64 MUST decode to exactly 32 bytes (compressed Ristretto255).
- proof_b64 MUST decode to 200–900 bytes (64-bit Bulletproofs range proof).
- bench_issuer MUST be a DID present in the validator's issuer_pks registry.
- The credential MUST not be expired.¶
The validator MUST independently verify each credential's Falcon-1024 signature before proceeding to composition.¶
The federation validator maintains a mapping:¶
issuer_pks: { DID → Falcon-1024 public key (base64 standard) }
¶
Each issuer's public key is obtained from their /.well-known/atb-keys.json
endpoint:¶
{
"keys": [
{
"kid": "<hex>",
"alg": "Falcon-1024",
"public_key_pqclean_b64": "<base64>"
}
]
}
¶
The validator MUST NOT accept credentials from issuers not in its registry. This is the sole trust boundary: the validator trusts specific issuer keys, but issuers do not need to trust each other.¶
For each credential i, extract the Pedersen commitment:¶
comm_i = base64decode(credentials[i].payload.commitment_b64) (32 bytes)¶
Sample a per-composition nonce:¶
nonce = CSPRNG(32 bytes)¶
Compute the composite commitment:¶
fed_commitment = SHA-256(DOMAIN || comm_0 || comm_1 || … || comm_{N-1} || nonce)
¶
where:¶
DOMAIN = b"AlgoVoi-FederationToken-v1" (26 bytes, UTF-8)¶
The domain label provides separation from other SHA-256 uses. The nonce ensures the composite commitment is unique per composition event, preventing an adversary from reusing a subset of credentials with different partners to produce a matching composite.¶
The federation token's expires_at MUST be set to:¶
expires_at = min(credentials[i].payload.expires_at for i in 0..N)¶
This ensures the federation token never outlives any of its input credentials.¶
The validator constructs the following payload:¶
{
"version": "1",
"fed_commitment": "<hex(fed_commitment)>",
"fed_nonce": "<hex(nonce)>",
"issuers": [
{ "did": "<issuer_0_did>", "kid": "<issuer_0_kid>", "alg": "Falcon-1024" },
{ "did": "<issuer_1_did>", "kid": "<issuer_1_kid>", "alg": "Falcon-1024" }
],
"threshold_met": true,
"issued_at": "<ISO8601-UTC>",
"expires_at": "<ISO8601-UTC>"
}
¶
Applies JCS canonicalization [RFC8785] to produce canonical_payload.¶
Computes the HMAC tag:¶
sig = HMAC-SHA256(validator_secret, DOMAIN || canonical_payload)¶
Assembles the federation token envelope:¶
{
"alg": "HMAC-SHA256",
"kid": "<hex(SHA-256(validator_secret))[:16]>",
"type": "federation_token",
"payload": { ... },
"sig": "<base64url(sig)>"
}
¶
Base64url-encodes the envelope JSON as the federation token string.¶
The gateway receiving Authorization: Bearer <fed_token> (after
the initial session exchange):¶
Base64url-decode and JSON-parse the envelope.¶
Verify type = "federation_token" and alg = "HMAC-SHA256".¶
Apply JCS canonicalization to payload.¶
Compute expected = HMAC-SHA256(validator_secret, DOMAIN || canonical).¶
Compare expected to the decoded sig using a constant-time comparison.¶
Verify expires_at has not elapsed.¶
If valid: extract fed_commitment, issuers, and enforce spend_cap.¶
The gateway does NOT re-verify Falcon-1024 signatures on the hot path. That work was done once by the federation validator.¶
Each credential in the composition is independently verifiable by any
party holding the issuer's public key. The composite token does not
obscure this: the issuers field in the token payload lists all issuers
and their kids, allowing retrospective audit.¶
The composite commitment fed_commitment binds the federation token to
the exact set of Pedersen commitments from the input credentials. An
adversary who replaces one credential with a different one will produce
a different fed_commitment and the HMAC will not verify.¶
The per-composition nonce prevents a partial-credential-set replay: an adversary cannot use commitment_A from one composition event and commitment_B from another to produce a valid composite.¶
The ZKP range proof in each input credential asserts score >= threshold
without revealing the exact score. The composite commitment is derived
from Pedersen commitment bytes, not from scores. The gateway learns only
that threshold_met = true.¶
All per-credential signing uses Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204). The composite token uses HMAC-SHA256, which is quantum- resistant under the birthday-bound model (Grover's algorithm reduces effective security from 256 to 128 bits — still adequate).¶
If the validator's HMAC key is compromised, an adversary can forge
federation tokens. Operators SHOULD rotate the validator key regularly
and revoke outstanding tokens on rotation by advancing the token's kid.¶
An HMAC-based federation token is verifiable by any instance holding the validator secret. In multi-instance deployments the secret MUST be shared across instances (e.g. via a secrets manager), not per-instance.¶
Operators SHOULD configure min_credentials >= 2 to require cross-issuer
evidence. A value of 1 provides single-issuer mode — useful for testing
but does not demonstrate cross-issuer composition.¶
The protocol permits two credentials from the same issuer. The composite commitment is still computed correctly and the HMAC verifies. However, the "no shared trust root" property holds trivially in this case. Operators that require distinct issuers SHOULD enforce issuer-DID uniqueness in the validator configuration.¶
Full Bulletproofs range proof verification (step 10 of [CREDENTIALBINDING]
§4) requires calling the ATB ZKP service. The federation validator package
performs structural validation of proof fields without the Rust service.
Operators requiring cryptographic range proof verification SHOULD configure
ATB_ZKP_ENABLED=true and the ATB_ZKP_URL environment variable.¶
The composition pattern in this document is novel in the agentic payments context. It draws on:¶
BBS+ / selective disclosure: The commitment-binding approach is inspired by Pedersen commitment composition in BBS+ credential presentations, without requiring pairing-based cryptography.¶
OIDC Federation: The validator-as-translator pattern mirrors OIDC federation, where a federation entity re-signs assertions about a relying party's trustworthiness without requiring the OP to know about the federation.¶
Verifiable Presentations (W3C VC): The issuers list in the
federation token is analogous to a VP's credential provenance graph,
but simplified for the payment-session context.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶