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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-hopley-x402-payment-evidence-frame-01" category="info" submissionType="independent">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="x402-payment-evidence-frame">Payment Evidence Frame for Agentic-Payment Lifecycle Receipts</title>

    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="Christopher Hopley">
      <organization>AlgoVoi</organization>
      <address>
        <email>chopmob@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>

    <area>Independent Submission</area>
    <workgroup>Independent Submission</workgroup>
    <keyword>x402</keyword> <keyword>agentic payments</keyword> <keyword>payment evidence</keyword> <keyword>receipt</keyword> <keyword>audit chain</keyword> <keyword>operator-independent</keyword> <keyword>post-quantum</keyword> <keyword>Falcon-1024</keyword> <keyword>ML-DSA-65</keyword> <keyword>JCS</keyword> <keyword>RFC 8785</keyword> <keyword>categorical receipt</keyword> <keyword>payment frame</keyword> <keyword>MiCA</keyword> <keyword>PSD2</keyword> <keyword>A2A</keyword> <keyword>MPP</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 34?>

<t>This document specifies a Payment Evidence Frame (PEF): a
transport-agnostic envelope that wraps any payment lifecycle receipt
from the x402 agentic-payment receipt stack under a named claim type,
a deterministic frame identifier, and an optional transport-layer
signature.</t>

<t>The frame introduces three properties that the inner receipt types
do not individually provide: (1) a stable cross-system identifier
(<spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>) derived deterministically from the receipt content by
SHA-256 over the JCS-canonical preimage, so the same payment evidence
can be referenced by identifier across HTTP headers, agent-to-agent
task artifacts, audit logs, and on-chain memo fields without
re-serialising the full receipt; (2) a taxonomy label (<spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx>)
that tells a consumer what class of evidence a frame carries before
the inner receipt format is parsed; and (3) a receipt integrity hash
(<spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx>) that allows any downstream party to confirm the inner
receipt is unaltered without deserialising its full structure.</t>

<t>The format uses the same JCS canonicalisation discipline
(draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs) as the five inner receipt
formats it envelopes, so implementations require only one
canonicalisation primitive for the full receipt stack.</t>

<t>This revision additionally specifies an operator-independent audit
chain construction over PEF frames (Section 7.5): an append-only,
content-addressed chain in which each row is a PEF frame contributed
and signed by its own operator, with no shared trusted root. Rows are
linked by the deterministic <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> of the preceding row, and each
row carries a post-quantum signature
(draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding) over the row's linkage and
content identity. The whole chain is verifiable offline from the
bytes alone -- recompute the linkage, then verify each operator's
signature against the public key carried in that row -- with no
callback to, and no trust in, any operator.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 71?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<section anchor="motivation"><name>Motivation</name>

<t>The x402 agentic-payment receipt stack defines five categorical
receipt formats for the distinct events in a payment lifecycle:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt -- pre-payment admission
screening (ALLOW / REFER / DENY).</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation -- per-execution
settlement confirmation (SETTLED / PENDING_FINALITY / REVERSED).</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-cancellation-receipt -- mandate termination
(USER_REQUESTED / MERCHANT_REQUESTED / COMPLIANCE_TERMINATED /
EXPIRED).</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt -- post-settlement refund
(FULL / PARTIAL / REJECTED).</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-composite-trust-query -- verifier-of-verifier
conclusion over an audit chain composed of the above
(TRUSTED / PROVISIONAL / INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE / UNTRUSTED).</t>
</list></t>

<t>Each receipt is a self-contained JCS-canonical JSON object with a
content hash. Each is independently verifiable. Each is designed
to be retained in an audit chain via hash-chain linkage.</t>

<t>A gap exists at the transport and interoperability layer. A
compliance receipt emitted by system A and consumed by system B
must be carried in some envelope that system B can inspect without
knowing in advance which of the five receipt formats it will find.
An agent-to-agent task artifact, an HTTP response extension field,
a memo field on a blockchain transaction, and a webhook payload all
face the same need: carry a receipt with enough metadata that the
consumer can route it, verify its integrity, and correlate it with
other events in the lifecycle -- without parsing the inner format
first.</t>

<t>Three specific gaps motivate this document:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t><strong>Stable cross-system identifier.</strong> A compliance receipt's
content hash changes if any field changes. There is no stable
identifier for "the payment evidence bundle associated with
transaction T" that persists across the HTTP layer, the agent
layer, and the audit-chain layer without carrying the full receipt
bytes at every hop.</t>
  <t><strong>Taxonomy label.</strong> A consumer receiving a JSON blob over a
generic channel (e.g. an A2A task artifact, an HTTP header) has
no standard signal for which of the five receipt types it holds
before deserialising the full struct. Dispatch logic cannot switch
on receipt type without parsing.</t>
  <t><strong>Integrity without deserialisation.</strong> A consumer that only needs
to confirm "this receipt has not been altered since the issuer
signed the frame" must today fully parse the inner receipt and
recompute its content hash. A receipt hash in the frame envelope
allows integrity checks to be performed at the frame layer.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The Payment Evidence Frame specified in this document addresses all
three gaps with a ten-field envelope that adds no new
canonicalisation rules and no new cryptographic primitives.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="scope"><name>Scope</name>

<t>This document specifies:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The canonical JSON shape of the Payment Evidence Frame (Section 3).</t>
  <t>The frame identifier derivation algorithm (<spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>, Section 4).</t>
  <t>The receipt hash derivation algorithm (<spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx>, Section 5).</t>
  <t>The reference to the canonicalisation discipline applicable to
the frame (Section 6 -- normative reference to
draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs, not redefined inline).</t>
  <t>The claim type taxonomy (Section 3.2).</t>
  <t>Composition of PEF with the five inner receipt formats and with
transport protocols (Section 7).</t>
  <t>The operator-independent audit chain construction over PEF frames:
chain-row shape, inter-row linkage, per-operator post-quantum
signing, and the offline whole-chain verification algorithm
(Section 7.5).</t>
  <t>Year-N auditability properties (Section 8).</t>
  <t>Worked examples covering all five claim types (Appendix A).</t>
</list></t>

<t>This document does NOT specify:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The inner receipt formats. They are specified in their respective
I-Ds (draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt, etc.). The PEF
envelope is additive; it does not redefine any inner receipt field.</t>
  <t>The transport protocol. PEF is a JSON shape; where it appears
(HTTP response body, HTTP header, A2A task artifact, MPP method
response, on-chain memo) is out of scope.</t>
  <t>The optional signature value. The <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field carries a
pre-computed RFC 9421 signature string when supplied; the signing
procedure is defined in draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-x402-binding,
not redefined here.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="relationship-to-other-internet-drafts"><name>Relationship to Other Internet-Drafts</name>

<t>This document normatively references:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs -- the JCS canonicalisation
discipline pinned in Section 6.</t>
</list></t>

<t>This document is complementary to:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt -- provides the
<spanx style="verb">compliance-receipt-v1</spanx> inner receipt format for frames with
<spanx style="verb">claim_type: payment_admission</spanx>.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation -- provides the
<spanx style="verb">settlement-attestation-v1</spanx> inner receipt format for frames with
<spanx style="verb">claim_type: payment_settlement</spanx>.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-cancellation-receipt -- provides the
<spanx style="verb">cancellation-receipt-v1</spanx> inner receipt format for frames with
<spanx style="verb">claim_type: payment_cancellation</spanx>.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt -- provides the
<spanx style="verb">refund-receipt-v1</spanx> inner receipt format for frames with
<spanx style="verb">claim_type: payment_refund</spanx>.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-composite-trust-query -- provides the
<spanx style="verb">composite-trust-query-v1</spanx> inner receipt format for frames with
<spanx style="verb">claim_type: composite_verdict</spanx>.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-x402-binding -- defines the signing
procedure for the optional transport-layer <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding -- defines the
Falcon-1024 (FIPS 206) and ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) credential
envelope and signing/verification procedure used for the
per-operator row signatures in the audit chain construction
(Section 7.5).</t>
</list></t>

<t>PEF sits above all five receipt formats. It does not replace them;
it envelopes them for transport and cross-system reference.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>

<section anchor="notation"><name>Notation</name>

<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="definitions"><name>Definitions</name>

<t><strong>Payment Evidence Frame (PEF)</strong>: a JSON object of the shape
specified in Section 3, wrapping one inner receipt from the x402
agentic-payment receipt stack under a named claim type and a
deterministic frame identifier.</t>

<t><strong>frame_id</strong>: a string of the form <spanx style="verb">sha256:&lt;lowercase-hex-64&gt;</spanx>
derived from the JCS-canonical bytes of the PEF preimage (the frame
object with <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> fields excluded). See
Section 4 for the derivation algorithm. The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is stable:
it does not change if the <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field is subsequently added,
and it does not change across independent re-derivations from
identical content.</t>

<t><strong>receipt_hash</strong>: a string of the form <spanx style="verb">sha256:&lt;lowercase-hex-64&gt;</spanx>
equal to the SHA-256 of the JCS-canonical bytes of the <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx>
field value. See Section 5.</t>

<t><strong>claim_type</strong>: a string-valued taxonomy label drawn from the closed
five-element enumeration in Section 3.2. Identifies the lifecycle
event the frame represents and the expected inner receipt format.</t>

<t><strong>receipt_format</strong>: a string-valued identifier for the inner receipt
format, drawn from the closed mapping in Section 3.3.</t>

<t><strong>frame_provider_did</strong>: a DID URI identifying the party that
constructed and issued the PEF frame.</t>

<t><strong>frame_timestamp_ms</strong>: an integer Unix epoch millisecond timestamp
at which the frame was constructed.</t>

<t><strong>preimage</strong>: the PEF frame object with the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> fields removed, used as input to the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>
derivation algorithm. The preimage is itself a valid JSON object and
is canonicalised under draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs before
hashing.</t>

<t><strong>canon_version</strong>: an in-band string identifying the canonicalisation
discipline. For this version of the format, the full URN is
<spanx style="verb">urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1</spanx>.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="frame-format-specification"><name>Frame Format Specification</name>

<t>A Payment Evidence Frame is a JSON object with ten fields, of which
nine are REQUIRED and one (<spanx style="verb">signature</spanx>) is OPTIONAL. The frame is
canonicalised under draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs per
Section 6. Field names sort lexicographically by JCS during
canonicalisation; the object uses arbitrary authoring order.</t>

<t>The ten fields are:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Field</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Type</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Required</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Description</ttcol>
      <c><spanx style="verb">canon_version</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>Canonicalisation URN. Fixed value for this version.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>Lifecycle event taxonomy. Closed five-element enum.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>SHA-256 of JCS(preimage). Stable cross-system identifier.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">frame_provider_did</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>DID URI of the party that constructed the frame.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">frame_timestamp_ms</spanx></c>
      <c>integer</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>Unix epoch milliseconds at which the frame was constructed.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">pef_version</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>Format version. Fixed value <spanx style="verb">1</spanx> for this version.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx></c>
      <c>object</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>The inner receipt, embedded verbatim.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">receipt_format</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>Inner receipt format identifier. Closed mapping per Section 3.3.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>REQUIRED</c>
      <c>SHA-256 of JCS(receipt). Integrity check without deserialisation.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">signature</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>OPTIONAL</c>
      <c>Pre-computed RFC 9421 transport-layer signature, when present.</c>
</texttable>

<section anchor="pefversion"><name>pef_version</name>

<t>A string-valued field. The value MUST be <spanx style="verb">1</spanx> for this version of the
format. Implementations MUST reject any other value at validation
time.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="claimtype"><name>claim_type</name>

<t>A string-valued field drawn from the following closed five-element
enumeration:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>claim_type</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Lifecycle event</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Expected receipt_format</ttcol>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_admission</spanx></c>
      <c>Pre-payment compliance screen</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">compliance-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_settlement</spanx></c>
      <c>Per-execution settlement confirmation</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">settlement-attestation-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_cancellation</spanx></c>
      <c>Mandate or order termination</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">cancellation-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_refund</spanx></c>
      <c>Post-settlement refund</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">refund-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">composite_verdict</spanx></c>
      <c>Verifier-of-verifier audit chain conclusion</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">composite-trust-query-v1</spanx></c>
</texttable>

<t>The enumeration is closed. Implementations MUST reject any value not
in this set at validation time before canonicalisation. The
<spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx> field is the primary dispatch signal: a consumer routing
incoming frames by lifecycle event MUST switch on <spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx>
before inspecting the inner <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="receiptformat"><name>receipt_format</name>

<t>A string-valued field drawn from the following closed mapping, keyed
by <spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx>:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>claim_type</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>receipt_format</ttcol>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_admission</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">compliance-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_settlement</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">settlement-attestation-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_cancellation</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">cancellation-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_refund</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">refund-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">composite_verdict</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">composite-trust-query-v1</spanx></c>
</texttable>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">receipt_format</spanx> value MUST match the inner receipt's self-
declared format identifier. Implementations MUST verify this mapping
at validation time. The mapping is closed and version-pinned; future
versions of either the frame or the inner receipt formats would
advance the version indicator.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="receipt"><name>receipt</name>

<t>An object-valued field containing the inner receipt, embedded
verbatim. The object MUST conform to the shape specified by the
format identified in <spanx style="verb">receipt_format</spanx>. The object MUST NOT be
modified, re-ordered, or re-encoded relative to its canonical form
before embedding; consumers SHOULD re-canonicalise and re-hash the
embedded receipt to verify <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="receipthash"><name>receipt_hash</name>

<t>A string-valued field of the form <spanx style="verb">sha256:&lt;lowercase-hex-64&gt;</spanx>. The
hex digest is the SHA-256 of the JCS-canonical bytes of the <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx>
field value. See Section 5 for the derivation algorithm.</t>

<t><spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> allows a consumer to confirm the inner receipt is
unaltered without fully deserialising it. A consumer that only needs
integrity confirmation computes SHA-256(JCS(<spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx>)) and compares
against <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx>. A mismatch indicates tampering.</t>

<t>Implementations MUST NOT strip the <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> prefix during
canonicalisation or verification.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="frameid"><name>frame_id</name>

<t>A string-valued field of the form <spanx style="verb">sha256:&lt;lowercase-hex-64&gt;</spanx>. The
hex digest is SHA-256 of the JCS-canonical bytes of the PEF preimage.
See Section 4 for the derivation algorithm.</t>

<t><spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is the stable cross-system identifier for this payment
evidence bundle. It is deterministic: independent parties holding the
same inner receipt and the same frame metadata MUST derive the same
<spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>. It is stable across signature addition: adding the
<spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field does not change the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> because <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx>
is excluded from the preimage.</t>

<t>Implementations MUST NOT strip the <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> prefix during
canonicalisation or verification.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="frameproviderdid"><name>frame_provider_did</name>

<t>A string-valued DID URI identifying the party that constructed and
issued the PEF frame. The DID method is not constrained; the field
is treated as opaque identifier-bytes under JCS canonicalisation.</t>

<t>The frame provider is typically the platform or agent that built the
inner receipt and is issuing it to a downstream consumer. The DID
MAY be the same as the <spanx style="verb">compliance_provider_did</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">settlement_provider_did</spanx>,
or <spanx style="verb">verifier_did</spanx> in the inner receipt if the same party is acting
in both capacities.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="frametimestampms"><name>frame_timestamp_ms</name>

<t>An integer-valued field carrying the Unix epoch millisecond timestamp
at which the frame was constructed, in UTC.</t>

<t>This field MUST be an integer. RFC 3339 string forms (e.g.
<spanx style="verb">"2026-05-30T12:00:00Z"</spanx>) MUST be rejected at the validation layer
before canonicalisation. This is Substrate Rule 2, normatively
specified in draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs Section 4.1.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="canonversion"><name>canon_version</name>

<t>A string-valued in-band canonicalisation rule pin. For this version
of the frame format the value MUST be
<spanx style="verb">urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1</spanx>.</t>

<t>The full URN form is used here (rather than the short form
<spanx style="verb">jcs-rfc8785-v1</spanx> used in the inner receipt formats) to distinguish
the frame-level canonicalisation pin from the inner receipt's own
<spanx style="verb">canon_version</spanx> field. The underlying discipline is identical.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="signature-optional"><name>signature (OPTIONAL)</name>

<t>A string-valued field carrying a pre-computed RFC 9421 HTTP Message
Signature string (draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-x402-binding) when
present.</t>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field is OPTIONAL. Its absence does not affect frame
validity or <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> derivation. When present, it binds the frame
to a transport-layer identity claim. The signing procedure,
verification algorithm, and key material requirements are defined in
draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-x402-binding.</t>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field is excluded from the preimage used to derive
<spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> (Section 4). This exclusion means <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is stable
before and after signature addition, enabling a two-phase workflow:
(1) build frame and derive <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>; (2) sign and attach
<spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> without invalidating any prior references to the
<spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="frame-id-derivation"><name>Frame ID Derivation</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is derived as follows:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t><strong>Construct the preimage.</strong> Start with the full PEF frame object.
Remove the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> field. Remove the <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field if
present. The resulting object is the preimage. The preimage is a
valid JSON object containing all fields except <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">signature</spanx>.</t>
  <t><strong>Canonicalise the preimage.</strong> Apply the JCS canonicalisation
discipline per draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs. This
produces a deterministic byte sequence. Field names are sorted
lexicographically; whitespace is removed; numeric values are
normalised per RFC 8785 Section 3.2.2.3; the <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx> object is
recursively canonicalised.</t>
  <t><strong>Hash.</strong> Compute SHA-256 of the canonical byte sequence.</t>
  <t><strong>Encode.</strong> Encode as the lowercase hex string of the 32-byte
digest, prefixed with <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx>. The result is a 71-character
string.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Implementations MUST follow these steps in order. In particular:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> field itself MUST be absent from the preimage. If
a frame is received with a <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> field present, the verifier
MUST remove it before computing the expected value and comparing.</t>
  <t>The <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field MUST be absent from the preimage regardless
of whether it is present in the received frame.</t>
  <t>The <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx> object inside the preimage is canonicalised as part
of the preimage, not separately. The <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx> is NOT
independently re-canonicalised and substituted; it is included in
the preimage object as-is and the whole preimage is canonicalised
in one pass.</t>
</list></t>

<section anchor="verification"><name>Verification</name>

<t>To verify a received frame's <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Remove <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> from the frame object.</t>
  <t>Canonicalise the result per draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs.</t>
  <t>Compute SHA-256 of the canonical bytes.</t>
  <t>Compare <spanx style="verb">sha256:&lt;hex&gt;</spanx> against the received <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>.</t>
  <t>If they match, the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is valid. If they differ, the frame
has been tampered with or the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> was incorrectly derived.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="stability-property"><name>Stability Property</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is stable across the <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field lifecycle.
A frame built without a <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> and a frame with an identical
content but an added <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field produce the same <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>.
This enables the following pattern:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Build frame, derive <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Reference <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> in downstream systems (audit chain, A2A
task artifact, HTTP header, memo field).</t>
  <t>Later, sign the frame and attach <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Downstream references to <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> remain valid.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="receipt-hash-derivation"><name>Receipt Hash Derivation</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> is derived as follows:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Extract the <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx> object from the frame.</t>
  <t>Canonicalise the <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx> object per
draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs.</t>
  <t>Compute SHA-256 of the canonical byte sequence.</t>
  <t>Encode as <spanx style="verb">sha256:&lt;lowercase-hex-64&gt;</spanx>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> is a commitment to the inner receipt content at
the time the frame was built. If the inner receipt is subsequently
modified (e.g. a field is altered in transit), the recomputed hash
will differ from <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx>, and the consumer will detect
tampering without needing to re-derive <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>.</t>

<t>Implementations MUST verify <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> as part of frame
validation. The two-step verification is:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Verify <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx>: recompute SHA-256(JCS(<spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx>)) and
compare.</t>
  <t>Verify <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>: per Section 4.1.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Both checks MUST pass for a frame to be considered valid.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="canonicalisation"><name>Canonicalisation</name>

<t>The PEF frame (excluding the <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field when present) MUST be
canonicalised under the discipline pinned by
draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs and identified by the URN:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The full normative specification of the discipline (JCS RFC 8785
plus the schema-normalisation requirements including Substrate
Rule 2 for integer timestamps) is in that document. This document
does not redefine the discipline inline.</t>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field, when present, MUST be excluded from
canonicalisation for the purposes of <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> derivation (Section
4). A frame with a <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field is canonical in its full form
for transport; the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> preimage is canonical without it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="composition-with-x402-receipt-stack-and-transport-protocols"><name>Composition with x402 Receipt Stack and Transport Protocols</name>

<section anchor="receipt-stack-composition"><name>Receipt Stack Composition</name>

<t>A PEF frame envelopes exactly one inner receipt. The five inner
receipt formats and their expected claim types are:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>receipt_format</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>claim_type</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Inner I-D</ttcol>
      <c><spanx style="verb">compliance-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_admission</spanx></c>
      <c>draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">settlement-attestation-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_settlement</spanx></c>
      <c>draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">cancellation-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_cancellation</spanx></c>
      <c>draft-hopley-x402-cancellation-receipt</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">refund-receipt-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_refund</spanx></c>
      <c>draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">composite-trust-query-v1</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">composite_verdict</spanx></c>
      <c>draft-hopley-x402-composite-trust-query</c>
</texttable>

<t>A payment lifecycle generates a sequence of PEF frames: one
<spanx style="verb">payment_admission</spanx> frame when the compliance receipt is emitted,
one <spanx style="verb">payment_settlement</spanx> frame when the settlement attestation is
emitted, zero or one <spanx style="verb">payment_cancellation</spanx> frame, zero or one
<spanx style="verb">payment_refund</spanx> frame, and zero or more <spanx style="verb">composite_verdict</spanx> frames
when a verifier queries the resulting audit chain.</t>

<t>Each frame's <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is an independent stable identifier for that
lifecycle event. Downstream systems correlating events across a
lifecycle do so by collecting <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> values from each frame as
it is emitted, rather than by walking the underlying audit chain.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="x402-transport"><name>x402 Transport</name>

<t>In the x402 HTTP protocol, a PEF frame MAY be included in the verify
response body as an extension field alongside the existing payment
confirmation fields:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
POST /verify HTTP/1.1
...

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "x402Version": 1,
  "settlement_evidence": {
    "pef_version": "1",
    "claim_type": "payment_settlement",
    "receipt_format": "settlement-attestation-v1",
    "frame_id": "sha256:<hex64>",
    ...
  }
}
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>A PEF frame MAY also be carried in an <spanx style="verb">X-Payment-Evidence</spanx> response
header, with the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> value as the header value and the full
frame retrievable at a content-addressed endpoint. The full frame
transport via header is implementation-defined.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="agent-to-agent-a2a-task-artifacts"><name>Agent-to-Agent (A2A) Task Artifacts</name>

<t>In A2A payment agent flows, a PEF frame MAY be attached as a task
artifact after a payment task completes. The standard artifact shape
is:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "type": "payment_evidence",
  "mimeType": "application/json",
  "data": {
    "pef_version": "1",
    "claim_type": "payment_settlement",
    "frame_id": "sha256:<hex64>",
    "receipt_format": "settlement-attestation-v1",
    "receipt_hash": "sha256:<hex64>",
    "receipt": { ... }
  }
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is the stable correlation handle for the orchestrator
managing a multi-step payment workflow. Agents reference the
<spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> in subsequent task messages without carrying the full
receipt bytes.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="mpp-payment-method-response"><name>MPP Payment Method Response</name>

<t>In Multi-Party Payment (MPP) flows, a PEF frame MAY be included in
the payment method authorisation response body, providing the payer
agent with a portable receipt envelope that references the
compliance-screen and settlement events in a single
content-addressed form.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="operator-independent-audit-chain-of-frames"><name>Operator-Independent Audit Chain of Frames</name>

<t>A PEF frame MAY be anchored into an audit chain as a chain row. The
chain row shape per draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt Section 5.1
uses the frame's <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> (the SHA-256 of the inner receipt)
as the <spanx style="verb">row_content_hash</spanx>. This enables an audit chain that
interleaves PEF frames with raw receipt records: a chain walker can
verify both the inner receipt and the frame envelope from a single
retained chain.</t>

<t>This section additionally specifies a self-contained, operator-
independent audit chain whose rows are PEF frames. The chain is
append-only and content-addressed: rows are linked by the
deterministic <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> of the preceding row, each row is signed by
its own operator's post-quantum key, and the whole chain is
verifiable offline from the bytes alone. There is no shared trusted
root: trust is per-row and content-addressed, and no single root key
whose compromise would forge the chain exists. A payment lifecycle
that spans several operators (an agent operator emitting a
<spanx style="verb">payment_admission</spanx> frame, a facilitator emitting a
<spanx style="verb">payment_settlement</spanx> frame, an auditor emitting a <spanx style="verb">composite_verdict</spanx>
frame) produces a single chain that any party can verify without
trusting any of the contributing operators.</t>

<section anchor="chain-row"><name>Chain Row</name>

<t>A chain row binds one PEF frame to its position and predecessor under
the identity of the operator that contributed it. The row identity is
the JSON object:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "chain_position": 0,
  "frame_id": "sha256:<hex64>",
  "operator_did": "did:web:agent-operator.example",
  "prev_row_hash": "sha256:<hex64>"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><spanx style="verb">chain_position</spanx> -- a zero-based integer index. It MUST be an
integer; RFC 3339 string forms and float forms MUST be rejected
before canonicalisation, per Substrate Rule 2
(draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs Section 4.1).</t>
  <t><spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> -- the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> (Section 4) of the PEF frame this row
commits. The committed frame is retained alongside the chain and is
itself independently verifiable per Sections 4.1 and 5.</t>
  <t><spanx style="verb">operator_did</spanx> -- the DID URI of the operator that contributed and
signed this row. Distinct rows MAY carry distinct <spanx style="verb">operator_did</spanx>
values; the chain does not require a single issuer.</t>
  <t><spanx style="verb">prev_row_hash</spanx> -- the <spanx style="verb">row_hash</spanx> (Section 7.5.2) of the preceding
row. For the genesis row (<spanx style="verb">chain_position</spanx> 0) it MUST be the
sentinel <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> followed by sixty-four <spanx style="verb">0</spanx> characters.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">row_hash</spanx> of a row is <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> followed by the lowercase hex
SHA-256 of the JCS-canonical bytes of the row identity object above,
computed under draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs. The
<spanx style="verb">row_hash</spanx> is content-addressed: it binds position, predecessor,
committed frame, and operator in one digest. Implementations MUST NOT
strip the <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> prefix during canonicalisation or verification.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="linkage"><name>Linkage</name>

<t>Rows form a chain by <spanx style="verb">prev_row_hash</spanx> reference: for every row at
<spanx style="verb">chain_position</spanx> N greater than 0, <spanx style="verb">prev_row_hash</spanx> MUST equal the
<spanx style="verb">row_hash</spanx> of the row at <spanx style="verb">chain_position</spanx> N-1. Because <spanx style="verb">row_hash</spanx>
includes <spanx style="verb">chain_position</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">operator_did</spanx>, any
reordering, insertion, deletion, or content change in an earlier row
changes that row's <spanx style="verb">row_hash</spanx> and breaks every subsequent
<spanx style="verb">prev_row_hash</spanx> link. The chain is therefore tamper-evident over both
order and content with no external index.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="per-operator-post-quantum-signature"><name>Per-Operator Post-Quantum Signature</name>

<t>Each row is signed by the operator named in its <spanx style="verb">operator_did</spanx>, over
the row identity object of Section 7.5.1, using a post-quantum
algorithm per draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding: Falcon-1024
(NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204). The signature and the
operator's public key are carried alongside the row in the credential
envelope defined by that document; this specification does not
redefine the envelope or the signing procedure.</t>

<t>Post-quantum row signatures are REQUIRED rather than the OPTIONAL
transport-layer <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field of Section 3.10: a long-retention
audit trail retains non-repudiation past a cryptographically-relevant
quantum computer only if the per-row signatures are post-quantum from
the outset. The transport-layer RFC 9421 <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx>
(draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-x402-binding) on an individual frame, when
present, is independent of and complementary to the operator row
signature; the two serve different layers and MAY both be present.</t>

<t>Different rows MAY be signed by different operators holding different
keys. No row's validity depends on any other operator's key, and no
shared root key exists.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="offline-whole-chain-verification"><name>Offline Whole-Chain Verification</name>

<t>A holder verifies the chain from the retained bytes alone, with no
callback to any operator or issuer. For a chain of rows in
<spanx style="verb">chain_position</spanx> order, a verifier MUST:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t><strong>Linkage.</strong> For <spanx style="verb">chain_position</spanx> 0, confirm <spanx style="verb">prev_row_hash</spanx> is
the genesis sentinel. For each subsequent row, recompute the
preceding row's <spanx style="verb">row_hash</spanx> (SHA-256 of JCS of its row identity)
and confirm it equals this row's <spanx style="verb">prev_row_hash</spanx>.</t>
  <t><strong>Committed frame.</strong> For each row, recompute the committed PEF
frame's <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> per Section 4.1 and its <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> per
Section 5, and confirm both verify and that the recomputed
<spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> equals the row's <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>. This binds the row to a
frame whose inner receipt is itself unaltered.</t>
  <t><strong>Operator signature.</strong> For each row, verify the operator's
post-quantum signature over the row identity object against the
public key carried in that row's credential envelope, per
draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The chain is valid if and only if all three checks pass for every
row. All three are computable from the retained chain bytes plus the
retained committed frames; none requires contacting an operator, an
issuer, or any AlgoVoi infrastructure. A failure in any check
identifies the first non-conforming row by <spanx style="verb">chain_position</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="frame-id-as-row-content-hash-compatibility"><name>Frame ID as Row Content Hash (Compatibility)</name>

<t>Where a deployment prefers to link a chain directly by frame content
rather than by the row identity of Section 7.5.1, the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>
itself (the SHA-256 of the JCS preimage) MAY be used as the
<spanx style="verb">row_content_hash</spanx> of the compliance-receipt-style chain row
(Section 5.1 of draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt). In this case
the chain references frame envelopes directly, and each frame remains
independently verifiable. This is the minimal integration; the
operator-independent construction of Sections 7.5.1--7.5.4 is the
full construction and is RECOMMENDED where cross-operator,
no-trusted-root verification is required.</t>

</section>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="year-n-auditability-properties"><name>Year-N Auditability Properties</name>

<t>The six properties pinned by
draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs Section 5 apply to the PEF
frame:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Self-describing canonicalisation pin via <spanx style="verb">canon_version</spanx>.</t>
  <t>No external rule registry required.</t>
  <t>Cross-implementation verifiability (8-implementation matrix per
the discipline I-D).</t>
  <t>Tamper detection via <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> (inner receipt) and
<spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> (frame envelope).</t>
  <t>Regulatory lifecycle coverage via closed <spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx> enumeration
spanning all five payment lifecycle events.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Plus three PEF-specific properties:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t><strong>Stable cross-system identifier.</strong> <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is derivable by
any party holding the frame bytes using only SHA-256 and the JCS
discipline. A consumer reading a retained <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> reference
years after emission can re-derive the identifier from the stored
frame bytes without access to any AlgoVoi infrastructure.</t>
  <t><strong>Inner receipt integrity without deserialisation.</strong> <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx>
is SHA-256(JCS(<spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx>)). A consumer verifying a stored frame
confirms inner receipt integrity with one hash comparison. The
inner receipt remains independently verifiable at its own content
address.</t>
  <t><strong>Signature stability.</strong> The optional <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field, if
subsequently added to a stored frame, does not alter <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>.
Audit chain entries referencing a <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> remain valid after
the frame is signed. This allows post-hoc signature enrichment of
stored frames without invalidating existing references.</t>
  <t><strong>Operator-independent offline verification.</strong> The audit chain of
Section 7.5 verifies from the retained bytes alone -- linkage,
committed-frame integrity, and each operator's post-quantum
signature -- with no callback to and no trust in any operator, and
with no shared root key. A holder re-verifying the chain in year N
needs only the retained chain bytes, the committed frames, and a
SHA-256 plus Falcon-1024 / ML-DSA-65 verifier; the
post-quantum row signatures preserve non-repudiation across the
retention period.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<section anchor="urn-namespace-registration"><name>URN Namespace Registration</name>

<t>This document references the URN
<spanx style="verb">urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1</spanx> registered by
draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs Section 10.1. No additional
URN namespace registration is required by this document.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="frame-format-identifier"><name>Frame Format Identifier</name>

<t>This document defines the frame format identifier:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
urn:x402:frame:payment-evidence-v1
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>This identifier MAY be used by PEF implementations to refer to
Payment Evidence Frames as a class. Registration with IANA is
requested under the <spanx style="verb">x402</spanx> URN namespace.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="claim-type-registry"><name>Claim Type Registry</name>

<t>This document defines the <spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx> closed enumeration:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
payment_admission
payment_settlement
payment_cancellation
payment_refund
composite_verdict
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>These values are defined for the <spanx style="verb">urn:x402:frame:payment-evidence-v1</spanx>
frame format. Future additions to the enumeration would require a
new I-D revising this document.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<section anchor="frame-tampering"><name>Frame Tampering</name>

<t>A PEF frame's <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is the SHA-256 of its JCS-canonical
preimage. Tampering with any field in the preimage (any field other
than <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx>) produces a different hash; the tampered frame
fails verification against any stored <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> reference.
Tampering with the inner <spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx> is detected by <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx>
mismatch before <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is even computed. Implementations MUST
verify both <spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> before accepting a frame.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="preimage-exclusion"><name>Preimage Exclusion</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> excludes <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> from its preimage (Section 4).
This is an intentional design choice that enables signature addition
after <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> derivation. A consumer MUST NOT include <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx>
in the preimage when verifying <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>; doing so would make
unsigned and signed frames verify differently, breaking stable
cross-system references.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="frame-provider-identity"><name>Frame Provider Identity</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">frame_provider_did</spanx> field is a self-asserted DID. It identifies
the party that constructed the frame but does not by itself prove
that party's identity to a consumer. Consumers MUST establish trust
in the frame provider through out-of-band means (DID method
resolution, certificate authority, mutual-trust agreement, or the
optional <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field per draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-x402-binding).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="claim-type-mismatch"><name>Claim Type Mismatch</name>

<t>A malicious party could embed a <spanx style="verb">compliance-receipt-v1</spanx> inner receipt
in a frame with <spanx style="verb">claim_type: payment_settlement</spanx>. Implementations
MUST verify that <spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">receipt_format</spanx> are consistent
per the mapping in Section 3.3, and MUST verify that the inner
receipt's self-declared format (its own version field or equivalent)
matches <spanx style="verb">receipt_format</spanx>. A mismatch MUST cause the frame to be
rejected.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="receipt-hash-collision"><name>Receipt Hash Collision</name>

<t><spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> is SHA-256, which is collision-resistant to currently
known attacks. A consumer SHOULD NOT accept a frame whose
<spanx style="verb">receipt_hash</spanx> is all-zeros or any other degenerate value. The
concern is not SHA-256 weakness but implementation errors that emit
a zero hash when the inner receipt is empty or malformed; the
<spanx style="verb">receipt</spanx> field MUST be a non-empty object.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="signature-absence"><name>Signature Absence</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field is OPTIONAL. Its absence does not indicate a
frame is invalid or untrustworthy; many legitimate frames are
unsigned. Consumers that require a transport-layer identity
guarantee (e.g. for regulatory-grade evidence submission) SHOULD
require the <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> field to be present and verify it per
draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-x402-binding before accepting the frame
as authoritative evidence.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="timestamp-integrity"><name>Timestamp Integrity</name>

<t><spanx style="verb">frame_timestamp_ms</spanx> is self-asserted by the frame provider. It
records the claimed time at which the frame was constructed, not a
verified time. Consumers relying on frame timestamps for
time-sensitive decisions (e.g. refund window eligibility) SHOULD
verify the timestamp against independently-derived evidence
(settlement chain timestamps, HTTP Date header, blockchain block
timestamp).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="audit-chain-trust-model"><name>Audit Chain Trust Model</name>

<t>The audit chain of Section 7.5 has no shared trusted root. Each row
is signed by its own operator over a content-addressed row identity,
and verification establishes only that each row was signed by the key
identified in that row and that the rows are linked in order. It does
not by itself establish that a given <spanx style="verb">operator_did</spanx> is the party a
consumer believes it to be; consumers MUST establish trust in each
<spanx style="verb">operator_did</spanx> through out-of-band means (DID method resolution, a
mutual-trust agreement, or a credential issued by a party the
consumer already trusts), exactly as for <spanx style="verb">frame_provider_did</spanx>
(Section 10.3). The construction's guarantee is that no operator can
alter, reorder, or forge another operator's row without detection,
and that the chain remains verifiable offline; it is not a claim that
the named operators are inherently trustworthy. Because the row
signatures are post-quantum (Section 7.5.3), the non-repudiation
property survives the arrival of a cryptographically-relevant quantum
computer, which a classically-signed chain would not.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="references"><name>References</name>

<section anchor="normative-references"><name>Normative References</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119,
March 1997.</t>
  <t>[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017.</t>
  <t>[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259,
December 2017.</t>
  <t>[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785,
June 2020.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="informative-references"><name>Informative References</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs, Hopley, C., "JCS
Canonicalisation Discipline for Agentic-Payment Receipts",
May 2026.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt, Hopley, C., "Categorical
Compliance Screening Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows",
May 2026.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation, Hopley, C.,
"Categorical Settlement Attestation Format for Agentic-Payment
Flows", May 2026.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-cancellation-receipt, Hopley, C.,
"Categorical Mandate Cancellation Receipt Format for
Agentic-Payment Flows", May 2026.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt, Hopley, C., "Categorical
Refund Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows", May 2026.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-composite-trust-query, Hopley, C., "Composite
Trust Query Response Format for Agentic-Payment Audit Chains",
May 2026.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-x402-binding, Hopley, C., "RFC 9421
HTTP Message Signatures Binding for x402 Payment Frames",
May 2026.</t>
  <t>draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding, Hopley, C.,
"Post-Quantum Credential Binding (Falcon-1024 / ML-DSA-65) for
x402 Agentic Payment Authorization", May 2026.</t>
  <t>AlgoVoi, "Substrate Authorship and Provenance",
https://docs.algovoi.co.uk/substrate-authorship-provenance</t>
  <t>AlgoVoi, "Payment Evidence Frame reference implementation",
https://pypi.org/project/algovoi-pef/</t>
  <t>EU Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA, Regulation (EU)
2023/1114), Article 68(9).</t>
  <t>EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU)
2024/1624), Article 77.</t>
  <t>EU Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2, Directive 2015/2366),
Articles 64, 72, 89.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="appendix-a-examples-informative"><name>Appendix A. Examples (Informative)</name>

<section anchor="a1-paymentadmission-compliance-screen-allow"><name>A.1. payment_admission -- compliance screen ALLOW</name>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "canon_version": "urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1",
  "claim_type": "payment_admission",
  "frame_id": "sha256:9badca886409ed26d09adfe6ce133a53100909dd4544d4ad160e130b6a755f29",
  "frame_provider_did": "did:key:z6MkgExzvcpvxrghf4Q3285xqSdenhRZHcP6wc5UvY6VVaz5",
  "frame_timestamp_ms": 1780143974835,
  "pef_version": "1",
  "receipt": {
    "canon_version": "jcs-rfc8785-v1",
    "jurisdiction_flags": ["UK", "EU"],
    "payer_ref": "sha256:e0f023d54479255752bac099d0565984b5884afec0f1a1ebe27e0eaf70a205ba",
    "screen_provider_did": "did:key:z6MkgExzvcpvxrghf4Q3285xqSdenhRZHcP6wc5UvY6VVaz5",
    "screen_result": "ALLOW",
    "screen_timestamp_ms": 1780143974835
  },
  "receipt_format": "compliance-receipt-v1",
  "receipt_hash": "sha256:bc7a68b64925b8a76109d35e89cca4c7ae04073fa686844975a5b5f4410afa27"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>A compliance screen result of ALLOW. The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is stable: any
downstream consumer, agent, or audit system holding the same inner
receipt and frame metadata MUST derive the identical <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="a2-paymentsettlement-settled-on-chain"><name>A.2. payment_settlement -- settled on-chain</name>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "canon_version": "urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1",
  "claim_type": "payment_settlement",
  "frame_id": "sha256:3c4f1e2a8b7d6e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f",
  "frame_provider_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk",
  "frame_timestamp_ms": 1780144012000,
  "pef_version": "1",
  "receipt": {
    "amount_microunits": 1000000,
    "canon_version": "jcs-rfc8785-v1",
    "jurisdiction_flags": ["UK"],
    "settled_payment_ref": "sha256:0dd5d0b76c9b9281fdeb2509ad38ab132b16a17385ca01d976ff9e6e12563a0f",
    "settlement_chain": "base_mainnet",
    "settlement_provider_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk",
    "settlement_result": "SETTLED",
    "settlement_timestamp_ms": 1780144010000
  },
  "receipt_format": "settlement-attestation-v1",
  "receipt_hash": "sha256:a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>A confirmed on-chain settlement on <spanx style="verb">base_mainnet</spanx>. The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>
can be passed in the x402 <spanx style="verb">/verify</spanx> response body as
<spanx style="verb">settlement_evidence.frame_id</spanx>, allowing the merchant backend to
reference the payment evidence without embedding the full receipt.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="a3-paymentcancellation-mandate-terminated-by-compliance"><name>A.3. payment_cancellation -- mandate terminated by compliance</name>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "canon_version": "urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1",
  "claim_type": "payment_cancellation",
  "frame_id": "sha256:b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3",
  "frame_provider_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk",
  "frame_timestamp_ms": 1780145000000,
  "pef_version": "1",
  "receipt": {
    "cancellation_reason": "COMPLIANCE_TERMINATED",
    "cancellation_timestamp_ms": 1780144990000,
    "canon_version": "jcs-rfc8785-v1",
    "issuer_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk",
    "jurisdiction_flags": ["UK", "EU"],
    "mandate_ref": "sha256:c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4"
  },
  "receipt_format": "cancellation-receipt-v1",
  "receipt_hash": "sha256:d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>A mandate terminated by compliance action. The <spanx style="verb">claim_type</spanx> signals
<spanx style="verb">payment_cancellation</spanx> without the consumer needing to inspect the
inner receipt's <spanx style="verb">cancellation_reason</spanx> field to classify the event.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="a4-paymentrefund-partial-refund-issued"><name>A.4. payment_refund -- partial refund issued</name>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "canon_version": "urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1",
  "claim_type": "payment_refund",
  "frame_id": "sha256:e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6",
  "frame_provider_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk",
  "frame_timestamp_ms": 1780146000000,
  "pef_version": "1",
  "receipt": {
    "canon_version": "jcs-rfc8785-v1",
    "issuer_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk",
    "jurisdiction_flags": ["UK"],
    "refund_amount_microunits": 500000,
    "refund_result": "PARTIAL",
    "refund_timestamp_ms": 1780145990000,
    "settlement_ref": "sha256:a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2"
  },
  "receipt_format": "refund-receipt-v1",
  "receipt_hash": "sha256:f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>A partial refund. Note the <spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> in the inner receipt
linking back to the settlement attestation frame -- the full
lifecycle is traceable by <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> at each stage.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="a5-compositeverdict-verifier-of-verifier-trusted"><name>A.5. composite_verdict -- verifier-of-verifier TRUSTED</name>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "canon_version": "urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1",
  "claim_type": "composite_verdict",
  "frame_id": "sha256:a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
  "frame_provider_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk",
  "frame_timestamp_ms": 1780147000000,
  "pef_version": "1",
  "receipt": {
    "canon_version": "jcs-rfc8785-v1",
    "chain_ref": "sha256:0dd5d0b76c9b9281fdeb2509ad38ab132b16a17385ca01d976ff9e6e12563a0f",
    "ctq_timestamp_ms": 1780146990000,
    "jurisdiction_flags": ["UK", "EU"],
    "query_ref": "sha256:8b7df143d91c716ecfa5fc1730022f6b421b05cedee8fd52b1fc65a96030ad52",
    "trust_outcome": "TRUSTED",
    "verifier_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk"
  },
  "receipt_format": "composite-trust-query-v1",
  "receipt_hash": "sha256:b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>A composite trust query verdict of TRUSTED, wrapped in a PEF frame
for transport. The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> can be passed to an orchestrating
agent as the correlation handle for the full audit conclusion,
without embedding the full CTQ response in every downstream message.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="a6-signed-frame-optional-signature-field"><name>A.6. Signed Frame (OPTIONAL signature field)</name>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "canon_version": "urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1",
  "claim_type": "payment_settlement",
  "frame_id": "sha256:3c4f1e2a8b7d6e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f",
  "frame_provider_did": "did:web:api.algovoi.co.uk",
  "frame_timestamp_ms": 1780144012000,
  "pef_version": "1",
  "receipt": { "..." : "..." },
  "receipt_format": "settlement-attestation-v1",
  "receipt_hash": "sha256:a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2",
  "signature": "sig=:base64url-encoded-signature:; keyid=\"...\"; created=1780144012"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is identical to the unsigned example in A.2. Adding
<spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> does not change the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> because <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> is
excluded from the preimage. Downstream references to the <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx>
derived before signing remain valid.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="appendix-b-reference-implementations-informative"><name>Appendix B. Reference Implementations (Informative)</name>

<t>The following open-source implementations conform to this format.
Both implement <spanx style="verb">build_pef()</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">verify_pef()</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">pef_frame_id()</spanx>
with byte-for-byte cross-language parity.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>algovoi-pef (Python) on PyPI:
https://pypi.org/project/algovoi-pef/
Depends on algovoi-substrate for the JCS canonicalisation
primitive. Apache 2.0 licensed.</t>
  <t>@algovoi/pef (TypeScript) on npm:
https://www.npmjs.com/package/@algovoi/pef
Byte-for-byte parity with the Python sibling. Depends on
@algovoi/substrate for the JCS canonicalisation primitive.
Apache 2.0 licensed.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A live production instance of PEF emission is accessible at:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
POST https://api.algovoi.co.uk/compliance/screen
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">compliance_receipt_pef</spanx> field in the response carries a
<spanx style="verb">payment_admission</spanx> PEF frame when the screen result is ALLOW or
DENY. The <spanx style="verb">frame_id</spanx> is derivable by any party holding the
returned frame using only SHA-256 and the JCS discipline.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="known-adopters-informative"><name>Known Adopters (Informative)</name>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Adopter</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Surface</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Claim types emitted</ttcol>
      <c>AlgoVoi (<spanx style="verb">api.algovoi.co.uk</spanx>)</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">/compliance/screen</spanx> response</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_admission</spanx></c>
      <c>AlgoVoi (<spanx style="verb">api.algovoi.co.uk</spanx>)</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">/checkout/*/verify</spanx> response</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">payment_settlement</spanx></c>
</texttable>

</section>
<section anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

<t>This document, the frame format it specifies, and the reference
implementations derived from it are AlgoVoi work under AlgoVoi
authorship. Substrate authorship history is catalogued at
<eref target="https://docs.algovoi.co.uk/substrate-authorship-provenance">https://docs.algovoi.co.uk/substrate-authorship-provenance</eref>.</t>

<t>The canonicalisation discipline pinned by Section 6 is normatively
specified in draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs under the same
authorship.</t>

<t>This document closes the transport layer gap in the agentic-payment
receipt stack. Below it sit five AlgoVoi-authored receipt formats:
compliance, settlement, cancellation, refund, and composite trust
query. PEF sits above all five and provides the stable cross-system
identifier and taxonomy label that enables receipt bytes to travel
across HTTP, agent-to-agent, and audit-chain boundaries without
losing their identity or requiring the consumer to parse the inner
format before routing.</t>

<t>The author acknowledges Anders Rundgren as the editor of RFC 8785,
the JSON Canonicalization Scheme on which the canonicalisation
discipline builds.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>








  </back>

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