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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding-01" category="info" submissionType="independent">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="x402-pqc-cred-binding">Post-Quantum Credential Binding for x402 Agentic Payment Authorization</title>

    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley">
      <organization>AlgoVoi</organization>
      <address>
        <email>hello@algovoi.co.uk</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Independent Submission</workgroup>
    <keyword>post-quantum</keyword> <keyword>x402</keyword> <keyword>agentic payments</keyword> <keyword>Falcon-1024</keyword> <keyword>ML-DSA</keyword> <keyword>NIST FIPS 204</keyword> <keyword>NIST FIPS 206</keyword> <keyword>credential binding</keyword> <keyword>zero-knowledge proof</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 70?>

<t>This document defines how Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206 / FN-DSA) and ML-DSA-65
(NIST FIPS 204) credentials bind to x402 agentic payment authorization.
It specifies the credential envelope format, the JCS canonicalization
discipline applied to signed payloads, the gateway verification procedure,
and the session token binding that replaces per-request API key authentication
for credentialed agents.</t>

<t>This is the first Internet-Draft in the agentic payments space to anchor
credential binding to the NIST post-quantum cryptography standards
(FIPS 203/204/206).</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 83?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>The x402 payment protocol <xref target="x402"/> enables HTTP-native micropayments between
autonomous agents and API providers. As agent deployments scale, two problems
emerge:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t><strong>Per-request authentication overhead.</strong> An agent making thousands of
payment-gated requests must authenticate on every call. API keys are
long-lived secrets that create revocation and rotation complexity.</t>
  <t><strong>Quantum vulnerability.</strong> All deployed x402 credentials use Ed25519 or
ES256 — algorithms broken by a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer
running Shor's algorithm.</t>
</list></t>

<t>This document addresses both by defining a credential binding scheme where:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>An agent earns a short-lived PQC-signed credential from a trusted evaluation
service (the Agent Trust Bench, <xref target="ATB"/>).</t>
  <t>The agent exchanges this credential for a gateway session token in a single
round-trip.</t>
  <t>Subsequent payment requests carry only the session token.</t>
  <t>The credential signing algorithm is Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or
ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204).</t>
</list></t>

<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174].</t>

<t><strong>Issuer:</strong> An entity that evaluates an agent and signs a credential asserting
the result. The reference implementation is the AlgoVoi Agent Trust Bench.</t>

<t><strong>Gateway:</strong> The x402 payment gateway that accepts credentials and issues
session tokens.</t>

<t><strong>Agent:</strong> An autonomous software system presenting credentials to a gateway
in exchange for payment-authorization session tokens.</t>

<t><strong>ATB Pass Certificate:</strong> A Falcon-1024-signed credential asserting that an
agent passed adversarial evaluation. Phase 1 contains a plaintext score;
Phase 2 replaces the score with a Bulletproofs range proof (zero-knowledge).</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="credential-envelope-format"><name>Credential Envelope Format</name>

<t>A PQC credential is a JSON object serialised to UTF-8 and encoded as
base64url (without padding). The structure is:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "alg":     "<algorithm>",
  "kid":     "<key-id>",
  "payload": { ... },
  "sig":     "<base64url signature>"
}
]]></artwork></figure>

<section anchor="alg-field"><name>alg field</name>

<t>MUST be one of:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><spanx style="verb">"Falcon-1024"</spanx> — FN-DSA-1024 per NIST FIPS 206.</t>
  <t><spanx style="verb">"ML-DSA-65"</spanx> — Module-Lattice Digital Signature per NIST FIPS 204.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">"Falcon-1024"</spanx> algorithm is the RECOMMENDED choice. It provides
1,024-bit classical security, 256-bit post-quantum security, and
compact signatures (~1,280 bytes).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="kid-field"><name>kid field</name>

<t>A 16-character lowercase hex string derived as:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
kid = hex(SHA-256(public_key_bytes))[:16]
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The gateway MUST verify that the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> in the envelope matches the
<spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> of the issuer's public key in its trusted-key registry before
proceeding to signature verification.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="payload-field"><name>payload field</name>

<t>A JSON object. Required fields for ATB Phase 2 credentials:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Field</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Type</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Description</ttcol>
      <c><spanx style="verb">atb_cert_version</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>MUST be <spanx style="verb">"2"</spanx> for Phase 2 ZKP credentials.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">bench_issuer</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>Issuer DID (e.g. <spanx style="verb">did:algovoi:bench:prod</spanx>).</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">commitment_b64</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>Bulletproofs Pedersen commitment (base64 std).</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">proof_b64</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>Bulletproofs range proof (base64 std).</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">threshold_milliunits</spanx></c>
      <c>integer</c>
      <c>Range proof lower bound (0–1000).</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">expires_at</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>ISO 8601 UTC expiry timestamp.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">issued_at</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>ISO 8601 UTC issuance timestamp.</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">methodology_version</spanx></c>
      <c>string</c>
      <c>Evaluation methodology version string.</c>
</texttable>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">commitment_b64</spanx> field MUST decode to exactly 32 bytes (a compressed
Ristretto255 point). The <spanx style="verb">proof_b64</spanx> field MUST decode to 200–900 bytes
(a 64-bit Bulletproofs range proof over Ristretto255).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="sig-field"><name>sig field</name>

<t>Base64url-encoded detached signature over the JCS-canonical form of the
<spanx style="verb">payload</spanx> field. The signer applies RFC 8785 <xref target="RFC8785"/> canonicalization
to the <spanx style="verb">payload</spanx> object, then signs the resulting UTF-8 bytes.</t>

<t>For <spanx style="verb">alg = "Falcon-1024"</spanx>, the signature is a Falcon-1024 detached
signature (NIST FIPS 206, PQClean format, ~1,280 bytes, base64url).</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="signing-procedure"><name>Signing Procedure</name>

<t>The issuer:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Constructs the <spanx style="verb">payload</spanx> JSON object with all required fields.</t>
  <t>Applies RFC 8785 JCS canonicalization to produce <spanx style="verb">canonical_bytes</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Signs <spanx style="verb">canonical_bytes</spanx> using Falcon-1024 or ML-DSA-65.</t>
  <t>Base64url-encodes the signature as <spanx style="verb">sig</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Assembles the envelope: <spanx style="verb">{"alg":…,"kid":…,"payload":…,"sig":…}</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Base64url-encodes the envelope JSON as the credential string.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The issuer MUST NOT include the <spanx style="verb">sig</spanx> field in the payload before signing.
The <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> envelope fields MUST NOT be signed.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="verification-procedure"><name>Verification Procedure</name>

<t>The gateway receiving <spanx style="verb">X-ATB-ZK-Credential: &lt;credential&gt;</spanx>:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Base64url-decode and JSON-parse the envelope.</t>
  <t>Verify <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> is a supported algorithm.</t>
  <t>Resolve the <spanx style="verb">bench_issuer</spanx> DID from the payload to a trusted hub entry.</t>
  <t>Verify <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> matches <spanx style="verb">hex(SHA-256(hub.public_key))[:16]</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Verify <spanx style="verb">expires_at</spanx> has not elapsed.</t>
  <t>Base64url-decode <spanx style="verb">sig</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Apply JCS canonicalization to <spanx style="verb">payload</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Verify the Falcon-1024 (or ML-DSA-65) signature.</t>
  <t>Decode and structurally validate <spanx style="verb">commitment_b64</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">proof_b64</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Call the ZKP verification service to verify the Bulletproofs range proof.</t>
  <t>If all checks pass, <spanx style="verb">passed = true</spanx>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A gateway SHOULD implement an LRU cache keyed by <spanx style="verb">(sha256(sig)[:32], kid)</spanx>
to avoid re-running Falcon verification for repeated presentations within
the cache TTL. The cache TTL MUST NOT exceed the credential's <spanx style="verb">expires_at</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="session-token-binding"><name>Session Token Binding</name>

<t>On successful credential verification, the gateway issues a session token:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
POST /auth/token
Authorization: Bearer <api-key>
X-Tenant-Id: <tenant-id>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "atb_zk_credential": "<credential>",
  "spend_cap_usd": 100.0,
  "ttl_secs": 3600
}
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>Response:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "token": "<session-token>",
  "token_type": "Bearer",
  "expires_in": 3600,
  "spend_cap_usd": 100.0,
  "jti": "<unique-token-id>"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The session token is a JWT <xref target="RFC7519"/> signed with the gateway's HMAC key.
Its claims include <spanx style="verb">tenant_id</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">jti</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">spend_cap</spanx> (in micro-USD), <spanx style="verb">exp</spanx>,
and <spanx style="verb">iat</spanx>. Subsequent requests carry only:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
Authorization: Bearer <session-token>
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>No API key or tenant header is required for the session duration.</t>

<section anchor="spend-cap-enforcement"><name>Spend Cap Enforcement</name>

<t>The gateway tracks cumulative spend per <spanx style="verb">jti</spanx> in-process. On each
successful payment, <spanx style="verb">spend</spanx> is incremented. If <spanx style="verb">spend &gt;= spend_cap</spanx>,
the gateway MUST reject the request with HTTP 402.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="algorithm-comparison"><name>Algorithm Comparison</name>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Property</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Ed25519</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Falcon-1024 (FIPS 206)</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)</ttcol>
      <c>Classical security</c>
      <c>128-bit</c>
      <c>1024-bit</c>
      <c>192-bit</c>
      <c>Post-quantum security</c>
      <c>Broken</c>
      <c>~256-bit</c>
      <c>~192-bit</c>
      <c>Signature size</c>
      <c>64 B</c>
      <c>~1,280 B</c>
      <c>~3,309 B</c>
      <c>NIST standard</c>
      <c>No</c>
      <c>FIPS 206</c>
      <c>FIPS 204</c>
      <c>Deployed in x402</c>
      <c>Yes</c>
      <c>AlgoVoi only</c>
      <c>AlgoVoi only</c>
</texttable>

<t>Implementations SHOULD prefer Falcon-1024 for its signature compactness
in HTTP header contexts.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<section anchor="quantum-threat-model"><name>Quantum threat model</name>

<t>An adversary with a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer can break
Ed25519 and ES256 signatures using Shor's algorithm. All credentials using
these algorithms are vulnerable to retrospective forgery once such a machine
exists. Issuers SHOULD migrate to Falcon-1024 or ML-DSA-65 before quantum
computers reach this capability threshold.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="score-privacy"><name>Score privacy</name>

<t>Phase 2 ATB credentials include a Bulletproofs range proof rather than a
plaintext score. The range proof attests that <spanx style="verb">score &gt;= threshold</spanx> without
revealing the exact score. Gateways MUST NOT attempt to reconstruct scores
from commitment values.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="replay-attacks"><name>Replay attacks</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">jti</spanx> in each session token is a random 128-bit value generated at
issuance. Gateways MUST track issued <spanx style="verb">jti</spanx> values and reject replayed tokens.
The credential <spanx style="verb">nonce</spanx> in Phase 1 activation flows prevents replay at the
license-activation layer.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="key-rotation"><name>Key rotation</name>

<t>Issuers SHOULD rotate Falcon-1024 keys at least annually. The <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> field
allows gateways to maintain a key registry and identify credentials by key
version without revoking the full issuer DID.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">

<reference anchor="FIPS204" >
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="August"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS 204" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="FIPS206" >
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures — FN-DSA (Falcon)</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="August"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS 206" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8785" >
  <front>
    <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
    <author initials="A." surname="Rundgren" fullname="A. Rundgren">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="B." surname="Jordan" fullname="B. Jordan">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Erdtman" fullname="S. Erdtman">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2020" month="June"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7519" >
  <front>
    <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2015" month="May"/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">

<reference anchor="x402" target="https://x402.org/spec">
  <front>
    <title>The x402 Payment Protocol for Internet-Native Micropayments</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ATB" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/109852">
  <front>
    <title>AlgoVoi Agent Trust Bench: Adversarial Evaluation, Post-Quantum Credential Binding, and Cross-Issuer Federation for Agentic Payment Safety</title>
    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="June"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="IACR ePrint 2026/109852" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="BULLETPROOFS" >
  <front>
    <title>Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More</title>
    <author initials="B. B. et" surname="al." fullname="B. Bünz et al.">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2018"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="IEEE S&amp;P 2018" value=""/>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>



  </back>

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