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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-hopley-x402-settlement-anchoring-00" category="info" submissionType="independent">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="x402-settlement-anchoring">Chain-Agnostic Anchoring of Canonical Settlement References for Agentic Payments</title>

    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley">
      <organization>AlgoVoi</organization>
      <address>
        <email>hello@algovoi.co.uk</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>

    <area>Applications</area>
    <workgroup>Independent Submission</workgroup>
    <keyword>x402</keyword> <keyword>agentic payments</keyword> <keyword>settlement</keyword> <keyword>content addressing</keyword> <keyword>JCS</keyword> <keyword>RFC 8785</keyword> <keyword>CAIP-2</keyword> <keyword>on-chain anchor</keyword> <keyword>OP_RETURN</keyword> <keyword>EVM calldata</keyword> <keyword>chain-agnostic</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 73?>

<t>This document specifies how a canonical content-addressed settlement
reference is anchored into a transaction on any blockchain, uniformly
across chain families, so that the same agentic-payment settlement can
be recorded on-chain and later verified offline from the transaction
bytes alone.</t>

<t>The settlement reference is a SHA-256 digest over the JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) form of a settlement record.
This document does not redefine the digest; it defines (1) a chain
identification rule that rejects ambiguous chain names before a
settlement is bound to a network, and (2) a family-uniform anchor
encoding that places the reference in the one field each chain family
makes available for opaque data (EVM calldata or a log topic, an SVM
memo, an AVM note, a UTXO OP_RETURN output, or a generic metadata
carrier). The anchor carries only the digest; it carries no party
identifiers, amounts, or personal data in cleartext.</t>

<t>Because the reference is content-addressed and the encoding is fixed
per family, any holder of the settlement record can recompute the
reference, read the anchor from the on-chain field, and confirm the
two match with no call to the settling party and no chain-specific
verification logic beyond reading one field.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 98?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>The x402 payment protocol <xref target="x402"/> and related agentic-payment systems
produce settlement records: structured statements that a payment
between two agents settled on a particular network for a particular
amount. A companion body of work specifies how such records are
canonicalised <xref target="CANONJCS"/>, chained into tamper-evident audit trails
<xref target="RETENTIONCHAIN"/>, and enveloped for transport <xref target="PEF"/>. All of that
work operates on content-addressed references derived by SHA-256 over
the JCS-canonical bytes of a record.</t>

<t>A gap remains at the chain boundary. Once a settlement reference
exists off-chain, an operator frequently wants to anchor it on-chain,
so that the settlement is timestamped and ordered by an independent
ledger and can be cited by transaction identifier. Two problems arise:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t><strong>Ambiguous chain identity.</strong> A settlement offer that names a chain
as "base" or "bitcoin" does not name a network. "base" may be
mainnet or a testnet; "bitcoin" may be mainnet, testnet, or a
signet. Binding a settlement to the wrong network destroys its
value. A settlement flow MUST resolve every chain name to an
unambiguous identifier, or refuse to settle.</t>
  <t><strong>Per-chain anchor drift.</strong> Each chain exposes a different field
for opaque application data. Without a fixed rule, the same
reference is encoded differently on each chain by each
implementation, and a verifier must special-case every chain to
read it back. This drift is precisely what a diligence reader
checks for; it is avoided by pinning one encoding per family from a
single source of truth.</t>
</list></t>

<t>This document closes both. It specifies a chain identification rule
(Section 4) and a family-uniform anchor encoding (Section 5), so that
the settlement reference is written identically on every chain of a
family and read back by a verifier that need not know the specific
chain. No new cryptographic primitive is introduced: the reference is
the JCS + SHA-256 content address defined by <xref target="CANONJCS"/>.</t>

<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/>
<xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals.</t>

<t><strong>settlement record</strong>: a JSON object stating the terms of a settled
agentic payment (the settling parties, the network, the amount, and a
nonce, at minimum). Its exact schema is out of scope; this document
constrains only how a reference to it is anchored.</t>

<t><strong>settlement_ref</strong>: the content-addressed reference to a settlement
record, of the form <spanx style="verb">sha256:&lt;lowercase-hex-64&gt;</spanx>, equal to <spanx style="verb">"sha256:"</spanx>
concatenated with the lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 digest of the
JCS-canonical bytes of the settlement record. See Section 3.</t>

<t><strong>canonical chain id</strong>: an unambiguous chain identifier of the form
<spanx style="verb">&lt;namespace&gt;:&lt;reference&gt;</spanx>, following the CAIP-2 convention <xref target="CAIP2"/>
(for example <spanx style="verb">eip155:8453</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">bip122:000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779ba</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">algorand:mainnet</spanx>).</t>

<t><strong>anchor value</strong>: the family-specific encoding of a <spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx>
placed in a transaction field. See Section 5.</t>

<t><strong>settlement family</strong>: one of <spanx style="verb">evm</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">svm</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">avm</spanx>, or <spanx style="verb">generic</spanx>,
determining which transaction field carries the anchor and how the
reference is encoded into it. See Section 5.1.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="relationship-to-other-documents"><name>Relationship to Other Documents</name>

<t>This document is additive to the agentic-payment receipt stack and
introduces no new hashing primitive:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The canonicalisation discipline and the SHA-256-over-JCS content
address are specified in <xref target="CANONJCS"/>. <spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> is that
content address applied to a settlement record.</t>
  <t><xref target="RETENTIONCHAIN"/> defines an <spanx style="verb">execution_ref</spanx> (Section 7.10 of that
document) that is a distinct primitive: it is a 64-hex value with no
<spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> prefix, bound to a pre-payment decision. The
<spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> in this document is <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx>-prefixed and bound to
a settlement record. The two references belong to different layers
and MUST NOT be conflated; an implementation carrying both retains
their distinct encodings.</t>
  <t><xref target="PEF"/> envelopes settlement receipts for transport; a
<spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> MAY appear as a field within a transported receipt.
This document specifies the on-chain anchoring of the reference, not
its transport.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="the-settlement-reference"><name>The Settlement Reference</name>

<t>A <spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> is computed as:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
settlement_ref = "sha256:" + hex(SHA256(JCS(settlement_record)))
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>where <spanx style="verb">JCS</spanx> is RFC 8785 <xref target="RFC8785"/> canonicalisation as disciplined by
<xref target="CANONJCS"/> (in particular, integer epoch-millisecond timestamps, not
RFC 3339 strings), <spanx style="verb">SHA256</spanx> is FIPS 180-4 <xref target="FIPS180-4"/>, and <spanx style="verb">hex</spanx> is
lowercase hexadecimal. The result is exactly 71 characters: the
7-character prefix <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> followed by 64 hexadecimal characters.</t>

<t>The reference is a commitment to the settlement record. Any party
holding the record recomputes the reference deterministically; any
change to any field of the record changes the reference. The record
itself is retained off-chain by the parties; only the reference is
anchored.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="chain-identification"><name>Chain Identification</name>

<t>Before a settlement is bound to a network, its chain name MUST be
normalised to a canonical chain id (Section 1.1). The normalisation
rule is:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>If the name is a known alias, replace it with its canonical id.
Aliases are a deployment-configured mapping; examples are
<spanx style="verb">base -&gt; eip155:8453</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">ethereum -&gt; eip155:1</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">sepolia -&gt; eip155:11155111</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">algorand -&gt; algorand:mainnet</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">solana -&gt; solana:mainnet</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">stellar -&gt; stellar:pubnet</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Otherwise, if the name already contains a <spanx style="verb">:</spanx> it is treated as a
canonical id and accepted as-is.</t>
  <t>Otherwise the name is bare and unknown. It MUST be rejected as
ambiguous. An implementation MUST NOT guess a network for a bare
unknown name.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Rule 3 is load-bearing. A bare name such as <spanx style="verb">bitcoin</spanx> names a family
but not a network, so it MUST be rejected; a settlement on Bitcoin
MUST name a canonical id such as
<spanx style="verb">bip122:000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779ba</spanx> (testnet) or the
corresponding mainnet genesis-hash id. A negotiation between two
agents succeeds only on an exact, network-specific match; this
prevents a wrong-network settlement that a permissive name-match would
allow.</t>

<section anchor="family-selection"><name>Family Selection</name>

<t>The settlement family (Section 1.1) is determined from the namespace
of the canonical chain id:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Namespace</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Family</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Examples</ttcol>
      <c><spanx style="verb">eip155</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">evm</spanx></c>
      <c>Ethereum, Base, Arc, and other EVM chains</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">solana</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">eclipse</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">svm</spanx></c>
      <c>Solana and SVM chains</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">algorand</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">voi</spanx></c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">avm</spanx></c>
      <c>Algorand, VOI</c>
      <c>any other namespace</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">generic</spanx></c>
      <c>Stellar, UTXO chains, Move chains, and any chain not otherwise mapped</c>
</texttable>

<t>An unmapped namespace falls through to the <spanx style="verb">generic</spanx> family, so a
chain that has never been seen before still anchors, through the
generic encoding of Section 5.2. This is the property that makes the
scheme chain-agnostic: adding a chain requires no change to a verifier
that already reads the four family encodings.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="anchor-encoding"><name>Anchor Encoding</name>

<section anchor="text-carrying-families-avm-svm-generic"><name>Text-Carrying Families (avm, svm, generic)</name>

<t>Chains whose anchor field carries an opaque text string (an AVM
transaction note, an SVM memo, a generic metadata field) encode the
reference in a namespaced, self-describing form:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
anchor_value = "algovoi-mesh:" + settlement_ref
             = "algovoi-mesh:sha256:" + hex(SHA256(JCS(record)))
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The fixed prefix <spanx style="verb">algovoi-mesh:</spanx> makes the anchor greppable and
self-describing on-chain and identifies the value as a settlement
reference rather than unrelated memo text. A verifier strips the fixed
prefix to recover the <spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx>. Implementations MUST anchor
this exact value and MUST NOT hand-roll a per-chain variant of the
prefix; a single anchor-value producer is the source of truth so the
form cannot drift per chain.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="evm-family"><name>EVM Family</name>

<t>EVM chains carry the anchor in transaction calldata or a log topic,
which is a 32-byte word. The word holds the raw digest only:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
anchor_value = "0x" + hex(SHA256(JCS(record)))
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> textual prefix is not carried on EVM: the field is a
fixed 32-byte word, and the digest is exactly 32 bytes, so the word
holds the digest and nothing else. This is the one family whose
encoding differs from Section 5.1, and it differs only because the
carrier is a fixed-width binary word rather than a text field. A
verifier reconstructs the <spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> by prefixing the recovered
32-byte word with <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="utxo-chains-generic-family-opreturn"><name>UTXO Chains (generic family, OP_RETURN)</name>

<t>On UTXO chains such as Bitcoin, the anchor is carried in an OP_RETURN
output. The standard relay limit for OP_RETURN data is 80 bytes. The
full 84-character hexadecimal form of the text encoding
(<spanx style="verb">algovoi-mesh:sha256:</spanx> plus 64 hex characters, 84 bytes) exceeds this
limit. Implementations therefore carry the raw digest rather than its
hex form:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
anchor_bytes = b"algovoi-mesh:sha256:" + SHA256(JCS(record))
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>that is, the 20-byte ASCII prefix <spanx style="verb">algovoi-mesh:sha256:</spanx> followed by
the raw 32-byte digest, for a total of 52 bytes, within the 80-byte
limit. A verifier reads the OP_RETURN data, strips the 20-byte ASCII
prefix, and hex-encodes the trailing 32 bytes to recover the digest.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="other-generic-carriers"><name>Other Generic Carriers</name>

<t>A chain in the generic family whose data carrier is a fixed-width
binary field rather than a text field (for example a Stellar
<spanx style="verb">manage_data</spanx> entry, whose value is at most 64 bytes) MAY carry the
raw 32-byte digest directly, as in Section 5.3 but without the ASCII
prefix where the field width does not admit it. The controlling
constraint is the carrier width; the reference recovered MUST be the
same <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx>-prefixed value in all cases.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="verification"><name>Verification</name>

<t>A verifier holding the settlement record and the anchoring transaction
confirms the anchor as follows:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Recompute <spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> from the retained record per Section 3.</t>
  <t>Determine the settlement family from the canonical chain id per
Section 4.1.</t>
  <t>Read the anchor field for that family and decode the
<spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> per the applicable subsection of Section 5
(strip the text prefix, or hex-encode the raw 32-byte word or
OP_RETURN payload, and re-apply the <spanx style="verb">sha256:</spanx> prefix).</t>
  <t>Compare the decoded reference to the recomputed reference. The
anchor is confirmed if and only if they are byte-identical.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The comparison requires no contact with the settling party and no
chain-specific logic beyond reading one field. A settlement whose
record has been altered in any field yields a different recomputed
reference and fails the comparison.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<section anchor="no-personal-data-on-chain"><name>No Personal Data On-Chain</name>

<t>The anchor carries only the SHA-256 digest of the settlement record.
Party identifiers, amounts, and any other record content appear only
inside the off-chain record, never in the on-chain field. An observer
of the chain learns that a settlement was anchored and its content
address, not who settled or for how much. The record is disclosed only
to a party that already holds it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="wrong-network-settlement"><name>Wrong-Network Settlement</name>

<t>The ambiguity rejection of Section 4 (Rule 3) is a security control,
not a convenience. Accepting a bare chain name and defaulting it to a
network would allow a counterparty to induce a settlement anchored on
a network the other party did not intend (for example a valueless
testnet in place of mainnet, or the reverse). Implementations MUST
reject bare unknown names rather than default them.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="encoding-confusion"><name>Encoding Confusion</name>

<t>Because one family (EVM, Section 5.2) omits the textual prefix while
the others carry it, a verifier MUST select the decoding by the
settlement family derived from the canonical chain id, not by
inspecting the field content. A field that does not decode to a
32-byte digest under the family's rule MUST be treated as absent or
invalid, not reinterpreted under a different family's rule.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="digest-strength"><name>Digest Strength</name>

<t>The reference is a SHA-256 digest, collision-resistant to currently
known attacks. A verifier SHOULD reject an all-zero or otherwise
degenerate anchor value, which indicates an implementation error
rather than a valid empty settlement.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="anchor-does-not-prove-authorisation"><name>Anchor Does Not Prove Authorisation</name>

<t>Anchoring a reference proves that some party wrote the reference to the
chain at a point in time; it does not by itself prove that the
settlement was authorised by the named parties. Authorisation is
established off-chain by the signatures over the settlement record and
its constituent offers, which are out of scope for this document.
A valid anchor and a valid authorisation are independent checks.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This document has no IANA actions. The <spanx style="verb">algovoi-mesh:</spanx> anchor prefix
is a vendor-scoped literal carried in application data fields and
requires no registry.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="interop-vectors-informative"><name>Interop Vectors (Informative)</name>

<t>The following testnet transactions anchor a <spanx style="verb">settlement_ref</spanx> under the
encodings of Section 5 and were confirmed on public testnets. Each
exercises a distinct family and carrier. They are provided as
reference deployments; the digests are content addresses of test
settlement records and carry no production data.</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Network</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Family / carrier</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Transaction</ttcol>
      <c>Ethereum Sepolia (<spanx style="verb">eip155:11155111</spanx>)</c>
      <c>evm / calldata</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">0x8d94a77228a919eb1bacf5f04dc4e08bd8fa3812c8b25b0fdc8359ec8b09ac56</spanx> (block 11276567)</c>
      <c>Bitcoin testnet (<spanx style="verb">bip122:...</spanx>)</c>
      <c>generic / OP_RETURN</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">d9b10aa3e821f75098a90418be05862d415617165f80ff7aaa101acdde735932</spanx> (block 5062123)</c>
      <c>XRP Ledger testnet</c>
      <c>generic / memo</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">E5529C1A1D8DEA91AB1E05894C8CE3F0BCEE4546A514A0C4AC86ED0EC61EE978</spanx> (ledger 19081862)</c>
</texttable>

<t>The EVM vector carries the raw 32-byte digest in calldata (Section
5.2); the Bitcoin vector carries the <spanx style="verb">algovoi-mesh:sha256:</spanx> prefix plus
the raw digest in a 52-byte OP_RETURN (Section 5.3); the XRPL vector
carries the <spanx style="verb">algovoi-mesh:sha256:&lt;hex&gt;</spanx> text form in a memo (Section
5.1).</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">

<reference anchor="RFC8785" >
  <front>
    <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
    <author initials="A." surname="Rundgren" fullname="A. Rundgren">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="B." surname="Jordan" fullname="B. Jordan">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Erdtman" fullname="S. Erdtman">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2020" month="June"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119" >
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="1997" month="March"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174" >
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2017" month="May"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="FIPS180-4" >
  <front>
    <title>Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS 180-4" value=""/>
</reference>


    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">

<reference anchor="CAIP2" target="https://chainagnostic.org/CAIPs/caip-2">
  <front>
    <title>CAIP-2: Blockchain ID Specification</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RETENTIONCHAIN" >
  <front>
    <title>Self-Verifiable Retention Chain for Payment Receipts</title>
    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="draft-hopley-x402-retention-chain" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="CANONJCS" >
  <front>
    <title>JCS Canonicalisation Discipline for Agentic-Payment Receipts</title>
    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="PEF" >
  <front>
    <title>Payment Evidence Frame for Agentic-Payment Lifecycle Receipts</title>
    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="draft-hopley-x402-payment-evidence-frame" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="x402" target="https://x402.org/spec">
  <front>
    <title>The x402 Payment Protocol for Internet-Native Micropayments</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>


<?line 410?>

<section anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

<t>The content-addressing and canonicalisation discipline on which this
anchoring builds is specified in draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs
under the same authorship. The author acknowledges Anders Rundgren as
editor of RFC 8785, the JSON Canonicalization Scheme on which the
content address builds.</t>

</section>


  </back>

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