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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-acme-dns-account-label-05" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="ACME-DNS-CHALLENGE">Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) DNS Labeled With ACME Account ID Challenge</title>

    <author fullname="Antonis Chariton">
      <organization>Independent Contributor</organization>
      <address>
        <email>daknob@daknob.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Amir A. Omidi">
      <organization>Independent Contributor</organization>
      <address>
        <email>amir@aaomidi.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="James Kasten">
      <organization>Snowflake</organization>
      <address>
        <email>james.kasten@snowflake.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Fotis Loukos">
      <organization>Google</organization>
      <address>
        <email>fotisl@google.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Stanislaw A. Janikowski">
      <organization>Google</organization>
      <address>
        <email>stanwise@google.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Automated Certificate Management Environment</workgroup>
    <keyword>acme</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 58?>

<t>This document outlines a new DNS-based challenge type for the ACME protocol that enables multiple independent systems to authorize a single domain name concurrently. By adding a unique label to the DNS validation record name, the dns-account-01 challenge avoids CNAME delegation conflicts inherent to the dns-01 challenge type. This is particularly valuable for multi-region or multi-cloud deployments that wish to rely upon DNS-based domain control validation and need to independently obtain certificates for the same domain.</t>



    </abstract>

    <note title="About This Document" removeInRFC="true">
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://github.com/aaomidi/draft-ietf-acme-dns-account-challenge"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-dns-account-label/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        WG Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:acme@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/acme/about/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/aaomidi/draft-ietf-acme-dns-account-challenge"/>.</t>
    </note>


  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 62?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">dns-01</spanx> challenge specified in section 8.4 of <xref target="RFC8555"/> uses a single DNS authorization label (<spanx style="verb">_acme-challenge</spanx>) for domain validation. This single-label approach creates a limitation in domain validation: each domain can only delegate its validation to one ACME client at a time. Since delegation requires the use of CNAME records, of which only one can exist per DNS name, operators are forced to choose a single ACME challenge solver for their domain name.</t>

<t>This limitation becomes particularly problematic in modern deployment architectures. In multi-region deployments, separate availability zones serve the same content while avoiding cross-zone dependencies. These zones need to independently obtain and manage certificates for the same domain name. Similarly, during zero-downtime migrations, two different infrastructure setups may coexist for extended periods, with both requiring access to valid certificates. Other use cases include multi-CDN deployments and the provision of backup certificates for use when an active certificate must be quickly revoked.</t>

<t>This document specifies a new challenge type: <spanx style="verb">dns-account-01</spanx>, which addresses these operational needs. The <spanx style="verb">dns-account-01</spanx> challenge incorporates the ACME account URL into the DNS validation record name, allowing multiple independent ACME clients to perform domain validation concurrently. Since these authorization labels depend on the ACME account KID (<xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>), operators can generate and configure the necessary DNS records in advance.</t>

<t>This document does not deprecate the <spanx style="verb">dns-01</spanx> challenge specified in <xref target="RFC8555"/>. The ability to complete the <spanx style="verb">dns-account-01</spanx> challenge requires ACME server operators to deploy new code, making adoption of this challenge an opt-in process.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

</section>
<section anchor="dns-account-01-challenge"><name>DNS-ACCOUNT-01 Challenge</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">dns-account-01</spanx> challenge allows an ACME client to prove control of a domain name by provisioning a TXT resource record containing a designated value for a specific validation domain name. It leverages the ACME account URL to construct a unique but stable validation domain name. The ACME server validates control of the domain name by performing one or more DNS queries to this validation domain name, following CNAME records, to arrive at one or more TXT resource records. The ACME server verifies that the contents of one or more of these TXT record(s) match the digest value of the key authorization that is constructed from the token value provided in the challenge.</t>

<section anchor="challenge-definition"><name>Challenge Definition</name>
<t>The challenge object contains the following fields:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>type (required, string): The string "dns-account-01".</t>
  <t>token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. This value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have at least 128 bits of entropy. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain any characters outside the base64url alphabet, including padding characters ("="). See <xref section="C.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9846"/> for information on additional requirements for secure randomness.</t>
  <t>url (required, string): The URL to which a response can be posted, as defined in <xref section="8" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>.</t>
  <t>status (required, string): The status of this challenge, as defined in <xref section="8" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>. Possible values are "pending", "processing", "valid", and "invalid" (see <xref section="7.1.6" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>).</t>
  <t>validated (optional, string): The time at which the ACME server validated this challenge, as defined in <xref section="8" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>.</t>
  <t>error (optional, object): Error that occurred while the ACME server was validating the challenge, as defined in <xref section="8" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Example challenge object:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{
    "type": "dns-account-01",
    "url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/i00MGYwLWIx",
    "status": "pending",
    "token": "ODE4OWY4NTktYjhmYS00YmY1LTk5MDgtZTFjYTZmNjZlYTUx"
}
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="challenge-fulfillment"><name>Challenge Fulfillment</name>

<t>To fulfill this challenge, an ACME client performs the following steps:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Construct Key Authorization  <list style="symbols">
      <t>Construct a key authorization <xref section="8.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/> from the <spanx style="verb">token</spanx> value provided in the challenge and the ACME client's account key</t>
      <t>Compute the SHA-256 digest <xref target="FIPS180-4"/> of the key authorization</t>
    </list></t>
  <t>DNS Record Creation  <list style="symbols">
      <t>Construct the validation domain name by prepending the following two labels to the domain name being validated:      <vspace blankLines='1'/>
        <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
"_" || base32(SHA-256(<ACCOUNT_URL>)[0:10]) || "._acme-challenge"
]]></artwork></figure>
      <list style="symbols">
          <t>SHA-256 is the SHA hashing operation defined in <xref target="FIPS180-4"/></t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">[0:10]</spanx> is the operation that selects the first ten bytes (bytes 0 through 9 inclusive) from the previous SHA-256 operation</t>
          <t>base32 is the operation defined in <xref target="RFC4648"/> and its use throughout this document is case-insensitive</t>
          <t>ACCOUNT_URL is defined in <xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/> as the value in the <spanx style="verb">Location</spanx> header field. It is used exactly as supplied by the ACME server in the <spanx style="verb">Location</spanx> header field, which is the same string the ACME client carries in the JWS <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> field. The SHA-256 operation is computed over the octets of this string, without any normalization, decoding, or case folding.</t>
          <t>The <spanx style="verb">||</spanx> operator indicates concatenation of strings</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>Provision a DNS <spanx style="verb">TXT</spanx> record under the constructed validation domain name, containing the base64url encoding (per Section 5 of <xref target="RFC4648"/>, without padding) of the SHA-256 digest computed in step 1.</t>
    </list></t>
  <t>Challenge Response  <list style="symbols">
      <t>Respond to the ACME server with an empty object ({}) to acknowledge that the challenge can be validated by the ACME server</t>
    </list></t>
</list></t>

<t>Example DNS record for domain <spanx style="verb">example.org</spanx> with account URL <spanx style="verb">https://example.com/acme/acct/ExampleAccount</spanx>:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
_ujmmovf2vn55tgye._acme-challenge.example.org. 300 IN TXT (
    "LoqXcYV8...fm21mqTI" )
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>Because the validation domain name differs for each ACME account, an operator can delegate validation of the same domain name to multiple ACME clients, each using its own ACME account, with one CNAME record each. For example, with a second account URL <spanx style="verb">https://example.com/acme/acct/ExampleAccount2</spanx>:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
_ujmmovf2vn55tgye._acme-challenge.example.org. 300 IN CNAME (
    example-org.validation.region1.example.net. )
_irn4jvgahsogihvs._acme-challenge.example.org. 300 IN CNAME (
    example-org.validation.region2.example.net. )
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>Each ACME client then provisions its <spanx style="verb">TXT</spanx> record at its own CNAME target, independently of the other.</t>

<t>Example response to the ACME server:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
POST /acme/chall/Rg5dV14Gh1Q HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json

{
  "protected": base64url({
    "alg": "ES256",
    "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/ExampleAccount",
    "nonce": "SS2sSl1PtspvFZ08kNtzKd",
    "url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/Rg5dV14Gh1Q"
  }),
  "payload": base64url({}),
  "signature": "Q1bURgJoEslbD1c5...3pYdSMLio57mQNN4"
}
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="server-validation"><name>Server Validation</name>

<t>Upon receiving the challenge response, the ACME server:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Performs the typical JWS validation according to <xref section="6.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/></t>
  <t>Constructs and stores the key authorization</t>
  <t>Computes the SHA-256 digest <xref target="FIPS180-4"/> of the stored key authorization</t>
  <t>Computes the validation domain name using the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> value exactly as it appears in the JWS protected header, without any normalization</t>
  <t>Queries for TXT records at the validation domain name</t>
  <t>Verifies that at least one TXT record matches the computed digest value</t>
</list></t>

<t>The validation succeeds only if all verifications pass. The ACME server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> mark the challenge as invalid if any verification fails.</t>

<t>The ACME client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> de-provision the resource record(s) provisioned for this challenge once the challenge is complete, i.e., once the "status" field of the challenge has the value "valid" or "invalid".</t>

<t>Resource records left in place accumulate at the validation domain name over time and increase the DNS response size.
Since their value is derived from a single-use challenge <spanx style="verb">token</spanx>, they cannot satisfy any future challenge. Therefore
stale resource records do not affect security, so de-provisioning is not strictly required; an ACME client can, e.g.,
remove them later in batches, or retry removal after an error asynchronously.</t>

<t>Multiple challenges can share the same validation domain name, e.g., when the same ACME account requests a certificate
for both a domain name and its wildcard. In this case, the ACME client provisions one <spanx style="verb">TXT</spanx> record per challenge and
removes only the record for the completed challenge, since removing all <spanx style="verb">TXT</spanx> records at the validation domain name
would cause the remaining validations to fail.</t>

<t>Resource records not provisioned for a specific challenge, such as a <spanx style="verb">CNAME</spanx> record delegating the validation domain
name, are not affected by this recommendation.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="errors"><name>Errors</name>

<t>Errors encountered during challenge validation are reported as described in <xref section="6.7" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>.</t>

<t>If the ACME server is unable to find a <spanx style="verb">TXT</spanx> record for the validation domain name, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include the account URL it used to construct the validation domain name in the problem document. ACME clients <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use or rely on the presence of this field to construct the validation domain name.</t>

<t>Including the account URL is intended solely to assist operators in troubleshooting when the validation domain name they provisioned does not match the one computed by the ACME server. As it is not required for validation, an ACME server can omit it, e.g., to avoid ACME client reliance on its presence and prevent ossification.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="implementation-considerations"><name>Implementation Considerations</name>

<t>As this challenge creates a strong dependency on the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> account identifier, the ACME server <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ensure that the account identifier is not changed during the lifetime of the account. This contains the entire URI, including the ACME endpoint domain name, port, scheme, and full HTTP path. The ACME client and ACME server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compute the validation domain name from the same unmodified account URL string, as supplied in the <spanx style="verb">Location</spanx> header field and carried in the JWS <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> field. The ACME server <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> apply URL normalization differently in the <spanx style="verb">Location</spanx> header field and while validating challenges.</t>

<t>Such a change, e.g., to the ACME server hostname due to a service migration, may sometimes be operationally necessary. However, it invalidates all validation domain names previously provisioned by ACME clients, which would then need to be recomputed and re-provisioned. An ACME server making such a change <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> continue to accept requests whose <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> contains previously issued account URLs, so that existing DNS records remain valid.</t>

<t>The two labels prepended to the domain name being validated add 34 octets to its length in DNS wire format, including their length octets. The complete validation domain name <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> exceed the 255-octet limit of <xref section="2.3.4" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC1035"/>. Since this added length does not depend on the account, the ACME server can determine whether the limit would be exceeded when it creates an authorization. The ACME server <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> offer the <spanx style="verb">dns-account-01</spanx> challenge for an identifier whose validation domain name would exceed this limit as the challenge cannot be completed. ACME clients can use a different challenge type for such identifiers.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>The same security considerations apply for the integrity of authorizations (<xref section="10.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>) and DNS security (<xref section="11.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>) as in the original specification for <spanx style="verb">dns-01</spanx>.</t>

<t>To allow for seamless account key rollover without the label changing, the dynamic part of the label depends on the ACME account and not the account key. This allows for long-lived labels, without the security considerations of keeping the account key static.</t>

<t>In terms of the construction of the account label prepended to the domain name, there is no need for a cryptographic hash. The goal is to simply create a long-lived and statistically distinct label of minimal size. SHA-256 was chosen due to its existing use in the <spanx style="verb">dns-01</spanx> challenge (<xref section="8.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8555"/>).</t>

<t>The first 10 bytes were picked as a tradeoff: the value needs to be short enough to stay lower than the size limits for DNS (<xref section="2.3.4" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC1035"/>), long enough to provide sufficient probability of collision avoidance across ACME accounts, and just the right size to have Base32 require no padding. As the algorithm is used for a uniform distribution of inputs, and not for integrity, we do not consider the trimming a security issue. The length of the complete validation domain name is discussed in <xref target="implementation-considerations"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<section anchor="acme-validation-method"><name>ACME Validation Method</name>

<t>The "ACME Validation Methods" registry <xref target="IANA-ACME-VALIDATION-METHODS"/> is to be updated to include the following entries:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
label: dns-account-01
identifier-type: dns
ACME: Y
Reference: This document
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">

<reference anchor="FIPS180-4" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/4/final">
  <front>
    <title>Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</title>
    <author >
      <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2015" month="August"/>
  </front>
</reference>


<reference anchor="RFC8555">
  <front>
    <title>Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME)</title>
    <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
    <author fullname="J. Hoffman-Andrews" initials="J." surname="Hoffman-Andrews"/>
    <author fullname="D. McCarney" initials="D." surname="McCarney"/>
    <author fullname="J. Kasten" initials="J." surname="Kasten"/>
    <date month="March" year="2019"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates are used for a number of purposes, the most significant of which is the authentication of domain names. Thus, certification authorities (CAs) in the Web PKI are trusted to verify that an applicant for a certificate legitimately represents the domain name(s) in the certificate. As of this writing, this verification is done through a collection of ad hoc mechanisms. This document describes a protocol that a CA and an applicant can use to automate the process of verification and certificate issuance. The protocol also provides facilities for other certificate management functions, such as certificate revocation.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8555"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8555"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9846">
  <front>
    <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
    <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
    <date month="July" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 8446, which specified TLS 1.3. This document obsoletes RFC 5246 (specifying TLS 1.2) and RFCs 5077, 6961, 7627, and 8422, all of which pertain to TLS 1.2 or earlier, and updates RFCs 5705 and 6066. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9846"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC4648">
  <front>
    <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
    <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
    <date month="October" year="2006"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC1035">
  <front>
    <title>Domain names - implementation and specification</title>
    <author fullname="P. Mockapetris" initials="P." surname="Mockapetris"/>
    <date month="November" year="1987"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This RFC is the revised specification of the protocol and format used in the implementation of the Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-883. This memo documents the details of the domain name client - server communication.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1035"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1035"/>
</reference>




    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">

<reference anchor="IANA-ACME-VALIDATION-METHODS" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme#acme-validation-methods">
  <front>
    <title>ACME Validation Methods</title>
    <author >
      <organization>IANA</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>


<?line 255?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

</section>


  </back>

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