| Internet-Draft | ACME OpenID Federation | November 2026 |
| De Marco, et al. | Expires 24 May 2027 | [Page] |
The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol allows server operators to obtain TLS certificates for their websites, based on a demonstration of control over the website's domain via a fully-automated challenge/response protocol.¶
OpenID Federation 1.0 defines how to build a trust infrastructure using a trusted third-party model. It uses a trust evaluation mechanism to attest to the possession of private keys, protocol specific metadata and miscellaneous administrative and technical information related to a specific entity.¶
This document defines how X.509 certificates associated with a given OpenID Federation Entity can be issued by an X.509 Certification Authority through the ACME protocol to the organizations which are part of a federation built on top of OpenID Federation 1.0.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Automated Certificate Management Environment Working Group mailing list (mailto:acme@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/acme/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
This document describes extensions to the ACME protocol that integrate with OpenID Federation 1.0, allowing an ACME server to issue X.509 Certificates associated with a given OpenID Federation entity. An entity can be a school, government agency, corporation, automated system, or any participant that wishes to join the Federation.¶
In a multilateral federation, composed of thousands of entities belonging to different organizations, all the participants adhere to the same regulation or trust framework. OpenID Federation 1.0 allows each participant to recognize other participants using a trust evaluation mechanism, with RESTful services and cryptographic materials.¶
Federation members declare what kind of Entities they are using a basic OpenID Federation component called an Entity Configuration, a signed JSON Web Token. This document defines new OpenID Federation Entity Types for certificate Requestors and Issuers, facilitating automated discovery of an issuer's ACME API.¶
X.509 Certificates can be provided to one or more such entities, without having pre-established any direct relationship or contract.¶
These Certificates are useful for integrating with existing systems and protocols which require X.509 Certificates. For example, RADIUS ([RFC2865]) deployments often require Certificates to authenticate clients, or these Certificates could also be used for TLS [RFC8446]. In order to accommodate a variety of use cases, this document adds no requirement that CAs conform to any particular issuance profile, because fields of the X.509 Certificates like the Common Names, Subject Alternative Names or Key Usages may depend on details of those existing systems.¶
This document extends [RFC5280], ACME ([RFC8555]) and OpenID Federation 1.0 ([OPENID-FED]) in the following ways:¶
It defines a new ACME Identifier type called openid-federation
(Section 4).¶
It defines a new ACME challenge type called openid-federation-01
(Section 5).¶
It defines new OpenID Federation 1.0 Entity Types acme_issuer
(Section 7.1) and acme_requestor (Section 6).¶
It defines how OpenID Federation 1.0 Superior Entities can use Subordinate Statements to publish X.509 Certificates previously issued with ACME (Section 8).¶
It defines a new SubjectAlternativeName type id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId
and a corresponding OID so that OpenID Federation 1.0 Entity Identifiers can
be included in X.509 Certificates if an Issuer wishes
(Section 9).¶
The terms "Federation Entity", "Trust Anchor", "Entity Configuration", "Subordinate Statement", "Superior Entity", "Immediate Superior Entity", "Federation Entity Keys", "Federation Entity Discovery", "Trust Mark", "Trust Chain", and "Resolved Metadata" used in this document are defined in Section 1.2 of [OPENID-FED].¶
The term "Certificate Signing Request" (CSR) used in this document is defined as a "Certification Request" in [RFC2986]. The term "Certification Authority" used in this document is defined in [RFC5280]. The terms "ACME Client" and "ACME Server" are defined in [RFC8555].¶
The specification also defines the following terms:¶
An identifier in the sense of [RFC8555]. Some identifier that the ACME client proves control of to the ACME server.¶
A globally unique string identifier that is bound to one Entity in OpenID Federation, as defined in Section 1.2 of [OPENID-FED].¶
A Federation Entity which wants to request X.509 Certificates. It operates an ACME client, extended according to this document.¶
A Federation Entity which issues X.509 Certificates. It operates an ACME server, extended according to this document.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
JSON member names defined by this document follow the convention of the protocol they extend. Members of ACME objects, including challenge objects, challenge responses, and problem documents, use camelCase as in [RFC8555]. Members of OpenID Federation Entity Type metadata use snake_case as in [OPENID-FED].¶
This document defines a new ACME Identifier type for OpenID Federation Entities,
openid-federation, whose value is the Entity Identifier of the Requestor (the
sub parameter of the Requestor's Entity Configuration, as defined in
Section 3.1.1 of [OPENID-FED]).
The hyphenated label matches the corresponding validation method
openid-federation-01 (Section 5).¶
For example, the ACME Identifier corresponding to the example Entity Configuration in Section 6 is:¶
{"type": "openid-federation", "value": "https://requestor.example.com"}
¶
The openid-federation ACME Identifier type MUST NOT be validated except by the
openid-federation-01 challenge.¶
The OpenID Federation challenge type allows a Requestor to prove control of a Federation Entity using the trust evaluation mechanism provided by [OPENID-FED]. The Requestor demonstrates control of a cryptographic public key published in its OpenID Federation Entity Configuration.¶
There are two ways the Certificate Issuer is able to check if a Requestor is part of the federation:¶
The Requestor provides a Trust Chain when solving the ACME challenge. This is RECOMMENDED since it reduces the effort of the Certificate Issuer in evaluating the trust to the Requestor.¶
The Requestor doesn't provide a Trust Chain in the challenge solution.¶
The openid-federation-01 ACME challenge object has the following format:¶
type (required, string): The string "openid-federation-01"¶
token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. This value MUST have at least 128 bits of entropy. It MUST NOT contain any characters outside the base64url alphabet as described in Section 5 of [RFC4648]. Trailing '=' padding characters MUST be stripped. See [RFC4086] for additional information on randomness requirements.¶
trustAnchors (optional, array of string): An array of strings containing the Entity Identifiers of the Issuer's Trust Anchors. When solving the challenge, the Requestor can construct a Trust Chain from itself to one of these Trust Anchors. It is RECOMMENDED that the Issuer includes this field to make it easier for the Requestor to construct a Trust Chain.¶
A non-normative example of a challenge with trustAnchors specified:¶
{
"type": "openid-federation-01",
"url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4",
"status": "pending",
"token": "LoqXcYV8q5ONbJQxbmR7SCTNo3tiAXDfowyjxAjEuX0",
"trustAnchors": [
"https://trust-anchor-1.example.com",
"https://trust-anchor-2.example.com"
]
}
¶
The openid-federation-01 challenge MUST NOT be used to validate possession of
any ACME Identifiers except openid-federation ACME Identifiers.¶
The Requestor responds to the challenge with an object with the following format:¶
sig (required, string): the compact JSON serialization (as described in
Section 7.1 of [RFC7515]) of a JWS, signing the key authorization
encoded in UTF-8.
The key authorization is computed from the token in the challenge and the
Requestor's ACME account key, as defined in Section 8.1 of [RFC8555].
The signature must be made by one of the keys published in the Requestor's
acme_requestor metadata in its Entity Configuration, as specified in
Section 6.
The JWS MUST include a kid header parameter corresponding to the key used
to sign the key authorization and a typ header parameter set to
"signed-acme-challenge+jwt".¶
trustChain (optional, array of string): an array of strings containing signed
JWTs, representing a Trust Chain from the Requestor to one of the Issuer's
Trust Anchors (see Section 4 of [OPENID-FED]).
The Resolved Metadata of the Trust Chain subject MUST contain
acme_requestor metadata that contains the key used to compute sig.
It is RECOMMENDED that the Requestor includes this field.
If the Requestor cannot construct a Trust Chain to one of the Trust Anchors
indicated by the Issuer, or if no Trust Anchors were indicated, it MAY use
some other Trust Anchor that it believes the Issuer trusts.
If the Requestor cannot construct a Trust Chain to any Trust Anchor, it MAY
omit the trustChain field from the challenge response.¶
A non-normative example for an authorization with trustChain specified:¶
POST /acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4
Host: issuer.example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
{
"protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
"nonce": "UQI1PoRi5OuXzxuX7V7wL0",
"url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4"
}),
"payload": base64url({
"sig": "wQAvHlPV1tVxRW0vZUa4BQ...",
"trustChain": ["eyJhbGciOiJFU...", "eyJhbGci..."]
}),
"signature": "Q1bURgJoEslbD1c5...3pYdSMLio57mQNN4"
}
¶
On receiving a challenge response, the Certificate Issuer verifies that the
Requestor is trusted. If the Requestor did not provide a trustChain, the
Issuer MUST perform Federation Entity Discovery (Section 10 of [OPENID-FED]) to obtain a Trust Chain for the Requestor.¶
The Issuer MUST verify that the Trust Chain is valid according to Section 4 of [OPENID-FED] and that it terminates at a Trust Anchor the Issuer is configured to trust. The Issuer MUST NOT accept a Trust Chain that terminates at any other Trust Anchor, including a Trust Anchor selected by the Requestor that the Issuer does not itself trust.¶
Once it has obtained a valid Trust Chain, the Issuer evaluates the entity's Resolved Metadata, and verifies:¶
That the requested openid-federation ACME Identifier value matches the sub
parameter of the Requestor's Entity Configuration.¶
That there is a key in the acme_requestor metadata (Section 6)
of the Requestor's Resolved Metadata with a kid matching the kid claim in
the challenge response.¶
That the sig field of the payload is the compact JSON serialization of a
valid JWS signing the key authorization, using the above public key.¶
That the JWS protected header contains a typ header parameter with the
value "signed-acme-challenge+jwt".¶
If all of the above checks succeed, then the validation is successful.
Otherwise, it has failed. In either case, the Certificate Issuer responds
according to Section 7.5.1 of [RFC8555]. If the Issuer fails to verify OpenID
Federation trust, the problem document SHOULD contain a subproblem of type
urn:ietf:params:acme:error:openIDFederationEntity constructed as discussed in
Section 11.¶
A non-normative example for the challenge object post-validation:¶
{
"type": "openid-federation-01",
"url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4",
"status": "valid",
"validated": "2024-10-01T12:05:13.72Z",
"token": "LoqXcYV8q5ONbJQxbmR7SCTNo3tiAXDfowyjxAjEuX0"
}
¶
The Requestor MUST publish in its Entity Configuration an acme_requestor
metadata containing a JWK set, according to Section 5.2.1 of [OPENID-FED]. The keys in the set are used to
respond to ACME challenges.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Entity Configuration including
the acme_requestor metadata and using the jwks metadata parameter.¶
{
"iss": "https://requestor.example.com",
"sub": "https://requestor.example.com",
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 1516298022,
"jwks": {
"keys": [
{
"kty": "RSA",
"alg": "RS256",
"use": "sig",
"kid": "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
"n": "pnXBOusEANuug6ewezb9J_...",
"e": "AQAB"
}
]
},
"metadata": {
"acme_requestor": {
"jwks": {
"keys": [
{
"kty": "RSA",
"kid": "SUdtUndEWVY2cUFDeD...",
"n": "y_Zc8rByfeRIC9fFZrD...",
"e": "AQAB"
},
{
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "MFYycG1raTI4SkZvVDBIMF9CNGw3VEZYUmxQLVN2T21nSWlkd3",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "qAOdPQROkHfZY1daGofOmSNQWpYK8c9G2m2Rbkpbd4c",
"y": "G_7fF-T8n2vONKM15Mzj4KR_shvHBxKGjMosF6FdoPY"
}
]
}
}
}
}
¶
The Issuer MUST only use the Requestor's acme_requestor to validate an ACME
challenge. Therefore, after completing the challenge, the Requestor MAY remove
the acme_requestor metadata from its Entity Configuration.¶
The Requestor's ACME client may either be configured to use a particular ACME server, or to automatically discover a Certificate Issuer through the OpenID Federation.¶
In order to be discoverable, the Issuer MUST publish the entity type
acme_issuer in its Entity Configuration, according to Section 7.1.¶
[OPENID-FED] describes a variety of patterns and generic mechanisms for discovering Federation Entities (see Section 17.2 of [OPENID-FED]). This section describes how Issuers may make themselves discoverable in a Federation by Requestors.¶
The Issuer MUST publish its Entity Configuration including the acme_issuer
Entity Type metadata within it. The acme_issuer metadata contains one
parameter, directory_url, which is the URL of the ACME Directory, as defined
in Section 7.1.1 of [RFC8555].¶
Before using a discovered Issuer, the Requestor MUST obtain a Trust Chain from
the Issuer to a Trust Anchor that the Requestor is configured to trust, and MUST
verify that the Issuer's Resolved Metadata contains acme_issuer metadata.
Requestors MUST use the ACME Directory URL from that Resolved Metadata for
client configuration of ACME endpoints.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Entity Configuration including
the acme_issuer metadata:¶
{
"iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
"sub": "https://issuer.example.com",
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 1516298022,
"jwks": {
"keys": [
{
"kty": "RSA",
"alg": "RS256",
"use": "sig",
"kid": "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
"n": "pnXBOusEANuug6ewezb9J_...",
"e": "AQAB"
}
]
},
"metadata": {
"acme_issuer": {
"directory_url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/directory"
}
}
}
¶
The X.509 Certificates issued by federation Immediate Superior Entities
pertaining to one or more Federation Entity Keys in control of their
Subordinates MAY publish this information by including the x5c member
in each JWK contained within the matching Subordinate Statement. The contents
of the published x5c member, including whether it contains a full or
partial Trust Chain, and if so, to what Trust Anchor, are policy decisions
out of scope for this document.¶
Depending on the Certificate Issuer's X.509 Certificate profile, the CSR and X.509 Certificate MAY associate the X.509 Certificate to the Federation Entity by including the Entity Identifier in the X.509 Certificate.¶
To do so, the Issuer includes a Subject Alternative Name extension containing an
otherName with a type-id of id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId. The value of
the name is an Octet String containing the UTF-8 encoding of the Entity
Identifier (i.e., the corresponding openid-federation ACME Identifier from
the newOrder request).¶
id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on XXX }
OpenIdFederationEntityId ::= UTF8String
¶
The identity of the Requestor is verified through proof of possession of a private key corresponding to a public key attested within a Trust Chain. The Trust Chain has an expiration time, and its content MUST NOT be trusted past the expiration time (Section 10.4 of [OPENID-FED]).¶
A successful openid-federation-01 challenge results in an ACME authorization
(Section 7.1.4 of [RFC8555]) whose federation-membership evidence is the Trust
Chain used to validate the challenge. Since the content of the Trust Chain cannot
be trusted after its expiration time, the Certificate Issuer MUST set the
expires field of such an authorization to a time no later than the expiration
time of that Trust Chain.¶
According to Section 7.1.6 of [RFC8555], after the expires time the
authorization moves to the "expired" state. An order that has not yet been
finalized and that still depends on that authorization then moves to the
"invalid" state. A later order for the same ACME Identifier therefore requires a
new authorization, validated with a Trust Chain that has not expired.¶
The validity period and the lifecycle of the issued certificate are determined by the certificate profile and by the policy of the Certificate Issuer, and are out of scope for this document.¶
This document defines a new error type URI to be used in problem documents [RFC9457], as described in Section 6.7 of [RFC8555].¶
The error type urn:ietf:params:acme:error:openIDFederationEntity is used to
encapsulate any OAuth error code returned while resolving OpenID Federation
Entities. The title of this error type is "OpenID Federation Error". The
detail member of the problem document MAY include the description of the
particular OAuth error code that caused the error. The problem document for this
error type SHOULD include an extension member named errorCode, which MUST be
set to the OAuth error code, taken from the error codes defined in
Section 8.9 of [OPENID-FED].¶
The extensions in this document build upon the Security Considerations and threat model of ACME (Section 10 of [RFC8555]) and of OpenID Federation 1.0 (Section 18 of [OPENID-FED]). This section describes the additional considerations, deployment requirements, and composition risks that arise from using OpenID Federation 1.0 as the identifier validation method for ACME.¶
The openid-federation-01 challenge proves two properties at the time of
validation: that the Requestor controls a private key attested in its
acme_requestor metadata, and that a Trust Chain binds that Requestor to a
Trust Anchor the Issuer is configured to trust.¶
This is a different control demonstration than http-01, dns-01, or
tls-alpn-01. Those methods prove control of a DNS name or IP address that
typically appears in the issued certificate. This method proves membership in a
federation and control of a federation-attested key. It does not, by itself,
prove control of any DNS name, IP address, or other identifier that a
Certification Authority might place in an X.509 certificate.¶
Issuers must be configured with an explicit set of Trust Anchors, and must
reject any Trust Chain that does not terminate at one of those Trust Anchors.
Each such Trust Anchor must be administered under a federation policy that is
appropriate for the certificates the Issuer will produce, including the
certificate profile, the population of entities that are eligible to obtain certificates,
and any additional authorization criteria (for example, Trust Marks or
federation policy constraints on acme_requestor metadata). A Trust Anchor
that is acceptable for other OpenID Federation applications is not automatically
acceptable for X.509 issuance.¶
Requestors that discover Issuers through the federation must likewise be configured with an explicit set of Trust Anchors, and must authenticate a candidate Issuer as a federation member before using its ACME Directory (Section 7.1). Automatic discovery without a configured Trust Anchor allows a Requestor to enroll with an attacker-controlled ACME server.¶
OpenID Federation Entity Statements are signed JWTs. Their integrity and the resulting Trust Chain can be evaluated independently of the TLS channel used to transport them ([OPENID-FED]). Implementations must treat Trust Chain validation, not Web PKI validation of the HTTPS server that hosts an Entity Configuration, as the source of trust for this challenge. TLS still provides confidentiality and server authentication for ACME and for Federation Entity Discovery; it does not substitute for federation trust evaluation.¶
A trustChain supplied in the challenge response is a hint that saves the
Issuer from performing Federation Entity Discovery. It is not a substitute for
validation. The Issuer must verify every Entity Statement in a client-supplied
Trust Chain and must confirm that the chain terminates at a Trust Anchor the
Issuer is configured to trust, exactly as it would for a chain the Issuer
discovered itself.¶
The trustAnchors field in the challenge object tells the Requestor which Trust
Anchors the Issuer is prepared to accept. It is an optimization for the
Requestor. The Requestor must not treat those values as Trust Anchors for its
own discovery or authentication of the Issuer. The Issuer must reject a
client-supplied chain that ends at a Trust Anchor it did not configure.¶
A Trust Chain must not be relied upon past its expiration
(Section 10.4 of [OPENID-FED]).
Section 10, Paragraph 1 requires that the notBefore and notAfter values of
issued certificates fall before that expiration. Separately, Issuers that reuse
ACME authorizations for later orders (Section 7.1.3 of [RFC8555]) must not
treat an authorization as valid after the Trust Chain that justified it has
expired. Reusing a stale authorization would allow issuance without a current
attestation of federation membership.¶
The directory_url in acme_issuer metadata is reached only after the
Requestor has authenticated the Issuer as a federation member. Using a
directory_url taken from an untrusted Entity Configuration, from search, or
from user input without Trust Chain evaluation exposes the Requestor to an
attacker-controlled ACME server. The key-authorization binding described above
limits the harm of completing a challenge at such a server; it does not make
that server safe to use for account registration, order creation, or certificate
download.¶
The Requestor must use the directory_url from the Issuer's Resolved Metadata,
so that federation policy along the Trust Chain can constrain which ACME server
the Requestor contacts.¶
This protocol involves three distinct key roles: the ACME account key
([RFC8555]), the keys published in acme_requestor metadata and used to sign
challenge responses, and the subject keys in Certificate Signing Requests and
issued certificates. These keys should be distinct. In particular, the
cryptographic keys in the acme_requestor metadata should not be reused for any
purpose other than signing openid-federation-01 challenge responses, including
as Federation Entity Keys, as ACME account keys, or as the subject key of an
issued certificate.¶
Reusing a key across protocols requires a cross-protocol analysis. Domain
separation for the challenge response depends on the JWS typ value
"signed-acme-challenge+jwt"; verifiers must reject responses that omit this
typ or use a different value ([RFC8725]). Distinct keys remain the most
reliable defense.¶
Compromise of an acme_requestor private key allows an attacker to complete
openid-federation-01 challenges for that Entity Identifier until the key is
removed from the Requestor's Resolved Metadata and any authorizations granted
under it have expired. Requestors must protect these private keys with at least
the same care as ACME account keys, and should rotate them periodically. After
a challenge has been completed, the Requestor may remove acme_requestor
metadata from its Entity Configuration (Section 6), which limits
the time during which the corresponding public keys are advertised.¶
If the Requestor omits trustChain, the Issuer performs Federation Entity
Discovery, which can cause the Issuer to make multiple outbound requests
(Section 18.1 of [OPENID-FED]). ACME account
credentials are needed to submit a challenge response, but account creation
is often open. Issuers should prefer client-supplied Trust Chains, should bound
the time, depth, and number of authority_hints they are willing to follow, and
should apply the same denial-of-service controls they apply to other outbound
validation methods in [RFC8555].¶
The token value in the challenge object must have at least 128 bits of
entropy, as specified in Section 5, so that challenge responses cannot
be predicted or reused across challenges.¶
The expires field of the authorization resulting from an
openid-federation-01 challenge bounds how long the Certificate Issuer relies
on a given Trust Chain (Section 10). As with the other ACME
challenge types, the challenge proves control of the ACME Identifier at a point
in time, while the issued certificate remains valid for the period set by the
Certificate Issuer, and what happens to the certificate afterwards is handled by
the X.509 ecosystem in which the certificate is used.¶
Deployments that want the lifecycle of the issued certificates to be bound to the federation membership of the Requestor could rely on the certificate lifecycle mechanisms of that ecosystem, according to the applicable certificate policy. Those mechanisms are outside the scope of this document.¶
IANA is kindly asked to make the following updates to registries:¶
The following updates are all assignments in the "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Protocol" registry group [IANA-ACME].¶
IANA is asked to add to the "ACME Identifier Types" registry, defined in Section 9.7.7 of [RFC8555], the entry below, as specified here in Section 4:¶
| Label | Reference |
|---|---|
| openid-federation | this document |
IANA is also asked to add to the "ACME Validation Methods" registry, defined in Section 9.7.8 of [RFC8555], the entry below, as specified here in Section 5:¶
| Label | Identifier Type | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| openid-federation-01 | openid-federation | this document |
IANA is also asked to add to the "ACME Error Types" registry, defined in Section 9.7.4 of [RFC8555], the entry below, as specified here in Section 11:¶
| Type | Description | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| openIDFederationEntity | An error occurred while resolving an OpenID Federation entity | this document |
IANA is asked to add to the "PKIX Other Name Forms" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8) the entry below, as specified here in Section 9¶
| Decimal | Description | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| TBA | id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId | this document |
~~~ BEGIN EDNOTE ~~~¶
This appendix is to be removed before publication.¶
This section contains explanatory material that recaps a lot of RFC 8555. It is included here for the benefit of readers who are familiar with OpenID Federation but not with ACME, and want to see at a glance how the whole thing fits together.¶
The following diagram illustrates a successful interaction between Issuer and Requestor to retrieve an X.509 Certificate. The diagram assumes the Requestor has already discovered the Issuer, and the Requestor has already created an ACME account with the Issuer.¶
This section is informational and non-normative. The remainder of this document, [RFC8555] and [OPENID-FED] should be considered correct should this appendix disagree with any of them.¶
,-----------------.
|Requestor's | ,-----------.
|OpenID Federation| |Requestor's| ,------------------------. ,-----------------------.
| Web Server | |ACME Client| |X.509 Certificate Issuer| |Federation Trust Anchor|
`--------+--------' `-----+-----' `-----------+------------' `-----------+-----------'
| | POST /acme/new-order | |
| |---------------------------------> |
| | | |
| |Authorization at | |
| |/acme/authz/[authz-id] | |
| |Finalize at | |
| | /acme/order/[order-id]/finalize | |
| |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | | |
| | POST /acme/authz/[authz-id] | |
| |---------------------------------> |
| | | |
| | openid-federation-01 Challenge | |
| | at /acme/chall/[chall-id] | |
| |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | | |
| ----. | |
| | | Sign challenge token | |
| | | with private key | |
| <---' | |
| | | |
| | POST /acme/chall/[chall-id] | |
| | with signed | |
| | token and entity ID | |
| | set to Requestor's ID | |
| |---------------------------------> |
| | | |
| | Challenge validation | |
| | beginning | |
| |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | | |
| GET /.well-known/openid-federation | |
|<---------------------------------------------------- |
| | | |
| Requestor's Entity Configuration | |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > |
| | | |
| | ______________________________________________________
| | ! OPT / If Requestor didn't provide Trust Chain | !
| | !_____/ | | !
| | ! | Determine Trust Chain | !
| | ! | from Issuer's | !
| | ! | Trust Anchor to Requestor| !
| | ! | (Federation Discovery) | !
| | ! | <------------------------>| !
| | !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!
| | | |
| | |----. |
| | | | Evaluate Trust Chain |
| | |<---' |
| | | |
| | |----. |
| | | | Check |
| | | | Entity Configuration |
| | | | sub matches |
| | | | Entity Identifier |
| | |<---' in the order |
| | | |
| | | |
| | |----. |
| | | | Check challenge |
| | | | sig is signed |
| | | | with key in |
| | |<---' Entity Configuration |
| | | |
| _________________________________________________________________________ |
| ! LOOP / Poll until authz status | ! |
| ! / is "valid" or "invalid" | ! |
| !_____/ | | ! |
| ! | POST-as-GET | ! |
| ! | /acme/authz/[authz-id] | ! |
| ! |---------------------------------> ! |
| ! | | ! |
| ! | Current authz status | ! |
| ! |<--------------------------------- ! |
| !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~! |
| | | |
| | | |
| ___________________________________________________________________________ |
| ! OPT / If the authz status is "valid" | ! |
| !_____/ | | ! |
| ! | POST | ! |
| ! | /acme/orders/[order-id]/finalize| ! |
| ! | with CSR | ! |
| ! |---------------------------------> ! |
| ! | | ! |
| ! | |----. ! |
| ! | | | Check CSR ! |
| ! | | | validity ! |
| ! | | | according to ! |
| ! | | | protocol ! |
| ! | |<---' and CA policy ! |
| ! | | ! |
| ! | | ! |
| ! | Order object with certificate | ! |
| ! | at /acme/cert/[cert-id] | ! |
| ! |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ! |
| ! | | ! |
| ! | POST /acme/cert/[cert-id] | ! |
| ! |---------------------------------> ! |
| ! | | ! |
| ! | Newly issued X.509 Certificate | ! |
| ! |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ! |
| !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~! |
,--------+--------. ,-----+-----. ,-----------+------------. ,-----------+-----------.
|Requestor's | |Requestor's| |X.509 Certificate Issuer| |Federation Trust Anchor|
|OpenID Federation| |ACME Client| `------------------------' `-----------------------'
| Web Server | `-----------'
`-----------------'
¶
~~~ END EDNOTE ~~~¶
Aaron Gable and Mike Ounsworth, for early and thorough reviews of this draft.¶