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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="ACME OpenID Federation">Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) with OpenID Federation 1.0</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation-01"/>
    <author initials="G." surname="De Marco" fullname="Giuseppe De Marco">
      <organization>independent</organization>
      <address>
        <email>demarcog83@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="B." surname="Pitman" fullname="Brandon Pitman">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>bran@bran.land</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="T." surname="Geoghegan" fullname="Tim Geoghegan">
      <organization>ISRG</organization>
      <address>
        <email>timgeog+ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="D." surname="Cook" fullname="David Cook">
      <organization>ISRG</organization>
      <address>
        <email>divergentdave@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="J.C." surname="Jones" fullname="J.C. Jones">
      <organization>ISRG</organization>
      <address>
        <email>ietf@insufficient.coffee</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="20"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Automated Certificate Management Environment</workgroup>
    <keyword>OpenID Federation</keyword>
    <keyword>ACME</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 89?>

<t>The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol allows server
operators to obtain TLS certificates for their websites, based on a
demonstration of control over the website's domain via a fully-automated
challenge/response protocol.</t>
      <t>OpenID Federation 1.0 defines how to build a trust infrastructure using a
trusted third-party model. It uses a trust evaluation mechanism to attest to the
possession of private keys, protocol specific metadata and miscellaneous
administrative and technical information related to a specific entity.</t>
      <t>This document defines how X.509 certificates associated with a given OpenID
Federation Entity can be issued by an X.509 Certification Authority through the
ACME protocol to the organizations which are part of a federation built on top
of OpenID Federation 1.0.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Automated Certificate Management Environment Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:acme@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/acme/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 106?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>This document describes extensions to the ACME protocol that integrate with
OpenID Federation 1.0, allowing an ACME server to issue X.509 Certificates
associated with a given OpenID Federation entity. An entity can be a school,
government agency, corporation, automated system, or any participant that
wishes to join the Federation.</t>
      <t>In a multilateral federation, composed of thousands of entities belonging to
different organizations, all the participants adhere to the same regulation or
trust framework. OpenID Federation 1.0 allows each participant to recognize
other participants using a trust evaluation mechanism, with RESTful services and
cryptographic materials.</t>
      <t>Federation members declare what kind of Entities they are using a basic OpenID
Federation component called an Entity Configuration, a signed JSON Web Token.
This document defines new OpenID Federation
Entity Types for certificate Requestors and Issuers, facilitating automated
discovery of an issuer's ACME API.</t>
      <t>X.509 Certificates can be provided to one or more such entities, without having
pre-established any direct relationship or contract.</t>
      <t>These Certificates are useful for integrating with existing systems and
protocols which require X.509 Certificates. For example, RADIUS (<xref target="RFC2865"/>)
deployments often require Certificates to authenticate clients, or these
Certificates could also be used for TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/>. In order to accommodate a
variety of use cases, this document adds no requirement that CAs conform to any
particular issuance profile, because fields of the X.509 Certificates like the
Common Names, Subject Alternative Names or Key Usages may depend on details of
those existing systems.</t>
      <t>This document extends <xref target="RFC5280"/>, ACME (<xref target="RFC8555"/>) and OpenID Federation
1.0 (<xref target="OPENID-FED"/>) in the following ways:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>It defines a new ACME Identifier type called <tt>openid-federation</tt>
(<xref target="identifier-type"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It defines a new ACME challenge type called <tt>openid-federation-01</tt>
(<xref target="challenge-type"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It defines new OpenID Federation 1.0 Entity Types <tt>acme_issuer</tt>
(<xref target="issuer-metadata"/>) and <tt>acme_requestor</tt> (<xref target="requestor-metadata"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It defines how OpenID Federation 1.0 Superior Entities can use Subordinate
Statements to publish X.509 Certificates previously issued with ACME
(<xref target="publish-cert"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It defines a new SubjectAlternativeName type <tt>id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId</tt>
and a corresponding OID so that OpenID Federation 1.0 Entity Identifiers can
be included in X.509 Certificates if an Issuer wishes
(<xref target="openidfed-othername-id"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>The terms "Federation Entity", "Trust Anchor", "Entity Configuration",
"Subordinate Statement", "Superior Entity", "Immediate Superior Entity",
"Federation Entity Keys", "Federation Entity Discovery", "Trust Mark", "Trust
Chain", and "Resolved Metadata" used in this document are defined in
<xref section="1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-1.2"/>.</t>
      <t>The term "Certificate Signing Request" (CSR) used in this document is defined as
a "Certification Request" in <xref target="RFC2986"/>. The term "Certification Authority"
used in this document is defined in <xref target="RFC5280"/>. The terms "ACME Client" and
"ACME Server" are defined in <xref target="RFC8555"/>.</t>
      <t>The specification also defines the following terms:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>ACME Identifier:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An identifier in the sense of <xref target="RFC8555"/>. Some identifier that the ACME
client proves control of to the ACME server.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Entity Identifier:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A globally unique string identifier that is bound to one Entity in OpenID
Federation, as defined in
<xref section="1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-1.2-3.4"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Requestor:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A Federation Entity which wants to request X.509 Certificates. It operates an
ACME client, extended according to this document.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Certificate Issuer (or Issuer):</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A Federation Entity which issues X.509 Certificates. It operates an ACME
server, extended according to this document.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<t>JSON member names defined by this document follow the convention of the protocol
they extend. Members of ACME objects, including challenge objects, challenge
responses, and problem documents, use camelCase as in <xref target="RFC8555"/>. Members of
OpenID Federation Entity Type metadata use snake_case as in <xref target="OPENID-FED"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="identifier-type">
      <name>OpenID Federation ACME Identifier</name>
      <t>This document defines a new ACME Identifier type for OpenID Federation Entities,
<tt>openid-federation</tt>, whose value is the Entity Identifier of the Requestor (the
<tt>sub</tt> parameter of the Requestor's Entity Configuration, as defined in
<xref section="3.1.1" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-3.1.1"/>).
The hyphenated label matches the corresponding validation method
<tt>openid-federation-01</tt> (<xref target="challenge-type"/>).</t>
      <t>For example, the ACME Identifier corresponding to the example Entity
Configuration in <xref target="requestor-metadata"/> is:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
{"type": "openid-federation", "value": "https://requestor.example.com"}
]]></artwork>
      <t>The <tt>openid-federation</tt> ACME Identifier type <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be validated except by the
<tt>openid-federation-01</tt> challenge.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="challenge-type">
      <name>OpenID Federation Challenge Type</name>
      <t>The OpenID Federation challenge type allows a Requestor to prove control of a
Federation Entity using the trust evaluation mechanism provided by
<xref target="OPENID-FED"/>. The Requestor demonstrates control of a cryptographic public key
published in its OpenID Federation Entity Configuration.</t>
      <t>There are two ways the Certificate Issuer is able to check if a Requestor is
part of the federation:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The Requestor provides a Trust Chain when solving the ACME challenge. This is
<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> since it reduces the effort of the Certificate Issuer in
evaluating the trust to the Requestor.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The Requestor doesn't provide a Trust Chain in the challenge solution.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The openid-federation-01 ACME challenge object has the following format:</t>
      <t>type (required, string):  The string "openid-federation-01"</t>
      <t>token (required, string):  A random value that uniquely identifies the
    challenge. This value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have at least 128 bits of entropy. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
    contain any characters outside the base64url alphabet as described in
    <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4648"/>. Trailing '=' padding characters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be stripped.
    See <xref target="RFC4086"/> for additional information on randomness requirements.</t>
      <t>trustAnchors (optional, array of string):  An array of strings containing the
    Entity Identifiers of the Issuer's Trust Anchors. When solving the
    challenge, the Requestor can construct a Trust Chain from itself to one of
    these Trust Anchors. It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the Issuer includes this field
    to make it easier for the Requestor to construct a Trust Chain.</t>
      <t>A non-normative example of a challenge with <tt>trustAnchors</tt> specified:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
   {
     "type": "openid-federation-01",
     "url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4",
     "status": "pending",
     "token": "LoqXcYV8q5ONbJQxbmR7SCTNo3tiAXDfowyjxAjEuX0",
     "trustAnchors": [
       "https://trust-anchor-1.example.com",
       "https://trust-anchor-2.example.com"
     ]
   }
]]></artwork>
      <t>The <tt>openid-federation-01</tt> challenge <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used to validate possession of
any ACME Identifiers except <tt>openid-federation</tt> ACME Identifiers.</t>
      <t>The Requestor responds to the challenge with an object with the following
format:</t>
      <t>sig (required, string):  the compact JSON serialization (as described in
    <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7515"/>) of a JWS, signing the key authorization
    encoded in UTF-8.
    The key authorization is computed from the token in the challenge and the
    Requestor's ACME account key, as defined in <xref section="8.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>.
    The signature must be made by one of the keys published in the Requestor's
    <tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata in its Entity Configuration, as specified in
    <xref target="requestor-metadata"/>.
    The JWS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include a <tt>kid</tt> header parameter corresponding to the key used
    to sign the key authorization and a <tt>typ</tt> header parameter set to
    "signed-acme-challenge+jwt".</t>
      <t>trustChain (optional, array of string):  an array of strings containing signed
    JWTs, representing a Trust Chain from the Requestor to one of the Issuer's
    Trust Anchors (see <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-4"/>).
    The Resolved Metadata of the Trust Chain subject <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain
    <tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata that contains the key used to compute <tt>sig</tt>.
    It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the Requestor includes this field.
    If the Requestor cannot construct a Trust Chain to one of the Trust Anchors
    indicated by the Issuer, or if no Trust Anchors were indicated, it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use
    some other Trust Anchor that it believes the Issuer trusts.
    If the Requestor cannot construct a Trust Chain to any Trust Anchor, it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
    omit the <tt>trustChain</tt> field from the challenge response.</t>
      <t>A non-normative example for an authorization with <tt>trustChain</tt> specified:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
   POST /acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4
   Host: issuer.example.com
   Content-Type: application/jose+json

   {
     "protected": base64url({
       "alg": "ES256",
       "kid": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
       "nonce": "UQI1PoRi5OuXzxuX7V7wL0",
       "url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4"
     }),
     "payload": base64url({
      "sig": "wQAvHlPV1tVxRW0vZUa4BQ...",
      "trustChain": ["eyJhbGciOiJFU...", "eyJhbGci..."]
     }),
     "signature": "Q1bURgJoEslbD1c5...3pYdSMLio57mQNN4"
   }
]]></artwork>
      <t>On receiving a challenge response, the Certificate Issuer verifies that the
Requestor is trusted. If the Requestor did not provide a <tt>trustChain</tt>, the
Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform Federation Entity Discovery (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-10"/>) to obtain a Trust Chain for the Requestor.</t>
      <t>The Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that the Trust Chain is valid according to
<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-4"/> and that it terminates at
a Trust Anchor the Issuer is configured to trust. The Issuer <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a
Trust Chain that terminates at any other Trust Anchor, including a Trust Anchor
selected by the Requestor that the Issuer does not itself trust.</t>
      <t>Once it has obtained a valid Trust Chain, the Issuer evaluates the entity's
Resolved Metadata, and verifies:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>That the requested <tt>openid-federation</tt> ACME Identifier value matches the <tt>sub</tt>
parameter of the Requestor's Entity Configuration.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>That there is a key in the <tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata (<xref target="requestor-metadata"/>)
of the Requestor's Resolved Metadata with a <tt>kid</tt> matching the <tt>kid</tt> claim in
the challenge response.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>That the <tt>sig</tt> field of the payload is the compact JSON serialization of a
valid JWS signing the key authorization, using the above public key.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>That the JWS protected header contains a <tt>typ</tt> header parameter with the
value "signed-acme-challenge+jwt".</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>If all of the above checks succeed, then the validation is successful.
Otherwise, it has failed. In either case, the Certificate Issuer responds
according to <xref section="7.5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>. If the Issuer fails to verify OpenID
Federation trust, the problem document <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> contain a subproblem of type
<tt>urn:ietf:params:acme:error:openIDFederationEntity</tt> constructed as discussed in
<xref target="error-type"/>.</t>
      <t>A non-normative example for the challenge object post-validation:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
   {
     "type": "openid-federation-01",
     "url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4",
     "status": "valid",
     "validated": "2024-10-01T12:05:13.72Z",
     "token": "LoqXcYV8q5ONbJQxbmR7SCTNo3tiAXDfowyjxAjEuX0"
   }
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="requestor-metadata">
      <name>Requestor Entity Configuration Metadata</name>
      <t>The Requestor <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> publish in its Entity Configuration an <tt>acme_requestor</tt>
metadata containing a JWK set, according to <xref section="5.2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-5.2.1"/>. The keys in the set are used to
respond to ACME challenges.</t>
      <t>The following is a non-normative example of an Entity Configuration including
the <tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata and using the <tt>jwks</tt> metadata parameter.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "iss": "https://requestor.example.com",
  "sub": "https://requestor.example.com",
  "iat": 1516239022,
  "exp": 1516298022,
  "jwks": {
    "keys": [
      {
        "kty": "RSA",
        "alg": "RS256",
        "use": "sig",
        "kid": "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
        "n": "pnXBOusEANuug6ewezb9J_...",
        "e": "AQAB"
      }
    ]
  },
  "metadata": {
    "acme_requestor": {
      "jwks": {
        "keys": [
          {
            "kty": "RSA",
            "kid": "SUdtUndEWVY2cUFDeD...",
            "n": "y_Zc8rByfeRIC9fFZrD...",
            "e": "AQAB"
          },
          {
            "kty": "EC",
            "kid": "MFYycG1raTI4SkZvVDBIMF9CNGw3VEZYUmxQLVN2T21nSWlkd3",
            "crv": "P-256",
            "x": "qAOdPQROkHfZY1daGofOmSNQWpYK8c9G2m2Rbkpbd4c",
            "y": "G_7fF-T8n2vONKM15Mzj4KR_shvHBxKGjMosF6FdoPY"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}
]]></artwork>
      <t>The Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only use the Requestor's <tt>acme_requestor</tt> to validate an ACME
challenge. Therefore, after completing the challenge, the Requestor <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> remove
the <tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata from its Entity Configuration.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="issuer-discovery">
      <name>Issuer Discovery</name>
      <t>The Requestor's ACME client may either be configured to use a particular ACME
server, or to automatically discover a Certificate Issuer through the OpenID
Federation.</t>
      <t>In order to be discoverable, the Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> publish the entity type
<tt>acme_issuer</tt> in its Entity Configuration, according to <xref target="issuer-metadata"/>.</t>
      <t><xref target="OPENID-FED"/> describes a variety of patterns and generic mechanisms for
discovering Federation Entities (see <xref section="17.2" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-17.2"/>). This section describes how Issuers may make
themselves discoverable in a Federation by Requestors.</t>
      <section anchor="issuer-metadata">
        <name>Issuer Metadata</name>
        <t>The Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> publish its Entity Configuration including the <tt>acme_issuer</tt>
Entity Type metadata within it. The <tt>acme_issuer</tt> metadata contains one
parameter, <tt>directory_url</tt>, which is the URL of the ACME Directory, as defined
in <xref section="7.1.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>.</t>
        <t>Before using a discovered Issuer, the Requestor <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> obtain a Trust Chain from
the Issuer to a Trust Anchor that the Requestor is configured to trust, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
verify that the Issuer's Resolved Metadata contains <tt>acme_issuer</tt> metadata.
Requestors <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the ACME Directory URL from that Resolved Metadata for
client configuration of ACME endpoints.</t>
        <t>The following is a non-normative example of an Entity Configuration including
the <tt>acme_issuer</tt> metadata:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "sub": "https://issuer.example.com",
  "iat": 1516239022,
  "exp": 1516298022,
  "jwks": {
    "keys": [
      {
        "kty": "RSA",
        "alg": "RS256",
        "use": "sig",
        "kid": "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
        "n": "pnXBOusEANuug6ewezb9J_...",
        "e": "AQAB"
      }
    ]
  },
  "metadata": {
    "acme_issuer": {
      "directory_url": "https://issuer.example.com/acme/directory"
    }
  }
}
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="publish-cert">
      <name>Publication of the Certificates within the Federation</name>
      <t>The X.509 Certificates issued by federation Immediate Superior Entities
pertaining to one or more Federation Entity Keys in control of their
Subordinates <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> publish this information by including the <tt>x5c</tt> member
in each JWK contained within the matching Subordinate Statement. The contents
of the published <tt>x5c</tt> member, including whether it contains a full or
partial Trust Chain, and if so, to what Trust Anchor, are policy decisions
out of scope for this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="openidfed-othername-id">
      <name>CSR and Certificate Fields</name>
      <t>Depending on the Certificate Issuer's X.509 Certificate profile, the CSR and
X.509 Certificate <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> associate the X.509 Certificate to the Federation Entity
by including the Entity Identifier in the X.509 Certificate.</t>
      <t>To do so, the Issuer includes a Subject Alternative Name extension containing an
<tt>otherName</tt> with a <tt>type-id</tt> of <tt>id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId</tt>. The value of
the name is an Octet String containing the UTF-8 encoding of the Entity
Identifier (i.e., the corresponding <tt>openid-federation</tt> ACME Identifier from
the <tt>newOrder</tt> request).</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
   id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on XXX }

   OpenIdFederationEntityId ::= UTF8String
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="trust-chain-expiration">
      <name>Trust Chain Expiration and Authorization Lifetime</name>
      <t anchor="certificate-lifecycle">The identity of the Requestor is verified through proof of possession of a
private key corresponding to a public key attested within a Trust Chain. The
Trust Chain has an expiration time, and its content <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be trusted past the
expiration time (<xref section="10.4" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-10.4"/>).</t>
      <t>A successful <tt>openid-federation-01</tt> challenge results in an ACME authorization
(<xref section="7.1.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>) whose federation-membership evidence is the Trust
Chain used to validate the challenge. Since the content of the Trust Chain cannot
be trusted after its expiration time, the Certificate Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the
<tt>expires</tt> field of such an authorization to a time no later than the expiration
time of that Trust Chain.</t>
      <t>According to <xref section="7.1.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>, after the <tt>expires</tt> time the
authorization moves to the "expired" state. An order that has not yet been
finalized and that still depends on that authorization then moves to the
"invalid" state. A later order for the same ACME Identifier therefore requires a
new authorization, validated with a Trust Chain that has not expired.</t>
      <t>The validity period and the lifecycle of the issued certificate are determined
by the certificate profile and by the policy of the Certificate Issuer, and are
out of scope for this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="error-type">
      <name>Errors</name>
      <t>This document defines a new error type URI to be used in problem documents
<xref target="RFC9457"/>, as described in <xref section="6.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>.</t>
      <t>The error type <tt>urn:ietf:params:acme:error:openIDFederationEntity</tt> is used to
encapsulate any OAuth error code returned while resolving OpenID Federation
Entities. The title of this error type is "OpenID Federation Error". The
<tt>detail</tt> member of the problem document <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the description of the
particular OAuth error code that caused the error. The problem document for this
error type <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include an extension member named <tt>errorCode</tt>, which <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
set to the OAuth error code, taken from the error codes defined in
<xref section="8.9" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-8.9"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The extensions in this document build upon the Security Considerations and
threat model of ACME (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>) and of OpenID Federation 1.0
(<xref section="18" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-18"/>). This section describes
the additional considerations, deployment requirements, and composition risks that
arise from using OpenID Federation 1.0 as the identifier validation method for
ACME.</t>
      <section anchor="trust-model">
        <name>Trust Model</name>
        <t>The <tt>openid-federation-01</tt> challenge proves two properties at the time of
validation: that the Requestor controls a private key attested in its
<tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata, and that a Trust Chain binds that Requestor to a
Trust Anchor the Issuer is configured to trust.</t>
        <t>This is a different control demonstration than <tt>http-01</tt>, <tt>dns-01</tt>, or
<tt>tls-alpn-01</tt>. Those methods prove control of a DNS name or IP address that
typically appears in the issued certificate. This method proves membership in a
federation and control of a federation-attested key. It does not, by itself,
prove control of any DNS name, IP address, or other identifier that a
Certification Authority might place in an X.509 certificate.</t>
        <t>Issuers must be configured with an explicit set of Trust Anchors, and must
reject any Trust Chain that does not terminate at one of those Trust Anchors.
Each such Trust Anchor must be administered under a federation policy that is
appropriate for the certificates the Issuer will produce, including the
certificate profile, the population of entities that are eligible to obtain certificates,
and any additional authorization criteria (for example, Trust Marks or
federation policy constraints on <tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata). A Trust Anchor
that is acceptable for other OpenID Federation applications is not automatically
acceptable for X.509 issuance.</t>
        <t>Requestors that discover Issuers through the federation must likewise be
configured with an explicit set of Trust Anchors, and must authenticate a
candidate Issuer as a federation member before using its ACME Directory
(<xref target="issuer-metadata"/>). Automatic discovery without a configured Trust Anchor
allows a Requestor to enroll with an attacker-controlled ACME server.</t>
        <t>OpenID Federation Entity Statements are signed JWTs. Their integrity and the
resulting Trust Chain can be evaluated independently of the TLS channel used to
transport them (<xref target="OPENID-FED"/>). Implementations must treat Trust Chain
validation, not Web PKI validation of the HTTPS server that hosts an Entity
Configuration, as the source of trust for this challenge. TLS still provides
confidentiality and server authentication for ACME and for Federation Entity
Discovery; it does not substitute for federation trust evaluation.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="integrity-of-authorizations">
        <name>Integrity of Authorizations</name>
        <t>ACME requires that a validation response be bound to the ACME account key, so
that a man-in-the-middle on the ACME channel cannot obtain an authorization for
its own account by replaying a legitimate client's response
(<xref section="10.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>). The <tt>openid-federation-01</tt> challenge meets this
requirement by signing the ACME key authorization, which includes the token and
the account key thumbprint, rather than signing the token alone.</t>
        <t>That binding is especially important for this challenge type. Unlike <tt>http-01</tt>,
<tt>dns-01</tt>, or <tt>tls-alpn-01</tt>, the signature that demonstrates control is sent on
the ACME channel rather than observed on a separate validation channel. A
Requestor that discovers Issuers automatically might be willing to complete a
challenge presented by an ACME server it has not preconfigured. Signing the key
authorization prevents such a server from relaying a token issued by a different
ACME server and reusing the Requestor's signature to obtain a certificate under
an account the attacker controls.</t>
        <t>The <tt>openid-federation</tt> identifier type must not be validated except by
<tt>openid-federation-01</tt>, and <tt>openid-federation-01</tt> must not be used to validate
any other identifier type (<xref target="identifier-type"/>, <xref target="challenge-type"/>). Hosting an
HTTP resource at an Entity Identifier URL, or completing a DNS challenge for a
name derived from that URL, does not demonstrate federation membership. Completing
<tt>openid-federation-01</tt> does not demonstrate control of a DNS name.</t>
        <t>The Issuer must take <tt>acme_requestor</tt> keys from the Requestor's Resolved
Metadata after Trust Chain evaluation, not from an Entity Configuration that has
not been bound to a trusted Trust Anchor. Federation policy along the Trust
Chain can constrain or replace metadata. If the Requestor and the Issuer would
derive different Resolved Metadata because they use different Trust Anchors or
different policy, the Issuer's view is authoritative for issuance: the Issuer
must not accept keys or other metadata from a Trust Chain that it does not
itself trust. A mismatch that causes issuance to fail is preferable to allowing
the Requestor's choice of Trust Anchor to weaken the Issuer's policy.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trust-chain-handling">
        <name>Trust Chain Handling</name>
        <t>A <tt>trustChain</tt> supplied in the challenge response is a hint that saves the
Issuer from performing Federation Entity Discovery. It is not a substitute for
validation. The Issuer must verify every Entity Statement in a client-supplied
Trust Chain and must confirm that the chain terminates at a Trust Anchor the
Issuer is configured to trust, exactly as it would for a chain the Issuer
discovered itself.</t>
        <t>The <tt>trustAnchors</tt> field in the challenge object tells the Requestor which Trust
Anchors the Issuer is prepared to accept. It is an optimization for the
Requestor. The Requestor must not treat those values as Trust Anchors for its
own discovery or authentication of the Issuer. The Issuer must reject a
client-supplied chain that ends at a Trust Anchor it did not configure.</t>
        <t>A Trust Chain must not be relied upon past its expiration
(<xref section="10.4" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-10.4"/>).
<xref target="certificate-lifecycle"/> requires that the <tt>notBefore</tt> and <tt>notAfter</tt> values of
issued certificates fall before that expiration. Separately, Issuers that reuse
ACME authorizations for later orders (<xref section="7.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>) must not
treat an authorization as valid after the Trust Chain that justified it has
expired. Reusing a stale authorization would allow issuance without a current
attestation of federation membership.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="certification-authority-policy">
        <name>Certification Authority Policy</name>
        <t>This document does not define an X.509 certificate profile. Fields of issued
certificates, including Common Name, Subject Alternative Names, Key Usage, and
validity period, are determined by Certification Authority policy and by the
systems those certificates are intended to interoperate with.</t>
        <t>Because <tt>openid-federation-01</tt> validates only an <tt>openid-federation</tt> identifier,
an Issuer that copies other names from a CSR, from federation metadata, or from
local policy into the certificate is asserting identifier bindings that this
challenge does not prove. Issuers must not include a DNS name, IP address,
email address, or other identifier in an issued certificate unless that
identifier has been validated by an appropriate ACME challenge or is justified
by the Issuer's certificate policy and the federation's trust framework. This
challenge type is intended as a bridge into existing, often closed, PKIs. It is
not a substitute for domain control validation in a publicly trusted Web PKI.</t>
        <t>If the Issuer includes an <tt>id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId</tt> Subject Alternative
Name (<xref target="openidfed-othername-id"/>), the value must be the Entity Identifier that
was validated. Including a different Entity Identifier would bind the
certificate to an entity whose control was not demonstrated.</t>
        <t>Successful validation attests federation membership and key control at
validation time. It does not, by itself, track later changes in membership. The
constraint in <xref target="certificate-lifecycle"/> limits certificate validity so that it
does not extend beyond the Trust Chain observed at issuance, but it does not
revoke a certificate if the Requestor later leaves the federation or if an
attested key is compromised. Deployments that need issued certificates to follow
federation membership after issuance must use the certificate lifecycle
mechanisms of their X.509 ecosystem, such as CRLs, OCSP, or short-lived
certificates, according to the Issuer's certificate policy.</t>
        <t>Publishing issued certificates in the <tt>x5c</tt> parameter of keys in a Subordinate
Statement (<xref target="publish-cert"/>) is a federation policy decision. Relying parties
that consume <tt>x5c</tt> in that context must still evaluate those certificates
according to the applicable PKI and federation policy. A stale <tt>x5c</tt> member can
advertise a certificate that has since expired or been revoked.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="issuer-discovery-1">
        <name>Issuer Discovery</name>
        <t>The <tt>directory_url</tt> in <tt>acme_issuer</tt> metadata is reached only after the
Requestor has authenticated the Issuer as a federation member. Using a
<tt>directory_url</tt> taken from an untrusted Entity Configuration, from search, or
from user input without Trust Chain evaluation exposes the Requestor to an
attacker-controlled ACME server. The key-authorization binding described above
limits the harm of completing a challenge at such a server; it does not make
that server safe to use for account registration, order creation, or certificate
download.</t>
        <t>The Requestor must use the <tt>directory_url</tt> from the Issuer's Resolved Metadata,
so that federation policy along the Trust Chain can constrain which ACME server
the Requestor contacts.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="key-management">
        <name>Key Management</name>
        <t>This protocol involves three distinct key roles: the ACME account key
(<xref target="RFC8555"/>), the keys published in <tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata and used to sign
challenge responses, and the subject keys in Certificate Signing Requests and
issued certificates. These keys should be distinct. In particular, the
cryptographic keys in the <tt>acme_requestor</tt> metadata should not be reused for any
purpose other than signing <tt>openid-federation-01</tt> challenge responses, including
as Federation Entity Keys, as ACME account keys, or as the subject key of an
issued certificate.</t>
        <t>Reusing a key across protocols requires a cross-protocol analysis. Domain
separation for the challenge response depends on the JWS <tt>typ</tt> value
"signed-acme-challenge+jwt"; verifiers must reject responses that omit this
<tt>typ</tt> or use a different value (<xref target="RFC8725"/>). Distinct keys remain the most
reliable defense.</t>
        <t>Compromise of an <tt>acme_requestor</tt> private key allows an attacker to complete
<tt>openid-federation-01</tt> challenges for that Entity Identifier until the key is
removed from the Requestor's Resolved Metadata and any authorizations granted
under it have expired. Requestors must protect these private keys with at least
the same care as ACME account keys, and should rotate them periodically. After
a challenge has been completed, the Requestor may remove <tt>acme_requestor</tt>
metadata from its Entity Configuration (<xref target="requestor-metadata"/>), which limits
the time during which the corresponding public keys are advertised.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="denial-of-service-considerations">
        <name>Denial-of-Service Considerations</name>
        <t>If the Requestor omits <tt>trustChain</tt>, the Issuer performs Federation Entity
Discovery, which can cause the Issuer to make multiple outbound requests
(<xref section="18.1" sectionFormat="of" target="OPENID-FED" relative="#section-18.1"/>). ACME account
credentials are needed to submit a challenge response, but account creation
is often open. Issuers should prefer client-supplied Trust Chains, should bound
the time, depth, and number of <tt>authority_hints</tt> they are willing to follow, and
should apply the same denial-of-service controls they apply to other outbound
validation methods in <xref target="RFC8555"/>.</t>
        <t>The <tt>token</tt> value in the challenge object must have at least 128 bits of
entropy, as specified in <xref target="challenge-type"/>, so that challenge responses cannot
be predicted or reused across challenges.</t>
        <t>The <tt>expires</tt> field of the authorization resulting from an
<tt>openid-federation-01</tt> challenge bounds how long the Certificate Issuer relies
on a given Trust Chain (<xref target="trust-chain-expiration"/>). As with the other ACME
challenge types, the challenge proves control of the ACME Identifier at a point
in time, while the issued certificate remains valid for the period set by the
Certificate Issuer, and what happens to the certificate afterwards is handled by
the X.509 ecosystem in which the certificate is used.</t>
        <t>Deployments that want the lifecycle of the issued certificates to be bound to the
federation membership of the Requestor could rely on the certificate lifecycle
mechanisms of that ecosystem, according to the applicable certificate policy.
Those mechanisms are outside the scope of this document.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA is kindly asked to make the following updates to registries:</t>
      <section anchor="acme-registry-group">
        <name>ACME Registry Group</name>
        <t>The following updates are all assignments in the "Automated Certificate
Management Environment (ACME) Protocol" registry group <xref target="IANA-ACME"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="acme-identifier-types">
          <name>ACME Identifier Types</name>
          <t>IANA is asked to add to the "ACME Identifier Types" registry, defined in
<xref section="9.7.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>, the entry below, as specified here in
<xref target="identifier-type"/>:</t>
          <table>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">Label</th>
                <th align="left">Reference</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">openid-federation</td>
                <td align="left">this document</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </section>
        <section anchor="acme-validation-methods">
          <name>ACME Validation Methods</name>
          <t>IANA is also asked to add to the "ACME Validation Methods" registry, defined
in <xref section="9.7.8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>, the entry below, as specified here
in <xref target="challenge-type"/>:</t>
          <table>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">Label</th>
                <th align="left">Identifier Type</th>
                <th align="left">Reference</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">openid-federation-01</td>
                <td align="left">openid-federation</td>
                <td align="left">this document</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </section>
        <section anchor="acme-error-types">
          <name>ACME Error Types</name>
          <t>IANA is also asked to add to the "ACME Error Types" registry, defined
in <xref section="9.7.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>, the entry below, as specified here in
<xref target="error-type"/>:</t>
          <table>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">Type</th>
                <th align="left">Description</th>
                <th align="left">Reference</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">openIDFederationEntity</td>
                <td align="left">An error occurred while resolving an OpenID Federation entity</td>
                <td align="left">this document</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="assign-x509-pkix-other-name">
        <name>Assign X.509 PKIX Other Name</name>
        <t>IANA is asked to add to the "PKIX Other Name Forms" registry
(<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8">1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8</eref>) the entry below, as
specified here in <xref target="openidfed-othername-id"/></t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Decimal</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">TBA</td>
              <td align="left">id-on-OpenIdFederationEntityId</td>
              <td align="left">this document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="OPENID-FED" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-federation-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Federation 1.0</title>
            <author initials="R." surname="Hedberg" fullname="Roland Hedberg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M. B." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A. Å." surname="Solberg" fullname="Andreas Solberg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="John Bradley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="G." surname="De Marco" fullname="Giuseppe De Marco">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="V." surname="Dzhuvinov" fullname="Vladimir Dzhuvinov">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="February" day="17"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA-ACME" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme">
          <front>
            <title>Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Protocol</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA-OAUTH" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Parameters</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8555">
          <front>
            <title>Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
            <author fullname="J. Hoffman-Andrews" initials="J." surname="Hoffman-Andrews"/>
            <author fullname="D. McCarney" initials="D." surname="McCarney"/>
            <author fullname="J. Kasten" initials="J." surname="Kasten"/>
            <date month="March" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates are used for a number of purposes, the most significant of which is the authentication of domain names. Thus, certification authorities (CAs) in the Web PKI are trusted to verify that an applicant for a certificate legitimately represents the domain name(s) in the certificate. As of this writing, this verification is done through a collection of ad hoc mechanisms. This document describes a protocol that a CA and an applicant can use to automate the process of verification and certificate issuance. The protocol also provides facilities for other certificate management functions, such as certificate revocation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8555"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8555"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2986">
          <front>
            <title>PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nystrom" initials="M." surname="Nystrom"/>
            <author fullname="B. Kaliski" initials="B." surname="Kaliski"/>
            <date month="November" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo represents a republication of PKCS #10 v1.7 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document, except for the security considerations section, is taken directly from the PKCS #9 v2.0 or the PKCS #10 v1.7 document. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4086">
          <front>
            <title>Randomness Requirements for Security</title>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schiller" initials="J." surname="Schiller"/>
            <author fullname="S. Crocker" initials="S." surname="Crocker"/>
            <date month="June" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Security systems are built on strong cryptographic algorithms that foil pattern analysis attempts. However, the security of these systems is dependent on generating secret quantities for passwords, cryptographic keys, and similar quantities. The use of pseudo-random processes to generate secret quantities can result in pseudo-security. A sophisticated attacker may find it easier to reproduce the environment that produced the secret quantities and to search the resulting small set of possibilities than to locate the quantities in the whole of the potential number space.</t>
              <t>Choosing random quantities to foil a resourceful and motivated adversary is surprisingly difficult. This document points out many pitfalls in using poor entropy sources or traditional pseudo-random number generation techniques for generating such quantities. It recommends the use of truly random hardware techniques and shows that the existing hardware on many systems can be used for this purpose. It provides suggestions to ameliorate the problem when a hardware solution is not available, and it gives examples of how large such quantities need to be for some applications. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="106"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4086"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4086"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9457">
          <front>
            <title>Problem Details for HTTP APIs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="E. Wilde" initials="E." surname="Wilde"/>
            <author fullname="S. Dalal" initials="S." surname="Dalal"/>
            <date month="July" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a "problem detail" to carry machine-readable details of errors in HTTP response content to avoid the need to define new error response formats for HTTP APIs.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7807.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9457"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9457"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2865">
          <front>
            <title>Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Rigney" initials="C." surname="Rigney"/>
            <author fullname="S. Willens" initials="S." surname="Willens"/>
            <author fullname="A. Rubens" initials="A." surname="Rubens"/>
            <author fullname="W. Simpson" initials="W." surname="Simpson"/>
            <date month="June" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a protocol for carrying authentication, authorization, and configuration information between a Network Access Server which desires to authenticate its links and a shared Authentication Server. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2865"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2865"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8446">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8725">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token Best Current Practices</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs, are URL-safe JSON-based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed and/or encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a simple security token format in numerous protocols and applications, both in the area of digital identity and in other application areas. This Best Current Practices document updates RFC 7519 to provide actionable guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment of JWTs.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="225"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8725"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8725"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 825?>

<section anchor="end-to-end-issuance-flow">
      <name>End-to-end Issuance Flow</name>
      <t>~~~ BEGIN EDNOTE ~~~</t>
      <t>This appendix is to be removed before publication.</t>
      <t>This section contains explanatory material that recaps a lot of RFC 8555. It is
included here for the benefit of readers who are familiar with OpenID Federation
but not with ACME, and want to see at a glance how the whole thing fits
together.</t>
      <t>The following diagram illustrates a successful interaction between Issuer and
Requestor to retrieve an X.509 Certificate. The diagram assumes the Requestor
has already discovered the Issuer, and the Requestor has already created an
ACME account with the Issuer.</t>
      <t>This section is informational and non-normative. The remainder of this document,
<xref target="RFC8555"/> and <xref target="OPENID-FED"/> should be considered correct should this
appendix disagree with any of them.</t>
      <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
,-----------------.
|Requestor's      |  ,-----------.
|OpenID Federation|  |Requestor's|               ,------------------------.  ,-----------------------.
| Web Server      |  |ACME Client|               |X.509 Certificate Issuer|  |Federation Trust Anchor|
`--------+--------'  `-----+-----'               `-----------+------------'  `-----------+-----------'
        |                  |           POST /acme/new-order  |                           |
        |                  |--------------------------------->                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |Authorization at                 |                           |
        |                  |/acme/authz/[authz-id]           |                           |
        |                  |Finalize at                      |                           |
        |                  | /acme/order/[order-id]/finalize |                           |
        |                  |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  | POST /acme/authz/[authz-id]     |                           |
        |                  |--------------------------------->                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |  openid-federation-01 Challenge |                           |
        |                  |  at /acme/chall/[chall-id]      |                           |
        |                  |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  ----.                             |                           |
        |                  |   | Sign challenge token        |                           |
        |                  |   | with private key            |                           |
        |                  <---'                             |                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  | POST /acme/chall/[chall-id]     |                           |
        |                  | with signed                     |                           |
        |                  | token and entity ID             |                           |
        |                  | set to Requestor's ID           |                           |
        |                  |--------------------------------->                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |      Challenge validation       |                           |
        |                  |      beginning                  |                           |
        |                  |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |          GET /.well-known/openid-federation        |                           |
        |<----------------------------------------------------                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |           Requestor's Entity Configuration         |                           |
        | - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |           ______________________________________________________
        |                  |           ! OPT  /  If Requestor didn't provide Trust Chain |  !
        |                  |           !_____/               |                           |  !
        |                  |           !                     |  Determine Trust Chain    |  !
        |                  |           !                     |  from Issuer's            |  !
        |                  |           !                     |  Trust Anchor to Requestor|  !
        |                  |           !                     |  (Federation Discovery)   |  !
        |                  |           !                     | <------------------------>|  !
        |                  |           !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |                                 |----.                      |
        |                  |                                 |    | Evaluate Trust Chain |
        |                  |                                 |<---'                      |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |                                 |----.                      |
        |                  |                                 |    | Check                |
        |                  |                                 |    | Entity Configuration |
        |                  |                                 |    | sub matches          |
        |                  |                                 |    | Entity Identifier    |
        |                  |                                 |<---' in the order         |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |                                 |----.                      |
        |                  |                                 |    | Check challenge      |
        |                  |                                 |    | sig is signed        |
        |                  |                                 |    | with key in          |
        |                  |                                 |<---' Entity Configuration |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |  _________________________________________________________________________     |
        |  ! LOOP  /  Poll until authz status                |                      !    |
        |  !      /  is "valid" or "invalid"                 |                      !    |
        |  !_____/         |                                 |                      !    |
        |  !               |    POST-as-GET                  |                      !    |
        |  !               |    /acme/authz/[authz-id]       |                      !    |
        |  !               |--------------------------------->                      !    |
        |  !               |                                 |                      !    |
        |  !               |           Current authz status  |                      !    |
        |  !               |<---------------------------------                      !    |
        |  !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!    |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |                  |                                 |                           |
        |  ___________________________________________________________________________   |
        |  ! OPT  /  If the authz status is "valid"          |                        !  |
        |  !_____/         |                                 |                        !  |
        |  !               | POST                            |                        !  |
        |  !               | /acme/orders/[order-id]/finalize|                        !  |
        |  !               | with CSR                        |                        !  |
        |  !               |--------------------------------->                        !  |
        |  !               |                                 |                        !  |
        |  !               |                                 |----.                   !  |
        |  !               |                                 |    | Check CSR         !  |
        |  !               |                                 |    | validity          !  |
        |  !               |                                 |    | according to      !  |
        |  !               |                                 |    | protocol          !  |
        |  !               |                                 |<---' and CA policy     !  |
        |  !               |                                 |                        !  |
        |  !               |                                 |                        !  |
        |  !               |  Order object with certificate  |                        !  |
        |  !               |  at /acme/cert/[cert-id]        |                        !  |
        |  !               |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -                        !  |
        |  !               |                                 |                        !  |
        |  !               |       POST /acme/cert/[cert-id] |                        !  |
        |  !               |--------------------------------->                        !  |
        |  !               |                                 |                        !  |
        |  !               |  Newly issued X.509 Certificate |                        !  |
        |  !               |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -                        !  |
        |  !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!  |
,--------+--------.  ,-----+-----.               ,-----------+------------.  ,-----------+-----------.
|Requestor's      |  |Requestor's|               |X.509 Certificate Issuer|  |Federation Trust Anchor|
|OpenID Federation|  |ACME Client|               `------------------------'  `-----------------------'
| Web Server      |  `-----------'
`-----------------'
]]></artwork>
      <t>~~~ END EDNOTE ~~~</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Aaron Gable and Mike Ounsworth, for early and thorough reviews of this draft.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="contributors" numbered="false" toc="include" removeInRFC="false">
      <name>Contributors</name>
      <contact initials="A." surname="Ghani" fullname="Ameer Ghani">
        <organization>ISRG</organization>
        <address>
          <email>inahga@letsencrypt.org</email>
        </address>
      </contact>
    </section>
  </back>
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