Network Working Group D. Katz Internet-Draft HPE Obsoletes: 5881 (if approved) D. Ward Intended status: Standards Track Expires: 22 May 2027 A. Retana, Ed. Futurewei Technologies, Inc. 18 November 2026 Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) draft-ietf-bfd-rfc5881bis-02 Abstract This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol over IPv4 and IPv6 for single IP hops. This document obsoletes RFC 5881. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Applications and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Initialization and Demultiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. TTL/Hop Limit Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Addressing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. BFD for Use with Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.1. New IANA Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix A. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1. Cisco Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.2. HPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 A.3. ZTE Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B.1. Version -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B.2. Version -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B.3. Version -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1. Introduction One very desirable application for Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) [RFC5880] is to track IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity between directly connected systems. This could be used to supplement the detection mechanisms in routing protocols or to monitor router-host connectivity, among other applications. This document describes the particulars necessary to use BFD in this environment. Interactions between BFD and other protocols and system functions are described in the BFD Generic Applications document [RFC5882]. Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 This document obsoletes [RFC5881]. 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. Applications and Limitations This application of BFD can be used by any pair of systems communicating via IPv4 and/or IPv6 across a single IP hop that is associated with an incoming interface. This includes, but is not limited to, physical media, virtual circuits, and tunnels. Each BFD session between a pair of systems MUST traverse a separate network-layer path in both directions. This is necessary for demultiplexing to work properly, and also because (by definition) multiple sessions would otherwise be protecting the same path. If BFD is to be used in conjunction with both IPv4 and IPv6 on a particular path, a separate BFD session MUST be established for each protocol (and thus encapsulated by that protocol) over that link. If the BFD Echo function is used, transmitted packets are immediately routed back towards the sender on the interface over which they were sent. This may interact with other mechanisms that are used on the two systems that employ BFD. In particular, ingress filtering [BCP38] is incompatible with the way Echo packets need to be sent. Implementations that support the Echo function MUST ensure that ingress filtering is not used on an interface that employs the Echo function or make an exception for ingress filtering Echo packets. An implementation of the Echo function also requires Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that may not exist on all systems. A system implementing the Echo function MUST be capable of sending packets to its own address, which will typically require bypassing the normal forwarding lookup. This typically requires access to APIs that bypass IP-layer functionality. Please note that BFD is intended as an Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) mechanism for connectivity check and connection verification. It is applicable for network-based services (e.g. router-to-router, subscriber-to-gateway, LSP/circuit endpoints, and service appliance failure detection). In these scenarios it is required that the operator correctly provision the rates at which BFD Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 is transmitted to avoid congestion (e.g link, I/O, CPU) and false failure detection. It is not applicable for application-to- application failure detection across the Internet because it does not have sufficient capability to do necessary congestion detection and avoidance and therefore cannot prevent congestion collapse. Host-to- host or application-to-application deployment across the Internet will require the encapsulation of BFD within a transport that provides "TCP-friendly" [RFC5348] behavior. 3. Initialization and Demultiplexing In this application, there will be only a single BFD session between two systems over a given interface (logical or physical) for a particular protocol. The BFD session must be bound to this interface. As such, both sides of a session MUST take the "Active" role (sending initial BFD Control packets with a zero value of Your Discriminator), and any BFD packet from the remote machine with a zero value of Your Discriminator MUST be associated with the session bound to the remote system, interface, and protocol. 4. Encapsulation BFD Control packets MUST be transmitted in UDP packets with destination port 3784, within an IPv4 or IPv6 packet. The source port MUST be in the range 49152 through 65535. The same UDP source port number MUST be used for all BFD Control packets associated with a particular session. The source port number SHOULD be unique among all BFD sessions on the system. If more than 16384 BFD sessions are simultaneously active, UDP source port numbers MAY be reused on multiple sessions, but the number of distinct uses of the same UDP source port number SHOULD be minimized. An implementation MAY use the UDP port source number to aid in demultiplexing incoming BFD Control packets, but ultimately the mechanisms in [RFC5880] MUST be used to demultiplex incoming packets to the proper session. BFD Echo packets MUST be transmitted in UDP packets with destination UDP port 3785 in an IPv4 or IPv6 packet. The setting of the UDP source port is outside the scope of this specification. The destination address MUST be chosen in such a way as to cause the remote system to forward the packet back to the local system. The source address MUST be chosen in such a way as to preclude the remote system from generating ICMP or Neighbor Discovery Redirect messages. In particular, the source address SHOULD NOT be part of the subnet bound to the interface over which the BFD Echo packet is being transmitted, and it SHOULD NOT be an IPv6 link-local address, unless it is known by other means that the remote system will not send Redirects. Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 BFD Echo packets MUST be transmitted in such a way as to ensure that they are received by the remote system. On multiaccess media, for example, this requires that the destination datalink address corresponds to the remote system. The above requirements may require the bypassing of some common IP layer functionality, particularly in host implementations. 5. TTL/Hop Limit Issues If BFD authentication is not in use on a session, all BFD Control packets for the session MUST be sent with a Time to Live (TTL) or Hop Limit value of 255. All received BFD Control packets that are demultiplexed to the session MUST be discarded if the received TTL or Hop Limit is not equal to 255. A discussion of this mechanism can be found in [RFC5082]. If BFD authentication is in use on a session, all BFD Control packets MUST be sent with a TTL or Hop Limit value of 255. All received BFD Control packets that are demultiplexed to the session MAY be discarded if the received TTL or Hop Limit is not equal to 255. If the TTL/Hop Limit check is made, it MAY be done before any cryptographic authentication takes place if this will avoid unnecessary calculation that would be detrimental to the receiving system. In the context of this section, "authentication in use" means that the system is sending BFD Control packets with the Authentication bit set and with the Authentication Section included and that all unauthenticated packets demultiplexed to the session are discarded, per the BFD base specification. 6. Addressing Issues Implementations MUST ensure that all BFD Control packets are transmitted over the one-hop path being protected by BFD. On a multiaccess network, BFD Control packets MUST be transmitted with source and destination addresses that are part of the subnet (addressed from and to interfaces on the subnet). On a point-to-point link, the source address of a BFD Control packet MUST NOT be used to identify the session. This means that the initial BFD packet MUST be accepted with any source address, and that subsequent BFD packets MUST be demultiplexed solely by the Your Discriminator field (as is always the case). This allows the source address to change if necessary. If the received source address changes, the local system MUST NOT use that address as the Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 destination in outgoing BFD Control packets; rather, it MUST continue to use the address configured at session creation. An implementation MAY notify the application that the neighbor's source address has changed, so that the application might choose to change the destination address or take some other action. Note that the TTL/Hop Limit check described in section 5 (or the use of authentication) precludes the BFD packets from having come from any source other than the immediate neighbor. 7. BFD for Use with Tunnels A number of mechanisms are available to tunnel IPv4 and IPv6 over arbitrary topologies. If the tunnel mechanism does not decrement the TTL or Hop Limit of the network protocol carried within, the mechanism described in this document may be used to provide liveness detection for the tunnel. The BFD authentication mechanism SHOULD be used and is strongly encouraged. 8. IANA Considerations Ports 3784 and 3785 were assigned by IANA for use with the BFD Control and BFD Echo protocols, respectively. This document obsoletes [RFC5881], which is referenced by those port assignments and by the IANA-BFD-TC-STD-MIB module [RFC7330]. 8.1. New IANA Actions IANA is requested to: * Replace the reference to RFC 5881 with a reference to this document for the entries listed in Table 1 in the "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" [RFC6335] (https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers). * Set the Assignee to the IESG (iesg@ietf.org) and the Contact to the IETF Chair (chair@ietf.org) for the same entries, as specified in Section 8.1.1 of [RFC6335] for assignments made through the IETF document stream. These entries do not currently list an Assignee or a Contact. * Replace every reference to RFC 5881 with a reference to this document in the IANA-BFD-TC-STD-MIB module (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ianabfdtcstd-mib). Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 +==============+=============+====================+=============+ | Service Name | Port Number | Transport Protocol | Description | +==============+=============+====================+=============+ | bfd-control | 3784 | tcp | BFD Control | | | | | Protocol | +--------------+-------------+--------------------+-------------+ | bfd-control | 3784 | udp | BFD Control | | | | | Protocol | +--------------+-------------+--------------------+-------------+ | bfd-echo | 3785 | tcp | BFD Echo | | | | | Protocol | +--------------+-------------+--------------------+-------------+ | bfd-echo | 3785 | udp | BFD Echo | | | | | Protocol | +--------------+-------------+--------------------+-------------+ Table 1: Port Registry Entries to Be Updated References to other documents are not changed. No other IANA actions are requested. 9. Security Considerations In this application, the use of TTL=255 on transmit and receive, coupled with an association to an incoming interface, is viewed as supplying equivalent security characteristics to other protocols used in the infrastructure, as it is not trivially spoofable. The security implications of this mechanism are further discussed in [RFC5082]. The security implications of the use of BFD authentication are discussed in [RFC5880]. The use of the TTL=255 check simultaneously with BFD authentication provides a low overhead mechanism for discarding a class of unauthorized packets and may be useful in implementations in which cryptographic checksum use is susceptible to denial-of-service attacks. The use or non-use of this mechanism does not impact interoperability. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 [RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C. Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October 2007, . [RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010, . [RFC5882] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Generic Application of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 5882, DOI 10.17487/RFC5882, June 2010, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 10.2. Informative References [BCP38] Best Current Practice 38, . At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following: Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827, May 2000, . [RFC5348] Floyd, S., Handley, M., Padhye, J., and J. Widmer, "TCP Friendly Rate Control (TFRC): Protocol Specification", RFC 5348, DOI 10.17487/RFC5348, September 2008, . [RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881, DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010, . [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011, . Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 [RFC7330] Nadeau, T., Ali, Z., and N. Akiya, "Definitions of Textual Conventions (TCs) for Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) Management", RFC 7330, DOI 10.17487/RFC7330, August 2014, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, . Appendix A. Implementation Status This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Note to the RFC Editor: This section may be removed upon publication as an RFC. This section documents the [RFC7942] implementation status of this document. A.1. Cisco Systems, Inc. Organization: Cisco Systems, Inc. Implementation Name: IOS XR Version 4.0, IOS XE Version 12.0(31)S2, IOS NX Version 5.0(2) Description: Details about Cisco Implementation of RFC 5881. Maturity: Widely used in general terms. Coverage: * Section 2: Multiple Session Support - Implemented * Section 2: IPv4 and IPv6 supported - Implemented * Section 2: Echo Function - Implemented * Section 3: Session association with a received Your Discriminator set to zero - Implemented * Section 4: UDP destination port 3784 (Control Packets) - Implemented Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 * Section 4: UDP source port in the 49152 through 65535 range - Implemented * Section 4: Unique UDP source ports - Implemented * Section 4: UDP destination port 3785 (Echo Packets) - Implemented * Section 5: Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (authentication not in use) - Implemented * Section 5: Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (authentication in use) - Implemented * Section 6: Enforce one-hop path - Implemented * Section 6: Multiaccess Networks - Implemented * Section 6: Point-to-Point Links - Implemented * Section 7: Tunnels - Implemented Licensing: Proprietary Implementation Experience: None Comments: N/A Contact Information: Rajaguru Veluchamy, Email: rvelucha@cisco.com Date: 18 August, 2026 A.2. HPE Organization: HPE Implementation Name: Junos Description: Junos OS BFD implementation Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 Maturity: Mature Coverage: * Section 2: Multiple Session Support - Implemented * Section 2: IPv4 and IPv6 supported - Implemented * Section 2: Echo Function - Implemented * Section 3: Session association with a received Your Discriminator set to zero - Implemented * Section 4: UDP destination port 3784 (Control Packets) - Implemented * Section 4: UDP source port in the 49152 through 65535 range - Implemented * Section 4: Unique UDP source ports - Implemented * Section 4: UDP destination port 3785 (Echo Packets) - Implemented * Section 5: Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (authentication not in use) - Implemented * Section 5: Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (authentication in use) - Implemented * Section 6: Enforce one-hop path - Implemented * Section 6: Multiaccess Networks - Implemented * Section 6: Point-to-Point Links - Implemented * Section 7: Tunnels - Implemented Licensing: Proprietary Implementation Experience: N/A Comments: N/A Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 Contact Information: Santhi Raju Challapalli, Email: santhi-raju.challapalli@hpe.com Date: 4 August, 2026 A.3. ZTE Corporation Organization: ZTE Corporation Implementation Name: ZXROSNGV15.10.30 Description: Details about ZTE Implementation of RFC 5881. Maturity: Widely used in general terms. Coverage: * Section 2: Multiple Session Support - Implemented * Section 2: IPv4 and IPv6 supported - Implemented * Section 2: Echo Function - Not Implemented (only Unaffiliated BFD Echo is implemented) * Section 3: Session association with a received Your Discriminator set to zero - Implemented * Section 4: UDP destination port 3784 (Control Packets) - Implemented * Section 4: UDP source port in the 49152 through 65535 range - Implemented * Section 4: Unique UDP source ports - Not Implemented * Section 4: UDP destination port 3785 (Echo Packets) - Implemented (only for Unaffiliated BFD Echo) * Section 5: Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (authentication not in use) - Not Implemented * Section 5: Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (authentication in use) - Not Implemented Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 * Section 6: Enforce one-hop path - Implemented * Section 6: Multiaccess Networks - Implemented * Section 6: Point-to-Point Links - Not Implemented * Section 7: Tunnels - Implemented Licensing: Proprietary Implementation Experience: N/A Comments: N/A Contact Information: Zhao Yanhua, Email: zhao.yanhua3@zte.com.cn Date: 31 August, 2026 Appendix B. Change Log This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. B.1. Version -00 This initial version is the same as RFC 5881, using the rfcxmlv3 formatting and minimal changes: * Updated contact information. * Updated RFC 2119 boilerplate to reflect RFC 8174. * Updated references. * Added a change log section. B.2. Version -01 This version includes the following changes from version -00: * Added an implementation status section. * Incorporated the Verified Erratum 2293 (https://errata.rfc- editor.org/eid2293/). Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) November 2026 B.3. Version -02 This version includes the following changes from version -01: * Added implementation reports from cisco, HPE, and ZTE. * Updated the IANA Considerations section to request that IANA registry and MIB module references to RFC 5881 point to this document. Authors' Addresses Dave Katz HPE Email: david.katz@hpe.com Dave Ward Email: dward@bgp.nu Alvaro Retana (editor) Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Email: aretana@futurewei.com Katz, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 14]