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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-crypto-deprec-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" xml:lang="en" updates="4556, 5349, 8636" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.33.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="PKINIT-CypDpr">Deprecation of Outdated Cryptographic Algorithms and Parameters in Kerberos PKINIT</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-crypto-deprec-00"/>
    <author initials="J." surname="Rische" fullname="Julien Rische">
      <organization>Red Hat, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>23-25 rue Delarivière Lefoullon</street>
          <city>Puteaux</city>
          <code>92800</code>
          <country>France</country>
        </postal>
        <email>jrische@redhat.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Common Authentication Technology Next Generation</workgroup>
    <keyword>Kerberos</keyword>
    <keyword>PKINIT</keyword>
    <keyword>cryptographic deprecation</keyword>
    <keyword>SHA-1</keyword>
    <keyword>Diffie-Hellman</keyword>
    <keyword>MODP</keyword>
    <keyword>RSA</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 69?>

<t>This document deprecates several outdated cryptographic algorithms and
parameters from the Kerberos PKINIT specification (RFC 4556) and its
extensions (RFC 5349, RFC 8636).  Specifically, it deprecates the RSA
key transport mechanism for reply key delivery, the Diffie-Hellman MODP
group 2 (1024-bit) parameter, the SHA-1-based octetstring2key key
derivation function, and the sha1WithRSAEncryption CMS signature
algorithm.  It also defines a new <tt>paChecksum2</tt> field in the
<tt>PKAuthenticator</tt> structure to provide checksum algorithm agility.</t>
      <t>This document updates RFC 4556, RFC 5349, and RFC 8636.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>Discussion Venues</name>
      <t>Discussion of this document takes place on the
    Common Authentication Technology Next Generation Working Group mailing list (kitten@ietf.org),
    which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/kitten/"/>.</t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
    <eref target="https://github.com/abbra/kitten-pkinit-pqc"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 82?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Since the publication of the initial PKINIT specification in <xref target="RFC4556"/>,
significant advances in cryptanalysis and computing power have rendered
several of its cryptographic elements inadequate for current use.
BCP 201 <xref target="RFC7696"/> stresses the importance of proactively deprecating
weakened algorithms.  This document addresses five such elements.</t>
      <t>The RSA key transport mechanism defined in <xref target="RFC4556"/> Section 3.2.3.2
relies on RSAES-PKCS-v1_5, which has been subject to Bleichenbacher-
style adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks since 1998 and to numerous
side-channel attacks documented in <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance"/>.
It also prevents the client from contributing entropy to the session
key.</t>
      <t>The 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman MODP group 2 (<xref target="RFC2409"/> Section 6.2,
<xref target="RFC2412"/> Appendix E.2), mandatory in <xref target="RFC4556"/>, provides at most
approximately 80 bits of security strength.  NIST has deprecated
1024-bit discrete-logarithm key sizes and major cryptographic libraries
such as OpenSSL no longer support this group, creating practical
interoperability failures in PKINIT deployments.</t>
      <t>SHA-1 has been demonstrably broken for collision resistance since 2017.
NIST disallowed SHA-1 for digital signature generation in 2013, and
<xref target="RFC9155"/> formally deprecated it in TLS 1.2.  Three elements of the
PKINIT protocol depend on SHA-1: the <tt>sha1WithRSAEncryption</tt> CMS
signature algorithm mandated in <xref target="RFC4556"/> Section 3.2.2, the
<tt>octetstring2key()</tt> key derivation function in <xref target="RFC4556"/>
Section 3.2.3.1, and the hardwired SHA-1 checksum in the <tt>paChecksum</tt>
field of <tt>PKAuthenticator</tt>.  <xref target="RFC8636"/> introduced negotiable KDFs and
acknowledged the <tt>paChecksum</tt> limitation but left both the KDF
negotiation and the checksum algorithm as optional.</t>
      <t>This specification:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Deprecates the RSA key transport mechanism (<xref target="sec-rsa-deprec"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Deprecates MODP group 2 (<xref target="sec-modp-deprec"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Makes the <tt>supportedKDFs</tt> field mandatory and deprecates the SHA-1
KDF (<xref target="sec-kdf-deprec"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Deprecates <tt>sha1WithRSAEncryption</tt> and <tt>ecdsa-with-SHA1</tt> in CMS
signatures (<xref target="sec-sig-deprec"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Defines <tt>paChecksum2</tt> for checksum algorithm agility
(<xref target="sec-pachecksum2"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-rsa-deprec">
      <name>RSA Key Transport</name>
      <t>Implementations conforming to this specification <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use the RSA
key transport mechanism (the <tt>encKeyPack</tt> choice of <tt>PA-PK-AS-REP</tt>)
defined in <xref target="RFC4556"/> Section 3.2.3.2.</t>
      <t>Clients conforming to this specification:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the <tt>clientPublicValue</tt> field in the <tt>AuthPack</tt>
structure, containing a Diffie-Hellman or ECDH public key.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> omit <tt>clientPublicValue</tt> in order to request RSA key
transport.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>KDCs conforming to this specification:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reply using the <tt>dhInfo</tt> choice in <tt>PA-PK-AS-REP</tt> (the
Diffie-Hellman key delivery method described in <xref target="RFC4556"/>
Section 3.2.3.1 or the ECDH method described in <xref target="RFC5349"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reply using the <tt>encKeyPack</tt> choice in <tt>PA-PK-AS-REP</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> return <tt>KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED</tt> if a client request
omits the <tt>clientPublicValue</tt> field.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-modp-deprec">
      <name>MODP Group 2</name>
      <t>Implementations conforming to this specification <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use
Diffie-Hellman MODP group 2 (the Second Oakley Group, 1024-bit prime).</t>
      <t>The requirements from <xref target="RFC4556"/> Section 3.2.3.1 are updated as
follows:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support MODP group 14 (2048-bit prime,
<xref target="RFC3526"/> Section 3).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support MODP group 16 (4096-bit prime,
<xref target="RFC3526"/> Section 5).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support additional MODP groups defined in
<xref target="RFC3526"/> with a modulus size of 2048 bits or larger.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>When a client sends a <tt>clientPublicValue</tt> using a deprecated group,
a KDC conforming to this specification <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request and
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reply with <tt>TD-DH-PARAMETERS</tt> containing only groups that
meet the minimum strength requirements defined above.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-kdf-deprec">
      <name>SHA-1-Based <tt>octetstring2key()</tt> KDF</name>
      <t>The <tt>supportedKDFs</tt> field defined in <xref target="RFC8636"/> is now <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>.</t>
      <t>Clients conforming to this specification:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the <tt>supportedKDFs</tt> field in the <tt>AuthPack</tt> structure.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include <tt>id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256</tt> in the <tt>supportedKDFs</tt> set.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include <tt>id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha384</tt> and
<tt>id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512</tt> in the <tt>supportedKDFs</tt> set.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include <tt>id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1</tt> in the <tt>supportedKDFs</tt> set.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>KDCs conforming to this specification:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> select a KDF from the <tt>supportedKDFs</tt> field in the request.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> select <tt>id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If the <tt>supportedKDFs</tt> field is absent from the request, the KDC
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reject the request and reply with <tt>KDC_ERR_NO_ACCEPTABLE_KDF</tt>
(error code 100, <xref target="RFC8636"/>).  Alternatively, the KDC <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> fall back
to the <xref target="RFC4556"/> <tt>octetstring2key()</tt> KDF if local policy permits
interoperability with legacy clients.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-sig-deprec">
      <name>CMS Signature Algorithms</name>
      <t>Implementations conforming to this specification <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use
<tt>sha1WithRSAEncryption</tt> for generating CMS signatures in PKINIT
messages.</t>
      <t>For RSA signatures, the following requirements apply:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support <tt>sha256WithRSAEncryption</tt> <xref target="RFC5754"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support <tt>sha384WithRSAEncryption</tt> and
<tt>sha512WithRSAEncryption</tt> <xref target="RFC5754"/>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>For ECDSA signatures, the requirements from <xref target="RFC5349"/> Section 3 are
updated as follows:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support <tt>ecdsa-with-SHA256</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support <tt>ecdsa-with-SHA384</tt> and
<tt>ecdsa-with-SHA512</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> use <tt>ecdsa-with-SHA1</tt>.  The <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
requirement for <tt>ecdsa-with-SHA1</tt> in <xref target="RFC5349"/> is downgraded.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>For CMS digest algorithms, the corresponding requirements apply:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support <tt>id-sha256</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support <tt>id-sha384</tt> and <tt>id-sha512</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use <tt>id-sha1</tt> for generating CMS signatures
in PKINIT messages.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>When a KDC receives a CMS <tt>SignedData</tt> from a client that uses
<tt>sha1WithRSAEncryption</tt>, <tt>ecdsa-with-SHA1</tt>, or <tt>id-sha1</tt> as the
digest algorithm, the KDC <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reject the request.  A KDC <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
accept SHA-1-based signatures from legacy clients if local policy
permits, but this is <bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-pachecksum2">
      <name><tt>paChecksum2</tt> Extension</name>
      <t>This specification defines a new <tt>PAChecksum2</tt> type and extends the
<tt>PKAuthenticator</tt> structure from <xref target="RFC4556"/> with a <tt>paChecksum2</tt>
field at tag [5].</t>
      <sourcecode type="asn1"><![CDATA[
PAChecksum2 ::= SEQUENCE {
    checksum                [0] OCTET STRING,
        -- Checksum computed over KDC-REQ-BODY using the algorithm
        -- specified in algorithmIdentifier.
    algorithmIdentifier     [1] AlgorithmIdentifier
        -- Digest algorithm OID.
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>The <tt>checksum</tt> field contains the digest computed over KDC-REQ-BODY
using the algorithm identified by <tt>algorithmIdentifier</tt>.  The
<tt>parameters</tt> field of the <tt>AlgorithmIdentifier</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent.</t>
      <t>The <tt>PKAuthenticator</tt> structure from <xref target="RFC4556"/> is extended as follows:</t>
      <sourcecode type="asn1"><![CDATA[
PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
    cusec                   [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
    ctime                   [1] KerberosTime,
    nonce                   [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
    paChecksum              [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
        -- RFC 4556: SHA-1 checksum over KDC-REQ-BODY.
    freshnessToken          [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
        -- RFC 8070: PA_AS_FRESHNESS token from KDC.
    paChecksum2             [5] PAChecksum2 OPTIONAL,
        -- This specification: algorithm-agile checksum
        -- over KDC-REQ-BODY.
    ...
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>The following digest algorithms are defined for use with <tt>paChecksum2</tt>:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support SHA-256
(OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1, <xref target="RFC5754"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> support SHA-384
(OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2, <xref target="RFC5754"/>) and SHA-512
(OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3, <xref target="RFC5754"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <dl>
        <dt>Client behavior:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A client constructing a PKINIT request conforming to this
specification <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the <tt>paChecksum2</tt> field and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include
the <tt>paChecksum</tt> field (SHA-1, per <xref target="RFC4556"/>).  Both checksums,
when present, are computed over the same KDC-REQ-BODY input.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>KDC validation:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A KDC conforming to this specification <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> require <tt>paChecksum2</tt> to
be present in the request.  If <tt>paChecksum2</tt> is absent, the KDC
returns <tt>KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED</tt> (error code 79,
<xref target="RFC4556"/>).
</t>
          <t>The KDC <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate <tt>paChecksum2</tt>.  If <tt>paChecksum</tt> is also
present, the KDC <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate it as well.  The KDC returns the
following errors:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP</tt> (error code 15, <xref target="RFC4120"/>): if the
digest algorithm in <tt>paChecksum2.algorithmIdentifier</tt> is not
supported by the KDC.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED</tt> (error code 41, <xref target="RFC4120"/>): if
verification of <tt>paChecksum2</tt> fails, or if <tt>paChecksum</tt> is
present and its verification fails.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>KDCs and clients <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> accept legacy algorithm choices from peers that
have not been updated to conform to this specification, subject to
local policy.  Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> log such fallback events.
Deployments are encouraged to coordinate a phased rollout in which the
KDC accepts (but does not yet require) the new fields before
enforcement is enabled.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC3526">
          <front>
            <title>More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</title>
            <author fullname="T. Kivinen" initials="T." surname="Kivinen"/>
            <author fullname="M. Kojo" initials="M." surname="Kojo"/>
            <date month="May" year="2003"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines new Modular Exponential (MODP) Groups for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. It documents the well known and used 1536 bit group 5, and also defines new 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, and 8192 bit Diffie-Hellman groups numbered starting at 14. The selection of the primes for theses groups follows the criteria established by Richard Schroeppel. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3526"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3526"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4120">
          <front>
            <title>The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Neuman" initials="C." surname="Neuman"/>
            <author fullname="T. Yu" initials="T." surname="Yu"/>
            <author fullname="S. Hartman" initials="S." surname="Hartman"/>
            <author fullname="K. Raeburn" initials="K." surname="Raeburn"/>
            <date month="July" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol, and it obsoletes RFC 1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than was provided in RFC 1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within those messages. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4120"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4120"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4556">
          <front>
            <title>Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)</title>
            <author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu"/>
            <author fullname="B. Tung" initials="B." surname="Tung"/>
            <date month="June" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes protocol extensions (hereafter called PKINIT) to the Kerberos protocol specification. These extensions provide a method for integrating public key cryptography into the initial authentication exchange, by using asymmetric-key signature and/or encryption algorithms in pre-authentication data fields. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4556"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4556"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5349">
          <front>
            <title>Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Support for Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)</title>
            <author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu"/>
            <author fullname="K. Jaganathan" initials="K." surname="Jaganathan"/>
            <author fullname="K. Lauter" initials="K." surname="Lauter"/>
            <date month="September" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the use of Elliptic Curve certificates, Elliptic Curve signature schemes and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement within the framework of PKINIT -- the Kerberos Version 5 extension that provides for the use of public key cryptography. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5349"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5349"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5754">
          <front>
            <title>Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="January" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the conventions for using the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) message digest algorithms (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). It also describes the conventions for using these algorithms with the CMS and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), and Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) signature algorithms. Further, it provides SMIMECapabilities attribute values for each algorithm. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5754"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5754"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8636">
          <front>
            <title>Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT) Algorithm Agility</title>
            <author fullname="L. Hornquist Astrand" initials="L." surname="Hornquist Astrand"/>
            <author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu"/>
            <author fullname="M. Cullen" initials="M." surname="Cullen"/>
            <author fullname="G. Hudson" initials="G." surname="Hudson"/>
            <date month="July" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document updates the Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT) standard (RFC 4556) to remove protocol structures tied to specific cryptographic algorithms. The PKINIT key derivation function is made negotiable, and the digest algorithms for signing the pre-authentication data and the client's X.509 certificates are made discoverable.</t>
              <t>These changes provide preemptive protection against vulnerabilities discovered in the future in any specific cryptographic algorithm and allow incremental deployment of newer algorithms.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8636"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8636"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2409">
          <front>
            <title>The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Harkins" initials="D." surname="Harkins"/>
            <author fullname="D. Carrel" initials="D." surname="Carrel"/>
            <date month="November" year="1998"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo describes a hybrid protocol. The purpose is to negotiate, and provide authenticated keying material for, security associations in a protected manner. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2409"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2409"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2412">
          <front>
            <title>The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="H. Orman" initials="H." surname="Orman"/>
            <date month="November" year="1998"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a protocol, named OAKLEY, by which two authenticated parties can agree on secure and secret keying material. The basic mechanism is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2412"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2412"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7696">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="November" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many IETF protocols use cryptographic algorithms to provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication, or digital signature. Communicating peers must support a common set of cryptographic algorithms for these mechanisms to work properly. This memo provides guidelines to ensure that protocols have the ability to migrate from one mandatory-to-implement algorithm suite to another over time.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="201"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7696"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7696"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8070">
          <front>
            <title>Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT) Freshness Extension</title>
            <author fullname="M. Short" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Short"/>
            <author fullname="S. Moore" initials="S." surname="Moore"/>
            <author fullname="P. Miller" initials="P." surname="Miller"/>
            <date month="February" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how to further extend the Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT) extension (defined in RFC 4556) to exchange an opaque data blob that a Key Distribution Center (KDC) can validate to ensure that the client is currently in possession of the private key during a PKINIT Authentication Service (AS) exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8070"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8070"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9155">
          <front>
            <title>Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 Signature Hashes in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2</title>
            <author fullname="L. Velvindron" initials="L." surname="Velvindron"/>
            <author fullname="K. Moriarty" initials="K." surname="Moriarty"/>
            <author fullname="A. Ghedini" initials="A." surname="Ghedini"/>
            <date month="December" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are increasingly vulnerable to attack, and this document deprecates their use in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 digital signatures. However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 with Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), as used in record protection. This document updates RFC 5246.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9155"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9155"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance">
          <front>
            <title>Implementation Guidance for the PKCS#1 RSA Cryptography Specification</title>
            <author initials="H." surname="Kario" fullname="Hubert Kario">
              <organization>Red Hat, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance-08"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MS-PKCA" target="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pkca/">
          <front>
            <title>Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT) in Kerberos Protocol</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Microsoft Corporation</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 347?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>The <tt>paChecksum2</tt> extension is based on the <tt>PAChecksum2</tt> structure
first defined in Microsoft's <xref target="MS-PKCA"/> specification.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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-->

</rfc>
