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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-mls-pq-ciphersuites-08" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="MLS Cipher Suites with ML-KEM">ML-KEM and Hybrid Cipher Suites for Messaging Layer Security</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mls-pq-ciphersuites-08"/>
    <author initials="R." surname="Mahy" fullname="Rohan Mahy">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>rohan.ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="R. L." surname="Barnes" fullname="Richard L. Barnes">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>rlb@ipv.sx</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
    <area>sec</area>
    <workgroup>MLS</workgroup>
    <keyword>ML-KEM</keyword>
    <keyword>Kyber</keyword>
    <keyword>post-quantum</keyword>
    <keyword>post quantum KEM</keyword>
    <keyword>KEM</keyword>
    <keyword>PQ/T</keyword>
    <keyword>hybrid</keyword>
    <keyword>hybrid KEM</keyword>
    <keyword>Key Encapsulation Mechanism</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 52?>

<t>This document registers new cipher suites for Messaging Layer Security (MLS) based on "post-quantum" algorithms, which are intended to be resilient to attack by quantum computers.
These cipher suites are constructed using the new Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), optionally in combination with traditional elliptic curve KEMs, together with appropriate authenticated encryption, hash, and signature algorithms.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://mlswg.github.io/mls-pq-ciphersuites/#go.draft-ietf-mls-pq-ciphersuites.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mls-pq-ciphersuites/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        MLS Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:mls@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mls/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mls/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/mlswg/mls-pq-ciphersuites/"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 57?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The potential availability of a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer has caused concern that well-funded adversaries could overturn long-held assumptions about the security assurances of classical Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and classical cryptographic signatures, which are fundamental to modern security protocols, including the MLS protocol <xref target="RFC9420"/>.</t>
      <t>Of particular concern are "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks, by which an attacker could collect encrypted traffic now, before a quantum computer exists, and later use a quantum computer to break the confidentiality protections on the collected traffic.</t>
      <t>In response to these concerns, the cryptographic community has defined "post-quantum" algorithms, which are designed to be resilient to attacks by quantum computers.
Symmetric algorithms can be made post-quantum secure simply by using longer keys and hashes.
For asymmetric operations such as KEMs and signatures, entirely new algorithms are needed.</t>
      <t>In this document, we define cipher suites that use the post-quantum secure Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) <xref target="MLKEM"/> together with appropriate symmetric algorithms, and either traditional or Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) <xref target="MLDSA"/> post-quantum signature algorithms.
The traditional signature cipher suites address the risk of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks, while not taking on the additional cost of post-quantum signatures.
The cipher suites with post-quantum signatures use either a pure post-quantum KEM or a Post-Quantum/Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid KEM.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="post-quantum-kem-cipher-suites">
      <name>Post-quantum KEM Cipher Suites</name>
      <t>Following the pattern of base MLS, we define several variations, to allow for users that prefer to only use NIST-approved cryptography, users that prefer a higher security level, and users that prefer a PQ/traditional hybrid KEM over pure ML-KEM:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-768 + X25519 (128-bit security, Non-NIST, PQ/T hybrid KEM)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-768 + P-256 (128-bit security, NIST, PQ/T hybrid KEM)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-1024 + P-384 (192-bit security, NIST, PQ/T hybrid KEM)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-768 (128-bit security, Non-NIST, pure PQ KEM)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-768 (128-bit security, NIST, pure PQ KEM)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-1024 (192-bit security, NIST, pure PQ KEM)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-768 + X25519 (128-bit security, Non-NIST, PQ/T hybrid KEM + PQ signature)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-768 (192-bit security, NIST, pure PQ)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>ML-KEM-1024 (256-bit security, NIST, pure PQ)</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The first two entries are each registered twice: once with AES128 GCM and SHA-256, and once with AES256 GCM and SHA-384.</t>
      <t>Some parts of the community wish to support the 128-bit security level with the same Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) <xref target="RFC5116"/> algorithms and hash function as used in the default cipher suite registered in <xref target="RFC9420"/>: (AES128 GCM <xref target="GCM"/>, and HMAC <xref target="RFC2104"/> with SHA-256 <xref target="SHS"/>); while other parts of the community would like to follow recent recommendations to transition immediately to AES256 GCM <xref target="GCM"/>, and HMAC <xref target="RFC2104"/> with SHA-384 <xref target="SHS"/>.</t>
      <t>For the cipher suites at the 192-bit or 256-bit security levels, we use AES256 GCM <xref target="GCM"/> as the AEAD algorithm, and HMAC <xref target="RFC2104"/> with SHA-384 <xref target="SHS"/> as the hash function.</t>
      <t>ML-KEM uses the SHAKE and SHA-3 algorithms <xref target="FIPS202"/> internally (see Section 4.1 of <xref target="MLKEM"/>).
Likewise the three hybrid KEMs <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-concrete-hybrid-kems"/> used in this document use SHAKE as a Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG) and SHA-3 as a Key Derivation Function (KDF) inside the hybrid combiner.</t>
      <t>MLS extensively uses the two-stage KDF functions <tt>Extract</tt> and <tt>Expand</tt> defined in <xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-hpke-hpke"/> to derive keys in the ratchet tree <xref section="7.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>, the key schedule <xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>, and the secret tree <xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>.
In particular, MLS uses the <tt>Extract</tt> function to incorporate commit secrets and pre-shared keys into the key schedule.
As <xref target="I-D.ietf-hpke-pq"/> does not define either function for "single-stage" KDFs like SHAKE (see <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-hpke-pq"/>), the cipher suites defined here use the HMAC-based KDF (HKDF) algorithms HKDF-SHA384 and HKDF-SHA256 for the KDF functions used inside MLS.</t>
      <t>Finally, one of the cipher suites at the 128-bit security level uses the same hybrid KEM as the first cipher suite, the ChaCha20-Poly1305 <xref target="RFC8439"/> AEAD algorithm, HMAC with SHA-384, and the pure PQ signature algorithm ML-DSA-44.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 was chosen for acceptable performance when implemented entirely in software.</t>
      <t>For the PQ/T hybrid KEMs and the pure ML-KEM HPKE integration, we use the KEMs defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-hpke-pq"/>.
The signature schemes values for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 <xref target="MLDSA"/> are defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa"/>.</t>
      <t>For the cipher suites using ML-DSA, the <tt>SignaturePublicKey</tt> (<xref section="5.1.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>) is the ML-DSA public key encoded with <tt>pkEncode</tt> (Algorithm 22 of <xref target="MLDSA"/>), not a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, and a signature is the byte string output by ML-DSA.Sign (Algorithm 2 of <xref target="MLDSA"/>).
<tt>SignWithLabel</tt> and <tt>VerifyWithLabel</tt> (<xref section="5.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>) use ML-DSA.Sign and ML-DSA.Verify (Algorithm 3 of <xref target="MLDSA"/>) with the serialized <tt>SignContent</tt> as the message and with the <xref target="MLDSA"/> context (ctx) parameter set to the empty string; the MLS label carried in <tt>SignContent</tt> provides domain separation.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="mls-cipher-suites">
        <name>MLS Cipher Suites</name>
        <t>This document requests that IANA add the following entries to the "MLS Cipher Suites" registry, replacing "XXXX" with the RFC number assigned to this document:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Value</th>
              <th align="left">Name</th>
              <th align="left">Rec</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0010</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_128_MLKEM768X25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0011</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_128_MLKEM768X25519_AES256GCM_SHA384_Ed25519</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0012</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_128_MLKEM768P256_AES128GCM_SHA256_P256</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0013</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_128_MLKEM768P256_AES256GCM_SHA384_P256</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0014</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_192_MLKEM1024P384_AES256GCM_SHA384_P384</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0015</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_128_MLKEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384_Ed25519</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0016</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_128_MLKEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384_P256</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0017</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_192_MLKEM1024_AES256GCM_SHA384_P384</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0020</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_128_MLKEM768X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA384_MLDSA44</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0021</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_192_MLKEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384_MLDSA65</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0022</td>
              <td align="left">MLS_256_MLKEM1024_AES256GCM_SHA384_MLDSA87</td>
              <td align="left">Y</td>
              <td align="left">RFCXXXX</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The mapping of cipher suites to HPKE primitives <xref target="I-D.ietf-hpke-hpke"/>, HMAC hash functions, and TLS signature schemes values <xref target="RFC9846"/> is as follows:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Value</th>
              <th align="left">KEM</th>
              <th align="left">KDF</th>
              <th align="left">AEAD</th>
              <th align="left">Hash</th>
              <th align="left">Signature</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0010</td>
              <td align="left">0x647a</td>
              <td align="left">0x0001</td>
              <td align="left">0x0001</td>
              <td align="left">SHA256</td>
              <td align="left">ed25519</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0011</td>
              <td align="left">0x647a</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">ed25519</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0012</td>
              <td align="left">0x0050</td>
              <td align="left">0x0001</td>
              <td align="left">0x0001</td>
              <td align="left">SHA256</td>
              <td align="left">ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0013</td>
              <td align="left">0x0050</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0014</td>
              <td align="left">0x0051</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0015</td>
              <td align="left">0x0041</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">ed25519</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0016</td>
              <td align="left">0x0041</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0017</td>
              <td align="left">0x0042</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0020</td>
              <td align="left">0x647a</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0003</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">mldsa44</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0021</td>
              <td align="left">0x0041</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">mldsa65</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0x0022</td>
              <td align="left">0x0042</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">0x0002</td>
              <td align="left">SHA384</td>
              <td align="left">mldsa87</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The hash used for the MLS transcript hash is the one referenced in the cipher suite name. "SHA256" and "SHA384" refer to the SHA-256 and SHA-384 functions defined in <xref target="SHS"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The first eight cipher suites defined in this document combine a post-quantum (or PQ/T hybrid) KEM with a traditional signature algorithm. As such, they are designed to provide confidentiality against quantum and classical attacks, but provide authenticity against classical attacks only.  Thus, these cipher suites do not provide full post-quantum security, only post-quantum confidentiality.
That post-quantum confidentiality holds only against passive attackers, such as those mounting "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks.
An attacker able to forge the traditional signatures, or the credentials that bind the signature keys to identities, can inject KeyPackages or group operations and thereby compromise the confidentiality of later epochs.</t>
      <t>The last three cipher suites also use post-quantum signature algorithms.</t>
      <t>For security considerations related to the KEMs used in this document, please see the documents that define those KEMs: <xref target="I-D.ietf-hpke-pq"/>, <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems"/>, and <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-concrete-hybrid-kems"/>.
For security considerations related to the post-quantum signature algorithms used in this document, please see <xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa"/> and <xref target="RFC9881"/>.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
      <name>Normative References</name>
      <reference anchor="SHS">
        <front>
          <title>Secure hash standard</title>
          <author>
            <organization/>
          </author>
          <date year="2015"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.fips.180-4"/>
        <refcontent>National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)</refcontent>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="MLKEM">
        <front>
          <title>Module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism standard</title>
          <author>
            <organization/>
          </author>
          <date month="August" year="2024"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.fips.203"/>
        <refcontent>National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)</refcontent>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="MLDSA">
        <front>
          <title>Module-lattice-based digital signature standard</title>
          <author>
            <organization/>
          </author>
          <date month="August" year="2024"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.fips.204"/>
        <refcontent>National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)</refcontent>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="FIPS202">
        <front>
          <title>SHA-3 standard :: permutation-based hash and extendable-output functions</title>
          <author>
            <organization/>
          </author>
          <date year="2015"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.fips.202"/>
        <refcontent>National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)</refcontent>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="GCM">
        <front>
          <title>Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation :: GaloisCounter Mode (GCM) and GMAC</title>
          <author fullname="M J Dworkin" initials="M." surname="Dworkin">
            <organization/>
          </author>
          <date year="2007"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d"/>
        <refcontent>National Institute of Standards and Technology</refcontent>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9420">
        <front>
          <title>The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol</title>
          <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
          <author fullname="B. Beurdouche" initials="B." surname="Beurdouche"/>
          <author fullname="R. Robert" initials="R." surname="Robert"/>
          <author fullname="J. Millican" initials="J." surname="Millican"/>
          <author fullname="E. Omara" initials="E." surname="Omara"/>
          <author fullname="K. Cohn-Gordon" initials="K." surname="Cohn-Gordon"/>
          <date month="July" year="2023"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>Messaging applications are increasingly making use of end-to-end security mechanisms to ensure that messages are only accessible to the communicating endpoints, and not to any servers involved in delivering messages. Establishing keys to provide such protections is challenging for group chat settings, in which more than two clients need to agree on a key but may not be online at the same time. In this document, we specify a key establishment protocol that provides efficient asynchronous group key establishment with forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS) for groups in size ranging from two to thousands.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9420"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9420"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC5116">
        <front>
          <title>An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption</title>
          <author fullname="D. McGrew" initials="D." surname="McGrew"/>
          <date month="January" year="2008"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document defines algorithms for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), and defines a uniform interface and a registry for such algorithms. The interface and registry can be used as an application-independent set of cryptoalgorithm suites. This approach provides advantages in efficiency and security, and promotes the reuse of crypto implementations. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5116"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5116"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC2104">
        <front>
          <title>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</title>
          <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
          <author fullname="M. Bellare" initials="M." surname="Bellare"/>
          <author fullname="R. Canetti" initials="R." surname="Canetti"/>
          <date month="February" year="1997"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2104"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2104"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.irtf-cfrg-concrete-hybrid-kems">
        <front>
          <title>Concrete Hybrid PQ/T Key Encapsulation Mechanisms</title>
          <author fullname="Deirdre Connolly" initials="D." surname="Connolly">
            <organization>SandboxAQ</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
            <organization>Cisco</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   PQ/T Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) combine "post-
   quantum" cryptographic algorithms, which are safe from attack by a
   quantum computer, with "traditional" algorithms, which are not.  CFRG
   has developed a general framework for creating hybrid KEMs.  In this
   document, we define concrete instantiations of this framework to
   illustrate certain properties of the framework and simplify
   implementors' choices.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-concrete-hybrid-kems-04"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-hpke-hpke">
        <front>
          <title>Hybrid Public Key Encryption</title>
          <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
         </author>
          <author fullname="Karthikeyan Bhargavan" initials="K." surname="Bhargavan">
            <organization>Inria</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Benjamin Lipp" initials="B." surname="Lipp">
            <organization>Rosenpass</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Wood">
         </author>
          <date day="28" month="October" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   This document specifies a scheme for hybrid public key encryption
   (HPKE).  This scheme provides a variant of public key encryption of
   arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key.  It also
   includes a variant that authenticates possession of a pre-shared key.
   HPKE works for any combination of an asymmetric Key Encapsulation
   Mechanism (KEM), key derivation function (KDF), and authenticated
   encryption with additional data (AEAD) encryption function.  This
   document provides instantiations of the scheme using widely used and
   efficient primitives, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
   key agreement, HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF), and SHA-2.

   This document obsoletes RFC 9180.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-hpke-hpke-06"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-hpke-pq">
        <front>
          <title>Post-Quantum and Post-Quantum/Traditional Hybrid Algorithms for HPKE</title>
          <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
            <organization>Cisco</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Deirdre Connolly" initials="D." surname="Connolly">
            <organization>Selkie Cryptography</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   Updating key exchange and public-key encryption protocols to resist
   attack by quantum computers is a high priority given the possibility
   of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks.  Hybrid Public Key
   Encryption (HPKE) is a widely-used public key encryption scheme based
   on combining a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), a Key Derivation
   Function (KDF), and an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
   (AEAD) scheme.  In this document, we define KEM algorithms for HPKE
   based on both post-quantum KEMs and hybrid constructions of post-
   quantum KEMs with traditional KEMs, as well as a KDF based on SHA-3
   that is suitable for use with these KEMs.  When used with these
   algorithms, HPKE is resilient with respect to attacks by a quantum
   computer.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-hpke-pq-05"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8439">
        <front>
          <title>ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols</title>
          <author fullname="Y. Nir" initials="Y." surname="Nir"/>
          <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
          <date month="June" year="2018"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document defines the ChaCha20 stream cipher as well as the use of the Poly1305 authenticator, both as stand-alone algorithms and as a "combined mode", or Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm.</t>
            <t>RFC 7539, the predecessor of this document, was meant to serve as a stable reference and an implementation guide. It was a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). This document merges the errata filed against RFC 7539 and adds a little text to the Security Considerations section.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8439"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8439"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa">
        <front>
          <title>Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3</title>
          <author fullname="Tim Hollebeek" initials="T." surname="Hollebeek">
            <organization>DigiCert</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Sophie Schmieg" initials="S." surname="Schmieg">
            <organization>Google</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Bas Westerbaan" initials="B." surname="Westerbaan">
            <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="11" month="September" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   This memo specifies how the post-quantum signature scheme ML-DSA
   (FIPS 204) is used for authentication in TLS 1.3.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-mldsa-06"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9846">
        <front>
          <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
          <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
          <date month="July" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
            <t>This document obsoletes RFC 8446, which specified TLS 1.3. This document obsoletes RFC 5246 (specifying TLS 1.2) and RFCs 5077, 6961, 7627, and 8422, all of which pertain to TLS 1.2 or earlier, and updates RFCs 5705 and 6066. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9846"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems">
        <front>
          <title>Hybrid PQ/T Key Encapsulation Mechanisms</title>
          <author fullname="Deirdre Connolly" initials="D." surname="Connolly">
            <organization>SandboxAQ</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
            <organization>Cisco</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Paul Grubbs" initials="P." surname="Grubbs">
            <organization>University of Michigan</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   This document defines generic constructions for hybrid Key
   Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) based on combining a post-quantum
   (PQ) KEM with a traditional cryptographic component.  Hybrid KEMs
   built using these constructions provide strong security properties as
   long as either of the underlying algorithms are secure.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems-12"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9881">
        <front>
          <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)</title>
          <author fullname="J. Massimo" initials="J." surname="Massimo"/>
          <author fullname="P. Kampanakis" initials="P." surname="Kampanakis"/>
          <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
          <author fullname="B. E. Westerbaan" initials="B. E." surname="Westerbaan"/>
          <date month="October" year="2025"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>Digital signatures are used within X.509 certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and to sign messages. This document specifies the conventions for using FIPS 204, the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) in Internet X.509 certificates and CRLs. The conventions for the associated signatures, subject public keys, and private key are also described.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9881"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9881"/>
      </reference>
    </references>
    <?line 160?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>This work would not be possible without the hard work of the CFRG Hybrid KEM design team: Aron Wussler, Bas Westerbaan, Deirdre Connolly, Mike Ounsworth, Nick Sullivan, and Stephen Farrell.
Thanks also to Joël Alwen, Marta Mularczyk, and Britta Hale.
Mark Atwood provided useful corrections and clarifications.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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</rfc>
