<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
  <!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.43 (Ruby 3.3.8) -->


<!DOCTYPE rfc  [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">

]>


<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-09" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" updates="9580" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title>OpenPGP Key Replacement</title>

    <author fullname="Daphne Shaw">
      <organization>Jabberwocky Tech</organization>
      <address>
        <email>dshaw@jabberwocky.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Andrew Gallagher" role="editor">
      <organization>PGPKeys.EU</organization>
      <address>
        <email>andrewg@andrewg.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>

    <area>sec</area>
    <workgroup>openpgp</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 49?>

<t>This document specifies a method in OpenPGP to suggest a replacement for an expired, revoked, or deprecated primary key.</t>



    </abstract>

    <note title="About This Document" removeInRFC="true">
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://andrewgdotcom.gitlab.io/openpgp-replacementkey"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        OpenPGP Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:openpgp@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/openpgp/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://gitlab.com/andrewgdotcom/openpgp-replacementkey"/>.</t>
    </note>


  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 53?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>The OpenPGP message format <xref target="RFC9580"></xref> defines two ways to invalidate a primary key.
One way is that the primary key may be explicitly revoked via a key revocation signature.
OpenPGP also supports the concept of key expiration, a date after which the key should not be used.
When a primary key is revoked or expires, very often there is another primary key that is intended to replace it.</t>

<t>A key owner may also create a new primary key that is intended to deprecate and replace their existing primary key, but without revoking or expiring that key.
This is useful during the rollout of new key versions and algorithms which may not (yet) enjoy universal support.
In such cases, a key owner may prefer that their correspondents use their new primary key, but if this is not possible for technical reasons they may continue to use the non-preferred key, which remains valid.</t>

<t>In the past some key owners have created key transition documents, which are signed, human-readable statements stating that a newer primary key should be preferred by their correspondents.
It is desirable that this process be automated through a standardised machine-readable mechanism.</t>

<t>This document is to specify the format of a Signature Subpacket to be optionally included in a revocation signature or direct self-signature over a primary key.
This subpacket contains a pointer to a suggested replacement for the (now deprecated) primary key that is signed over, or one or more (deprecated) primary keys for which the current primary key is the suggested replacement.
The replacement certificate may then be automatically retrieved by the key owner's correspondents and (if supported and validated) used instead of the deprecated certificate.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="conventions-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>In OpenPGP, the term "key" has often been used broadly to describe different concepts, which can lead to confusion.
To avoid ambiguity in this document, we define the following terms:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>"Replacement Primary Key" and "Deprecated Primary Key": These refer to a primary key as contained in an OpenPGP Certificate (<xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/>) or Transferable Secret Key (<xref section="10.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/>).</t>
  <t>"Target Key": This refers to either a replacement or deprecated primary key that is referenced in a Replacement Key subpacket.</t>
  <t>"Current Primary Key": This refers to the primary key that contains the self-signature being discussed.</t>
  <t>"Replacement Certificate", "Deprecated Certificate" and "Current Certificate": These refer to the certificate that contains the respective primary key.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The term "OpenPGP Certificate", or just "certificate", is used in this document interchangeably with "OpenPGP Transferable Public Key".</t>

<t>This document also introduces the following terms:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>An "identity" is any identifying label such as an email address or "real name"; it is not limited to User IDs, for example it may be a record in a local database.</t>
  <t>An "identity claim" is any statement, explicit or implied, that an identity belongs to a particular primary key; it does not need to be a certification signature, and is not necessarily true.</t>
  <t>An "identity link" is an identity claim that is considered to be true and accurate by the receiving implementation.</t>
  <t>An "Identity Equivalence Binding" is a doubly-linked, directed relationship between two primary keys, one of which is the stated replacement for the other.</t>
  <t>An "Identity Equivalence Set" is a collection of two or more primary keys whose Identity Equivalence Bindings form a maximal connected graph.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="replacement-key-subpacket"><name>The Replacement Key Subpacket</name>

<t>The Replacement Key subpacket is a Signature Subpacket as specified in <xref section="5.2.3.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/>, and all general Signature Subpacket considerations from there apply here as well.
The value of the Signature Subpacket type octet for the Replacement Key subpacket is 100 (TEMPORARY, permanent code point TBC).</t>

<t>The Replacement Key subpacket is a statement by the key owner that either:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The current primary key is replaced by another primary key.</t>
  <t>The current primary key is the replacement for one or more deprecated primary key(s).</t>
</list></t>

<t>Use of the Replacement Key subpacket is optional.
The absence of a Replacement Key subpacket <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be interpreted as meaning that there is no replacement or deprecated primary key(s) relating to the current primary key.</t>

<t>The Replacement Key subpacket <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only be used in the hashed subpackets area of a Primary Key Revocation <xref section="5.2.1.11" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/> or Direct Key signature <xref section="5.2.1.10" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/>.
A receiving implementation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any Replacement Key subpacket found elsewhere.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="replacement-key-subpacket-format"><name>Format of the Replacement Key Subpacket</name>

<t>The format of the Replacement Key subpacket is:</t>

<texttable title="Replacement Key Subpacket Fields" anchor="replacement-key-subpacket-fields">
      <ttcol align='left'>Octets</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Field</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Notes</ttcol>
      <c>1</c>
      <c>Class</c>
      <c>&#160;</c>
      <c>1</c>
      <c>Record length (1)</c>
      <c>&#160;</c>
      <c>1</c>
      <c>Target Key Version (1)</c>
      <c>&#160;</c>
      <c>N1</c>
      <c>Target Key Fingerprint (1)</c>
      <c>&#160;</c>
      <c>M</c>
      <c>Target Key Imprint (1)</c>
      <c>&#160;</c>
      <c>1</c>
      <c>Record length (2)</c>
      <c>optional</c>
      <c>1</c>
      <c>Target Key Version (2)</c>
      <c>optional</c>
      <c>N2</c>
      <c>Target Key Fingerprint (2)</c>
      <c>optional</c>
      <c>M</c>
      <c>Target Key Imprint (2)</c>
      <c>optional</c>
      <c>...</c>
      <c>...</c>
      <c>...</c>
</texttable>

<t>The class octet contains flags that indicate the form and semantics of the subpacket:</t>

<texttable title="Replacement Key Subpacket Flags" anchor="replacement-key-subpacket-flags">
      <ttcol align='left'>Flag bit</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Flag name</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Form of remainder of packet</ttcol>
      <c>0x01</c>
      <c>Backward reference(s)</c>
      <c>Multiple targets may be given</c>
</texttable>

<t>The 0x01 bit of the class octet is the "backward reference(s)" bit.
When set, this means that the target key(s) identified by the packet are the primary keys for which the current primary key is the replacement primary key.
Otherwise, the subpacket represents a forward reference and the target key is the replacement primary key for the current primary key.</t>

<t>All other flag bits of the class octet are currently undefined.
All undefined flags <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be zeroed when generating the class octet.
An implementation that encounters a class octet with nonzero bits that it does not recognise <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore those bits.</t>

<t>Note that if the critical bit on the Replacement Key subpacket is set, a receiving implementation could consider the whole self-signature to be in error (<xref section="5.2.3.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/>).
The critical bit therefore <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be set on the Replacement Key subpacket.</t>

<t>The remainder of the subpacket contains one or more target records of the form:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
( Record Length || Target Key Version || Target Key Fingerprint || Target Key Imprint )
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The Record Length field contains a one-octet number which indicates the length of the next three fields in octets.
If a receiving implementation does not understand the target key version, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ignore the target record and skip to the next.
The Record Length field is authoritative, and a receiving implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> infer the length of a target record by any other means.
If the Record Length field indicates that a target record contains more octets than expected, a receiving implementation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any trailing extra octets.
If a target record contains fewer octets than expected, it is malformed and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>If the class octet does not have the 0x01 bit set, the subpacket <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain exactly one target record to identify the replacement primary key.</t>
  <t>If the class octet has the 0x01 bit set, the subpacket contains one or more target records, to identify the deprecated primary key(s) that the current primary key is a replacement for.</t>
</list></t>

<t>If a subpacket contains an unexpected number of target records, it is malformed and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.</t>

<t>The length of the Target Key Fingerprint field (N) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the fingerprint length corresponding to the immediately preceding Target Key Version field, e.g. 20 octets for version 4, or 32 octets for version 6.
The length of the Target Key Imprint field (M) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the length of the output of the digest algorithm specified in <xref target="imprint-digest-algorithms"/>, e.g. 32 octets for SHA3-256.</t>

<t>If a replacement or deprecated primary key is unknown, then a Replacement Key subpacket <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be included in the signature.</t>

<section anchor="key-imprints"><name>Key Imprints</name>

<t>An imprint of a public key packet is a generalization of a fingerprint.
It is a digest calculated over the same normalized octet sequence that the fingerprint is calculated over, except that it may use a digest algorithm other than the one specified for the fingerprint.
Conversely, the fingerprint of a public key packet can be considered a special case of an imprint.
A public key packet has only one fingerprint, but may have any number of imprints, each using a different digest algorithm.</t>

<section anchor="imprint-digest-algorithms"><name>Imprint Digest Algorithms in the Replacement Key Subpacket</name>

<t>When used in a Replacement Key subpacket, the Target Key Imprint is calculated using SHA3-256 (<xref section="9.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/>) for all target keys of version 6 or less.
This guards against a key-substitution attack when referring to a key that uses a weaker digest algorithm in its fingerprint.
The use of distinct algorithm families for the fingerprint and imprint also provides robustness against future attacks against either of the digest constructions.</t>

<t>A receiving implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use the fingerprint to locate a target key, but <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that the imprint matches.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="graph-topology"><name>Graph Topology</name>

<t>A given signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain at most one Replacement Key subpacket in its hashed subpacket area.
If a signature contains more than one such subpacket, even if malformed, a receiving implementation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> disregard them all.</t>

<t>A certificate <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> have multiple signatures that contain Replacement Key subpackets, however at most one Replacement Key subpacket in a certificate is current (and therefore meaningful) at any given time.
If the primary key is revoked with a Reason for Revocation of "Key is superseded" <xref section="5.2.3.31" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/>, the current Replacement Key subpacket (if any) is found in the most recent valid Key Revocation signature.
If it is not revoked, the current Replacement Key subpacket (if any) is found in the most recent valid Direct Key signature.
If the most recent valid Key Revocation or Direct Key signature does not contain a Replacement Key subpacket, or the primary key is revoked with any other Reason for Revocation, then there is no current Replacement Key subpacket.</t>

<t>This imposes a simple graph topology:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A deprecated certificate <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> claim to have more than one replacement.</t>
  <t>A deprecated certificate that claims to have a replacement <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> claim to be the replacement for any other(s).</t>
</list></t>

<t>In addition, the order of the deprecated primary keys specified in a backward-reference Replacement Key subpacket is meaningful.
If a replacement primary key is supported by a receiving implementation, but is not usable for the desired purpose (for example, it may not have an encryption-capable subkey), the implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use the ordering of the deprecated primary keys in its backward Replacement Key subpacket (if one exists) to indicate which deprecated primary key is preferred as a fallback.
The deprecated primary keys <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore be listed in order of decreasing preference.</t>

<figure title="Example Topology of Replacement Key Subpackets"><artset><artwork  type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="576" width="608" viewBox="0 0 608 576" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">
<path d="M 8,112 L 8,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,256 L 8,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,400 L 8,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,128 L 24,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,272 L 24,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,416 L 24,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,128 L 184,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,272 L 184,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,416 L 184,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 200,112 L 200,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 200,256 L 200,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 200,400 L 200,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 408,48 L 408,528" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,64 L 424,528" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 584,64 L 584,528" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 600,48 L 600,528" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,32 L 584,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,64 L 584,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,96 L 184,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,112 L 552,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,128 L 184,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 216,128 L 440,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,144 L 552,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,160 L 152,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 168,176 L 392,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,192 L 152,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,208 L 184,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,224 L 184,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,240 L 184,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,256 L 552,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,272 L 184,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 216,272 L 440,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,288 L 552,288" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,304 L 152,304" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 168,320 L 392,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,336 L 152,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,352 L 184,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,368 L 184,368" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,384 L 184,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,400 L 552,400" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,416 L 184,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 216,416 L 440,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,432 L 552,432" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,448 L 152,448" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 168,464 L 392,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,480 L 152,480" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,496 L 184,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,512 L 184,512" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,528 L 584,528" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,544 L 584,544" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,32 C 415.16936,32 408,39.16936 408,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 584,32 C 592.83064,32 600,39.16936 600,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,96 C 15.16936,96 8,103.16936 8,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,96 C 192.83064,96 200,103.16936 200,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,112 C 447.16936,112 440,119.16936 440,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,112 C 560.83064,112 568,119.16936 568,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,144 C 447.16936,144 440,136.83064 440,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,144 C 560.83064,144 568,136.83064 568,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,160 C 47.16936,160 40,167.16936 40,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,160 C 160.83064,160 168,167.16936 168,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,192 C 47.16936,192 40,184.83064 40,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,192 C 160.83064,192 168,184.83064 168,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,224 C 15.16936,224 8,216.83064 8,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,224 C 192.83064,224 200,216.83064 200,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,240 C 15.16936,240 8,247.16936 8,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,240 C 192.83064,240 200,247.16936 200,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,256 C 447.16936,256 440,263.16936 440,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,256 C 560.83064,256 568,263.16936 568,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,288 C 447.16936,288 440,280.83064 440,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,288 C 560.83064,288 568,280.83064 568,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,304 C 47.16936,304 40,311.16936 40,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,304 C 160.83064,304 168,311.16936 168,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,336 C 47.16936,336 40,328.83064 40,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,336 C 160.83064,336 168,328.83064 168,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,368 C 15.16936,368 8,360.83064 8,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,368 C 192.83064,368 200,360.83064 200,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,384 C 15.16936,384 8,391.16936 8,400" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,384 C 192.83064,384 200,391.16936 200,400" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,400 C 447.16936,400 440,407.16936 440,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,400 C 560.83064,400 568,407.16936 568,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,432 C 447.16936,432 440,424.83064 440,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,432 C 560.83064,432 568,424.83064 568,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,448 C 47.16936,448 40,455.16936 40,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,448 C 160.83064,448 168,455.16936 168,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,480 C 47.16936,480 40,472.83064 40,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,480 C 160.83064,480 168,472.83064 168,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,512 C 15.16936,512 8,504.83064 8,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 184,512 C 192.83064,512 200,504.83064 200,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,544 C 415.16936,544 408,536.83064 408,528" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 584,544 C 592.83064,544 600,536.83064 600,528" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="400,464 388,458.4 388,469.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,392,464)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="400,320 388,314.4 388,325.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,392,320)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="400,176 388,170.4 388,181.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,392,176)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="224,416 212,410.4 212,421.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,216,416)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="224,272 212,266.4 212,277.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,216,272)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="224,128 212,122.4 212,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,216,128)"/>
<g class="text">
<text x="464" y="52">Replacement</text>
<text x="532" y="52">Cert</text>
<text x="468" y="84">Backward</text>
<text x="524" y="84">RKSP</text>
<text x="60" y="116">Deprecated</text>
<text x="124" y="116">Cert</text>
<text x="152" y="116">1</text>
<text x="476" y="132">Target</text>
<text x="532" y="132">Record</text>
<text x="64" y="148">Forward</text>
<text x="116" y="148">RKSP</text>
<text x="356" y="148">&quot;Replaces&quot;</text>
<text x="76" y="180">Target</text>
<text x="132" y="180">Record</text>
<text x="248" y="196">&quot;Replaced</text>
<text x="304" y="196">by&quot;</text>
<text x="60" y="260">Deprecated</text>
<text x="124" y="260">Cert</text>
<text x="152" y="260">2</text>
<text x="476" y="276">Target</text>
<text x="532" y="276">Record</text>
<text x="64" y="292">Forward</text>
<text x="116" y="292">RKSP</text>
<text x="356" y="292">&quot;Replaces&quot;</text>
<text x="76" y="324">Target</text>
<text x="132" y="324">Record</text>
<text x="248" y="340">&quot;Replaced</text>
<text x="304" y="340">by&quot;</text>
<text x="60" y="404">Deprecated</text>
<text x="124" y="404">Cert</text>
<text x="152" y="404">3</text>
<text x="476" y="420">Target</text>
<text x="532" y="420">Record</text>
<text x="64" y="436">Forward</text>
<text x="116" y="436">RKSP</text>
<text x="356" y="436">&quot;Replaces&quot;</text>
<text x="76" y="468">Target</text>
<text x="132" y="468">Record</text>
<text x="248" y="484">&quot;Replaced</text>
<text x="304" y="484">by&quot;</text>
<text x="28" y="564">&quot;RKSP&quot;</text>
<text x="64" y="564">=</text>
<text x="120" y="564">Replacement</text>
<text x="184" y="564">Key</text>
<text x="240" y="564">Subpacket</text>
</g>
</svg>
</artwork><artwork  type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
                                                   .---------------------.
                                                  | Replacement Cert      |
                                                  | +-------------------+ |
                                                  | | Backward RKSP     | |
 .---------------------.                          | |                   | |
| Deprecated Cert 1     |                         | |  .-------------.  | |
| +-------------------+ | <-----------------------+-+-+ Target Record | | |
| | Forward RKSP      | |              "Replaces" | |  '-------------'  | |
| |  .-------------.  | |                         | |                   | |
| | | Target Record +-+-+-----------------------> | |                   | |
| |  '-------------'  | | "Replaced by"           | |                   | |
| +-------------------+ |                         | |                   | |
 '---------------------'                          | |                   | |
 .---------------------.                          | |                   | |
| Deprecated Cert 2     |                         | |  .-------------.  | |
| +-------------------+ | <-----------------------+-+-+ Target Record | | |
| | Forward RKSP      | |              "Replaces" | |  '-------------'  | |
| |  .-------------.  | |                         | |                   | |
| | | Target Record +-+-+-----------------------> | |                   | |
| |  '-------------'  | | "Replaced by"           | |                   | |
| +-------------------+ |                         | |                   | |
 '---------------------'                          | |                   | |
 .---------------------.                          | |                   | |
| Deprecated Cert 3     |                         | |  .-------------.  | |
| +-------------------+ | <-----------------------+-+-+ Target Record | | |
| | Forward RKSP      | |              "Replaces" | |  '-------------'  | |
| |  .-------------.  | |                         | |                   | |
| | | Target Record +-+-+-----------------------> | |                   | |
| |  '-------------'  | | "Replaced by"           | |                   | |
| +-------------------+ |                         | |                   | |
 '---------------------'                          | |                   | |
                                                  | +-------------------+ |
                                                   '---------------------'
"RKSP" = Replacement Key Subpacket
]]></artwork></artset></figure>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="interpretation-of-the-replacement-key-subpacket"><name>Interpretation of the Replacement Key Subpacket</name>

<t>The relationships expressed by Replacement Key subpackets may be either singly- or doubly-linked.
Doubly-linked Replacement Key subpackets have a more consequential interpretation.
If a Replacement Key subpacket is found in a Key Revocation signature, then the Reason for Revocation subpacket provides crucial additional context.</t>

<section anchor="identity-equivalence-binding"><name>Identity Equivalence Binding</name>

<t>The existence of a matching pair of forward- and backward-reference Replacement Key subpackets on the most recent direct self-signatures or key revocations over two primary keys, with each referring to the other primary key, forms an Identity Equivalence Binding.
A collection of certificates whose Identity Equivalence Bindings form a maximal connected graph (see <xref target="graph-topology"/>) is an Identity Equivalence Set, and all members of that set are said to be Identity Equivalent to each other.</t>

<t>If an implementation links a particular identity (such as a User ID or a database record) to one primary key by a means other than Identity Equivalence, then it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat that identity as being linked, in the same manner and to the same extent, with each other primary key in the same Identity Equivalence Set.
Each such "derived" identity link is a subsidiary relationship of the original "direct" identity link.
If the same identity is directly linked into the Identity Equivalence Set by multiple identity claims, the derived link(s) are subsidiary to the strongest or most reliable direct link.
A derived identity link is otherwise independent of any identity claims over the other primary keys, or lack thereof.
Each distinct identity <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be modelled separately; a direct or derived link to one identity makes no statement about any other identities found in the Identity Equivalence Set.</t>

<t>The equivalence binding is invalidated under the following circumstances:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>if either primary key is revoked with a Reason for Revocation other than "Key is superseded".</t>
  <t>if either primary key overrides the equivalence binding with a new direct self-signature that a) does not contain a Replacement Key subpacket, or b) contains a Replacement Key subpacket that does not refer to the other key, or c) contains a Replacement Key subpacket that inverts the direction of the binding, and there is no corresponding update to the other certificate.</t>
  <t>if either signature that forms the equivalence binding has expired.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Note however:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>If either primary key is expired or revoked with a Reason for Revocation of "Key is superseded", the equivalence binding is unaffected.</t>
  <t>If either primary key is revoked with any other Reason for Revocation, then the equivalence binding is invalidated but the other key is not revoked.</t>
  <t>Other properties (such as expiry dates, usage preferences, custom notations) <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be applied to other members of the Identity Equivalence Set.</t>
</list></t>

<t>If a backward Replacement Key subpacket refers to multiple deprecated keys, it is possible that only some of those have a valid Identity Equivalence Binding.
If a particular Identity Equivalence Binding is invalid, it does not invalidate the other bindings associated with the same backward Replacement Key subpacket.</t>

<t>Identity Equivalence is transitive; if <spanx style="verb">A</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">B</spanx> are both Identity Equivalent to <spanx style="verb">C</spanx> (in other words, if <spanx style="verb">C</spanx> replaces both <spanx style="verb">A</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">B</spanx>), then <spanx style="verb">A</spanx> is also Identity Equivalent to <spanx style="verb">B</spanx>.
This transitivity is the basis for an Identity Equivalence Set, in which an identity linked to any of the primary keys is linked to them all.
This equality of identity, and the distinction between direct and derived identity links, is independent of the order of preference of fallback primary keys (<xref target="graph-topology"/>).</t>

<t>Members of an Identity Equivalence Set <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be treated as a single key for the purposes of the Web of Trust, particularly when relying on multiple independent certification pathways.</t>

<section anchor="time-evolution-of-identity-equivalence"><name>Time Evolution of Identity Equivalence</name>

<t>An implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume that Identity Equivalence Bindings have any permanent significance.
For example, if an MUA relies solely upon an Identity Equivalence Binding between <spanx style="verb">A</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">B</spanx> to validate <spanx style="verb">B</spanx>, the validity of <spanx style="verb">B</spanx> at a future date depends on the continuing validity of the Identity Equivalence Binding.
If the binding is no longer valid, for example if it has been obsoleted by a more recent direct key signature, and there are no other certification pathways to <spanx style="verb">B</spanx>, then <spanx style="verb">B</spanx> is no longer valid.</t>

<t>It is therefore <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that applications attempt to find alternative certification pathways for replacement certificates.
The optimal method of obtaining alternative certification pathways is application-dependent, and therefore beyond the scope of this document.
Note that similar time evolution concens also apply to other methods of validation, such as the Web of Trust.</t>

<t>Historically, the interpretation of Signature Expiration Time subpackets in Direct Key signatures has been inconsistent between implementations.
To avoid confusion, generating implementations <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> include Signature Expiration Time subpackets in Direct Key signatures when a Replacement Key subpacket is present.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="consequences-of-identity-equivalence"><name>Consequences of Identity Equivalence</name>

<t>Identity Equivalence Binding operates at the same conceptual level as subkey binding.
A subkey is linked to a particular identity if its primary key is linked to that identity.
It is not possible to limit the use of particular subkeys of the same primary to particular identities.</t>

<t>Similarly, a primary key is linked to an identity if any of the primary keys in its Identity Equivalence Set is so linked.
This means that it is not possible to limit the use of particular certificates in the set to particular identities.
Any identities that the key owner's correspondents link to any member of an Identity Equivalence Set will be equally linked to them all.</t>

<t>For example, if a key owner has a particular User ID in one certificate, but not in an Identity Equivalent certificate, her correspondents will still link that User ID with both certificates.
If so, they may (in some circumstances) send messages encrypted to one of the certificates but addressed to an identity which that particular certificate does not claim.</t>

<t>An implementation <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> warn the user if they try to create an Identity Equivalence Set using certificates with mismatched current User IDs.
It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> similarly warn the user if they try to add a new User ID to only one member of an Identity Equivalence Set, and (if possible) offer to add it to all members instead.</t>

<t>This is a design limitation of the Key Replacement mechanism.
Since <xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/> does not require a certificate to contain a User ID, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> still be possible to link an identity to it by other means.
If we were to require matching User IDs for Identity Equivalence, the Replacement Key mechanism would not be fully functional for identity links that did not rely on User IDs.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="absence-of-an-identity-equivalence-binding"><name>Absence of an Identity Equivalence Binding</name>

<t>The Replacement Key subpacket <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be treated as a Web of Trust certification over either the current or replacement primary key.
In the absence of an Identity Equivalence Binding, a receiving implementation <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> validate the replacement certificate as they would any other.</t>

<t>If an implementation supports the creation of unpaired Replacement Key subpackets, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> warn the key owner that correspondents may not be able to use the preferred certificate in the absence of other means of identity verification.
For example, it could prompt the key owner to ask any third party who certified a User ID on the deprecated certificate to certify the corresponding User ID on the replacement.</t>

<section anchor="limiting-chaining-of-non-equivalent-replacements"><name>Limiting Chaining of Non-Equivalent Replacements</name>

<t>It is possible for a singly-linked chain of certificates to exist, where each (non-final) certificate contains a valid forward Replacement Key subpacket with no equivalence binding.
Such a chain may terminate, or may form a closed loop.
A generating implementation <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> intentionally create singly-linked chains or loops, however they may be encountered in practice as a result of a stale cache, user or implementation error, or malice.</t>

<t>It may be possible for the certificates in a singly-linked chain to be validated without Identity Equivalence Bindings, such as by provenance or Web of Trust.
In such a scenario, a receiving implementation might be induced to process the chain of references until it found the end, or a certificate that did not validate.
An implementation <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> limit the maximum number of references it follows (per invocation), and/or implement a loop detection mechanism to prevent following a closed loop of references indefinitely.</t>

<t>For example, a receiving implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose to process only one unpaired forward Key Replacement subpacket per invocation.
Such an implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> however process a subsequent unpaired subpacket on its next invocation, if the current certificate in the chain successfully validated.
While this could result in unstable behaviour, where the apparent preferred certificate of the correspondent changes continually, each invocation will consume a finite amount of resources.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="reasons-for-revocation"><name>Reasons for Revocation</name>

<t>If a Key Revocation signature contains a Replacement Key subpacket, a Reason for Revocation subpacket <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also be included, to prevent it from being interpreted as "No reason specified".</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>if a Replacement Key subpacket is included in a Key Revocation signature, then the Reason For Revocation subpacket <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> indicate "Key is superseded".</t>
  <t>if no Replacement Key subpacket is included in a Key Revocation signature, but a Replacement Key might be specified at a later date, then the Reason For Revocation subpacket <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> indicate "Key is superseded".</t>
  <t>otherwise, the Reason for Revocation subpacket <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> indicate "Key is retired and no longer used", to explicitly state that the revoked primary key has no replacement.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A receiving implementation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any Replacement Key subpacket present in a Key Revocation signature with a Reason for Revocation that is not "Key is superseded".</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="selection-of-encryption-subkeys"><name>Selection of Encryption Subkeys</name>

<t>If a replacement certificate has been validated, whether as a member of an Identity Equivalence Set or otherwise, correspondents <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> assign it preference over the current certificate.
When a correspondent of the key owner selects subkeys for encryption, the subkeys in the replacement certificate <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore be considered first.
If the subkeys in the replacement certificate are not usable, then:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>If there is an equivalence binding, the subkeys in the first listed deprecated certificate <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be considered next.
  If the subkeys in the first deprecated certificate are not usable, then the subkeys in the next deprecated certificate (if any) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be considered, and so forth.</t>
  <t>If there is no equivalence binding, the subkeys in the current certificate <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used.</t>
</list></t>

<t>When encrypting to herself, the key owner <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use a different encryption subkey selection algorithm from the one used for her correspondents.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>If an implementation were to accept a Replacement Key subpacket in the unhashed subpackets area, an attacker could trick the implementation into accepting a key transition by adding a bogus Replacement Key subpacket to an existing signature.</t>

<t>An Identity Equivalence Binding requires the active consent of both primary key owners.
This is to prevent one key owner from unilaterally claiming signatures made by the other key owner, using the same argument that motivates the embedded Primary Key Binding signature in a signing-capable subkey's binding signature (see <xref section="5.2.1.9" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/> and <xref section="10.1.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9580"/>).</t>

<t>The Target Key Imprint is included to mitigate against weaknesses in the fingerprint digest algorithm used by older key versions.
By including a digest over the key material in the target primary public key packet, using a different digest algorithm family from the one used by the fingerprint, we mitigate against both known weaknesses in older fingerprint algorithms, and potential future attacks against current fingerprint algorithms.
We intentionally chose not to use embedded back-signatures or third-party certifications, both to keep the design simple and to limit the size of the subpacket(s) required.</t>

<t>It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that future OpenPGP specifications update the requirements in <xref target="imprint-digest-algorithms"/> so that the digest algorithm used in the Target Key Imprint field always comes from a different family than the target key version's fingerprint algorithm.
This will help ensure that the above security property will also apply to future key versions.</t>

<t>In the absence of a complete Identity Equivalence Binding, the Replacement Key subpacket is merely advisory.
In this scenario, it provides information for the purposes of key discovery only, without any actionable statement about the User IDs on the replacement.</t>

<t>In addition, as this document is an update of <xref target="RFC9580"></xref>, the security considerations there should be carefully reviewed.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This document requests that the following entry be added to the OpenPGP Signature Subpacket registry:</t>

<texttable title="Signature Subpacket Registry" anchor="signature-subpacket-registry">
      <ttcol align='left'>Type</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Name</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Specification</ttcol>
      <c>100 (TEMPORARY)</c>
      <c>Replacement Key</c>
      <c>This document</c>
</texttable>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC9580">
  <front>
    <title>OpenPGP</title>
    <author fullname="P. Wouters" initials="P." role="editor" surname="Wouters"/>
    <author fullname="D. Huigens" initials="D." surname="Huigens"/>
    <author fullname="J. Winter" initials="J." surname="Winter"/>
    <author fullname="Y. Niibe" initials="Y." surname="Niibe"/>
    <date month="July" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies the message formats used in OpenPGP. OpenPGP provides encryption with public key or symmetric cryptographic algorithms, digital signatures, compression, and key management.</t>
      <t>This document is maintained in order to publish all necessary information needed to develop interoperable applications based on the OpenPGP format. It is not a step-by-step cookbook for writing an application. It describes only the format and methods needed to read, check, generate, and write conforming packets crossing any network. It does not deal with storage and implementation questions. It does, however, discuss implementation issues necessary to avoid security flaws.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFCs 4880 ("OpenPGP Message Format"), 5581 ("The Camellia Cipher in OpenPGP"), and 6637 ("Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in OpenPGP").</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9580"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9580"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7942">
  <front>
    <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
    <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <date month="July" year="2016"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
      <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
</reference>



    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">

<reference anchor="Autocrypt" target="https://autocrypt.org/">
  <front>
    <title>Autocrypt - Convenient End-to-End Encryption for E-Mail</title>
    <author initials="V." surname="Breitmoser" fullname="Vincent Breitmoser">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="H." surname="Krekel" fullname="Holger Krekel">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="D. K." surname="Gillmor" fullname="Daniel Kahn Gillmor">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>



<reference anchor="I-D.draft-bre-openpgp-samples">
   <front>
      <title>OpenPGP Example Keys and Certificates</title>
      <author fullname="Bjarni Rúnar Einarsson" initials="B. R." surname="Einarsson">
         <organization>Mailpile ehf</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="&quot;juga&quot;" initials="" surname="&quot;juga&quot;">
         <organization>Independent</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Daniel Kahn Gillmor" initials="D. K." surname="Gillmor">
         <organization>American Civil Liberties Union</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="8" month="May" year="2025"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   The OpenPGP development community benefits from sharing samples of
   signed or encrypted data.  This document facilitates such
   collaboration by defining a small set of OpenPGP certificates and
   keys for use when generating such samples.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-bre-openpgp-samples-03"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.koch-openpgp-webkey-service">
   <front>
      <title>OpenPGP Web Key Directory</title>
      <author fullname="Werner Koch" initials="W." surname="Koch">
         <organization>g10 Code GmbH</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="22" month="July" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This specification describes a service to locate OpenPGP and LibrePGP
   keys by mail address using a Web service and the HTTPS protocol.  It
   also provides a method for secure communication between the key owner
   and the mail provider to publish and revoke the public key.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-22"/>
   
</reference>



    </references>

</references>


<?line 403?>

<section anchor="example-workflows"><name>Example Workflows</name>

<t>In the following, Alice has a v4 primary keypair and subsequently generates a new v6 primary keypair, then at a later date she revokes her v4 primary key.
Bob is her correspondent who consumes the updated certificate(s).
We do not assume that Alice's secret keys are stored on the same hardware device.</t>

<section anchor="alice-generates-a-new-primary-key"><name>Alice Generates a New Primary Key</name>

<section anchor="alices-actions"><name>Alice's Actions</name>

<t>If Alice's client supports v6 certificates, and Alice only has a v4 certificate, it may suggest to Alice that she should generate a v6 primary keypair and certificate.
If the secret key material for the v4 certificate is available, the client may offer to generate the new keypair and certificate automatically.
The client should warn Alice of potential compatibility issues with any other devices that she may have which share the v4 secret key material.
The client should also perform pre-flight checks that may include:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Refreshing the certificate from the internet to check whether another client has already created a replacement.</t>
  <t>Attempting to sync with other devices in a multi-device deployment, e.g. by emailing itself.</t>
</list></t>

<t>On creation of a v6 primary keypair and certificate, Alice's client will:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Add a Direct Key signature to Alice's new (v6) certificate, including a backward Replacement Key subpacket that references her deprecated v4 certificate.</t>
  <t>If the deprecated (v4) secret key is available, add a new Direct Key signature to its certificate with a forward Replacement Key subpacket that references the v6 replacement.</t>
  <t>Publish the updated certificate(s) to a keyserver.</t>
  <t>Back up the new secret key material and (if necessary) sync it to any other devices.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="bobs-actions"><name>Bob's Actions</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Bob wants to send Alice a message and has Alice's deprecated (v4) certificate.</t>
  <t>Either Bob's copy of Alice's deprecated certificate already has a Replacement Key subpacket that references her replacement (v6) fingerprint, or Bob refreshes Alice's deprecated certificate from a keyserver and sees the new Replacement Key subpacket.</t>
  <t>If Bob has a v6 implementation, it can proceed with fetching Alice's v6 replacement certificate, validating it, and using it to send his message to Alice.</t>
  <t>If Bob doesn't have a v6 implementation, it can continue to use Alice's v4 deprecated certificate.</t>
</list></t>

<t>(WKD does not currently allow more than one valid certificate to be returned for a query, therefore it cannot easily support this use case.)</t>

<t>Bob's client has previously marked Alice's deprecated certificate as usable for her email address.
If this was done directly (as opposed to via the Web of Trust), Bob's client may also directly mark her replacement certificate as usable.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="alices-second-device"><name>Alice's Second Device</name>

<t>Alice's client should perform regular consistency tests, by performing the pre-flight checks above to discover whether another client or device has published a different replacement certificate.
In such a scenario, the client should warn the user and attempt to reconcile the differences by first syncing the secret key material, and then updating the older "replacement" certificate to be an additional deprecated certificate for the newer replacement, and finally updating the proper replacement certificate to refer to the additional deprecated certificate.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="alice-revokes-her-deprecated-primary-key"><name>Alice Revokes Her Deprecated Primary Key</name>

<section anchor="alices-actions-1"><name>Alice's Actions</name>

<t>On revocation of her v4 primary key, Alice's client will:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Add a forward Replacement Key subpacket to the Primary Key Revocation signature, referencing the replacement.</t>
  <t>If the replacement secret key is available, add a new Direct Key signature to its certificate with a new or updated backward Replacement Key subpacket that references the deprecated certificate.</t>
  <t>Publish the updated certificate(s) to a keyserver.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="bobs-actions-1"><name>Bob's Actions</name>

<t>Bob already has both Alice's v4 and v6 certificates.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Bob's client refreshes Alice's certificates from a keyserver; her deprecated certificate contains a Primary Key Revocation signature with a Replacement Key subpacket but the preferred certificate is unchanged.</t>
  <t>There is an Identity Equivalence Binding between the deprecated and replacement certificates, which Bob's client automatically validates.</t>
  <t>Bob's v6-aware client continues to use Alice's preferred certificate as before.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Bob's client has previously marked Alice's deprecated certificate as usable for her email address.
If it has not yet directly marked Alice's replacement certificate as usable, it should do so now to remove the requirement to validate the now-revoked v4 certificate.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="carols-actions"><name>Carol's Actions</name>

<t>Carol wants to send Alice a message; Carol has Alice's deprecated (v4) certificate but they have not corresponded for some time.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Carol's client refreshes Alice's deprecated certificate from a keyserver; it contains a Primary Key Revocation signature with a Replacement Key subpacket.</t>
  <t>Carol's client looks up Alice's replacement (v6) certificate on a keyserver.</t>
  <t>There is an Identity Equivalence Binding between the deprecated and replacement certificates, which Carol's client automatically validates.</t>
  <t>Carol's client uses Alice's replacement certificate instead of the deprecated certificate.</t>
</list></t>

<t>(There are other means to achieve a similar result, such as WKD <xref target="I-D.koch-openpgp-webkey-service"></xref> or <xref target="Autocrypt"></xref>, but they may not be available.
For example, Alice's service provider may not support WKD, and Alice may not have sent Carol an autocrypt message since revoking her deprecated primary key.)</t>

<t>Carol's client has previously marked Alice's deprecated certificate as usable for her email address.
Carol's client should now directly mark Alice's replacement certificate as usable.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="alices-second-device-1"><name>Alice's Second Device</name>

<t>On receipt of the new (v6) certificate on a second device, Alice's second client will:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Check to see if the certificate contains an unpaired backward Replacement Key subpacket that refers to any of the available secret keys.</t>
  <t>If the reference is correct and Alice consents, add a Direct Key signature to the affected certificate with a forward Replacement Key subpacket.</t>
  <t>Publish the updated certificate to a keyserver.</t>
</list></t>

<t>If Alice has a local encryption subkey that she prefers for encryption to herself, her client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use it regardless of any Replacement Key subpacket(s) in her published certificate.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="time-evolution-of-an-identity-equivalence-set"><name>Time Evolution of an Identity Equivalence Set</name>

<t>Let’s say that Alice has two deprecated keys (one ECC and one RSA), and a replacement key (ML-DSA).
Let’s also say that she has the identity <spanx style="verb">alice@example.com</spanx> on the ECC and ML-DSA keys, and the identity <spanx style="verb">a.lovelace@example.com</spanx> on the RSA and ML-DSA keys.</t>

<figure title="Bob's View of Alice's Certificates"><artset><artwork  type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="544" width="624" viewBox="0 0 624 544" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">
<path d="M 8,144 L 8,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,352 L 8,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,176 L 24,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,384 L 24,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 208,176 L 208,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 208,384 L 208,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 224,144 L 224,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 224,352 L 224,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 256,112 L 256,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 256,320 L 256,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 408,48 L 408,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,96 L 424,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 600,96 L 600,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 616,48 L 616,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,32 L 600,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 248,64 L 424,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 176,96 L 240,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,96 L 600,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,128 L 208,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 168,160 L 240,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,160 L 552,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,176 L 208,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 240,176 L 440,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,192 L 552,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,208 L 152,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 168,224 L 392,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,240 L 152,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,256 L 208,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,272 L 208,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,336 L 208,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 208,368 L 240,368" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,368 L 552,368" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,384 L 208,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 240,384 L 440,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,400 L 552,400" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,416 L 152,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 168,432 L 392,432" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,448 L 152,448" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,464 L 208,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,480 L 208,480" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,496 L 600,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,512 L 600,512" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,32 C 415.16936,32 408,39.16936 408,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 600,32 C 608.83064,32 616,39.16936 616,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 240,96 C 248.83064,96 256,103.16936 256,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,128 C 15.16936,128 8,135.16936 8,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 208,128 C 216.83064,128 224,135.16936 224,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 240,160 C 248.83064,160 256,152.83064 256,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,160 C 447.16936,160 440,167.16936 440,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,160 C 560.83064,160 568,167.16936 568,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,192 C 447.16936,192 440,184.83064 440,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,192 C 560.83064,192 568,184.83064 568,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,208 C 47.16936,208 40,215.16936 40,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,208 C 160.83064,208 168,215.16936 168,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,240 C 47.16936,240 40,232.83064 40,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,240 C 160.83064,240 168,232.83064 168,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,272 C 15.16936,272 8,264.83064 8,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 208,272 C 216.83064,272 224,264.83064 224,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,336 C 15.16936,336 8,343.16936 8,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 208,336 C 216.83064,336 224,343.16936 224,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 240,368 C 248.83064,368 256,360.83064 256,352" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,368 C 447.16936,368 440,375.16936 440,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,368 C 560.83064,368 568,375.16936 568,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 456,400 C 447.16936,400 440,392.83064 440,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 552,400 C 560.83064,400 568,392.83064 568,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,416 C 47.16936,416 40,423.16936 40,432" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,416 C 160.83064,416 168,423.16936 168,432" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 56,448 C 47.16936,448 40,440.83064 40,432" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 152,448 C 160.83064,448 168,440.83064 168,432" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 24,480 C 15.16936,480 8,472.83064 8,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 208,480 C 216.83064,480 224,472.83064 224,464" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 424,512 C 415.16936,512 408,504.83064 408,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 600,512 C 608.83064,512 616,504.83064 616,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="432,64 420,58.4 420,69.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,424,64)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="400,432 388,426.4 388,437.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,392,432)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="400,224 388,218.4 388,229.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,392,224)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="248,384 236,378.4 236,389.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,240,384)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="248,176 236,170.4 236,181.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,240,176)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="216,368 204,362.4 204,373.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,208,368)"/>
<polygon class="arrowhead" points="176,160 164,154.4 164,165.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,168,160)"/>
<g class="text">
<text x="448" y="52">Alice's</text>
<text x="508" y="52">ML-DSA</text>
<text x="552" y="52">Key</text>
<text x="88" y="68">Bob's</text>
<text x="140" y="68">Second</text>
<text x="208" y="68">Signature</text>
<text x="504" y="68">alice@example.com</text>
<text x="508" y="84">a.lovelace@example.com</text>
<text x="24" y="100">Bob's</text>
<text x="72" y="100">First</text>
<text x="136" y="100">Signature</text>
<text x="468" y="116">Backward</text>
<text x="524" y="116">RKSP</text>
<text x="48" y="148">Alice's</text>
<text x="96" y="148">ECC</text>
<text x="128" y="148">Key</text>
<text x="88" y="164">alice@example.com</text>
<text x="476" y="180">Target</text>
<text x="532" y="180">Record</text>
<text x="64" y="196">Forward</text>
<text x="116" y="196">RKSP</text>
<text x="356" y="196">&quot;Replaces&quot;</text>
<text x="76" y="228">Target</text>
<text x="132" y="228">Record</text>
<text x="272" y="244">&quot;Replaced</text>
<text x="328" y="244">by&quot;</text>
<text x="152" y="308">Bob's</text>
<text x="200" y="308">Third</text>
<text x="264" y="308">Signature</text>
<text x="48" y="356">Alice's</text>
<text x="96" y="356">RSA</text>
<text x="128" y="356">Key</text>
<text x="108" y="372">a.lovelace@example.com</text>
<text x="476" y="388">Target</text>
<text x="532" y="388">Record</text>
<text x="64" y="404">Forward</text>
<text x="116" y="404">RKSP</text>
<text x="356" y="404">&quot;Replaces&quot;</text>
<text x="76" y="436">Target</text>
<text x="132" y="436">Record</text>
<text x="272" y="452">&quot;Replaced</text>
<text x="328" y="452">by&quot;</text>
<text x="28" y="532">&quot;RKSP&quot;</text>
<text x="64" y="532">=</text>
<text x="120" y="532">Replacement</text>
<text x="184" y="532">Key</text>
<text x="240" y="532">Subpacket</text>
</g>
</svg>
</artwork><artwork  type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
                                                   .-----------------------.
                                                  | Alice's ML-DSA Key      |
        Bob's Second Signature--------------------+-> alice@example.com     |
                                                  | a.lovelace@example.com  |
Bob's First Signature---------.                   | +---------------------+ |
                               |                  | | Backward RKSP       | |
 .------------------------.    |                  | |                     | |
| Alice's ECC Key          |   |                  | |                     | |
| alice@example.com <------+--'                   | |  .-------------.    | |
| +----------------------+ | <--------------------+-+-+ Target Record |   | |
| | Forward RKSP         | |           "Replaces" | |  '-------------'    | |
| |  .-------------.     | |                      | |                     | |
| | | Target Record +----+-+--------------------> | |                     | |
| |  '-------------'     | | "Replaced by"        | |                     | |
| +----------------------+ |                      | |                     | |
 '------------------------'                       | |                     | |
                                                  | |                     | |
                Bob's Third Signature             | |                     | |
                               |                  | |                     | |
 .------------------------.    |                  | |                     | |
| Alice's RSA Key          |   |                  | |                     | |
| a.lovelace@example.com <-+--'                   | |  .-------------.    | |
| +----------------------+ | <--------------------+-+-+ Target Record |   | |
| | Forward RKSP         | |           "Replaces" | |  '-------------'    | |
| |  .-------------.     | |                      | |                     | |
| | | Target Record +----+-+--------------------> | |                     | |
| |  '-------------'     | | "Replaced by"        | |                     | |
| +----------------------+ |                      | |                     | |
 '------------------------'                       | |                     | |
                                                  | +---------------------+ |
                                                   '-----------------------'
"RKSP" = Replacement Key Subpacket
]]></artwork></artset></figure>

<t>If Bob has made a certification signature (1) over <spanx style="verb">alice@example.com</spanx> and the ECC key, then from his point of view there is a direct identity link between <spanx style="verb">alice@example.com</spanx> and her ECC key, and a derived identity link (via equivalence) between it and both of the other two keys.
These derived links are subsidiary to the direct link and do not have an independent existence - if Bob’s certification expires, the direct link is invalidated and by extension the derived links are also invalidated.
If however Bob also made a certification signature (2) over Alice’s ML-DSA key, then the expiration of the first certification would not invalidate the second, and all three keys would remain linked to <spanx style="verb">alice@example.com</spanx> - but now Bob’s certification over the ML-DSA key would anchor the direct identity link, and the link between <spanx style="verb">alice@example.com</spanx> and her ECC key would now be equivalence-derived.</t>

<t>None of the above has any consequence for the identity <spanx style="verb">a.lovelace@example.com</spanx>.
Bob knows of no proof that Alice owns that email address, and while her RSA certificate may claim <spanx style="verb">a.lovelace@example.com</spanx>, and we may therefore infer that the owner of the other certificates also claims <spanx style="verb">a.lovelace@example.com</spanx> (because equivalence implies they are the same person), there is no supporting evidence to elevate any of these claims to a concrete link.</t>

<t>But let’s say that Bob then receives an email from <spanx style="verb">a.lovelace@example.com</spanx> with the ML-DSA certificate in its <xref target="Autocrypt"></xref> header.
He <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> therefore infer that the identity <spanx style="verb">a.lovelace@example.com</spanx> is directly linked (via the TOFU principle) to the ML-DSA certificate - and thereby also to the other two certificates.
This TOFU-based direct identity link may be considered “weaker” than one based on a certification signature, and so the derived identity links on the other two certificates <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be considered equally “weak".
If Bob subsequently certifies (3) the identity <spanx style="verb">a.lovelace@example.com</spanx> on the RSA key (for example), all the derived links would become subsidiary to that link, and also become equally “strong”.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

<t>The authors would like to thank Bart Butler, Kai Engert, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Daniel Huigens, Simon Josefsson, Johannes Roth, Heiko Schäfer, Falko Strenzke, Neal Walfield, Justus Winter and Aron Wussler for suggestions and discussions.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="document-history"><name>Document History</name>

<t>Note to RFC Editor: this section should be removed before publication.</t>

<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-08-and-09"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-08 and -09</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Corrected some inconsistent and anachronistic terminology.</t>
  <t>Clarified description of time evolution.</t>
  <t>Fixed some referencing.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-07-and-08"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-07 and -08</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Added Implementation Status section.</t>
  <t>Added test vectors.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-06-and-07"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-06 and -07</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Changed imprint algorithm calculation to be SHA3-256 for all currently-known target key versions.</t>
  <t>Swap role of ECC and RSA certificates in Alice-Bob example.</t>
  <t>Minor textual cleanup.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-05-and-06"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-05 and -06</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Specified "current" Replacement Key subpacket.</t>
  <t>Record length is now one octet again.</t>
  <t>Removed references to "hard" and "soft" revocation reasons, and tightened BCP14 language around reasons.</t>
  <t>Cleaned up artwork.</t>
  <t>Improved example workflows.</t>
  <t>Various minor clarifications.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-04-and-05"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-04 and -05</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Key Equivalence is now Identity Equivalence.</t>
  <t>Specified Identity Equivalence Sets.</t>
  <t>Defined terms "identity", "identity claim", "identity link", "direct link", "derived link".</t>
  <t>Moved 0x40 to 0x01 and renamed from "inverse relationship" to "backward reference(s)".</t>
  <t>Substituted "original" with "deprecated".</t>
  <t>Expanded and improved "Terminology" section.</t>
  <t>Merged content of "Placement of the Replacement Key Subpacket" section into other sections.</t>
  <t>Removed reference to draft-ietf-openpgp-persistent-symmetric-keys (but kept the surrounding text).</t>
  <t>Renamed and reordered some sections.</t>
  <t>Added receiving implementation MUSTs in several places.</t>
  <t>Various minor clarifications.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-03-and-04"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-03 and -04</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Made target records forward-compatible.</t>
  <t>Added additional guidance for Alice's client.</t>
  <t>Removed unnecessary reference to WKD.</t>
  <t>Removed requirement for unilateral reference to be treated as a preference.</t>
  <t>Modified wording to avoid incompatibility with future encryption subkey selection draft.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-02-and-03"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-02 and -03</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Added section clarifying time evolution of equivalence.</t>
  <t>Added section clarifying how to prevent resource exhaustion when following chains.</t>
  <t>Clarified description of equivalence transitivity.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-01-and-02"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-01 and -02</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Added explanation of hard vs soft revocations.</t>
  <t>Remove the "No Replacement" bit and use the Reason for Revocation subpacket instead.</t>
  <t>Record length field is now two octets.</t>
  <t>Inverted treatment of undefined flag bits.</t>
  <t>Remove references to the Preferred Key Server subpacket.</t>
  <t>Expanded example workflows section and add reference to draft-ietf-openpgp-persistent-symmetric-keys.</t>
  <t>Various terminology nitpicking.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-00-and-01"><name>Changes Between draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-00 and -01</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Updated references to RFC9580.</t>
  <t>Removed subpacket version octet.</t>
  <t>Added guidance for encryption subkey selection.</t>
  <t>Added record length fields.</t>
  <t>Renamed to "OpenPGP Key Replacement" and normalised terminology.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey-02-and-draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-00"><name>Changes Between draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey-02 and draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-00</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Standardised capitalisation and terminology.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey-01-and-02"><name>Changes Between draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey-01 and -02</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Specified Public Key Imprints.</t>
  <t>Specified inverse relationship flag and packet format.</t>
  <t>Restricted graph topology.</t>
  <t>Specified Key Equivalence Binding.</t>
  <t>Guidance re subpacket placement escalated from <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> to <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>, and critical bit to <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey-00-and-01"><name>Changes Between draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey-00 and -01</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Added example workflows.</t>
  <t>Specifically describe "deprecation without expiry or revocation" use case.</t>
  <t>Add note about weakness of signatures over fingerprints.</t>
  <t>Miscellaneous clarifications.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="changes-between-draft-shaw-openpgp-replacementkey-00-and-draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey-00"><name>Changes Between draft-shaw-openpgp-replacementkey-00 and draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey-00</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Changed <spanx style="verb">algid</spanx> octet to <spanx style="verb">key version</spanx> octet.</t>
  <t>Changed initial subpacket version number to 1.</t>
  <t>Clarified semantics of some edge cases.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="implementation-status"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<t>Note to RFC Editor: this section should be removed before publication.</t>

<t>This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in <xref target="RFC7942"/>.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs.
Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors.
This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features.
Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.</t>

<t>According to RFC7942:</t>

<ul empty="true"><li>
  <t>this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit.</t>
</li></ul>

<section anchor="protonmailgo-crypto"><name>ProtonMail/go-crypto</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>https://github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/pull/311/</t>
  <t>Maturity: alpha.</t>
  <t>Coverage: wire formats.</t>
  <t>Version compatibility: draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-07.</t>
  <t>Licensing: BSD 3-clause.</t>
  <t>Implementation experience: TBC.</t>
  <t>Contact information: Andrew Gallagher.</t>
  <t>Updated: 2026-05-18.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="rpgp"><name>rPGP</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/725/</t>
  <t>Maturity: alpha.</t>
  <t>Coverage: wire formats.</t>
  <t>Version compatibility: draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey-07.</t>
  <t>Licensing: Apache/MIT.</t>
  <t>Implementation experience: TBC.</t>
  <t>Contact information: Heiko Schäfer.</t>
  <t>Updated: 2026-05-18.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="test-vectors"><name>Test Vectors</name>

<section anchor="minimal-identity-equivalence-set"><name>Minimal Identity Equivalence Set</name>

<t>This set contains two unrevoked primary keys.
The deprecated key is RSA1024, and the replacement key is Ed25519.
Neither certificate contains any user IDs or subkeys.</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="complex-identity-equivalence-set"><name>Complex Identity Equivalence Set</name>

<t>This set contains three keys:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A deprecated, revoked v4 Ed25519 key with a User ID of <spanx style="verb">Alice Lovelace &lt;alice@openpgp.example&gt;</spanx></t>
  <t>A deprecated, unrevoked v4 RSA3072 key with a User ID of <spanx style="verb">Bob Babbage &lt;bob@openpgp.example&gt;</spanx></t>
  <t>A replacement v6 Ed25519 key with a User ID of <spanx style="verb">David Deluxe &lt;david@openpgp.example&gt;</spanx></t>
</list></t>

<t>The key material for these was sourced from <xref target="I-D.draft-bre-openpgp-samples"/>.</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
</section>


  </back>

<!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>

