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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-rats-ear-06" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.35.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="EAR">EAT Attestation Results</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-ear-06"/>
    <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="Thomas Fossati">
      <organization>NVIDIA</organization>
      <address>
        <email>tfossati@nvidia.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="E." surname="Voit" fullname="Eric Voit">
      <organization>Cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <email>evoit@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Trofimov" fullname="Sergei Trofimov">
      <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sergei.trofimov@arm.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz">
      <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Rheinstrasse 75</street>
          <city>Darmstadt</city>
          <code>64295</code>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <email>henk.birkholz@ietf.contact</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="20"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Remote ATtestation ProcedureS</workgroup>
    <keyword>EAT</keyword>
    <keyword>attestation result</keyword>
    <keyword>attestation verifier</keyword>
    <keyword>AR4SI</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 79?>

<t>This document defines the EAT Attestation Result (EAR) message format.</t>
      <t>EAR is used by a verifier to encode the result of the appraisal over an
attester's evidence.
It embeds an AR4SI's "trustworthiness vector" to present a normalized view of
the evaluation results, thus easing the task of defining and computing
authorization policies by relying parties.
Alongside the trustworthiness vector, EAR provides contextual information bound
to the appraisal process.
This allows a relying party (or an auditor) to reconstruct the frame of
reference in which the trustworthiness vector was originally computed.
EAR supports simple devices with one attester as well as composite devices that
are made of multiple attesters, allowing the state of each attester to be
separately examined.
EAR can also accommodate registered and unregistered extensions.
It can be serialized and protected using either CWT or JWT.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://thomas-fossati.github.io/draft-ear/draft-fv-rats-ear.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-ear/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Remote ATtestation ProcedureS Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:rats@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/thomas-fossati/draft-ear"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 98?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>This document defines the EAT <xref target="RFC9711"/> Attestation Result (EAR) message format.</t>
      <t>EAR is used by a verifier to encode the result of the appraisal over an
attester's evidence.
It embeds an AR4SI's "trustworthiness vector" <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/> to present a
normalized view of the evaluation results, thus easing the task of defining and
computing authorization policies by relying parties.
Alongside the trustworthiness vector, EAR provides contextual information bound
to the appraisal process.
This allows a relying party (or an auditor) to reconstruct the frame of
reference in which the trustworthiness vector was originally computed.
EAR supports simple devices with one attester as well as composite devices that
are made of multiple attesters (see <xref section="3.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/>) allowing the
state of each attester to be separately examined.
EAR can also accommodate registered and unregistered extensions.
It can be serialized and protected using either CWT <xref target="RFC8392"/> or JWT <xref target="RFC7519"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>This document uses terms and concepts defined by the RATS architecture.
For a complete glossary see <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/>.</t>
      <t>This document uses the terms Composite Attester, Component Attester, Partial Evidence, Lead Verifier and Component Verifier defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-multi-verifier"/>.</t>
      <t>The terminology from CBOR <xref target="STD94"/>, CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/> and COSE <xref target="STD96"/> applies;
in particular, CBOR diagnostic notation is defined in <xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="STD94"/>
and <xref section="G" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8610"/>.</t>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="sec-ear">
      <name>EAT Attestation Result</name>
      <t>EAR is an EAT token which can be serialized as JWT <xref target="RFC7519"/> or CWT <xref target="RFC8392"/>.</t>
      <t>The EAR claims-set is as follows:</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-cddl-ear">
        <name>EAR (CDDL Definition)</name>
        <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
;# import rfc9711 as eat
;# import ar4si as ar4si
;# import cmw as cmw
;# import eat-measured-component as mc

EAR = {
  eat.profile-label => "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05"
  ? status-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-tier
  ? status-details-label => details-type
  eat.iat-claim-label => ~eat.time-int
  ? eat.exp-claim-label => ~eat.time-int
  verifier-id-label => ar4si.verifier-id
  ? raw-evidence-label => cmw-record
  eat.submods-label => { + text => $submod-value }
  ? eat.nonce-label => eat.nonce-type
  ? topology-label => topology-type
  ? input-digest-label => mc.digest
  ? components-bound-label => components-bound-type
  * $$ear-extension
}

cmw-record = eat.JC<cmw.json-record, cmw.cbor-record>

; A submod carries one of:
;  - EAR-appraisal: the appraisal of a single attester;
;  - EAR: an unsigned EAR claims-set from a Component Verifier, in the same
;    serialization as the enclosing token;
;  - eat.Nested-Token: a complete, signed EAR from a Component Verifier, possibly
;    in a different serialization than the enclosing token (see
;    Section 4.2.18.3 of RFC 9711 for how the nested token is identified).
$submod-value /= EAR-appraisal
$submod-value /= EAR
$submod-value /= eat.Nested-Token

; EAR-specific claims
raw-evidence-label = eat.JC<"ear_raw_evidence", 1002>
verifier-id-label = eat.JC<"ear_verifier_id", 1004>
topology-label = eat.JC<"ear_device_topology", 1007>
input-digest-label = eat.JC<"ear_input_digest", 1008>
components-bound-label = eat.JC<"ear_components_bound", 1009>

; The Verifier's assessment on the bindings between the Component Attesters of
; a Composite Attester.  The codes are AR4SI enumeration values in the
; affirming (2), contraindicated (96) and incomplete (1) tiers.
components-bound-type = components-bound-true-label /
                        components-bound-false-label /
                        components-bound-undetermined-label
components-bound-true-label = eat.JC<"bound", 2>
components-bound-false-label = eat.JC<"not-bound", 96>
components-bound-undetermined-label = eat.JC<"could-not-determine", 1>
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
      <t>Where:</t>
      <dl newline="true">
        <dt><tt>eat_profile</tt> (mandatory)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The EAT profile (<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>) associated with the EAR claims-set
and encodings defined by this document.
It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the following tag URI (<xref target="RFC4151"/>)
<tt>tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05</tt>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>ear_status</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The overall appraisal status for the (composite) attester represented as one of the five trustworthiness tiers (<xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/>).
The <tt>none</tt> tier is the neutral element of this computation: it does not affect the result and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used as the value of this claim.
The value of this claim <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be set to a tier of no higher trust than the tier corresponding to the worst status found across all submods, regardless of whether a given submod is represented as an <tt>EAR-appraisal</tt>, a nested <tt>EAR</tt>, or a <tt>Nested-Token</tt> (see <xref target="sec-nested-submods"/>), and of no higher trust than the tier of <tt>ear_components_bound</tt> if present (see <xref target="sec-components-bound"/>).
When a submod is a <tt>Nested-Token</tt> whose contents the verifier cannot parse or independently verify -- for example, because it uses a serialization or a signature scheme the verifier does not support, or because it does not contain an EAR -- the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat that submod as having the <tt>incomplete</tt> tier (<xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/>) for the purposes of computing this claim.
That is, the verifier was unable to complete the appraisal of that submod, and therefore cannot vouch for the trustworthiness of the attester it represents.
The verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> infer from the opaque submod any tier it has not itself established.
Relying Parties that need to know whether the whole tree has been appraised have to inspect the <tt>Nested-Token</tt> submods individually.
This claim exists to help Relying Parties easily determine the overall status of the appraisal without having to inspect each submod.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>ear_status_details</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A non-empty array of strings, each giving a reason for the value of <tt>ear_status</tt>.
See <xref target="sec-details"/> for the rules that apply to all <tt>*_details</tt> claims.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>iat</tt> (mandatory)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>"Issued At" claim -- the time at which the EAR is issued.
See <xref section="4.1.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/> and <xref section="4.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/> for the EAT-specific encoding restrictions (i.e., disallowing the floating point representation).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>exp</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>"Expiration Time" claim -- the time at which the EAR expires and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be accepted for processing.
See <xref section="4.1.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/>.
Similar to <tt>iat</tt>, an EAR token <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain an <tt>exp</tt> claim in floating-point format.
Any recipient of a token with a floating-point format <tt>exp</tt> claim <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> consider it an error.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>ear_verifier_id</tt> (mandatory)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Identifying information about the appraising verifier.
See <xref section="3.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/> for further details on its structure and serialization.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>ear_raw_evidence</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The unabridged evidence submitted for appraisal, including any signed
container/envelope, wrapped in a Record CMW (see <xref section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9999"/>).
This field may be consumed by other Verifiers in multi-stage verification
scenarios or by auditors.
There are privacy considerations associated with this claim.  See
<xref target="sec-priv-cons"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>submods</tt> (mandatory)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A submodule map (<xref section="4.2.18" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>) holding, for each separately
appraised attester or Component Verifier, one of: an <tt>EAR-appraisal</tt>; a nested <tt>EAR</tt>
claims-set; or a <tt>Nested-Token</tt> carrying a complete, independently signed EAR
produced by a Component Verifier.
The map <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain at least one entry.
For each appraised attester or Component Verifier the verifier chooses a unique
label.
For example, when evidence is in EAT format, the label could be constructed
from the associated EAT profile.
A verifier <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> publicly and permanently document its labelling scheme for
each supported evidence type, unless EAR payloads are produced and consumed
entirely within a private deployment.
See <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> for the details about the contents of an
<tt>EAR-appraisal</tt>, and <xref target="sec-nested-submods"/> for the recursive and tunnelled
cases.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>eat_nonce</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A user supplied nonce that is echoed by the verifier to provide freshness.
The nonce is a sequence of bytes between 8 and 64 bytes long. When serialized
as JWT, the nonce <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be base64url encoded without padding, resulting in a
string between 12 and 86 bytes long.
See <xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>ear_device_topology</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A map that describes the device attester graph using adjacency lists.
Attesters are represented by their corresponding labels in the <tt>submods</tt> claim.
Each map key represents an attester in the graph, and the associated map value is an array of labels representing the list of sub-attesters for that attester.
If the claim is present, the map <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain at least one element.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>ear_input_digest</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A cryptographic digest of the appraisal request input that produced this EAR, used to bind the EAR to the exact input the Verifier received.
Its value is the <tt>digest</tt> type defined in <xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-eat-measured-component"/>.
See <xref target="sec-ear-input-digest"/> for the details.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>ear_components_bound</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Whether the bindings between the Component Attesters of a Composite Attester, where used, were verified.
The value is one of <tt>bound</tt>, <tt>not-bound</tt> or <tt>could-not-determine</tt>.
See <xref target="sec-components-bound"/> for the details.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>$$ear-extension</tt> (optional)</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Any registered or unregistered extension.
See <xref target="sec-extensions"/> for further details.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <section anchor="sec-ear-input-digest">
        <name>Input Digest</name>
        <t>The <tt>ear_input_digest</tt> claim cryptographically binds an EAR to the exact appraisal request input received by the Verifier, providing a protection that <tt>eat_nonce</tt> alone does not provide.
While <tt>eat_nonce</tt> establishes freshness and confirms that the Verifier processed the requester's nonce, it does not bind the remainder of the request.</t>
        <t>For example, an adversary positioned between the TLS terminator and the Verifier's trust boundary could substitute the evidence carried in the request while leaving the nonce intact.
The Relying Party would then receive an EAR with a valid nonce, but for attacker-chosen evidence.
<tt>ear_input_digest</tt> closes this attack by allowing the Relying Party to check that the digest matches the appraisal request input it originally sent (or caused to be sent), exposing any substitution.
Other, similar, attacks that rely on tampering with the appraisal request input without affecting the nonce are also expected to be closed by the same mechanism.</t>
        <t>The digest is computed over the raw wire bytes of the complete appraisal request input:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The sender computes the digest over the encoded request bytes, after encoding and before transmission, and retains those exact bytes for later verification.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The Verifier computes the digest over the raw bytes as received on the wire, before any decoding or processing.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Because neither side re-encodes the input before hashing, encoding format and field ordering are irrelevant: the sender and the Verifier are comparing the same bytes -- the ones that were sent on the wire.
This also means <tt>ear_input_digest</tt> is transport-agnostic: it does not matter whether the bytes are carried in an HTTP body, a gRPC message, or any other framing, as long as the sender has access to, and retains, the exact bytes that the Verifier will hash.</t>
        <t>When using <tt>ear_input_digest</tt>, use of CMW (<xref target="RFC9999"/>) as the appraisal request format is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>.
CMW provides a well-defined encapsulation boundary that makes it straightforward for both parties to identify which bytes constitute the complete request input, and to apply the hash at the correct point in their respective pipelines.</t>
        <section anchor="sec-ear-input-digest-applicability">
          <name>Applicability</name>
          <t>Deployments that produce or verify <tt>ear_input_digest</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> satisfy both of the following conditions:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Encapsulation: the appraisal request input <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be carried in a single, self-delimiting encapsulation; between the sender's encoding step and the Verifier's hashing step, this encapsulation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be modified.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Byte access: the sender <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have access to, and retain, the literal octets of the encoded appraisal request input.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>If either condition does not hold, <tt>ear_input_digest</tt> <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be produced or verified.</t>
          <t>When both conditions hold, <tt>ear_input_digest</tt> provides strong end-to-end request binding, and Relying Parties <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> verify it.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-ear-appraisal">
        <name>EAR Appraisal Claims</name>
        <figure anchor="fig-cddl-ear-appraisal">
          <name>EAR Appraisal Claims (CDDL Definition)</name>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
;# import rfc9711 as eat

EAR-appraisal = {
  ? eat.profile-label => eat.general-uri / eat.general-oid
  status-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-tier
  ? status-details-label => details-type
  ? trustworthiness-vector-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-vector
  ? trustworthiness-vector-details-label => trustworthiness-vector-details
  ? appraisal-policy-ids-label => [ + text ]
  ? eat.nonce-label => eat.nonce-type
  ? attester-claims-label => claims-map-type
  ? verifier-claims-label => claims-map-type
  ? endorser-claims-label => supply-chain-claims-type
  ? reference-value-provider-claims-label => supply-chain-claims-type
  ? transport-identity-key-label => transport-identity-key-type
  ? secret-wrapping-keys-label => secret-wrapping-keys-type
  * $$ear-appraisal-extension
}

status-label = eat.JC<"ear_status", 1000>
trustworthiness-vector-label = eat.JC<"ear_trustworthiness_vector", 1001>
status-details-label = eat.JC<"ear_status_details", 1010>
trustworthiness-vector-details-label =
  eat.JC<"ear_trustworthiness_vector_details", 1011>

details-type = [ + text ]

trustworthiness-vector-details = ar4si.non-empty<{
  ? ar4si.instance-identity-label => details-type,
  ? ar4si.configuration-label => details-type,
  ? ar4si.executables-label => details-type,
  ? ar4si.file-system-label => details-type,
  ? ar4si.hardware-label => details-type,
  ? ar4si.runtime-opaque-label => details-type,
  ? ar4si.storage-opaque-label => details-type,
  ? ar4si.sourced-data-label => details-type,
}>
appraisal-policy-ids-label = eat.JC<"ear_appraisal_policy_ids", 1003>
attester-claims-label = eat.JC<"ear_attester_claims", 1005>
verifier-claims-label = eat.JC<"ear_verifier_claims", 1006>
endorser-claims-label = eat.JC<"ear_endorser_claims", 1014>
reference-value-provider-claims-label = eat.JC<"ear_reference_value_provider_claims", 1015>
transport-identity-key-label = eat.JC<"eat_transport_identity_key", 1012>
secret-wrapping-keys-label = eat.JC<"eat_secret_wrapping_keys", 1013>

; supply chain entity name => claims it asserted
supply-chain-claims-type = { + text => claims-map-type }
]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt><tt>eat_profile</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The EAT profile (<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>) associated with the <tt>EAR-appraisal</tt> claims-set.
Note that if multiple <tt>EAR-appraisal</tt> submods exist within the same <tt>EAR</tt> token, they may all have different values for this claim.
If the <tt>EAR-appraisal</tt> contains extensions, this claim <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be present unless the profile can be implied by other means (e.g., via the application context or outer protocol elements).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_status</tt> (mandatory)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The overall appraisal status for this attester represented as one of the five
trustworthiness tiers (<xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/>).
The <tt>none</tt> tier is the neutral element of this computation: it does not affect the result and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used as the value of this claim.
The value of this claim <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be set to a tier of no higher trust than the tier
corresponding to the worst trustworthiness claim across the entire
trustworthiness vector.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_status_details</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A non-empty array of strings, each giving a reason for the value of <tt>ear_status</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_trustworthiness_vector</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The AR4SI trustworthiness vector providing the breakdown of the appraisal for
this attester.
See <xref section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/> for the details.
This claim <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present unless the party requesting Evidence appraisal
explicitly asks for it to be dropped, e.g., via an API parameter or similar
arrangement.  Such consumer would therefore rely entirely on the semantics of
the <tt>ear_status</tt> claim.  This behaviour is <bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14> because of the
resulting loss of quality of the appraisal result.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_trustworthiness_vector_details</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A map from trustworthiness vector categories to non-empty arrays of strings, each giving a reason for the value of the corresponding category.
Each key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a category that is present in <tt>ear_trustworthiness_vector</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_appraisal_policy_ids</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A list of one or more unique identifiers for appraisal policies used to evaluate the attestation results.
The order of the identifiers in the list represents the order in which the policies are applied, with those appearing earlier being applied first.
The list <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be empty.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>eat_nonce</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The nonce extracted from Evidence corresponding to this appraisal record.
Note that this is entirely distinct from the nonce in <xref target="sec-ear"/>.
It reflects evidence freshness rather than attestation results freshness.
Specifically, it reflects the freshness of the evidence whose attestation results are contained in this appraisal record.
This is useful when the relying party is the challenger in the remote attestation protocol and needs to verify that the nonce in the supplied evidence matches, without having to parse the evidence format.
See also <xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_attester_claims</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A map containing claims with Attester authority, i.e., claims extracted from the appraised Evidence.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_verifier_claims</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A map containing claims with Verifier authority, i.e., claims added by the Verifier during appraisal and derived from evaluating the Appraisal Policy for Evidence.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_endorser_claims</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A map containing claims with Endorser authority, i.e., claims that are not present in the appraised Evidence and that the Verifier added during appraisal using Endorsements.
Each key identifies the supply chain entity that asserted the claims in the associated value, which is a map of claims.
Identifiers are subject to the rules given under <tt>ear_reference_value_provider_claims</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ear_reference_value_provider_claims</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A map containing claims with Reference Value Provider authority, i.e., claims that are present in the appraised Evidence and that the Verifier corroborated using Reference Values.
Each key identifies the supply chain entity that provided the Reference Values, and the associated value is a map of the corroborated claims.
A corroborated claim <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be omitted from <tt>ear_attester_claims</tt>: the complete set of claims extracted from the Evidence is the union of the two maps.
The identifier is a human-readable string (e.g., "Arm" or "NVIDIA") that the Verifier derives from the cryptographic identity of the supply chain entity (e.g., the key that signed the Endorsements or Reference Values) when it ingests them, so that Relying Parties do not have to handle keys.
The same entity <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be given the same identifier throughout an EAR, and an identifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be shared by distinct entities.
A claim asserted by more than one authority appears under the identifier of each of them.
Each occurrence is an independent assertion.
To avoid arbitrary values, the Verifier <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> derive the identifier from the first of the following sources that is available: the subject name (e.g., the organization or common name attribute) of the certificate of the key that signed the CoRIM conveying the Endorsements or Reference Values, provided the certification path validates to a trust anchor of the Verifier; the <tt>entity-name</tt> of the entity with the <tt>manifest-signer</tt> role in the <tt>corim-entity-map</tt> (<xref section="4.1.5" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-corim"/>); the <tt>signer-name</tt> in the <tt>corim-signer-map</tt> (<xref section="4.2.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-corim"/>); a name configured in the Appraisal Policy for Evidence.
The <tt>entity-name</tt> and <tt>signer-name</tt> are asserted by the signer itself, so the Verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use them unless it has authenticated the binding between the name and the key that signed the CoRIM.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>eat_transport_identity_key</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The public key that the appraised Attester uses to authenticate itself to its peer in a secure channel.
See <xref target="sec-transport-identity-key"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>eat_secret_wrapping_keys</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The public keys that the appraised Attester publishes so that a Relying Party can wrap a secret to it.
See <xref target="sec-secret-wrapping-keys"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>$$ear-appraisal-extension</tt> (optional)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Any registered or unregistered extension.
See <xref target="sec-extensions"/> for further details.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-transport-identity-key">
        <name>Transport Identity Key</name>
        <t>The <tt>eat_transport_identity_key</tt> claim identifies the key an Attester uses to authenticate itself in a secure channel, for example the end-entity key of a TLS certificate.
It lets a Relying Party tie an attestation to the entity it is talking to.
Like any EAT claim, it can also appear in Evidence, where the Attester asserts it, and in an Attestation Result, where it is present only if the Verifier appraised it in Evidence.</t>
        <t>The value is one of:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the DER encoding of the key's SubjectPublicKeyInfo (<xref section="4.1.2.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5280"/>), as a byte string, or as a base64url-encoded string in JSON;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a digest of that encoding, in the <tt>digest</tt> format of <xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-eat-measured-component"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The SubjectPublicKeyInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encoded exactly as the Attester presents it to its peer: the <tt>subjectPublicKeyInfo</tt> field of the end-entity certificate, or the raw public key itself when no certificate is used.
This lets the Relying Party compare encodings byte for byte, and makes the digest form reproducible.</t>
        <t>The digest form identifies the hash algorithm, so that it can be used before the channel's algorithms are negotiated.
It suits Attesters whose Evidence carries only a digest of the key, and keeps Evidence and Attestation Results small when keys are large, as post-quantum keys are.</t>
        <t>The claim only says that the key is resident in the Attester's Target Environment.
It does not prove that the peer holds the corresponding private key: the Relying Party obtains that proof from the channel's authentication step (e.g., CertificateVerify in TLS).
To tie the attestation to the peer, the Relying Party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compare the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the key it authenticated with the claim byte for byte, hashing it with the algorithm named in the claim when the digest form is used.
A mismatch <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be treated as an attestation failure.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-secret-wrapping-keys">
        <name>Secret Wrapping Keys</name>
        <t>The <tt>eat_secret_wrapping_keys</tt> claim carries public keys that an Attester designates for encrypting, or establishing keys for, secrets released to it.
A Relying Party can release a secret to the Attester by wrapping it with one of the keys.
Secure key release protocols are an example of this use.
Like any EAT claim, it can appear in Evidence, where the Attester publishes the keys, and in an Attestation Result, where the Verifier conveys keys it obtained from appraised Evidence.</t>
        <t>The value is a JWK Set (<xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7517"/>) in JSON, or a COSE_KeySet (<xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="STD96"/>) in CBOR.
The set <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be empty.
The keys <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be public keys: private and symmetric key parameters <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be present.
The claim defines no labels or roles for individual keys.
The algorithms, the intended use and any identifier of a key are conveyed by its own parameters (e.g., <tt>alg</tt>, <tt>key_ops</tt> and <tt>kid</tt>), which a Relying Party can use to select the key it needs.
A Relying Party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> wrap a secret with a key unless the key's own parameters (<tt>alg</tt> or <tt>key_ops</tt>) indicate that it is intended for encryption, key wrapping or key agreement.
If a set contains keys intended for other purposes, such as signature verification, the Relying Party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore them.</t>
        <t>In an Attestation Result, the Verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include a key only if the appraised Evidence binds that key to the Attester, for example because the claim is in the signed Evidence, or through a digest of the key in a signed Evidence claim that the Verifier has checked.
The Verifier does not assert that the Attester holds the corresponding private keys, because this claim does not rely on proof of possession.
A Relying Party gets that assurance by using the key: a secret wrapped with a key whose private part the Attester does not hold cannot be unwrapped by it.</t>
        <t>A Verifier that conveys this claim in an appraisal record <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> also include it in <tt>ear_verifier_claims</tt>.
If the claim also appears in <tt>ear_verifier_claims</tt>, the Relying Party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the claim in the appraisal record and ignore the other occurrence.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-components-bound">
        <name>Components Binding</name>
        <t>The per-component results in <tt>submods</tt> say that each Component Attester was individually appraised, but they do not say that the appraised Component Attesters belong together.
A Composite Attester may tie the Partial Evidence of its Component Attesters to each other, for example by collecting it within the same challenge-response session, or by chaining the keys that sign it.
The <tt>ear_components_bound</tt> claim tells the Relying Party whether the Verifier verified these bindings.</t>
        <t>The claim is only meaningful in the appraisal of a Composite Attester, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be present otherwise.
It is present if and only if the Composite Attester uses at least one binding between its Component Attesters.
Absence of the claim means that no binding is used, or that the Verifier makes no statement about it, for example because it does not implement the logic needed to verify the bindings.</t>
        <t>The value is one of the following, serialized as a string in JSON and as an integer in CBOR.
The integers are AR4SI enumeration values (<xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/>), and each value maps to a trustworthiness tier:</t>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt><tt>bound</tt> (2)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>All the bindings in use were verified.
The tier is <tt>affirming</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>not-bound</tt> (96)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>At least one binding in use failed verification.
The tier is <tt>contraindicated</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>could-not-determine</tt> (1)</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>At least one binding is in use, but the Verifier could not evaluate it, for example because it does not support the binding scheme, or because a Component Verifier reported nothing about it.
The tier is <tt>incomplete</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>A receiver that encounters a value it does not recognise <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat it as <tt>could-not-determine</tt>.</t>
        <t>The tier of <tt>ear_components_bound</tt> is taken into account when computing <tt>ear_status</tt> like any other trustworthiness claim: <tt>ear_status</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be of no higher trust than this tier.
A <tt>not-bound</tt> value is never benign.</t>
        <t>A binding scheme is defined by how the Composite Attester arranges the collection of Evidence from its Component Attesters, and by the Evidence collection protocol it exposes or is used with.
The Verifier can report <tt>bound</tt> or <tt>not-bound</tt> only if it understands the binding scheme, and can verify the binding mechanics as they appear in the Evidence.
Examples of binding schemes are a shared nonce, a common session key, a certificate chain or another form of key delegation, and cross-signing between Component Attesters.</t>
        <t>When the EAR has nested <tt>EAR</tt> or <tt>Nested-Token</tt> submods, the Lead Verifier computes its own value over the bindings it is in a position to verify, and combines it with the nested values by taking the one of lowest trust, in the same way as for <tt>ear_status</tt>.</t>
        <t>A nested submod that carries no claim does not contribute a value.</t>
        <t>A <tt>bound</tt> value does not imply that the individual components are trustworthy.
For example, the Realm token of a CCA Attester <xref target="I-D.ffm-rats-cca-token"/> can be bound to the Platform token while <tt>ear_status</tt> is <tt>incomplete</tt> because the Realm measurements have not been corroborated.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-details">
        <name>Details Claims</name>
        <t>The <tt>ear_status_details</tt> and <tt>ear_trustworthiness_vector_details</tt> claims let a Verifier tell the Relying Party the reasons for the values of <tt>ear_status</tt> and of the trustworthiness vector categories.
They are optional, and are intended for values other than <tt>affirming</tt>.</t>
        <t>Each string states one reason, in text meant for people (e.g., logs, diagnostics, support).
The text is not standardised: it can change between Verifiers, versions of the same Verifier and, if localised, languages.
A Relying Party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> base automated decisions on it.
Those rely entirely on <tt>ear_status</tt> and <tt>ear_trustworthiness_vector</tt>, which remain authoritative.</t>
        <t>The text can reproduce data controlled by the Attester (e.g., file names found in the Evidence), so a Relying Party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat it as untrusted input (see <xref target="sec-sec-cons"/>).
It can also reveal details of the Attester's state, see <xref target="sec-priv-cons"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-nested-submods">
        <name>Recursive and Tunnelled Submods</name>
        <t>In addition to a flat <tt>EAR-appraisal</tt>, a submod <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> instead carry a nested
<tt>EAR</tt> or a <tt>Nested-Token</tt> (<xref section="4.2.18.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>).
This gives the EAR a recursive structure that can directly reflect the
topology of a mesh of cooperating verifiers, e.g., the Lead Verifier of the
Hierarchical pattern defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-multi-verifier"/>, which
dispatches the appraisal of composite evidence to one or more Component Verifiers
and then collects their results into its own EAR.</t>
        <t>The three $submod-value alternatives serve different purposes:</t>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt><tt>EAR-appraisal</tt></dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The existing, flat representation.
Used when the verifier itself performs the appraisal of the associated
attester, or restates a Component Verifier's result as its own appraisal.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>EAR</tt></dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A complete EAR claims-set produced by a Component Verifier, embedded directly, in
the same serialization (JSON or CBOR) as the enclosing EAR.
This lets a Component Verifier's full result -- including its own <tt>submods</tt>,
potentially several levels deep -- be embedded as plain claims data,
integrity-protected only by the enclosing EAR's own signature.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>Nested-Token</tt></dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A complete, independently signed EAR produced by a Component Verifier and
tunnelled opaquely, using the nesting mechanics described in <xref section="4.2.18.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>.
This is the only alternative that supports a Component Verifier whose EAR uses a
different serialization than the enclosing token (e.g., a JWT-serialized
sub-EAR nested inside a CWT-serialized top-level EAR, or vice versa).
The nested token's encoding is self-describing, so the consumer needs no
out-of-band knowledge of it: for CBOR it is given by the CBOR tag found after
removing the byte string wrapping, for JSON by the <tt>JSON-Selector</tt> name
(<xref section="4.2.18" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>).
EAR restricts <tt>Nested-Token</tt> to its <tt>"JWT"</tt> and <tt>"CBOR"</tt> forms; the
<tt>"BUNDLE"</tt> and <tt>"DIGEST"</tt> forms defined by <xref target="RFC9711"/> for detached claims-sets
are out of scope for EAR.
The content of a <tt>Nested-Token</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an EAR.
The CDDL cannot enforce this, because the token is opaque to the schema; a
verifier that finds otherwise treats the submod as <tt>incomplete</tt> (see <tt>ear_status</tt>
in <xref target="sec-ear"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The existing flat representation of device topology, the
<tt>ear_device_topology</tt> claim (<xref target="sec-ear"/>), is unaffected by, and can be used
independently of, the above; it remains the appropriate choice when a single
verifier appraises a composite attester made up of several evidence sources
without delegating appraisal to other verifiers.</t>
        <t>A Relying Party that only consumes the top-level <tt>ear_status</tt> claim (see
<xref target="sec-ear"/>) does not need to understand any of the above: correctness only
depends on the verifier correctly rolling up the status of every submod,
regardless of its representation, into that claim.
A Relying Party that wants a full audit trail, however, needs to be able to
recurse into nested <tt>EAR</tt> submods and to decode <tt>Nested-Token</tt> submods --
which, per above, may require support for a different serialization or
signature scheme than the one used by the enclosing token.</t>
        <t><xref target="fig-ex-json-3"/> shows a Lead Verifier's EAR for a confidential computing
scenario: a confidential VM ("cvm") running on a confidential platform
("cpu") and using a trusted device ("gpu") to offload a specialized ML
workload.
Each submod uses a different $submod-value kind, reflecting a realistic split
of appraisal responsibilities across independent, vendor-specific verifiers:
"cvm" is appraised directly by the Lead Verifier and carries a flat
<tt>EAR-appraisal</tt>; "cpu" is appraised by Vendor-A's confidential computing
verifier, whose full EAR claims-set, including its own "platform" submod, is
embedded in-band as a nested <tt>EAR</tt>, because it happens to use the same
(JSON) serialization as the enclosing token; "gpu" is appraised by Vendor-B's
confidential computing verifier, whose EAR is tunnelled opaquely as a
<tt>Nested-Token</tt>, JWT-serialized regardless of the serialization of the
enclosing token.
The Lead Verifier's <tt>ear_status</tt> reflects the worst status found across all
three; the one it cannot itself parse is accounted for as <tt>incomplete</tt>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-ex-json-3">
          <name>JSON claims-set: recursive and tunnelled submods</name>
          <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

{
  "eat_profile": "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05",
  "iat": 1666529184,
  "ear_status": "warning",
  "ear_components_bound": "bound",
  "ear_verifier_id": {
    "developer": "https://veraison-project.org",
    "build": "vts 0.0.1"
  },
  "submods": {
    "cvm": {
      "ear_status": "affirming",
      "ear_trustworthiness_vector": {
        "instance-identity": 2,
        "executables": 2,
        "configuration": 2
      }
    },
    "cpu": {
      "eat_profile": "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05",
      "iat": 1666529150,
      "ear_verifier_id": {
        "developer": "https://vendor-a.example/cc-verifier",
        "build": "cc-verifier 1.2.0"
      },
      "submods": {
        "platform": {
          "ear_status": "warning",
          "ear_trustworthiness_vector": {
            "hardware": 2,
            "configuration": 1
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "gpu": [
      "JWT",
      "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.\
eyJlYXRfcHJvZmlsZSI6InRhZzppZXRmLm9yZywyMDI2OnJhdHMvZWFyIzA0IiwiaWF0\
IjoxNjY2NTI5MTAwLCJlYXJfc3RhdHVzIjoiYWZmaXJtaW5nIn0.\
                         QjJyZlBoM0tzWjF2WHdRbjlMbURhU3lFb1RjNGdIak0"
    ]
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
      </section>
      <section anchor="json-serialisation">
        <name>JSON Serialisation</name>
        <section anchor="examples">
          <name>Examples</name>
          <t>The example in <xref target="fig-ex-json-1"/> shows an EAR claims-set corresponding to a
"contraindicated" appraisal, meaning the verifier has found some problems with
the attester's state reported in the submitted evidence.
Specifically, the identified issue is related to unauthorized code or
configuration loaded in runtime memory (i.e., value 96 in the executables
category).
The appraisal is for a device with one attester labelled "PSA".  Note that in
case there is only one attester, the labelling can be freely chosen because
there is no ambiguity.</t>
          <figure anchor="fig-ex-json-1">
            <name>JSON claims-set: contraindicated appraisal</name>
            <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
{
  "eat_profile": "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05",
  "iat": 1666529184,
  "ear_verifier_id": {
    "developer": "https://veraison-project.org",
    "build": "vts 0.0.1"
  },
  "ear_raw_evidence": [
    "application/vnd.evidence",
    "NzQ3MjY5NzM2NTYzNzQK"
  ],
  "ear_input_digest": [
    "sha-256",
    "TInrSlzsaz9jfL7abgvJ2roo2P93Jozst3x3OU_afNg"
  ],
  "submods": {
    "PSA": {
      "ear_status": "contraindicated",
      "ear_status_details": [
        "The 'executables' category is contraindicated."
      ],
      "ear_trustworthiness_vector": {
        "instance-identity": 2,
        "executables": 96,
        "hardware": 2
      },
      "ear_trustworthiness_vector_details": {
        "executables": [ "unauthorized code found in runtime memory" ]
      },
      "ear_appraisal_policy_ids":
        [ "https://veraison.example/policy/1/60a0068d" ],
      "eat_transport_identity_key":
        "MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEMKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D7gS2XpJFbZiItSs3m9-9Ue6GnvHw_GW2ZZaVtszggXIw",
      "eat_secret_wrapping_keys": {
        "keys": [
          {
            "kty": "EC",
            "crv": "P-256",
            "x": "MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4",
            "y": "4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM",
            "kid": "wrap-1",
            "alg": "ECDH-ES+A256KW"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
          <t>The breakdown of the trustworthiness vector is as follows:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Instance Identity (affirming): recognized and not compromised</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configuration (warning): known vulnerabilities</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Executables (contraindicated): contraindicated run-time</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>File System (none): no claim being made</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Hardware (affirming): genuine</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Runtime Opaque (none): no claim being made</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Storage Opaque (none): no claim being made</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Sourced Data (none): no claim being made</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>The example in <xref target="fig-ex-json-2"/> contains the appraisal for a composite device
with two attesters named "CCA Platform" and "CCA Realm" respectively.
Both attesters have either "affirming" or (implicit) "none" values in their
associated trustworthiness vectors.
Note that the "none" values can refer to either an AR4SI category that is
unapplicable for the specific attester (ideally, the applicability should be
specified by the evidence format itself), or to the genuine lack of information
at the attester site regarding the specific category.  For example, the
reference values for the "CCA Realm" executables (i.e., the confidential
computing workload) may not be known to the CCA platform verifier.
In such cases, it is up to the downstream entity (typically, the relying party)
to complete the partial appraisal.</t>
          <figure anchor="fig-ex-json-2">
            <name>JSON claims-set: simple affirming appraisal</name>
            <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
{
  "eat_profile": "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05",
  "iat": 1666529300,
  "ear_verifier_id": {
    "developer": "https://veraison-project.org",
    "build": "vts 0.0.1"
  },
  "ear_raw_evidence": [
    "application/vnd.evidence",
    "NzQ3MjY5NzM2NTYzNzQKNzQ3MjY5NzM2NTYzNzQK"
  ],
  "submods": {
    "CCA Platform": {
      "ear_status": "affirming",
      "ear_trustworthiness_vector": {
        "instance-identity": 2,
        "executables": 2,
        "hardware": 2
      },
      "ear_appraisal_policy_ids":
        [ "https://veraison.example/policy/1/60a0068d" ]
    },
    "CCA Realm": {
      "ear_status": "affirming",
      "ear_trustworthiness_vector": {
        "instance-identity": 2
      },
      "ear_appraisal_policy_ids":
        [ "https://veraison.example/policy/1/60a0068d" ]
    }
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cbor-serialisation">
        <name>CBOR Serialisation</name>
        <section anchor="examples-1">
          <name>Examples</name>
          <t>The example in <xref target="fig-ex-cbor-1"/> is semantically equivalent to that in
<xref target="fig-ex-json-1"/>.  It shows the same "contraindicated" appraisal using the
more compact CBOR serialization of the EAR claims-set.</t>
          <figure anchor="fig-ex-cbor-1">
            <name>CBOR claims-set: contraindicated appraisal</name>
            <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
{
  265: "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05",
  6: 1666529184,
  1004: {
    0: "https://veraison-project.org",
    1: "vts 0.0.1"
  },
  1002: [
    "application/vnd.evidence",
    h'6C696665626F61746D616E'
  ],
  1009: 2,
  1008: [
    1,
    h'4c89eb4a5cec6b3f637cbeda6e0bc9daba28d8ff77268cecb77c77394fda7cd8'
  ],
  266: {
    "PSA": {
      1000: 96,
      1010: [ "The 'executables' category is contraindicated." ],
      1001: {
        0: 2,
        2: 96,
        4: 2
      },
      1011: {
        2: [ "unauthorized code found in runtime memory" ]
      },
      1003: [ "https://veraison.example/policy/1/60a0068d" ],
      1012: [
        1,
        h'51b944cdfa544d4c3273aa6bf350625a7dd53bbb6a71723274f538b19a207760'
      ],
      1013: [
        {
          1: 2,
          -1: 1,
          -2: h'30a0424cd21c2944838a2d75c92b37e76ea20d9f00893a3b4eee8a3c0aafec3e',
          -3: h'e04b65e92456d9888b52b379bdfbd51ee869ef1f0fc65b6659695b6cce081723',
          2: h'7772617031',
          3: -31
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-extensions">
      <name>EAR Extensions</name>
      <t>EAR provides core semantics for describing the result of appraising attestation
evidence.
However, a given application may offer extra functionality to its relying
parties, or tailor the attestation result to the needs of the application (e.g.,
TEEP <xref target="I-D.ietf-teep-protocol"/>).
To accommodate such cases, both <tt>EAR</tt> and <tt>EAR-appraisal</tt> claims-sets can be
extended by plugging new claims into the <tt>$$ear-extension</tt> (or
<tt>$$ear-appraisal-extension</tt>, respectively) CDDL socket.</t>
      <t>The rules that govern extensibility of EAR are those defined in <xref target="RFC8392"/> and
<xref target="RFC7519"/> for CWTs and JWTs respectively.</t>
      <t>An extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> change the semantics of the <tt>EAR</tt> and <tt>EAR-appraisal</tt>
claims-sets.</t>
      <t>Whether or not an extension requires a new EAR profile identifier depends on whether it must be understood by all consumers of that EAR token.</t>
      <t>If an extension is optional, meaning a receiver that does not understand it can safely ignore it while still processing the rest of the EAR correctly, then the existing EAR profile identifier <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be retained.
(This is enabled by the requirement to ignore unknown claims stated in <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>.)</t>
      <t>However, if an extension introduces claims that <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be understood and acted upon by all consumers, i.e., a receiver that does not recognise the extension cannot safely process the EAR, then a new EAT profile identifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used to signal this requirement.
Such a profile identifier would typically be defined in a specification document alongside the mandatory extension claims.</t>
      <section anchor="unregistered-claims">
        <name>Unregistered claims</name>
        <t>An application-specific extension will normally mint its claim from the "private
space" - using integer values less than -65536 for CWT, and Public or
Private Claim Names as defined in Sections <xref target="RFC7519" section="4.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC7519" section="4.3" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC7519"/> when
serializing to JWT.</t>
        <t>It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that JWT EARs use Collision-Resistant Public Claim Names
(<xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/>) rather than Private Claim Names.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-registered-claims">
        <name>Registered claims</name>
        <t>If an extension will be used across multiple applications, or is intended to be
used across multiple environments, the associated extension claims
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be registered in one, or both, the CWT and JWT claim registries.</t>
        <t>In general, if the registration policy requires an accompanying specification
document (as it is the case for "specification required" and "standards
action"), such document <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> explicitly say that the extension is expected to
be used in EAR claims-sets identified by this profile.</t>
        <t>An up-to-date view of the registered claims can be obtained via the
<xref target="IANA.cwt"/> and <xref target="IANA.jwt"/> registries.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="choosing-between-registered-and-unregistered-claims">
        <name>Choosing between registered and unregistered claims</name>
        <t>If an extension supports functionality of a specific application, its claims <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be registered.</t>
        <t>If an extension supports a protocol that may be applicable across multiple
applications or environments (e.g., TEEP), its claims <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be registered.</t>
        <t>Since, in general, there is no guarantee that an application will be confined
within an environment, it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that extension claims that have
meaning outside the application's context are always registered.</t>
        <t>It is also possible that claims that start out as application-specific acquire
a more stable meaning over time. In such cases, it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that new
equivalent claims are created in the "public space" and are registered as
described in <xref target="sec-registered-claims"/>. The original "private space" claims
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> then be deprecated by the application.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="grouping-claims-under-a-single-top-level-key">
        <name>Grouping Claims Under a Single Top-Level Key</name>
        <t>EAR places no constraint on the type of value carried by an extension claim.
An extension may therefore use any CBOR or JSON value type that is appropriate for the information it conveys.</t>
        <t>However, when an extension introduces more than one logically related claim and those claims are intended to be registered in the CWT or JWT claim registries, it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to group them as members of a single map value carried under one top-level registered key.
This minimises consumption of the public codepoint namespace, which is a finite shared resource.</t>
        <t>This recommendation does not apply to claims minted from the private space (integer values less than -65536 for CWT, and Private Claim Names as defined in <xref section="4.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/> for JWT), where namespace pressure is not a concern.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-extensions-teep">
        <name>TEEP Extension</name>
        <t>The TEEP protocol <xref target="I-D.ietf-teep-protocol"/> specifies the required claims that an attestation
result must carry for a TAM (Trusted Application Manager) to make decisions on
how to remediate a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) that is out of
compliance, or update a TEE that is requesting an authorized change.</t>
        <t>The list is provided in <xref section="4.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-teep-protocol"/>.</t>
        <t>EAR defines a TEEP application extension for the purpose of conveying such claims.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-cddl-teep">
          <name>TEEP Extension (CDDL Definition)</name>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
;# import rfc9711 as eat
;# import rfc9393

$$ear-appraisal-extension //= (
  ear.teep-claims-label => ear-teep-claims
)

ear-teep-claims = non-empty<{
  ? eat.nonce-label => eat.nonce-type
  ? eat.ueid-label => eat.ueid-type
  ? eat.oemid-label => eat.oemid-pen / eat.oemid-ieee / eat.oemid-random
  ? eat.hardware-model-label => eat.hardware-model-type
  ? eat.hardware-version-label => eat.hardware-version-type
  ? eat.manifests-label => eat.manifests-type
}>

ear.teep-claims-label = eat.JC<"ear_teep_claims", 65000>
]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <section anchor="json-serialization-example">
          <name>JSON Serialization Example</name>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
{
  "eat_profile": "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05",
  "iat": 1666529184,
  "ear_verifier_id": {
    "developer": "https://veraison-project.org",
    "build": "vts 0.0.1"
  },
  "ear_raw_evidence": [
    "application/vnd.evidence",
    "NzQ3MjY5NzM2NTYzNzQK"
  ],
  "submods": {
    "PSA": {
      "ear_status": "contraindicated",
      "ear_trustworthiness_vector": {
        "instance-identity": 2,
        "executables": 96,
        "hardware": 2
      },
      "ear_appraisal_policy_ids":
        [ "https://veraison.example/policy/1/60a0068d" ],
      "ear_teep_claims": {
        "eat_nonce": "80FH7byS7VjfARIq0_KLqu6B9j-F79QtV6p",
        "ueid": "AQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4PEBESExQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAh",
        "oemid": "Av8B",
        "hwmodel": "fJYq",
        "hwversion": ["1.2.5", 16384]
      }
    }
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cbor-serialization-example">
          <name>CBOR Serialization Example</name>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
{
  265: "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05",
  6: 1666529184,
  1004: {
    0: "https://veraison-project.org",
    1: "vts 0.0.1"
  },
  1002: [
    "application/vnd.evidence",
    h'6C696665626F61746D616E'
  ],
  266: {
    "PSA": {
      1000: 0,
      1001: {
        0: 2,
        1: 2,
        2: 2,
        4: 2
      },
      1003: [ "https://veraison.example/policy/1/60a0068d" ],
      65000: {
        10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
        256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
        258: 64242,
        259: h'ee80f5a66c1fb9742999a8fdab930893',
        260: ["1.2.5", 16384]
      }
    }
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="media-types">
      <name>Media Types</name>
      <t>Media types for EAR are automatically derived from the base EAT media type
<xref target="RFC9782"/> using the profile string defined in <xref target="sec-ear"/>.</t>
      <t>For example, a JWT serialization would use:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
application/eat-jwt; eat_profile="tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05"
]]></artwork>
      <t>A CWT serialization would instead use:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
application/eat-cwt; eat_profile="tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05"
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol
defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft,
and is based on a proposal described in <xref target="RFC7942"/>.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the
IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs.
Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not
imply endorsement by the IETF.
Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here
that was supplied by IETF contributors.
This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of
available implementations or their features.
Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.</t>
      <t>According to <xref target="RFC7942"/>, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to
assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code,
which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have
made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see
fit".</t>
      <section anchor="project-veraison">
        <name>Project Veraison</name>
        <t>The organization responsible for this implementation is Project Veraison, a
Linux Foundation project hosted at the Confidential Computing Consortium.</t>
        <t>The organization currently provides three separate implementations: one in
Golang, one in Rust and another in C17.</t>
        <t>The developers can be contacted on the Zulip channel:
<eref target="https://veraison.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/357929-EAR/"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="githubcomveraisonear">
          <name><tt>github.com/veraison/ear</tt></name>
          <t>The software, hosted at <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/ear"/>, provides a Golang
package that allows encoding, decoding, signing and verification of EAR
payloads together with a CLI (<tt>arc</tt>) to create, verify and visualize EARs on
the command line.
The maturity level is currently alpha, and only the JWT serialization is
implemented.
The license is Apache 2.0.
The package is used by the Project Veraison verifier to produce attestation
results.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="githubcomveraisonc-ear">
          <name><tt>github.com/veraison/c-ear</tt></name>
          <t>The software, hosted at <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/c-ear"/>, provides a C17
library that allows verification and partial decoding of EAR payloads.
The maturity level is currently pre-alpha, and only the JWT serialization is
implemented.
The license is Apache 2.0.
The library targets relying party applications that need to verify attestation
results.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="githubcomveraisonrust-ear">
          <name><tt>github.com/veraison/rust-ear</tt></name>
          <t>The software, hosted at <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/rust-ear"/>, provides a
Rust (2021 edition) library that allows verification and partial decoding of
EAR payloads. The maturity level is currently pre-alpha, with limitted
algorithm support.  Both JWT and COSE serializations are implemented.  The
license is Apache 2.0.  The library targets verifiers that need to produce
attestation results as well as relying party applications that need to verify
and consume attestation results.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-sec-cons">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>EAR is a profile of the EAT specification <xref target="RFC9711"/>, it also reuses the CWT specification <xref target="RFC8392"/>.
The security considerations of these specifications therefore apply here too.</t>
      <t>Any textual fields (e.g., the strings in <tt>ear_status_details</tt> and <tt>ear_trustworthiness_vector_details</tt>) that are stored in a file, inserted into a database, or displayed to humans must be properly sanitized to prevent attacks and undesirable behavior.
Further discussion and references on this topic can be found in <xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9839"/>.</t>
      <t>The <tt>ear_endorser_claims</tt> and <tt>ear_reference_value_provider_claims</tt> claims attribute claims to supply chain entities.
The attribution is the Verifier's.
Relying Parties cannot see or check the keys and signatures on which it is based.
Consequently, they rely on the Verifier's mapping from cryptographic identities to identifiers and on the integrity protection of the EAR.</t>
      <section anchor="releasing-secrets-to-published-keys">
        <name>Releasing Secrets to Published Keys</name>
        <t>A Relying Party that wraps a secret with a key in <tt>eat_secret_wrapping_keys</tt> (see <xref target="sec-secret-wrapping-keys"/>) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check that the EAR is fresh for its request, for example by verifying <tt>eat_nonce</tt>, and that <tt>ear_status</tt> is acceptable under its Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results.
Otherwise, a stale EAR could direct a secret to an environment that has since been compromised.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="binding-ear-to-the-appraisal-request">
        <name>Binding EAR to the Appraisal Request</name>
        <t><tt>eat_nonce</tt> alone only proves that the Verifier processed a request carrying a given nonce; it does not prove that the request contained the evidence (or any other input) that the requester actually sent.
An on-path attacker able to tamper with the appraisal request without disturbing the nonce -- for example, by substituting the evidence while leaving the nonce intact -- can therefore cause a Relying Party to accept an EAR that has a valid nonce but does not reflect the evidence the Relying Party asked to have appraised.</t>
        <t>The <tt>ear_input_digest</tt> claim (see <xref target="sec-ear-input-digest"/>), when applicable, mitigates this class of attack by binding the EAR to the exact wire bytes of the appraisal request the Verifier received.
Implementers and deployers are strongly encouraged to read <xref target="sec-ear-input-digest"/> in full before deciding to produce or verify <tt>ear_input_digest</tt>, since an inappropriate deployment topology can silently negate its security benefit.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-priv-cons">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>EAR is designed to expose as little identifying information as possible about
the attester.
However, certain EAR claims have direct privacy implications.
Implementations should therefore allow applying privacy-preserving techniques
to those claims, for example allowing their redaction, anonymisation or
outright removal.
Specifically:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be possible to disable inclusion of the optional
<tt>ear_status_details</tt> and <tt>ear_trustworthiness_vector_details</tt> claims</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be possible to disable inclusion of the optional <tt>ear_raw_evidence</tt>
claim</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be possible to disable inclusion of the optional
<tt>ear_attester_claims</tt>, <tt>ear_verifier_claims</tt>, <tt>ear_endorser_claims</tt> and
<tt>ear_reference_value_provider_claims</tt> claims</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be possible to allow redaction, anonymisation or removal of
specific claims from the <tt>ear_attester_claims</tt>, <tt>ear_verifier_claims</tt>,
<tt>ear_endorser_claims</tt> and <tt>ear_reference_value_provider_claims</tt> objects</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>EAR is an EAT, therefore the privacy considerations in <xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9711"/>
apply.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="sec-iana-ear-claims">
        <name>New EAT Claims</name>
        <t>This specification adds the following values to the "JSON Web Token Claims"
registry <xref target="IANA.jwt"/> and the "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry <xref target="IANA.cwt"/>.</t>
        <t>Each entry below is an addition to both registries.</t>
        <t>The "Claim Description", "Change Controller" and "Specification Documents" are
common and equivalent for the JWT and CWT registries.
The "Claim Key" and "Claim Value Types(s)" are for the CWT registry only.
The "Claim Name" is as defined for the CWT registry, not the JWT registry.
The "JWT Claim Name" is equivalent to the "Claim Name" in the JWT registry.</t>
        <section anchor="ear-status">
          <name>EAR Status</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_status</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: EAR Status</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_status</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1000 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): unsigned integer (0, 2, 32, 96, 127)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="trustworthiness-vector">
          <name>Trustworthiness Vector</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_trustworthiness_vector</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: EAR Trustworthiness Vector</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_trustworthiness_vector</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1001 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="status-details">
          <name>Status Details</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_status_details</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: EAR Status Details</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_status_details</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1010 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): array</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear"/> and <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="trustworthiness-vector-details">
          <name>Trustworthiness Vector Details</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_trustworthiness_vector_details</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: EAR Trustworthiness Vector Details</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_trustworthiness_vector_details</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1011 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ear-raw-evidence">
          <name>EAR Raw Evidence</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_raw_evidence</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: EAR Raw Evidence as CMW</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_raw_evidence</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1002 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): array</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ear-appraisal-policy-identifier">
          <name>EAR Appraisal Policy Identifier</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_appraisal_policy_ids</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: EAR Appraisal Policy Identifiers</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_appraisal_policy_ids</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1003 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): array</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="verifier-software-identifier">
          <name>Verifier Software Identifier</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_verifier_id</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: AR4SI Verifier Software Identifier</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_verifier_id</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1004 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="attester-claims">
          <name>Attester Claims</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_attester_claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Attester Claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_attester_claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1005 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="verifier-claims">
          <name>Verifier Claims</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_verifier_claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Verifier Claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_verifier_claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1006 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="endorser-claims">
          <name>Endorser Claims</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_endorser_claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Endorser Claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_endorser_claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1014 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="reference-value-provider-claims">
          <name>Reference Value Provider Claims</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_reference_value_provider_claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Reference Value Provider Claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_reference_value_provider_claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1015 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-appraisal"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="device-topology">
          <name>Device Topology</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_device_topology</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Device Attesters Arrangement</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_device_topology</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1007 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ear-input-digest">
          <name>EAR Input Digest</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_input_digest</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Digest of the EAR Appraisal Request Input</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_input_digest</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1008 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): array</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-ear-input-digest"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ear-components-bound">
          <name>EAR Components Bound</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ear_components_bound</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Verification Outcome of the Bindings Between Component Attesters</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: ear_components_bound</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1009 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): text (JSON) or integer (CBOR)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-components-bound"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="transport-identity-key">
          <name>Transport Identity Key</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: eat_transport_identity_key</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Transport Identity Key</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: eat_transport_identity_key</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1012 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): byte string or text string (SubjectPublicKeyInfo), or array (digest)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-transport-identity-key"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="secret-wrapping-keys">
          <name>Secret Wrapping Keys</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: eat_secret_wrapping_keys</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Secret Wrapping Keys</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>JWT Claim Name: eat_secret_wrapping_keys</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Key: 1013 (suggested)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Value Type(s): map (JWK Set) or array (COSE_KeySet)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-secret-wrapping-keys"/> of RFCthis</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ear-teep-claims">
          <name>EAR TEEP Claims</name>
          <t>TODO</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8392">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="E. Wahlstroem" initials="E." surname="Wahlstroem"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="May" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8392"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8392"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8610">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="June" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="STD94">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="December" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="STD96">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
              <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si">
          <front>
            <title>Attestation Results for Secure Interactions</title>
            <author fullname="Eric Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit">
              <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Hardjono" initials="T." surname="Hardjono">
              <organization>MIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>NVIDIA</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Vincent Scarlata" initials="V." surname="Scarlata">
              <organization>Intel</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines reusable Attestation Result information
   elements.  When these elements are offered to Relying Parties as
   Evidence, different aspects of Attester trustworthiness can be
   evaluated.  Additionally, where the Relying Party is interfacing with
   a heterogeneous mix of Attesting Environment and Verifier types,
   consistent policies can be applied to subsequent information exchange
   between each Attester and the Relying Party.

   This document also defines two serialisations of the proposed
   information model, utilising CBOR and JSON.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9711">
          <front>
            <title>The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)</title>
            <author fullname="L. Lundblade" initials="L." surname="Lundblade"/>
            <author fullname="G. Mandyam" initials="G." surname="Mandyam"/>
            <author fullname="J. O'Donoghue" initials="J." surname="O'Donoghue"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wallace" initials="C." surname="Wallace"/>
            <date month="April" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set that describes the state and characteristics of an entity, a device such as a smartphone, an Internet of Things (IoT) device, network equipment, or such. This claims set is used by a relying party, server, or service to determine the type and degree of trust placed in the entity.</t>
              <t>An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or a JSON Web Token (JWT) with attestation-oriented claims.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9711"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9711"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-teep-protocol">
          <front>
            <title>Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mingliang Pei" initials="M." surname="Pei">
              <organization>Broadcom</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Dave Wheeler" initials="D. M." surname="Wheeler">
              <organization>Amazon</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Dave Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler">
              <organization>Microsoft</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Akira Tsukamoto" initials="A." surname="Tsukamoto">
              <organization>Openchip &amp; Software Technologies, S.L.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="26" month="February" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies the Trusted Execution Environment
   Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol, which enables secure lifecycle
   management of Trusted Components in devices with a Trusted Execution
   Environment (TEE).  The protocol defines message exchanges between a
   Trusted Application Manager (TAM) and a TEEP Agent to query device
   state, convey attestation evidence, and install, update, or delete
   Trusted Components.  Messages are encoded in CBOR and secured using
   COSE.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-teep-protocol-26"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9782">
          <front>
            <title>Entity Attestation Token (EAT) Media Types</title>
            <author fullname="L. Lundblade" initials="L." surname="Lundblade"/>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="T. Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati"/>
            <date month="May" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The payloads used in Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) may require an associated media type for their conveyance, for example, when the payloads are used in RESTful APIs.</t>
              <t>This memo defines media types to be used for Entity Attestation Tokens (EATs).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9782"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9782"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9999">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW)</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="T. Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The conceptual messages introduced by the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture (RFC 9334) are protocol-agnostic data units that are conveyed between RATS roles during RATS interactions. Conceptual messages describe the meaning and function of such data units within RATS data flows without specifying a wire format, encoding, transport mechanism, or processing details. The initial set of conceptual messages is defined in Section 8 of RFC 9334 and includes Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, Reference Values, and Appraisal Policies.</t>
              <t>This document introduces the Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) that provides a common structure to encapsulate these messages. It defines a dedicated Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) tag, corresponding JSON Web Token (JWT) and CBOR Web Token (CWT) claims, and an X.509 extension.</t>
              <t>Together, these mechanisms allow CMWs to be used in CBOR-based protocols, web APIs using JWTs and CWTs, and PKIX artifacts such as X.509 certificates. Additionally, this document defines media types and CoAP Content-Formats that may be used to identify CMWs when transported over protocols such as HTTP, MIME, and CoAP.</t>
              <t>The goal is to improve the interoperability and flexibility of remote attestation protocols. Introducing a shared message format such as CMW enables consistent support for different attestation message types, enables the evolution of message serialization formats without breaking compatibility, and avoids the need to redefine how messages are handled within each protocol.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9999"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9999"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-eat-measured-component">
          <front>
            <title>Entity Attestation Token (EAT) Measured Component</title>
            <author fullname="Simon Frost" initials="S." surname="Frost">
              <organization>Arm</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>Linaro</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="20" month="February" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The term "measured component" refers to an object within the
   attester's target environment whose state can be sampled and
   typically digested using a cryptographic hash function.  Examples of
   measured components include firmware stored in flash memory, software
   loaded into memory at start time, data stored in a file system, or
   values in a CPU register.  This document provides the information
   model for the "measured component" and two associated data models.
   This separation is intentional: the JSON and CBOR serializations,
   coupled with the media types and associated Constrained Application
   Protocol (CoAP) Content-Formats, enable the immediate use of the
   semantics within the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) framework.
   Meanwhile, the information model can be reused in future
   specifications to provide additional serializations, for example,
   using ASN.1.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-eat-measured-component-12"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9839">
          <front>
            <title>Unicode Character Repertoire Subsets</title>
            <author fullname="T. Bray" initials="T." surname="Bray"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="August" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document discusses subsets of the Unicode character repertoire for use in protocols and data formats and specifies three subsets recommended for use in IETF specifications.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9839"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9839"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9334">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-multi-verifier">
          <front>
            <title>Remote Attestation with Multiple Verifiers</title>
            <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
              <organization>Arm Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="zhang jun" initials="Z." surname="jun">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies France S.A.S.U.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Houda Labiod" initials="H." surname="Labiod">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies France S.A.S.U.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   IETF RATS Architecture, defines the key role of a Verifier.  In a
   complex system, this role needs to be performed by multiple Verifiers
   coordinating together to assess the full trustworthiness of an
   Attester.  This document focuses on various topological patterns for
   a multiple Verifier system.  It only covers the architectural aspects
   introduced by the Multi Verifier concept, which is neutral with
   regard to specific wire formats, encoding, transport mechanisms, or
   processing details.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-multi-verifier-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-corim">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Reference Integrity Manifest</title>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>NVIDIA</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
              <organization>arm</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ned Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Wei Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) enable Relying Parties to assess
   the trustworthiness of a remote Attester and therefore to decide
   whether or not to engage in secure interactions with it.  Evidence
   about trustworthiness can be rather complex and it is deemed
   unrealistic that every Relying Party is capable of the appraisal of
   Evidence.  Therefore that burden is typically offloaded to a
   Verifier.  In order to conduct Evidence appraisal, a Verifier
   requires not only fresh Evidence from an Attester, but also trusted
   Endorsements and Reference Values from Endorsers and Reference Value
   Providers, such as manufacturers, distributors, or device owners.
   This document specifies the information elements for representing
   Endorsements and Reference Values in CBOR format.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-corim-12"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ffm-rats-cca-token">
          <front>
            <title>Arm's Confidential Compute Architecture Reference Attestation Token</title>
            <author fullname="Simon Frost" initials="S." surname="Frost">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>Linaro</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Giridhar Mandyam" initials="G." surname="Mandyam">
              <organization>Advanced Micro Devices Inc</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="7" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The Arm Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA) is series of hardware
   and software innovations that enhance Arm’s support for Confidential
   Computing for large, compute-intensive workloads.  Devices that
   implement CCA can produce attestation tokens as described in this
   memo, which are the basis for trustworthiness assessment of the
   Confidential Compute environment.  This document specifies the CCA
   attestation token structure and semantics.

   The CCA attestation token is a profile of the Entity Attestation
   Token (EAT).  This specification describes what claims are used in an
   attestation token generated by CCA compliant systems, how these
   claims get serialized to the wire, and how they are cryptographically
   protected.

   This informational document is published as an independent submission
   to improve interoperability with Arm's architecture.  It is not a
   standard nor a product of the IETF.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ffm-rats-cca-token-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
              <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4151">
          <front>
            <title>The 'tag' URI Scheme</title>
            <author fullname="T. Kindberg" initials="T." surname="Kindberg"/>
            <author fullname="S. Hawke" initials="S." surname="Hawke"/>
            <date month="October" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the "tag" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme. Tag URIs (also known as "tags") are designed to be unique across space and time while being tractable to humans. They are distinct from most other URIs in that they have no authoritative resolution mechanism. A tag may be used purely as an entity identifier. Furthermore, using tags has some advantages over the common practice of using "http" URIs as identifiers for non-HTTP-accessible resources. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4151"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4151"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.cwt" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.jwt" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1362?>

<section anchor="collated-cddl">
      <name>Collated CDDL</name>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

;;; *** undefined: $$ear-extension
;;; *** undefined: $$ear-appraisal-extension
EAR = {
  eat.profile-label => "tag:ietf.org,2026:rats/ear#05",
  ? status-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-tier,
  ? status-details-label => details-type,
  eat.iat-claim-label => ~eat.time-int,
  ? eat.exp-claim-label => ~eat.time-int,
  verifier-id-label => ar4si.verifier-id,
  ? raw-evidence-label => cmw-record,
  eat.submods-label => {+ text => $submod-value},
  ? eat.nonce-label => eat.nonce-type,
  ? topology-label => topology-type,
  ? input-digest-label => mc.digest,
  ? components-bound-label => components-bound-type,
  * $$ear-extension,
}
cmw-record = eat.JC<cmw.json-record, cmw.cbor-record>
$submod-value /= EAR-appraisal / EAR / eat.Nested-Token
raw-evidence-label = eat.JC<"ear_raw_evidence", 1002>
verifier-id-label = eat.JC<"ear_verifier_id", 1004>
topology-label = eat.JC<"ear_device_topology", 1007>
input-digest-label = eat.JC<"ear_input_digest", 1008>
components-bound-label = eat.JC<"ear_components_bound", 1009>
components-bound-type = components-bound-true-label / components-\
              bound-false-label / components-bound-undetermined-label
components-bound-true-label = eat.JC<"bound", 2>
components-bound-false-label = eat.JC<"not-bound", 96>
components-bound-undetermined-label = eat.JC<"could-not-determine", \
                                                                   1>
EAR-appraisal = {
  ? eat.profile-label => eat.general-uri / eat.general-oid,
  status-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-tier,
  ? status-details-label => details-type,
  ? trustworthiness-vector-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-vector,
  ? trustworthiness-vector-details-label => trustworthiness-vector-\
                                                             details,
  ? appraisal-policy-ids-label => [+ text],
  ? eat.nonce-label => eat.nonce-type,
  ? attester-claims-label => claims-map-type,
  ? verifier-claims-label => claims-map-type,
  ? endorser-claims-label => supply-chain-claims-type,
  ? reference-value-provider-claims-label => supply-chain-claims-\
                                                                type,
  ? transport-identity-key-label => transport-identity-key-type,
  ? secret-wrapping-keys-label => secret-wrapping-keys-type,
  * $$ear-appraisal-extension,
}
status-label = eat.JC<"ear_status", 1000>
trustworthiness-vector-label = eat.JC<"ear_trustworthiness_vector", \
                                                                1001>
status-details-label = eat.JC<"ear_status_details", 1010>
trustworthiness-vector-details-label = eat.JC<"\
                           ear_trustworthiness_vector_details", 1011>
details-type = [+ text]
trustworthiness-vector-details = ar4si.non-empty<{
    ? ar4si.instance-identity-label => details-type,
    ? ar4si.configuration-label => details-type,
    ? ar4si.executables-label => details-type,
    ? ar4si.file-system-label => details-type,
    ? ar4si.hardware-label => details-type,
    ? ar4si.runtime-opaque-label => details-type,
    ? ar4si.storage-opaque-label => details-type,
    ? ar4si.sourced-data-label => details-type,
}>
appraisal-policy-ids-label = eat.JC<"ear_appraisal_policy_ids", 1003>
attester-claims-label = eat.JC<"ear_attester_claims", 1005>
verifier-claims-label = eat.JC<"ear_verifier_claims", 1006>
endorser-claims-label = eat.JC<"ear_endorser_claims", 1014>
reference-value-provider-claims-label = eat.JC<"\
                          ear_reference_value_provider_claims", 1015>
transport-identity-key-label = eat.JC<"eat_transport_identity_key", \
                                                                1012>
secret-wrapping-keys-label = eat.JC<"eat_secret_wrapping_keys", 1013>
supply-chain-claims-type = {+ text => claims-map-type}
claims-map-type = eat.JC<claims-map-type-json, claims-map-type-cbor>
claims-map-type-json = {+ text => any}
claims-map-type-cbor = {+ (text / int) => any}
topology-type = {+ text => [+ text]}
transport-identity-key-type = spki-type / mc.digest
spki-type = eat.JC<text .b64u bytes, bytes>
secret-wrapping-keys-type = eat.JC<jwk-set, cose-key-set>
jwk-set = {keys: [+ jwk]}
jwk = {
  kty: text,
  * text => any,
}
cose-key-set = [+ cose-key]
cose-key = {
  1 => int / tstr,
  * (int / tstr) => any,
}
eat.JC<J, C> = eat.JSON-ONLY<J> / eat.CBOR-ONLY<C>
eat.JSON-ONLY<J> = J .feature "json"
eat.CBOR-ONLY<C> = C .feature "cbor"
ar4si.non-empty<M> = M .within ({+ any => any})
ar4si.trustworthiness-tier /= ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-none-label \
/ ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-affirming-label / ar4si.trustworthiness\
-tier-warning-label / ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-contraindicated-\
                  label / ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-incomplete-label
ar4si.verifier-id = {
  ar4si.developer-label => text,
  ar4si.build-label => text,
}
ar4si.trustworthiness-vector = ar4si.non-empty<{
    ? ar4si.instance-identity-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-claim,
    ? ar4si.configuration-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-claim,
    ? ar4si.executables-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-claim,
    ? ar4si.file-system-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-claim,
    ? ar4si.hardware-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-claim,
    ? ar4si.runtime-opaque-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-claim,
    ? ar4si.storage-opaque-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-claim,
    ? ar4si.sourced-data-label => ar4si.trustworthiness-claim,
}>
ar4si.instance-identity-label = ar4si.JC<"instance-identity", 0>
ar4si.configuration-label = ar4si.JC<"configuration", 1>
ar4si.executables-label = ar4si.JC<"executables", 2>
ar4si.file-system-label = ar4si.JC<"file-system", 3>
ar4si.hardware-label = ar4si.JC<"hardware", 4>
ar4si.runtime-opaque-label = ar4si.JC<"runtime-opaque", 5>
ar4si.storage-opaque-label = ar4si.JC<"storage-opaque", 6>
ar4si.sourced-data-label = ar4si.JC<"sourced-data", 7>
ar4si.JC<J, C> = ar4si.JSON-ONLY<J> / ar4si.CBOR-ONLY<C>
ar4si.JSON-ONLY<J> = J .feature "json"
ar4si.CBOR-ONLY<C> = C .feature "cbor"
ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-none-label = ar4si.JC<"none", 0>
ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-affirming-label = ar4si.JC<"affirming", 2>
ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-warning-label = ar4si.JC<"warning", 32>
ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-contraindicated-label = ar4si.JC<"\
                                                contraindicated", 96>
ar4si.trustworthiness-tier-incomplete-label = ar4si.JC<"incomplete"\
                                                               , 127>
ar4si.developer-label = ar4si.JC<"developer", 0>
ar4si.build-label = ar4si.JC<"build", 1>
ar4si.trustworthiness-claim = -128 .. 127
cmw.json-record = [
  type: cmw.media-type,
  value: cmw.base64url-string,
  ? ind: uint .bits cmw.cm-type,
]
cmw.cbor-record = [
  type: cmw.coap-content-format-type / cmw.media-type,
  value: bytes,
  ? ind: uint .bits cmw.cm-type,
]
cmw.media-type = text .abnf ("Content-Type" .cat cmw.Content-Type-\
                                                                ABNF)
cmw.base64url-string = text .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_-]+"
cmw.cm-type = &(
  reference-values: 0,
  endorsements: 1,
  evidence: 2,
  attestation-results: 3,
  appraisal-policy: 4,
)
cmw.coap-content-format-type = uint .size 2
cmw.Content-Type-ABNF = '

Content-Type   = Media-Type-Name *( *SP ";" *SP parameter )
parameter      = token "=" ( token / quoted-string )

token          = 1*tchar
tchar          = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "\'" / "*"
               / "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
               / DIGIT / ALPHA
quoted-string  = %x22 *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) %x22
qdtext         = SP / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E
quoted-pair    = "\\" ( SP / VCHAR )

Media-Type-Name = type-name "/" subtype-name

type-name = restricted-name
subtype-name = restricted-name

restricted-name = restricted-name-first *126restricted-name-chars
restricted-name-first  = ALPHA / DIGIT
restricted-name-chars  = ALPHA / DIGIT / "!" / "#" /
                         "$" / "&" / "-" / "^" / "_"
restricted-name-chars =/ "." ; Characters before first dot always
                             ; specify a facet name
restricted-name-chars =/ "+" ; Characters after last plus always
                             ; specify a structured syntax suffix

DIGIT     =  %x30-39           ; 0 - 9
POS-DIGIT =  %x31-39           ; 1 - 9
ALPHA     =  %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A - Z / a - z
SP        =  %x20
VCHAR     =  %x21-7E           ; printable ASCII (no SP)
'
mc.digest = [
  alg: int / text,
  val: mc.digest-value-type,
]
mc.digest-value-type = mc.eat.JC<mc.bytes-b64u, bytes>
mc.eat.JC<J, C> = mc.eat.JSON-ONLY<J> / mc.eat.CBOR-ONLY<C>
mc.eat.JSON-ONLY<J> = J .feature "json"
mc.eat.CBOR-ONLY<C> = C .feature "cbor"
mc.bytes-b64u = text .b64u bytes
eat.profile-label = eat.JC<"eat_profile", 265>
eat.iat-claim-label = eat.JC<"iat", 6>
eat.time-int = #6.1(int)
eat.exp-claim-label = eat.JC<"exp", 4>
eat.submods-label = eat.JC<"submods", 266>
eat.nonce-label = eat.JC<"eat_nonce", 10>
eat.nonce-type = eat.JC<tstr .size (8 .. 88), bstr .size (8 .. 64)>
eat.Nested-Token = eat.CBOR-Nested-Token / eat.JSON-Selector
eat.general-uri = eat.JC<text, ~uri>
eat.general-oid = eat.JC<eat.json-oid, ~eat.oid>
eat.CBOR-Nested-Token = eat.JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token / eat.CBOR-\
                                              Token-Inside-CBOR-Token
eat.JSON-Selector = eat.$JSON-Selector
eat.json-oid = tstr .regexp "([0-2])((\\.0)|(\\.[1-9][0-9]*))*"
eat.oid = #6.111(bstr)
eat.JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = tstr
eat.CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = bstr .cbor eat.$CBOR-Tagged-Token
eat.$JSON-Selector /= [
    type: "JWT",
    nested-token: eat.JWT-Message,
] / [
    type: "CBOR",
    nested-token: eat.CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token,
]
eat.$CBOR-Tagged-Token /= #6.61(bstr) / #6.18(bstr) / #6.17(bstr) / \
                                                          #6.16(bstr)
eat.JWT-Message = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.[A\
                                                        -Za-z0-9_-]*"
eat.CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token = eat.base64-url-text
eat.base64-url-text = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_-]+"
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-policy-agent-example">
      <name>Open Policy Agent Example</name>
      <t>Open Policy Agent <eref target="https://www.openpolicyagent.org">OPA</eref> is a popular and
flexible policy engine that is used in a variety of contexts, from cloud to
IoT.  OPA policies are written using a purpose-built, declarative programming
language called
<eref target="https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/policy-language/">Rego</eref>.  Rego has
been designed to handle JSON claim-sets and their JWT envelopes as first class
objects, which makes it an excellent fit for dealing with JWT EARs.</t>
      <t>The following example illustrates an OPA policy that a Relying Party would use
to make decisions based on a JWT EAR received from a trusted verifier.</t>
      <sourcecode type="rego"><![CDATA[
package ear

ear_appraisal = {
    "verified": signature_verified,
    "appraisal-status": status,
    "trustworthiness-vector": trust_vector,
} {
    # verify EAR signature is correct and from one of the known and
    # trusted verifiers
    signature_verified := io.jwt.verify_es256(
        input.ear_token,
        json.marshal(input.trusted_verifiers)
    )

    # extract the EAR claims-set
    [_, payload, _] := io.jwt.decode(input.ear_token)

    # access the attester-specific appraisal record
    app_rec := payload.submods.PARSEC_TPM
    status := app_rec["ear_status"] == "affirming"

    # extract the trustworhiness vector for further inspection
    trust_vector := app_rec["ear_trustworthiness_vector"]
}

# add further conditions on the trust_vector here
# ...
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>The result of the policy appraisal is the following JSON object:</t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
    "ear_appraisal": {
        "appraisal-status": true,
        "trustworthiness-vector": {
            "executables": 2,
            "hardware": 2,
            "instance-identity": 2
        },
        "verified": true
    }
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>For completeness, the trusted verifier public key and the EAR JWT used in the
example are provided below.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
    "ear_token": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJlYXIucmF3L\
WV2aWRlbmNlIjoiTnpRM01qWTVOek0yTlRZek56UUsiLCJlYXIudmVyaWZpZXItaWQiO\
nsiYnVpbGQiOiJ2dHMgMC4wLjEiLCJkZXZlbG9wZXIiOiJodHRwczovL3ZlcmFpc29uL\
XByb2plY3Qub3JnIn0sImVhdF9wcm9maWxlIjoidGFnOmdpdGh1Yi5jb20sMjAyMzp2Z\
XJhaXNvbi9lYXIiLCJpYXQiOjEuNjY2NTI5MTg0ZSswOSwianRpIjoiNTViOGIzZmFkO\
GRkMWQ4ZWFjNGU0OGYxMTdmZTUwOGIxMWY4NDRkOWYwMTg5YmZlZDliODc1MTVhNjc1N\
DI2NCIsIm5iZiI6MTY3NzI0Nzg3OSwic3VibW9kcyI6eyJQQVJTRUNfVFBNIjp7ImVhc\
i5hcHByYWlzYWwtcG9saWN5LWlkIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly92ZXJhaXNvbi5leGFtcGxlL3Bvb\
GljeS8xLzYwYTAwNjhkIiwiZWFyLnN0YXR1cyI6ImFmZmlybWluZyIsImVhci50cnVzd\
HdvcnRoaW5lc3MtdmVjdG9yIjp7ImV4ZWN1dGFibGVzIjoyLCJoYXJkd2FyZSI6Miwia\
W5zdGFuY2UtaWRlbnRpdHkiOjJ9LCJlYXIudmVyYWlzb24ua2V5LWF0dGVzdGF0aW9uI\
jp7ImFrcHViIjoiTUZrd0V3WUhLb1pJemowQ0FRWUlLb1pJemowREFRY0RRZ0FFY2pTc\
DhfTVdNM2d5OFR1Z1dPMVRwUVNqX3ZJa3NMcEMtZzhsNVMzbHBHYjdQV1dHb0NBakVQO\
F9BNTlWWndMWGd3b1p6TjBXeHVCUGpwYVdpV3NmQ1EifX19fQ.3Ym-f1LEgamxePUM7h\
6Y2RJDGh9eeL0xKor0n1wE9jdAnLNwm3rTKFV2S2LbqVFoDtK9QGalT2t5RnUdfwZNmg\
",
    "trusted_verifiers": {
        "keys": [
            {
                "alg": "ES256",
                "crv": "P-256",
                "kty": "EC",
                "x": "usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8",
                "y": "IBOL-C3BttVivg-lSreASjpkttcsz-1rb7btKLv8EX4"
            }
        ]
    }
}
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <t><cref>Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.</cref></t>
      <t>The list of currently open issues for this document can be found at
<eref target="https://github.com/thomas-fossati/draft-ear/issues"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Many thanks to
Dave Thaler,
Dhawal Kumar,
Ding Ma,
Greg Kostal,
Hannes Tschofenig,
Jerry Yu,
Mikko Ylinen,
Raghuram Yeluri,
Simon Frost,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum,
Yogesh Deshpande
for helpful comments and discussions that have shaped this document.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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