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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-sshm-sshsig-format-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="SSHSIG">Lightweight Secure Shell (SSH) Signature Format</title>

    <author fullname="Sebastian Kinne">
      <organization></organization>
      <address>
        <email>skinne@google.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Damien Miller">
      <organization>OpenSSH</organization>
      <address>
        <email>djm@mindrot.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Simon Josefsson" role="editor">
      <organization></organization>
      <address>
        <email>simon@josefsson.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>

    <area>IETF</area>
    <workgroup>Secure Shell Maintenance</workgroup>
    <keyword>SSH</keyword> <keyword>Secure Shell</keyword> <keyword>Signature</keyword> <keyword>secsh</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 44?>

<t>This document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format that is
compatible with SSH keys and wire formats.</t>



    </abstract>

    <note title="About This Document" removeInRFC="true">
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-sshsig-format/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        SSHM Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:ssh@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ssh/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ssh/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://gitlab.com/jas/ietf-sshsig-format"/>.</t>
    </note>


  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 49?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>Secure Shell (SSH) <xref target="RFC4251"></xref> is a secure remote-login protocol. It
provides for an extensible variety of public key algorithms for
identifying servers and users to one another.</t>

<t>The SSH key and signature formats have found uses outside of the
interactive online SSH protocol itself.  This document specifies the
signature formats.</t>

<t>At present, only detached and armored signatures are supported.</t>

<t>It is suggested that when referring to this signature format that the
term "SSHSIG" is used.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="conventions-used-in-this-document"><name>Conventions Used In This Document</name>

<t>The descriptions of key and signature formats use the notation
introduced in <xref target="RFC4251"></xref>.</t>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

</section>
<section anchor="armored-format"><name>Armored format</name>

<t>The Armored SSH signatures is ASCII-encoded <xref target="RFC20"></xref> and consists of a
header, a base64 encoded blob, and a footer.</t>

<t>The header is the string "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----" followed by a
newline. The footer is the string "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----"
immediately after a newline.</t>

<t>Newlines here is defined as ASCII LF.  Some text transfer mechanism
may use other line delimiters, however when Armored SSHSIG signatures
are stored in context which are input to cryptographic hashes or
otherwise subject to bit-by-bit comparisons, implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use
ASCII LF as the line delimiter to have one canonical representation.</t>

<t>The header <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present at the start of every signature.  Files
containing the signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> start with the header.  Likewise, the
footer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present at the end of every signature.</t>

<t>The base64 encoded blob <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be broken up by newlines every 76
characters.</t>

<t>Example:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgJKxoLBJBivUPNTUJUSslQTt2hD
jozKvHarKeN8uYFqgAAAADZm9vAAAAAAAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKNC4IEbt
Tq0Fb56xhtuE1/lK9H9RZJfON4o6hE9R4ZGFX98gy0+fFJ/1d2/RxnZky0Y7GojwrZkrHT
FgCqVWAQ==
-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="blob-format"><name>Blob format</name>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS>
#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
#define SIG_VERSION    0x01

byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE
 uint32 SIG_VERSION
 string publickey
 string namespace
 string reserved
 string hash_algorithm
 string signature
<CODE ENDS>
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The publickey field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the serialisation of the public key
used to make the signature using the usual SSH encoding rules, i.e
<xref target="RFC4253"></xref>, <xref target="RFC5656"></xref>, <xref target="RFC8709"></xref>, etc.</t>

<t>Verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject signatures with versions greater than those they
support.</t>

<t>The purpose of the namespace value is to specify a unambiguous
interpretation domain for the signature, e.g. file signing.  This
prevents cross-protocol attacks caused by signatures intended for one
intended domain being accepted in another.  The namespace value <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> be the empty string.</t>

<t>The reserved value is present to encode future information (e.g. tags)
into the signature. Implementations should ignore the reserved field
if it is not empty.</t>

<t>Data to be signed is first hashed with the specified hash_algorithm.
This is done to limit the amount of data presented to the signature
operation, which may be of concern if the signing key is held in
limited or slow hardware or on a remote ssh-agent. The supported hash
algorithms for this pupose are "sha256" and "sha512". (Signature
algorithms may use other hash algorithms internally.)</t>

<t>The signature itself is made using the SSH signature algorithm and
encoding rules for the chosen key type. For RSA signatures, the
signature algorithm must be "rsa-sha2-512" or "rsa-sha2-256" (i.e.
not the legacy RSA-SHA1 "ssh-rsa").</t>

<t>This blob is encoded as a string using the <xref target="RFC4253"></xref> encoding rules and
base64 encoded to form the middle part of the armored signature.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="signed-data-of-which-the-signature-goes-into-the-blob-above"><name>Signed Data, of which the signature goes into the blob above</name>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS>
#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"

byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE
 string namespace
 string reserved
 string hash_algorithm
 string H(message)
<CODE ENDS>
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The preamble is the six-byte sequence "SSHSIG". It is included to
ensure that manual signatures can never be confused with any message
signed during SSH user or host authentication.</t>

<t>The reserved value is present to encode future information (e.g. tags)
into the signature. Implementations should ignore the reserved field
if it is not empty.</t>

<t>The data is concatenated and passed to the SSH signing function.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>None</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>The security considerations of all referenced specifications are
inherited.</t>

<t>Cryptographic algorithms and parameters are usually broken or weakened
over time.  Implementers and users need to continously re-evaluate
that cryptographic algorithms continue to provide the expected level
of security.</t>

<t>Implementations has to follow best practices to avoid security
concerns, and users needs to continously re-evaulate implementations
for security vulnerabilities.</t>

<t>SSH supports several Public Key Algorithms and new algorithms may be
introduced in the future.  This document does not limit their use in
SSHSIG.  Any SSH Public Key Algorithm is automatically available in
SSHSIG.  Therefore, applications relying on SSHSIG have to decide
which algorithms and parameters are acceptable in their particular
use-case.  Things to consider include which algorithms to support
(e.g., disallow 'ssh-dss' and 'null' and/or only allow 'ssh-ed25519'),
key sizes (e.g., 'rsa-sha2-256' key sizes below 2048 bits), algorithm
properties (e.g., disallow 'ssh-rsa' due to SHA-1), cryptographic
features (e.g., malleability of the signature), performance
characteristics, code size, signature size, and so on.</t>

<t>This signature format embeds the public key, which is usually already
available for a verifier to perform the cryptographic verification
with and to make trust decisions.  When verifying a signature
cryptographically, it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to use the locally configured
public key rather than the public key provided in the signature.  A
bit-by-bit comparison of the public key could also be done.  The
public key within the signature should be treated as untrusted input,
but it may be used as an identifier to find the locally trusted public
key that can be used to verify the signature.</t>

<t>RSA public keys can be used with both SHA2-256 ('rsa-sha2-256') and
SHA2-512 ('rsa-sha2-512').  Implementations <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> let library
defaults chose the variant to use but instead instruct the library
specifically which algorithm to use.  This is a generic concern, but
historically has only been relevant for RSA.</t>

<t>Some implementation do not explicitly require or validate that the
namespace is not empty.  We RECOMMEND that implementations reject
those signatures as invalid.  Comparing the namespace value before
performing the signature verification <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be done to provide a better
error condition rather than a generic signature verification failure.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

<t>The text in this document is from <spanx style="verb">PROTOCOL.sshsig</spanx> in OpenSSH which
appears to have been contributed to by at least Sebastian Kinne,
Damien Miller, Markus Friedl, HARUYAMA Seigo, and Pedro Martelletto.
Further improvements to this document are due to Paul Tagliamonte,
Hidde Beydals, Castedo Ellerman, Ron Frederick, and Benjamin Pannell.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="implementation-status"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<t>This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in <xref target="RFC7942"></xref>.  The
description of implementations in this section is intended to assist
the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs.
Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here
does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort has
been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied
by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not be
construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.</t>

<t>According to <xref target="RFC7942"></xref>, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.  It
is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they
see fit</t>

<t>The following example projects maintain an implementation of this
protocol:</t>

<t><strong>OpenSSH</strong>: C implementation.</t>

<t>Website: https://www.openssh.com/</t>

<t><strong>SSHSIGLIB</strong>: Python implementation by Castedo Ellerman.</t>

<t>Website: https://gitlab.com/perm.pub/sshsiglib</t>

<t><strong>SSHSIGN-GO</strong>: Go implementation by Benjamin Pannell at SierraSoftworks.</t>

<t>Website: https://github.com/SierraSoftworks/sshsign-go</t>

<t><strong>SSHSIG</strong>: Go implementation by Hidde Beydals.</t>

<t>Website: https://github.com/hiddeco/sshsig</t>

<t><strong>GO-SSHSIG</strong>: Go implementation by Paul Tagliamonte.</t>

<t>Website: https://github.com/paultag/go-sshsig</t>

<t><strong>REKOR-PKI-SSH</strong>: Go implementation by Sigstore/Rekor.</t>

<t>Website: https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/tree/v1.0.1/pkg/pki/ssh</t>

<t><strong>AsyncSSH</strong>: Python implementation by Ron Frederick.</t>

<t>Website: https://asyncssh.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api.html#sshsig-support</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC20">
  <front>
    <title>ASCII format for network interchange</title>
    <author fullname="V.G. Cerf" initials="V.G." surname="Cerf"/>
    <date month="October" year="1969"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="80"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="20"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC20"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4251">
  <front>
    <title>The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture</title>
    <author fullname="T. Ylonen" initials="T." surname="Ylonen"/>
    <author fullname="C. Lonvick" initials="C." role="editor" surname="Lonvick"/>
    <date month="January" year="2006"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network. This document describes the architecture of the SSH protocol, as well as the notation and terminology used in SSH protocol documents. It also discusses the SSH algorithm naming system that allows local extensions. The SSH protocol consists of three major components: The Transport Layer Protocol provides server authentication, confidentiality, and integrity with perfect forward secrecy. The User Authentication Protocol authenticates the client to the server. The Connection Protocol multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels. Details of these protocols are described in separate documents. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4251"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4251"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4253">
  <front>
    <title>The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol</title>
    <author fullname="T. Ylonen" initials="T." surname="Ylonen"/>
    <author fullname="C. Lonvick" initials="C." role="editor" surname="Lonvick"/>
    <date month="January" year="2006"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network.</t>
      <t>This document describes the SSH transport layer protocol, which typically runs on top of TCP/IP. The protocol can be used as a basis for a number of secure network services. It provides strong encryption, server authentication, and integrity protection. It may also provide compression.</t>
      <t>Key exchange method, public key algorithm, symmetric encryption algorithm, message authentication algorithm, and hash algorithm are all negotiated.</t>
      <t>This document also describes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method and the minimal set of algorithms that are needed to implement the SSH transport layer protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4253"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4253"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5656">
  <front>
    <title>Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer</title>
    <author fullname="D. Stebila" initials="D." surname="Stebila"/>
    <author fullname="J. Green" initials="J." surname="Green"/>
    <date month="December" year="2009"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for use within the Secure Shell (SSH) transport protocol. In particular, it specifies Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key agreement, and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for use in the SSH Transport Layer protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5656"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5656"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8709">
  <front>
    <title>Ed25519 and Ed448 Public Key Algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol</title>
    <author fullname="B. Harris" initials="B." surname="Harris"/>
    <author fullname="L. Velvindron" initials="L." surname="Velvindron"/>
    <date month="February" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes the use of the Ed25519 and Ed448 digital signature algorithms in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. Accordingly, this RFC updates RFC 4253.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8709"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8709"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>



    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC7942">
  <front>
    <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
    <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <date month="July" year="2016"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
      <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
</reference>



    </references>



  </back>

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