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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-09" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="WIMSE Workload-to-Workload HTTP-Sig">WIMSE Workload-to-Workload Authentication with HTTP Signatures</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-09"/>
    <author fullname="Joe Salowey">
      <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
      <address>
        <email>joe@salowey.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <email>yaronf.ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="20"/>
    <area>Applications and Real-Time</area>
    <workgroup>Workload Identity in Multi System Environments</workgroup>
    <keyword>workload</keyword>
    <keyword>identity</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 40?>

<t>The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for software workloads
in a variety of runtime environments, from the most basic ones to complex
multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-tenant deployments.
This document defines one of the mechanisms to provide workload authentication,
using HTTP Signatures. While only applicable to HTTP traffic, the protocol provides end-to-end
protection of requests (and optionally, responses), even when service traffic is not end-to-end
encrypted, that is, when TLS proxies and load balancers are used.
Authentication is based on the Workload Identity Token (WIT).</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://ietf-wg-wimse.github.io/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Workload Identity in Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:wimse@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 51?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>This document defines authentication and authorization between two HTTP-based workloads.
This is the core component of the WIMSE architecture <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-arch"/>.
The workload-to-workload call consists of a single HTTP request and its response.</t>
      <t>One option to protect such traffic is through Mutual TLS (mTLS), and this usage is defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls"/>.
Many deployments prefer application-layer approaches, whether for lack of Certification Authority (CA) infrastructure or because
inter-service communication crosses multiple TLS hops that each authenticate only one segment of the path.
An HTTP message signature with a Workload Identity Token authenticates the caller end to end across those hops.
This document defines one such WIMSE approach for application-layer protection.</t>
      <t>We define a profile of the HTTP Signatures protocol <xref target="RFC9421"/> to protect the service traffic.
Service authentication uses the Workload Identity Token (WIT) defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/>,
and the signature uses the private key associated with the WIT and thus proves possession of that key.</t>
      <t>WIMSE is specifying two approaches for application-layer protection, both using the newly introduced
Workload Identity Token <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/>. The first alternative <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt"/> is inspired by the OAuth DPoP specification <xref target="RFC9449"/>.
The second is based on the HTTP Message Signatures RFC <xref target="RFC9421"/>, and it is defined in this document.
<xref target="app-layer-comparison"/> includes a comparison of the two approaches.</t>
      <section anchor="deployment-architecture-and-message-flow">
        <name>Deployment Architecture and Message Flow</name>
        <t>Refer to <xref section="1.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/> for the deployment architecture which is common to both application-level approaches, as well as the transport-level one.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>All terminology in this document follows <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-arch"/>.</t>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="http-sig-auth">
      <name>The Protocol: Authentication Based on HTTP Message Signatures</name>
      <t>This protocol uses the Workload Identity Token <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/> and the private key associated with its public key,
to sign the HTTP request and optionally, the response.
Formally, this is a profile of the Message Signatures specification <xref target="RFC9421"/>.</t>
      <t>The request is signed as per <xref target="RFC9421"/>. The following derived components <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be signed:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>@method</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>@path</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>@query</tt></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This profile covers <tt>@path</tt> and <tt>@query</tt> separately rather than <tt>@request-target</tt>,
following <xref section="2.2.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/>.
<tt>@query</tt> is included even when the request has no query component; in that case its value is <tt>?</tt> (<xref section="2.2.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/>).
The <tt>@authority</tt> derived component is not included: TLS-terminating proxies and load balancers commonly rewrite the authority (see <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-arch"/> and <xref target="middleboxes"/>), so signing it would break those deployments. Recipient binding is carried instead by the mandatory <tt>wimse-aud</tt> signature parameter (<xref target="wimse-aud-param"/>).</t>
      <t>Exception for CONNECT (<xref section="9.3.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9110"/>): the request target is in authority-form (<tt>host:port</tt>), so <tt>@path</tt> and <tt>@query</tt> are not meaningful.
For a CONNECT request, senders <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cover <tt>@method</tt> and <tt>@authority</tt> instead of <tt>@path</tt> and <tt>@query</tt>, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> cover <tt>@path</tt> or <tt>@query</tt>.
The <tt>@authority</tt> value follows <xref section="2.2.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/> (hostname lowercased; default port omitted) and can therefore differ from the CONNECT request target, which always includes the port.
This exception is specific to CONNECT; this profile otherwise continues to omit <tt>@authority</tt>.</t>
      <t>In addition, the following request headers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be signed when they exist:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>Content-Type</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>Content-Digest</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>Authorization</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>Txn-Token</tt> <xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>Workload-Identity-Token</tt></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>If the response is signed, the following components <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be signed:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>@status</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>@method;req</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>@path;req</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>@query;req</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>Content-Type</tt> if it exists</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>Content-Digest</tt> if it exists</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>Workload-Identity-Token</tt></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>When the signed response corresponds to a CONNECT request, senders <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cover <tt>@method;req</tt> and <tt>@authority;req</tt> instead of <tt>@path;req</tt> and <tt>@query;req</tt>, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> cover <tt>@path;req</tt> or <tt>@query;req</tt>.</t>
      <t>To protect the integrity of the message body, if the request or response includes a body, the sender <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include
(and the receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify) a <tt>Content-Digest</tt> header as defined in <xref target="RFC9530"/>.
This implies the receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compute the <tt>Content-Digest</tt> value for the message content received
and compare it with the <tt>Content-Digest</tt> value provided in the message.</t>
      <t>For both requests and responses, the following signature parameters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be included:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>created</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>expires</tt> - expiration <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be short, e.g. on the order of minutes. This profile is for individual request/response exchanges; mechanisms for long-lived batch-style workloads are out of scope.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>nonce</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>tag</tt> - the value for implementations of this specification is <tt>wimse-workload-to-workload</tt></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>For requests only, the following signature parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also be included:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>wimse-aud</tt> (<xref target="wimse-aud-param"/>)</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>For requests only, the following signature parameter <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also be included:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> (<xref target="wimse-sign-response-param"/>)</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>For responses only, the following signature parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also be included:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> (<xref target="wimse-req-nonce-param"/>)</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The following signature parameters in the <tt>Signature-Input</tt> header <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>keyid</tt> - The signing key is sent along with the message in the WIT. Additionally specifying the key identity would add confusion.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>alg</tt> - The signature algorithm is specified in the <tt>jwk</tt> section of the <tt>cnf</tt> claim in the WIT. See <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/> and Sec. 3.3.7 of <xref target="RFC9421"/> for details.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to include only one signature with the HTTP message.
The WIMSE signature is the one whose <tt>tag</tt> parameter is <tt>wimse-workload-to-workload</tt> (<xref section="7.2.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/>). If no signature has that <tt>tag</tt> value, the message does not carry a WIMSE HTTP signature. If more than one signature has that <tt>tag</tt> value, the recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the message. When more than one signature is present, recipients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use that <tt>tag</tt> to find the WIMSE signature; they <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> choose by label (<xref section="7.2.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/>).</t>
      <t>Senders <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate each <tt>nonce</tt> at random, with negligible collision probability among nonces a recipient might observe within the lifetime of a signature.
The sender <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use a cryptographically secure random number generator, and the nonce <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain at least 64 bits of entropy; 96 bits or more is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>.
Members of a sender cluster therefore need not coordinate nonce generation.
On a request, the client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use a server-generated <tt>nonce</tt> from <tt>Accept-Signature</tt> (<xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/>) instead of generating one, when that value meets these requirements.</t>
      <t>Recipients <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> maintain a replay cache and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reject a message (request or response) whose <tt>nonce</tt> they have already seen. What nonces are remembered, and for how long, is a local policy matter; this document does not require replay caches to be shared across validators. Without such sharing, replay to a different cluster member can still succeed.</t>
      <t>For clarity: the signature's lifetime (the <tt>expires</tt> signature parameter) is different and typically much shorter than the WIT's lifetime, denoted by its <tt>exp</tt> claim.
Recipients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject signatures that fall outside their validity time window.</t>
      <t>Implementers need to be aware that the WIT is extracted from the message before the message signature is validated. Recipients of signed HTTP messages <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate the WIT as specified in <xref section="5.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/> before validating the HTTP message signature. They <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ensure that the message is not processed further before it has been fully validated.</t>
      <t>The WIT and the HTTP message signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sent over a server-authenticated TLS connection
unless another channel provides confidentiality and server authentication comparable to TLS.
When TLS is used, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform hostname validation according to <xref section="6.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9525"/>,
and TLS deployments <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> follow the recommendations in <xref target="BCP195"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="sig-algs">
        <name>Signature Algorithms</name>
        <t>The HTTP message signature algorithm is determined by the <tt>alg</tt> member of the <tt>cnf.jwk</tt> object in the WIT
("The Workload Identity Token" in <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/>).
This profile does not define a separate algorithm baseline; general-purpose implementations follow the
algorithm requirements in that document, including support for <tt>ES256</tt>.
The <tt>alg</tt> signature parameter <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used, as specified above.</t>
        <t>Recipients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the HTTP message signature using the algorithm identified by <tt>cnf.jwk.alg</tt>
and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the message if that algorithm is not acceptable under local policy for the peer's trust domain.
See also <xref section="7.3.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/> on key and algorithm specification downgrades.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="wimse-aud-param">
        <name>The <tt>wimse-aud</tt> Signature Parameter</name>
        <t><xref target="RFC9421"/> defines signature parameters for HTTP message signatures: metadata carried in the <tt>Signature-Input</tt> field
alongside the covered components. That metadata is covered by the signature as the <tt>@signature-params</tt> component value
(Section 2.3 of <xref target="RFC9421"/>), which is always the last line of the signature base.</t>
        <t>The <tt>wimse-aud</tt> signature metadata parameter is a String parameter for requests.
Using a signature parameter carries the audience explicitly in <tt>Signature-Input</tt>, so the value is protected by the signature and is not affected by hop-by-hop rewriting of the request URI.</t>
        <t>The sender <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set <tt>wimse-aud</tt> to an audience value that identifies the intended recipient of the request.
By default, the sender uses the HTTP target URI (<xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9110"/>) of the request, without query or fragment components, as known to the sender.
When intermediaries rewrite the request URI, or when that string would not match what the recipient expects, the sender uses a deployment-specific audience value that the recipient can recognize.
The audience identifies the intended recipient of the proof; it is distinct from the sender's Workload Identifier in the WIT <tt>sub</tt> claim.</t>
        <t>The recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that <tt>wimse-aud</tt> matches one of the audience values in its trusted configuration using the Simple String Comparison method of <xref section="6.2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3986"/>.
Strings that differ only by URI normalization (for example, a trailing slash or an explicit default port) do not match under that method; if such variants are acceptable, each should be included in the configuration.
The recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> derive an acceptable audience from untrusted request fields such as <tt>Host</tt>.
A sender that relies on the default target-URI value is responsible for producing a string that matches one of the recipient's configured values under that comparison.
See "Workload Identifiers and Authentication Granularity" in <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="wimse-sign-response-param">
        <name>The <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> Signature Parameter</name>
        <t>The <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> signature metadata parameter is a Boolean parameter for requests.
When present with the value true, the client requires a signed HTTP response:
the server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> sign the response as specified in <xref target="signing-the-response"/>,
or return an error if it cannot (<xref target="error-conditions"/>).
When the parameter is omitted, or present with the value false, the client does not require a signed response via this parameter.</t>
        <t>If the client is configured to require a signed response, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> with the Boolean value true in the request's <tt>Signature-Input</tt>.</t>
        <t>This parameter is not mandatory. Moreover, the server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> sign the response even if this parameter is missing from the request or is present with the value false.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="wimse-req-nonce-param">
        <name>The <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> Signature Parameter</name>
        <t>The <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> signature metadata parameter is a String parameter for signed responses.
This parameter binds requests to responses and prevents a malicious
server-side component or middlebox from replaying responses to the wrong client.</t>
        <t>Every signed response <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt>. The server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set it to the value of the <tt>nonce</tt> signature parameter from the <tt>Signature-Input</tt> of the request that triggered the response.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="signing-the-response">
        <name>Signing the Response</name>
        <t>Protecting the response by signing it with the server's WIT is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> but not required. In particular, if the response
may be exceptionally large or is expected to be streamed, signing it may not be practical.</t>
        <t>Response signing is required of the server for a given exchange when either of the following is true:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The request's <tt>Signature-Input</tt> includes <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> with the Boolean value true (<xref target="wimse-sign-response-param"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Local policy at the server requires response signing for that exchange.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>If the server is required to sign the response but cannot produce a signed response (for example, because the response is streamed or
exceptionally large), it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> return a successful unsigned response; it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return an error
as described in <xref target="error-conditions"/>.</t>
        <t>The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject an unsigned response when the request's <tt>Signature-Input</tt> included <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> with the Boolean value true.</t>
        <t>If the client did not require a signed response via <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt>, server-side local-policy signing is opportunistic from the client's point of view: the client has no signal that a signature was expected, so a middlebox that strips a signed response leaves an ordinary unsigned response that the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept. The server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> still sign in that case. Whenever a signed response is present, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate it and reject it if validation fails.</t>
        <t>When validating a signed response, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> is present and equals the <tt>nonce</tt> from the corresponding request.</t>
        <t>As described in <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/>, either client or server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> send an
<tt>Accept-Signature</tt> header.
That header indicates a preference for signed messages; it does not mandate that a response be signed.
Only <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> with the Boolean value true creates such a mandate (<xref target="wimse-sign-response-param"/>, <xref target="signing-the-response"/>).
When both are present, the server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> as authoritative for whether a signed response is required.
When a client sends <tt>Accept-Signature</tt> in a request, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> list the
response components it wishes to have signed, including at least those specified above for signed
responses.
When a server sends <tt>Accept-Signature</tt> in a response, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
list the request components it wishes to have signed in subsequent requests, minimally those
specified above for signed requests.
<tt>Accept-Signature</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used to request coverage weaker than this profile.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="error-conditions">
        <name>Error Conditions</name>
        <t>Errors may occur during the processing of the message signature.
This profile specifies the following HTTP status codes for API use.
The party generating the error <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include a problem details body (<xref target="RFC9457"/>)
with the corresponding registered problem type (<xref target="iana-problem-types"/>),
unless it knows that the peer does not accept problem details responses.</t>
        <t>If authentication of a signed request fails — including WIT validation
(<xref section="5.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/>) or verification of the HTTP message signature —
for any reason such as an invalid signature, an expired validity time window, or a malformed data structure,
the server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return 400 (Bad Request).
The problem type for this error is
<tt>https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types#wimse-signature-invalid</tt>
(<xref target="iana-problem-signature-invalid"/>).
The server <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> distinguish in the response which check failed,
so as not to reveal whether the WIT or the HTTP message signature was unacceptable.
The use of HTTP status code 401 is <bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14> for this purpose because it requires a WWW-Authenticate with acceptable HTTP auth mechanisms in
the error response and an associated Authorization header in the subsequent request. The use of these headers for the WIT is not compatible
with this specification.</t>
        <t>If response signing is required (<xref target="signing-the-response"/>) and the server cannot sign the response,
the server <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> return a successful unsigned response.
If the server does not support response signing, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return 501 (Not Implemented);
the problem type for this error is
<tt>https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types#wimse-signed-response-unsupported</tt>
(<xref target="iana-problem-signed-response-unsupported"/>).
If the server supports response signing but cannot sign this particular response
(for example, because the response is streamed or exceptionally large),
it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return 400 (Bad Request);
the problem type for this error is
<tt>https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types#wimse-signed-response-unavailable</tt>
(<xref target="iana-problem-signed-response-unavailable"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="example-requests-and-responses">
        <name>Example Requests and Responses</name>
        <t>The following non-normative examples illustrate this profile with two algorithms:
<tt>Ed25519</tt> (<xref target="RFC9864"/>) for svcA/svcB, and <tt>ES256</tt> for svcC.</t>
        <t>The first exchange is svcA calling svcB; the second is svcB calling svcC.
The <tt>nonce</tt> values in these examples are illustrative and do not meet the entropy requirement in <xref target="http-sig-auth"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="ed25519-svca-calling-svcb">
          <name>Ed25519: svcA calling svcB</name>
          <t>Following is a signed request and a signed response using <tt>Ed25519</tt>.</t>
          <t>The caller (svcA) uses this keypair:</t>
          <figure>
            <name>svcA Private Key (Ed25519)</name>
            <sourcecode type="jwk"><![CDATA[
{
  "alg": "Ed25519",
  "crv": "Ed25519",
  "d": "fNVx2xkvU-jbsowg3cHMGLPzODvkM8Rd1UClQxv_VP0",
  "kid": "svc-a-key",
  "kty": "OKP",
  "x": "QDYLWc32T8hljQoolDi0ukqXtvNB1h-qNbpfuwZkZDg"
}
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
          <t>The caller uses its keypair and generates the following HTTP request:</t>
          <figure>
            <name>Signed Request (svcA to svcB)</name>
            <sourcecode type="http"><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

GET /gimme-ice-cream?flavor=vanilla HTTP/1.1
Host: svcb.example.com
Signature: sig1=:wfnk8T0ysp3a6bvqZAoeBoa2dFgRHooSel8jIAbKnbIP13cpy/O\
1J6xAYkziiUnVQ+NlMoR+ANDBHRwoB7ZIAA==:
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identity\
-token");created=1789405135;expires=1789405435;nonce="abcd1111";tag=\
"wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-aud="https://svcb.example.com/gim\
me-ice-cream";wimse-sign-response
Workload-Identity-Token: eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoiaXNzdWVyLWt\
leSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTki\
LCJjcnYiOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoic3ZjLWEta2V5Iiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwieCI6\
IlFEWUxXYzMyVDhobGpRb29sRGkwdWtxWHR2TkIxaC1xTmJwZnV3WmtaRGcifX0sImV4\
cCI6MTc4OTQwNTQzNSwiaWF0IjoxNzg5NDA1MTM1LCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1w\
bGUuY29tL2lzc3VlciIsImp0aSI6IndpdC0xNzg5NDA1MTM1OTUxMjQ5OTY1Iiwic3Vi\
Ijoid2ltc2U6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zdmNBIn0.XDaCtnf42Z4bYKqQxTkMGJ-Gtcg5\
iG7Z0QdBxj4J_d8Q4PVcoFwxfaeKnJD_iuTF8Nt_0eyZOiGYgngCk2omAg

]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
          <t>Assuming that the workload being called (svcB) has the following keypair:</t>
          <figure>
            <name>svcB Private Key (Ed25519)</name>
            <sourcecode type="jwk"><![CDATA[
{
  "alg": "Ed25519",
  "crv": "Ed25519",
  "d": "uJf73cksN9k54kJtgrc0nBc3_WzkcJovRXWjEIYyESE",
  "kid": "svc-b-key",
  "kty": "OKP",
  "x": "WUZzabuwlwS9xlhndvLRMWQdkyjdOqVySiwqqd6brLM"
}
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
          <t>A signed response would be:</t>
          <figure>
            <name>Signed Response (svcB to svcA)</name>
            <sourcecode type="http"><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Length: 20
Content-Digest: sha-256=:uJC3qmCc7n6/6w4N2I0vAfj1cd/hTOAhxLEYXmPbNno\
=:
Content-Type: text/plain
Signature: sig1=:CUsdmPCDf6I587umdsSTKJvC00fMkj48Z7g1sWzYWAzhB2OZgZa\
ujchkP1Xw2dsJlTngAIbhyIq07diOYnHIBQ==:
Signature-Input: sig1=("@status" "workload-identity-token" "content-\
type" "content-digest" "@method";req "@path";req "@query";req);creat\
ed=1789405135;expires=1789405437;nonce="abcd2222";tag="wimse-workloa\
d-to-workload";wimse-req-nonce="abcd1111"
Workload-Identity-Token: eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoiaXNzdWVyLWt\
leSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTki\
LCJjcnYiOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoic3ZjLWIta2V5Iiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwieCI6\
IldVWnphYnV3bHdTOXhsaG5kdkxSTVdRZGt5amRPcVZ5U2l3cXFkNmJyTE0ifX0sImV4\
cCI6MTc4OTQwNTQzNywiaWF0IjoxNzg5NDA1MTM3LCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1w\
bGUuY29tL2lzc3VlciIsImp0aSI6IndpdC0xNzg5NDA1MTM1OTUxNTEzODY2Iiwic3Vi\
Ijoid2ltc2U6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zdmNCIn0.T9hsSJX6aaMAbF5lnB47vHXj4k_c\
gOVRQtENfrdj0_Ut9vv5eEnGXcR_vqyfcm8mi-tQyg57sEvfFuoseRoCBA

No ice cream today.
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
        </section>
        <section anchor="es256-svcb-calling-svcc">
          <name>ES256: svcB calling svcC</name>
          <t>The following exchange uses <tt>ES256</tt> at the callee (svcC).
The caller is svcB, using the <tt>Ed25519</tt> keypair above.</t>
          <t>The callee (svcC) uses this keypair:</t>
          <figure>
            <name>svcC Private Key (ES256)</name>
            <sourcecode type="jwk"><![CDATA[
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "d": "RuJQPzrHlQrRllszMFQQw3e8bSdArcYeXjhnXRXclHs",
  "kid": "svc-c-key",
  "kty": "EC",
  "x": "dquxM0LHBbWlYCDxcNRHe9kb41lrnL0h_9ntNXKxzxw",
  "y": "HPqRls-EZoPrHY9gNRcZGq5pkypeovfnzLSfsYP2L6o"
}
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
          <t>A signed request from svcB to svcC:</t>
          <figure>
            <name>Signed Request (svcB to svcC)</name>
            <sourcecode type="http"><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

POST /inventory/cones HTTP/1.1
Host: svcc.example.com
Content-Digest: sha-256=:TzKXT0tUEfiTFkjRzwE8nCFnQljMuX5xwJaJgJCp+1g\
=:
Content-Length: 31
Content-Type: application/json
Signature: sig1=:EzNtEBAW99awIJtUjPxMqtHXYh0Y6MpOwzeMePSMCx6oqU2gh68\
0rk5+B1zFD8Xv7TRRffiM6nCOd58u4bvGDg==:
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identity\
-token" "content-type" "content-digest");created=1789405135;expires=\
1789405437;nonce="abcd3333";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-a\
ud="https://svcc.example.com/inventory/cones";wimse-sign-response
Workload-Identity-Token: eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoiaXNzdWVyLWt\
leSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTki\
LCJjcnYiOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoic3ZjLWIta2V5Iiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwieCI6\
IldVWnphYnV3bHdTOXhsaG5kdkxSTVdRZGt5amRPcVZ5U2l3cXFkNmJyTE0ifX0sImV4\
cCI6MTc4OTQwNTQzNywiaWF0IjoxNzg5NDA1MTM3LCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1w\
bGUuY29tL2lzc3VlciIsImp0aSI6IndpdC0xNzg5NDA1MTM1OTUxNTEzODY2Iiwic3Vi\
Ijoid2ltc2U6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zdmNCIn0.T9hsSJX6aaMAbF5lnB47vHXj4k_c\
gOVRQtENfrdj0_Ut9vv5eEnGXcR_vqyfcm8mi-tQyg57sEvfFuoseRoCBA

{"flavor":"vanilla","amount":1}
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
          <t>A signed response from svcC:</t>
          <figure>
            <name>Signed Response (svcC to svcB)</name>
            <sourcecode type="http"><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

HTTP/1.1 409 Conflict
Content-Length: 43
Content-Digest: sha-256=:xKyvC1Ob10QItKe0NdnKhtZ/6R7/JkpTxdH20RccxFY\
=:
Content-Type: application/json
Signature: sig1=:opZnqGnxaozdrf8ecfV+pAQ2wH2aIOtM5+dS6NI/MozKaVF3OUf\
xFyAC34i2+KbMNZHYlTzJzCPqXRucMbgFlA==:
Signature-Input: sig1=("@status" "workload-identity-token" "content-\
type" "content-digest" "@method";req "@path";req "@query";req);creat\
ed=1789405135;expires=1789405439;nonce="abcd4444";tag="wimse-workloa\
d-to-workload";wimse-req-nonce="abcd3333"
Workload-Identity-Token: eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoiaXNzdWVyLWt\
leSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2Iiwi\
Y3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJraWQiOiJzdmMtYy1rZXkiLCJrdHkiOiJFQyIsIngiOiJkcXV4\
TTBMSEJiV2xZQ0R4Y05SSGU5a2I0MWxybkwwaF85bnROWEt4enh3IiwieSI6IkhQcVJs\
cy1FWm9QckhZOWdOUmNaR3E1cGt5cGVvdmZuekxTZnNZUDJMNm8ifX0sImV4cCI6MTc4\
OTQwNTQzOSwiaWF0IjoxNzg5NDA1MTM5LCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29t\
L2lzc3VlciIsImp0aSI6IndpdC0xNzg5NDA1MTM1OTUxNTcwODY2Iiwic3ViIjoid2lt\
c2U6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zdmNDIn0.kaMHAoW7nZ5NrkwOzHE1zGEm-S9Dk5rWICPj\
KQenhHuwksZqhW2EO1MV0vh_dcBQzvnMS710Do9KEZkcg4QyDQ

{"error":"out_of_stock","flavor":"vanilla"}
]]></sourcecode>
          </figure>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t><cref>Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section, as well as the reference to RFC 7942, before publication.</cref></t>
      <t>This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in <xref target="RFC7942"/>. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.</t>
      <t>According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.  It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".</t>
      <section anchor="cofide">
        <name>Cofide</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Organization: Cofide</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Implementation: <eref target="https://github.com/cofide/wimse-s2s-httpsig-poc">https://github.com/cofide/wimse-s2s-httpsig-poc</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Maturity:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>WIT + HTTP Message Signatures: proof-of-concept</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Coverage: WIT, HTTP Message Signatures</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>License: Apache 2.0</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Contact: jason@cofide.io</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Last updated: 13-Nov-2025</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="wimsey">
        <name>wimsey</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Organization: independent</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Implementation: <eref target="https://github.com/kanywst/wimsey">https://github.com/kanywst/wimsey</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Maturity:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>WIT + HTTP Message Signatures: alpha</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Coverage: WIT, HTTP Message Signatures, signed responses as per version -08 of the draft</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>License: Apache 2.0</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Contact: <eref target="https://github.com/kanywst">kanywst on GitHub</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Last updated: 22-Oct-2026</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This section includes security considerations that are specific to the HTTP Signature protocol defined here. Refer to
<xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/> for more generic security considerations associated with the workload identity
and its WIT representation.</t>
      <section anchor="workload-identity-token-and-proof-of-possession">
        <name>Workload Identity Token and Proof of Possession</name>
        <t>The Workload Identity Token (WIT) is bound to a secret cryptographic key and is
always presented with a proof of possession (PoP) as described in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/>. The WIT is a general purpose token that can be presented
in multiple contexts. The WIT and its PoP are only used in the
application-layer options, and neither is used in mTLS. As specified in that document,
the WIT is not used as a bearer token. While this helps reduce the sensitivity of the token it
is still possible that a token and its PoP may be captured and
replayed within the PoP's lifetime.</t>
        <t>The HTTP Signature profile presented here binds the PoP to the critical parts of the HTTP request (and potentially
response), including the request method, path, query, the intended audience (<tt>wimse-aud</tt>), and the message content.
The audience is a signed signature parameter rather than a re-derived URI component, so it survives intermediaries that rewrite the authority.
This profile does not cover <tt>@authority</tt> for that reason (<xref target="http-sig-auth"/>).
This eliminates most of the risk associated with active attackers on a middlebox.</t>
        <t>In addition, the following mitigations apply:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Preventing Eavesdropping and Interception with TLS</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>An attacker observing or intercepting the communication channel can view the token and its PoP and attempt to replay it to gain an advantage.
Sending the token and PoP on a server-authenticated TLS connection (<xref target="http-sig-auth"/>), with hostname validation,
mitigates passive capture on the path. TLS-terminating intermediaries still see the cleartext WIT and signature; see <xref target="middleboxes"/>.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Limiting Signature Lifespan</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A short <tt>expires</tt> value (<xref target="http-sig-auth"/>) limits the window during which a captured signature can be replayed.
Rejecting signatures outside their validity time is required by that section.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Replay Protection</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The <tt>nonce</tt> signature parameter and optional replay caching (<xref target="http-sig-auth"/>) provide basic replay detection.
Depending upon the design of the system it may be difficult to synchronize the replay cache across all message validators.
If an attacker can somehow influence the identity of the validator (e.g. which cluster member receives the message) then
replay protection would not be effective.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="middleboxes">
        <name>Middle Boxes</name>
        <t>In some deployments the Workload Identity Token and PoP
(signature) may pass through multiple systems. The communication between the
systems is over TLS, but the WIT and signature are available in the clear at each
intermediary. While the intermediary cannot modify the token or the
information within the signature without detection, it can attempt to capture and replay the message or modify
unsigned information, such as any HTTP headers that remain unsigned.</t>
        <t>HTTP permits intermediaries to transform messages (<xref target="RFC9421"/>).
This profile is intended to remain verifiable across common TLS-terminating proxies and load balancers:
it does not cover <tt>@authority</tt>, and it carries recipient binding in <tt>wimse-aud</tt> (<xref target="http-sig-auth"/>).
An intermediary can add its own HTTP message signature to a message that already carries a WIMSE signature.
Recipients continue to identify the WIMSE signature by its <tt>tag</tt> value <tt>wimse-workload-to-workload</tt>
and do not select by label (<xref target="http-sig-auth"/>).</t>
        <t>If an intermediary changes a component covered by the WIMSE signature, verification of that signature fails.
This document does not define a profile for stripping the origin WIMSE signature and replacing it with a new
WIMSE signature at the intermediary.
Such resigning would authenticate the intermediary rather than the origin workload and is left to
deployment-specific policy outside this specification.</t>
        <t>Mitigations listed in the protocol provide a reasonable level of security in these situations, in particular
if responses are signed in addition to requests.
See also <xref target="signing-the-response"/> for the distinction between client-mandated and opportunistic response signing.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>Privacy considerations for the Workload Identity Token and its proof of possession are discussed in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/>. This profile does not introduce additional privacy concerns beyond those.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="http-signature-metadata-parameters-registration">
        <name>HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters" registry <xref target="IANA.HTTP.MESSAGE.SIGNATURE"/>, per the registration template in Section 6.3.1 of <xref target="RFC9421"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>wimse-aud</tt>, per <xref target="iana-wimse-aud-param"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>wimse-sign-response</tt>, per <xref target="iana-wimse-sign-response-param"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt>, per <xref target="iana-wimse-req-nonce-param"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <section anchor="iana-wimse-aud-param">
          <name><tt>wimse-aud</tt></name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Name: <tt>wimse-aud</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Description: String; the WIMSE message audience. Request signatures only; binds the HTTP message signature to the intended recipient.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: RFC XXX, <xref target="wimse-aud-param"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="iana-wimse-sign-response-param">
          <name><tt>wimse-sign-response</tt></name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Name: <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Description: Boolean; when true on a request signature, the client requires the server to sign the corresponding HTTP response.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: RFC XXX, <xref target="wimse-sign-response-param"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="iana-wimse-req-nonce-param">
          <name><tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt></name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Name: <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Description: String; on response signatures, the <tt>nonce</tt> value from the triggering request's <tt>Signature-Input</tt>; binds the response to that request.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: RFC XXX, <xref target="wimse-req-nonce-param"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="iana-problem-types">
        <name>HTTP Problem Types Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "HTTP Problem Types" registry
of <xref target="RFC9457"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="iana-problem-signature-invalid">
          <name><tt>wimse-signature-invalid</tt></name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Type URI: <tt>https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types#wimse-signature-invalid</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Title: WIMSE HTTP Signature Invalid</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Recommended HTTP status code: 400</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: RFC XXX, <xref target="error-conditions"/></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="iana-problem-signed-response-unsupported">
          <name><tt>wimse-signed-response-unsupported</tt></name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Type URI: <tt>https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types#wimse-signed-response-unsupported</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Title: WIMSE Signed Response Unsupported</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Recommended HTTP status code: 501</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: RFC XXX, <xref target="error-conditions"/></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="iana-problem-signed-response-unavailable">
          <name><tt>wimse-signed-response-unavailable</tt></name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Type URI: <tt>https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types#wimse-signed-response-unavailable</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Title: WIMSE Signed Response Unavailable</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Recommended HTTP status code: 400</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: RFC XXX, <xref target="error-conditions"/></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9421">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Sporny" initials="M." surname="Sporny"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over components of an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer and where the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before reaching the verifier. This document also describes a means for requesting that a signature be applied to a subsequent HTTP message in an ongoing HTTP exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9421"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9421"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
   tenant deployments.

   This document defines the credentials that workloads use to represent
   their identity.  They can be used in various protocols to
   authenticate workloads to each other.  To use these credentials,
   workloads must provide proof of possession of the associated private
   key material, which is covered in other documents.  This document
   focuses on the credentials alone, independent of the proof-of-
   possession mechanism.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9110">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9530">
          <front>
            <title>Digest Fields</title>
            <author fullname="R. Polli" initials="R." surname="Polli"/>
            <author fullname="L. Pardue" initials="L." surname="Pardue"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines HTTP fields that support integrity digests. The Content-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP message content. The Repr-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP representations. Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest can be used to indicate a sender's interest and preferences for receiving the respective Integrity fields.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 3230 and the Digest and Want-Digest HTTP fields.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9530"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9530"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9525">
          <front>
            <title>Service Identity in TLS</title>
            <author fullname="P. Saint-Andre" initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre"/>
            <author fullname="R. Salz" initials="R." surname="Salz"/>
            <date month="November" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Internet Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates. This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6125.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9525"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9525"/>
        </reference>
        <referencegroup anchor="BCP195" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195">
          <reference anchor="RFC8996" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996">
            <front>
              <title>Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1</title>
              <author fullname="K. Moriarty" initials="K." surname="Moriarty"/>
              <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
              <date month="March" year="2021"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>This document formally deprecates Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346). Accordingly, those documents have been moved to Historic status. These versions lack support for current and recommended cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms, and various government and industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding these old TLS versions. TLS version 1.2 became the recommended version for IETF protocols in 2008 (subsequently being obsoleted by TLS version 1.3 in 2018), providing sufficient time to transition away from older versions. Removing support for older versions from implementations reduces the attack surface, reduces opportunity for misconfiguration, and streamlines library and product maintenance.</t>
                <t>This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0 (RFC 4347) but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version 1.1.</t>
                <t>This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS version 1.0 or TLS version 1.1, as described herein. This document also updates the best practices for TLS usage in RFC 7525; hence, it is part of BCP 195.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8996"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8996"/>
          </reference>
          <reference anchor="RFC9325" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325">
            <front>
              <title>Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
              <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
              <author fullname="P. Saint-Andre" initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre"/>
              <author fullname="T. Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati"/>
              <date month="November" year="2022"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) are used to protect data exchanged over a wide range of application protocols and can also form the basis for secure transport protocols. Over the years, the industry has witnessed several serious attacks on TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the most commonly used cipher suites and their modes of operation. This document provides the latest recommendations for ensuring the security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS. These recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases.</t>
                <t>RFC 7525, an earlier version of the TLS recommendations, was published when the industry was transitioning to TLS 1.2. Years later, this transition is largely complete, and TLS 1.3 is widely available. This document updates the guidance given the new environment and obsoletes RFC 7525. In addition, this document updates RFCs 5288 and 6066 in view of recent attacks.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9325"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9325"/>
          </reference>
          <reference anchor="RFC9852" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9852">
            <front>
              <title>New Protocols Using TLS Must Require TLS 1.3</title>
              <author fullname="R. Salz" initials="R." surname="Salz"/>
              <author fullname="N. Aviram" initials="N." surname="Aviram"/>
              <date month="July" year="2026"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>TLS 1.3 is widely used, has had comprehensive security proofs, and improves both security and privacy deficiencies in TLS 1.2. Therefore, new protocols that use TLS must require TLS 1.3. As DTLS 1.3 is not widely available or deployed, this prescription does not pertain to DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to TLS only.</t>
                <t>This document updates RFC 9325. It discusses post-quantum cryptography and the security and privacy improvements in TLS 1.3 as the rationale for the update.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9852"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9852"/>
          </reference>
        </referencegroup>
        <reference anchor="RFC3986">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9457">
          <front>
            <title>Problem Details for HTTP APIs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="E. Wilde" initials="E." surname="Wilde"/>
            <author fullname="S. Dalal" initials="S." surname="Dalal"/>
            <date month="July" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a "problem detail" to carry machine-readable details of errors in HTTP response content to avoid the need to define new error response formats for HTTP APIs.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7807.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9457"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9457"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
              <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="IANA.HTTP.MESSAGE.SIGNATURE" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-message-signature/http-message-signature.xhtml#signature-metadata-parameters">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signature</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-wimse-arch">
          <front>
            <title>Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>University of the Bundeswehr Munich</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="16" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The increasing prevalence of cloud computing and micro service
   architectures has led to the rise of complex software functions being
   built and deployed as workloads, where a workload is defined as
   software executing for a specific purpose, potentially comprising one
   or more running instances.  This document discusses an architecture
   for designing and standardizing protocols and payloads for conveying
   workload identity and security context information.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-arch-09"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls">
          <front>
            <title>Workload Authentication Using Mutual TLS</title>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="24" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-tenant
   deployments.  This document profiles workload authentication based on
   X.509 Workload Identity Certificates using mutual TLS (mTLS).

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-mutual-tls-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Proof Token</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="August" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from basic
   deployments to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-tenant
   systems.  This document specifies the Workload Proof Token (WPT), a
   mechanism for workloads to prove possession of the private key
   associated with a Workload Identity Token (WIT).  The WPT is a signed
   JWT that binds the workload's authentication to a specific HTTP
   request, providing application-layer proof of possession for
   workload-to-workload communication.  This specification is designed
   to work alongside the WIT credential format defined in draft-ietf-
   wimse-workload-creds and can be combined with other WIMSE protocols
   in multi-hop call chains.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens) are designed to maintain and
   propagate user identity, workload identity and authorization context
   throughout the Call Chain within a trusted domain during the
   processing of external requests (e.g. such as API calls) or requests
   initiated internally within the Trust Domain.  Txn-Tokens ensure that
   this context is preserved throughout the Call Chain thereby enhancing
   security and consistency in complex, multi-service architectures.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9864">
          <front>
            <title>Fully-Specified Algorithms for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)</title>
            <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
            <date month="October" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that fully specify the cryptographic operations to be performed, including any curve, key derivation function (KDF), and hash functions, as being "fully specified". It refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that require additional information beyond the algorithm identifier to determine the cryptographic operations to be performed as being "polymorphic". This specification creates fully-specified algorithm identifiers for registered JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) polymorphic algorithm identifiers, enabling applications to use only fully-specified algorithm identifiers. It deprecates those polymorphic algorithm identifiers.</t>
              <t>This specification updates RFCs 7518, 8037, and 9053. It deprecates polymorphic algorithms defined by RFCs 8037 and 9053 and provides fully-specified replacements for them. It adds to the instructions to designated experts in RFCs 7518 and 9053.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9864"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9864"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 645?>

<section anchor="security-goals">
      <name>Security Goals</name>
      <t>This appendix presents semiformal security goals for this protocol, when used in conjunction with the WIT credential.
The intent is to inform developers and to support eventual formal verification of the protocol; the goals are not
normative requirements beyond those stated in the body of this document.</t>
      <section anchor="prerequisites">
        <name>Prerequisites</name>
        <t>The following are out of scope of the protocol and their security is assumed.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>There exists a WIT Issuer which is trusted to issue credentials honestly.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Workloads have a way to authenticate themselves to the Issuer and be provisioned with a valid WIT, associated
with their WIMSE identity.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>All workloads are provisioned with trust anchors that allow them to validate incoming WITs.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The entire authorization subsystem is out of scope and trusted. This can potentially include
provisioning and enforcement of an authorization policy, issuance of transaction tokens
and workload attestation.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>All workload-to-workload traffic is TLS-protected. However TLS may be terminated on one or more middleboxes
and the TLS endpoint identity (or identities) is not associated with a WIMSE identity.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>As a result, all workload-to-workload traffic is confidential and (assuming honest participants) is only available to sender,
receiver, and any TLS-terminating middleboxes that process the traffic.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authentication">
        <name>Authentication</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>A workload receiving a request can validate that it is signed correctly, and can identify the sender.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A workload receiving a response can similarly validate the signature and identify the sender when a signed response is present.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The above implies that a stolen WIT cannot be used by an entity other than its owner.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="integrity">
        <name>Integrity</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Covered components of a request cannot be modified without detection by the recipient. Integrity of
all present HTTP headers specified in this document is protected, as well as
the derived components listed in <xref target="http-sig-auth"/>, the signature parameters
(including <tt>wimse-aud</tt> and <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> on requests and <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> on responses)
as covered by <tt>@signature-params</tt> in <xref target="RFC9421"/>, and
the message content (when present).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Covered components of a signed response cannot be modified without detection by the recipient.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>This profile is designed so that, for typical REST APIs, the essential parts of the message are covered by the signature.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Headers not specified in this document may remain unsigned and could potentially be modified or deleted by intermediaries without detection.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="replay-and-deletion">
        <name>Replay and Deletion</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Replay protection is not strictly mandated because of implementation
considerations (e.g., distributed system challenges with synchronizing replay
caches across validators). Therefore it is not claimed as
a goal, though implementations are encouraged to detect replays where feasible.
We note that since most of the message is signed, replay attacks are only possible in a
context where the request would be accepted as valid, and this mitigates the risk to some extent.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>When a signed response is present, validating <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> mitigates replay of that response to a client other than the one that sent the triggering request.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Undetected deletion of a request/response pair is prevented only when the client required a signed response via <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> with the Boolean value true and rejects an unsigned response. Server local-policy signing alone does not provide that guarantee (<xref target="signing-the-response"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <t><cref>RFC Editor: please remove before publication.</cref></t>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-09">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-09</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Allow a request to carry a server-generated <tt>nonce</tt> from <tt>Accept-Signature</tt> when that value meets the uniqueness and entropy requirements (#369).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarify that CONNECT <tt>@authority</tt> follows RFC 9421 default-port omission (#419).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Introduction: name HTTP in the opening sentence, and explain why application-layer signatures help across TLS hops (#417).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Note that example nonces are illustrative and below the entropy floor (#420).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Point WIT validation and deployment-architecture cross-references at the correct workload-creds sections (#422).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Address Justin Richer's shepherd review (#385).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Exception for CONNECT: cover <tt>@authority</tt> instead of <tt>@path</tt>/<tt>@query</tt> (#368).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specify Simple String Comparison for <tt>wimse-aud</tt> verification (#396).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-07">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-07</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>WGLC: replace <tt>@request-target</tt> with <tt>@path</tt>/<tt>@query</tt>; select the WIMSE signature by <tt>tag</tt> (#297, #301).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>WGLC: tighten signed-response rules (<tt>wimse-sign-response</tt>, <tt>Accept-Signature</tt>, opportunistic local-policy signing, deletion detection) and require <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> on every signed response (#297, #301, #305).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>WGLC: clarify <tt>wimse-aud</tt> (defaults, deployment-specific values) and why <tt>@authority</tt> is not covered; nonce replay caching; algorithms via WIT <tt>cnf.jwk.alg</tt>; middlebox/proxy considerations (#297, #305).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarify parameter types, <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> false vs omitted, integrity goals, and short <tt>expires</tt>; make <tt>wimse-arch</tt> and RFC 9457 normative (#305).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Regenerate examples for the profile changes; add an <tt>ES256</tt> svcB-to-svcC exchange alongside <tt>Ed25519</tt> svcA/svcB (#312, <xref target="RFC9864"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference the WIT validation procedure in <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/> (#290); consistent "proof of possession"/"PoP" wording.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-06">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-06</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Add <tt>wimse-sign-response</tt> request signature parameter so clients can mandate a signed response; regenerate examples (#277).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-05">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-05</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Regenerate non-normative request/response examples so the signed response includes <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> matching the request <tt>nonce</tt> (#274).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-04">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-04</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>On signed responses, require <tt>wimse-req-nonce</tt> (request binding); register with IANA. Non-normative response example not updated accordingly; the <tt>Signature</tt> value was not regenerated (see issue tracker).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-03">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-03</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Replace <tt>Wimse-Audience</tt> HTTP header with the <tt>wimse-aud</tt> signature metadata parameter (<xref target="RFC9421"/>); register with IANA (HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters). Non-normative request example updated accordingly; the <tt>Signature</tt> value was not regenerated (see issue tracker).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-02">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-02</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Add new <tt>Wimse-Audience</tt> HTTP header (superseded by <tt>wimse-aud</tt> in -03).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-01">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-01</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Clarified response signing.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarified signature vs. token lifetime.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Added security goals.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Added an Implementation Status section.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-00">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-00</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Initial version, extracted from the -07 draft with minimal edits.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Rework the WPT's <tt>oth</tt> claim.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Update the media types.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Discuss extensibility of WIT and WPT.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarify error handling, specifically why not HTTP 401.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Correct the code examples.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Add registration request content for a <tt>wimse</tt> URI scheme.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>New section on key management.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Use of the <tt>Accept-Signature</tt> header.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-06">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-06</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Explicit definition of the Workload Identity Certificate.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Definition of the validation of workload identifiers as part of workload authentication. Still work in progress.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-05">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-05</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Removed the entire Workload Identity section which is now covered in the Architecture document.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Content-Digest is mandatory with HTTP-Sig.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Some wording on extending the protocol beyond HTTP.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>IANA considerations.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-04">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-04</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Require <tt>cnf.jwk.alg</tt> in WIT which restricts signature algorithm of WPT or HTTP-Sig.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Replay protection as a <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> for both WPT and HTTP-Sig.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Consolidate terminology with the Architecture draft.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-03">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-03</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Consistently use "workload".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Implement comments from the SPIFFE community.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Make <tt>iss</tt> claim in WIT optional and add wording about its relation to key distribution.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Remove <tt>iss</tt> claim from WPT.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Make <tt>jti</tt> claim in WIT optional.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Error handling for the application-level methods.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-02">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-02</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Coexistence with bearer tokens.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Improve the architecture diagram.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Some more ABNF.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarified identifiers and URIs.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Moved an author to acknowledgments.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-01">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-01</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Addressed multiple comments from Pieter.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarified WIMSE identity concepts, specifically "trust domain"
and "workload identifier".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Much more detail around mTLS, including some normative language.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>WIT (the identity token) is now included in the WPT proof of possession.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Added a section comparing the DPoP-inspired app-level security option to
the Message Signature-based alternative.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-00">
        <name>draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-00</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Initial WG draft, an exact copy of draft-sheffer-wimse-s2s-protocol-00</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Added this document history section</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="app-layer-comparison">
      <name>Comparing the DPoP Inspired Option with Message Signatures</name>
      <t>The two workload protection options have different strengths and weaknesses regarding implementation
complexity, extensibility, and security.
Here is a summary of the main differences between
<xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt"/> and <xref target="http-sig-auth"/>.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The DPoP-inspired solution is less HTTP-specific, making it easier to adapt for
other protocols beyond HTTP. This flexibility is particularly valuable for
asynchronous communication scenarios, such as event-driven systems.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Message Signatures, on the other hand, benefit from an existing HTTP-specific RFC with
some established implementations. This existing groundwork means that this option could
be simpler to deploy, to the extent such implementations are available and easily integrated.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Given that the WIT (Workload Identity Token) is a type of JWT, the
DPoP-inspired approach that also uses JWT is less complex and technology-intensive than Message
Signatures. In contrast, Message Signatures introduce an additional layer of
technology, potentially increasing the complexity of the overall system.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Message Signatures offer superior integrity protection, particularly by mitigating
message modification by middleboxes. See also <xref target="middleboxes"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A key advantage of Message Signatures is that they support response signing.
This opens up the possibility for future decisions about whether to make
response signing mandatory, allowing for flexibility in the specification
and/or in specific deployment scenarios.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>In general, Message Signatures provide greater flexibility compared to
the DPoP-inspired approach. Future versions of this specification (and subsequent implementations) can decide
whether specific aspects of message signing, such as coverage of particular fields,
should be mandatory or optional. Covering more fields will constrain the proof
so it cannot be easily reused in another context, which is often a security improvement. The DPoP inspired approach could
be designed to include extensibility to sign other fields, but this would make it closer to
trying to reinvent Message Signatures.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The authors would like to thank Pieter Kasselman for his detailed comments,
Flemming Andreasen, Kieran Sweeney and Anton Sokolov for their WGLC reviews,
Justin Richer for his document shepherd review,
as well as Jason Costello, Maartje Eyskens, Radosław Piliszek and kanywst for implementing this draft and sharing their learnings.</t>
      <t>We thank Daniel Feldman for his contributions to earlier versions of this document. We also thank Arndt Schwenkschuster and Brian Campbell who coauthored
the grand unified WIMSE Workload to Workload protocol draft.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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